

A Temporal Epistemic Logic with a Reset Operation^{*}

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ABSTRACT

We present an axiomatisation for an extension of a temporal epistemic logic with an epistemic “reset” operator defined on the intersection between epistemic and temporal relations. Additionally we show the logic has the finite model property, hence it is decidable.

Categories and Subject Descriptors

F.4.1 [Mathematical Logic and Formal Languages]:
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General Terms

Theory

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Epistemic logic, axiomatisation, decidability

1. INTRODUCTION

Modal logics provide a formal framework to specify and reason about computations in distributed and multi-agent systems. In particular, interpreted systems [6] provide a formal Kripke-style semantics to reason about different states of knowledge of the agents. On this semantics, different concepts of knowledge have been explored, from implicit [11] to distributed, common, deductive, algorithmic knowledge, etc. All these logics are normally seen as formal specification languages for representing agents' knowledge.

A number of works have recently appeared in the literature relating to model checking techniques [4] for verifying automatically that a multi-agent system satisfies a particular temporal epistemic specification [13, 19, 9, 20]. While model checking presents some documented advantages over theorem proving, the core difficulty of the approach is the “state explosion problem”, i.e. the fact the model representing the system grows very quickly to a size which is difficult to manage even when encoded symbolically.

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Bounded model checking [2] and other SAT-based approaches attempt to ease this problem by performing aggressive depth-first search on appropriate restricted submodels. This technique has been shown to be quite effective in temporal-epistemic logic as well [19, 21], but a key problem is that an epistemic modality defined on equality of local states (as in interpreted systems) forces to consider states reachable from *any* possible branch from the initial state, thereby limiting the advantages of the techniques. It is sometimes useful though, to reason about epistemic properties of agents that result from a “reset” operation, i.e., to reason about the knowledge regarding the future from the current time, *as if* a pruning of the model was performed at that instant and only the submodel *generated* by that point (as initial state) were to be considered. This happens, for instance, when different instances of the same property are checked a number of times over the same run, such as safe receipt of a stream of bits.

In this paper we introduce an epistemic modality R_i (for “reset”) that intrinsically incorporates the concept of resetting the model at the point where the modality is considered. This is equivalent to assuming that the agents are able to distinguish (i.e., to remove from their epistemically indistinguishable set of accessible states) the current state from states in the past and from states belonging to a different computational branch from the one that terminated in the state under evaluation. Alternatively, one can see this modality as expressing standard implicit knowledge but under the assumption the system enjoys a particular form of perfect recall [18], so that the agent would be able to recognise states with the same prefix. Representing perfect recall or even weaker variants of it is particularly costly in terms of model checking as the size of local states grows rapidly with time. The alternative that this operator suggests is to use a standard semantics but evaluate the R_i on the intersection of the epistemic relation for agent i with the reflexive transitive closure of the temporal relation.

Although our research is *inspired* by efficient implementations of model checking algorithms for epistemic temporal logic, in this paper we focus on the metalogical properties of the resulting logic and leave for the future the coding of specialised verification algorithms and data structures. Specifically, in Section 2 we present syntax and semantics. In Section 3 we exemplify the formalism to the bit transmission problem. Section 4 is devoted to the construction of the underlying machinery to prove the main results of the paper. Sections 5 and 6 present this main results, namely a decidability theorem and a completeness proof for the logic;

these follow the schema of the completeness and decidability proof in [10] which we extend to deal with the logic presented here. Section 7 contains conclusions and final remarks.

2. SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS

Here we give a syntax and semantics of a temporal epistemic logic \mathcal{L} with an operator that is defined in terms of the intersection of the transitive reflexive closure of a serial temporal relation and the standard epistemic relation (which is an equivalence relation); the temporal part of \mathcal{L} corresponds to the well-known CTL [3], and the epistemic part is the logic $S5_n$ [6].

Syntax. Let \mathcal{PV} be a set of propositional variables containing the symbol \top , which stands for the logical constant TRUE, Ag a finite set of agents, $p \in \mathcal{PV}$ and $i \in Ag$. The language \mathcal{L} is defined by the following grammar:

$$\varphi := p \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi \wedge \varphi \mid EX\varphi \mid E(\varphi U\varphi) \mid A(\varphi U\varphi) \mid K_i\varphi \mid R_i\varphi$$

In the above, the operators E and A denote path quantifiers with the following meaning “for some computation path” and “for all the computation paths”, respectively; the operators X and U are the path operators read as “at the next step” and “until”, respectively; the operator R_i is read as “following a reset operation agent i knows”, and K_i represents the standard epistemic modality, read as “agent i knows”. The remaining Boolean and temporal operators can be defined in a usual way.

Let φ and ψ be \mathcal{L} formulae. We say that ψ is a *subformula* of φ and write $\psi \in Sub(\varphi)$ if either (a) $\psi = \varphi$; or (b) φ is of the form $\neg\alpha$, $EX\alpha$, $K_i\alpha$, or $R_i\alpha$, and ψ is a subformula of α ; or (c) φ is of the form $\alpha \wedge \beta$, $E(\alpha U\beta)$, or $A(\alpha U\beta)$ and ψ is a subformula of either α or β . Further, we define the *length* of a formula φ to be the number of symbols (parentheses, propositional variables and connectives, modal operators) of which it consists.

Semantics. Traditionally, the semantics of temporal epistemic logics is given on interpreted systems, defined as follows [6].

DEFINITION 1 (INTERPRETED SYSTEM). *Given a set of agents $Ag = \{1, \dots, n\}$, consider:*

- L_1, \dots, L_n to be the countable sets of local states for the agents and L_e a set of local states for the environment; Any element in $S \subseteq L_1 \times \dots \times L_e$ is called a global state.
- $P_1 : L_1 \rightarrow 2^{Act_1}, \dots, P_n : L_n \rightarrow 2^{Act_n}$ a set of protocols for the agents and $P_e : L_e \rightarrow 2^{Act_e}$ a protocol for the environment where Act_i (respectively, Act_e) is a set of actions for agent i (respectively, the environment);
- $\tau : S \times Act_1 \times \dots \times Act_n \times Act_e \rightarrow S$ a transition function for the system;
- $\mathcal{V} : S \rightarrow 2^{\mathcal{PV}}$ is an interpretation for the atoms in \mathcal{PV} .

The tuple $IS = (S, \tau, \mathcal{V})$ is called an interpreted system. IS is the class of all interpreted systems; we refer to [6] for more details on the above.

We interpret the language \mathcal{L} on models below.

DEFINITION 2 (MODEL). *Given a set of agents Ag , a model is a tuple $M = (S, T, \{\sim_i\}_{i \in Ag}, \mathcal{V}, \{\sqcap_i\}_{i \in Ag})$, such that S is a countable set of states; $T \subseteq S \times S$ is a serial relation on S ; for each agent $i \in Ag$, $\sim_i \subseteq S \times S$ is an equivalence relation; $\mathcal{V} : S \rightarrow 2^{\mathcal{PV}}$ is a valuation function that*

assigns to each state a set of proposition variables that are assumed to be true at that state; and $\sqcap_i = \sim_i \cap T^$ for each $i \in Ag$, where T^* denotes the reflexive and transitive closure of T . We call $F = (S, T, \{\sim_i\}_{i \in Ag}, \{\sqcap_i\}_{i \in Ag})$ a frame.*

A *path* in M is an infinite sequence $\pi = (s_0, s_1, \dots)$ of states such that $(s_i, s_{i+1}) \in T$ for each $i \in \{0, 1, \dots\}$. For a path $\pi = (s_0, s_1, \dots)$, we take $\pi(i) = s_i$. By $\Pi(s)$ we denote the set of all the paths starting at $s \in S$.

DEFINITION 3 (SATISFACTION). *Let M be a model, s a state, and $\alpha, \beta \in \mathcal{L}$. The satisfaction relation \models , indicating truth of a formula in model M at state s , is defined inductively as follows:*

$$\begin{aligned} (M, s) \models p & \text{ iff } p \in \mathcal{V}(s), \\ (M, s) \models \neg\alpha & \text{ iff } (M, s) \not\models \alpha, \\ (M, s) \models \alpha \wedge \beta & \text{ iff } (M, s) \models \alpha \text{ and } (M, s) \models \beta, \\ (M, s) \models EX\alpha & \text{ iff } (\exists \pi \in \Pi(s))(M, \pi(1)) \models \alpha, \\ (M, s) \models E(\alpha U\beta) & \text{ iff } (\exists \pi \in \Pi(s))(\exists m \geq 0)[(M, \pi(m)) \models \beta \\ & \text{ and } (\forall 0 \leq j < m)(M, \pi(j)) \models \alpha], \\ (M, s) \models A(\alpha U\beta) & \text{ iff } (\forall \pi \in \Pi(s))(\exists m \geq 0)[(M, \pi(m)) \models \beta \\ & \text{ and } (\forall 0 \leq j < m)(M, \pi(j)) \models \alpha], \\ (M, s) \models K_i\alpha & \text{ iff } (\forall s' \in S) (s \sim_i s' \text{ implies } (M, s') \models \alpha), \\ (M, s) \models R_i\alpha & \text{ iff } (\forall s' \in S) (s \sqcap_i s' \text{ implies } (M, s') \models \alpha). \end{aligned}$$

Satisfaction for the Boolean and temporal operators as well as the epistemic modality K_i is standard. The formula $R_i\alpha$ holds at state s in a model M if α holds in all the states that are reachable from s via temporal relation T and they are in the i -th epistemic relation with s . In other words, $(M, s) \models R_i\alpha$ means that in the state s agent i knows α under assumption that he does not consider as possible states that do not belong to the future of s .

We also say that φ is *valid* in M (written $M \models \varphi$), if $M, s \models \varphi$ for all states $s \in S$, and that φ is *satisfiable* in M , if $M, s \models \varphi$ for some state $s \in S$. Further, we say that φ is *valid* (written $\models \varphi$), if φ is valid in all the models M , and that φ is *satisfiable* if it is satisfiable in some model M . In the latter case M is said to be a model for φ .

The models as defined here can also be used to interpret formulae on interpreted systems (Definition 1) directly. To do so we need to associate a model to every interpreted system.

DEFINITION 4 (GENERATED MODELS). *Given an interpreted system $IS = (S, \tau, \mathcal{V})$ a model M_{IS} for IS is a tuple $M = (S, T, \{\sim_i\}_{i \in Ag}, \mathcal{V}, \{\sqcap_i\}_{i \in Ag})$ such that S is the set of global states; T is defined by sTs' iff there exist actions $act_1 \in ACT_1, \dots, act_n \in ACT_n, act_e \in ACT_e$ such that $\tau(s, act_1, \dots, act_n, act_e) = s'$; for any $i \in Ag$ $s \sim_i s'$ iff $l_i(s) = l_i(s')$, where $l_i : S \rightarrow L_i$ is the function returning the local state of agent i given a global state s ; \mathcal{V} is an interpretation for the proposition variables; for any $i \in Ag$ $\sqcap_i = \sim_i \cap T^*$.*

We say that a formula ϕ is true (respectively, valid) on an interpreted system IS if ϕ is true (respectively, valid) on the generated model.

DEFINITION 5. *A formula ϕ is valid on the class of interpreted systems \mathcal{IS} if ϕ is valid on any model generated from any $IS \in \mathcal{IS}$.*

It is of note that we can show the following which will be useful for the completeness proof.

LEMMA 1. For any model M there exists an interpreted system IS such that, the generated model of IS is isomorphic to M .

Proof. The proof follows the same construction given in [15, 16].

3. THE BIT TRANSMISSION PROBLEM

In this section we present an example regarding the use of the operator R_i defined in this paper. In particular we analyse a variant of the bit transmission problem (BTP), a well-known example in reasoning about knowledge [6].

Imagine we have two processes, a *sender* \mathfrak{S} and a *receiver* \mathfrak{R} , which communicate over a possibly faulty communication line. \mathfrak{S} wants to send a finite stream of bits to \mathfrak{R} . They follow this protocol: \mathfrak{S} immediately starts sending the bit to \mathfrak{R} , and continues to do so until it receives an acknowledgement from \mathfrak{R} . \mathfrak{R} does nothing until it receives the bit; from then on it sends acknowledgements of receipt to \mathfrak{S} . When \mathfrak{S} receives an acknowledgement, it stops sending the “old” bit to \mathfrak{R} , and performs a reset operation, thereby giving a sign to \mathfrak{R} that a new bit will be sent¹. Then, \mathfrak{S} starts sending the new bit and the cycle repeats. We apply the \mathcal{L} formalism to model and reason about the above scenario.

Let us begin by building a model $M = (S, T, \sim_{\mathfrak{S}}, \sim_{\mathfrak{R}}, \mathcal{V}, \sqcap_{\mathfrak{S}}, \sqcap_{\mathfrak{R}})$ for the BTP. There are three active components in the scenario: agents \mathfrak{S} and \mathfrak{R} , and a communication channel represented by an environment \mathfrak{E} . Each of these can be modelled by considering their respective local states. For \mathfrak{S} , it is enough to consider five possible local states. They represent the value of the bit that \mathfrak{S} is attempting to transmit, and whether or not \mathfrak{S} has received an acknowledgement or an end signal from \mathfrak{R} . We thus have: $L_{\mathfrak{S}} = \{0, 1, 0\text{-ack}, 1\text{-ack}, \text{end}\}$. Let $n > 0$ be the maximal length of the stream of bits to be sent. We consider $L_{\mathfrak{R}} = \{x^j y \mid x \in \{0\text{-ack}, 1\text{-ack}\}, y \in \{0, 1\}, 0 < j \leq n\} \cup \{x^j \mid x \in \{0\text{-ack}, 1\text{-ack}\}, 0 < j \leq n\} \cup \{\epsilon\}$. \mathfrak{R} 's local state is ϵ if \mathfrak{R} has received no bits from \mathfrak{S} . \mathfrak{R} 's local state is 0 (respectively 1) if the received bit is 0 (respectively 1). \mathfrak{R} 's local state is $k_1\text{-ack} \dots k_j\text{-ack}$ (respectively $k_1\text{-ack} \dots k_j\text{-ack} k$) for $k_1, \dots, k_j, k \in \{0, 1\}$ and $j \leq n$, if the stream of bits he received is $k_1 \dots k_j$ (respectively $k_1 \dots k_j k$) and \mathfrak{S} has performed j reset actions. For \mathfrak{E} it is enough to consider a singleton: $L_{\mathfrak{E}} = \{\cdot\}$.

The following sets of actions are available to the agents: $Act_{\mathfrak{S}} = \{\text{sendbit}, \text{reset}, \lambda\}$; $Act_{\mathfrak{R}} = \{\text{sendack}, \text{sendend}, \lambda\}$, where λ stands for no action. The actions $Act_{\mathfrak{E}}$ for the environment correspond to the transmission of messages between \mathfrak{S} and \mathfrak{R} on the unreliable communication channel. We will assume that the communication channel can transmit messages in both directions simultaneously and independently. The set of actions for \mathfrak{E} is $Act_{\mathfrak{E}} = \{\leftrightarrow, \rightarrow, \leftarrow, -\}$, where \leftrightarrow represents the action in which the channel transmits any message successfully in both directions, \rightarrow that it transmits successfully from \mathfrak{S} to \mathfrak{R} but loses any message from \mathfrak{R} to \mathfrak{S} , \leftarrow that it transmits successfully from \mathfrak{R} to \mathfrak{S} but loses any message from \mathfrak{S} to \mathfrak{R} , and $-$ that it loses any messages sent in either direction.

The protocols the agents are running are defined as follows: $P_{\mathfrak{S}}(0) = P_{\mathfrak{S}}(1) = \{\text{sendbit}\}$, $P_{\mathfrak{S}}(0\text{-ack}) = P_{\mathfrak{S}}(1\text{-ack})$

¹For simplicity we assume that resets are communicated with no faults; an acknowledgement-based protocol could be introduced for resets without violating the properties we show below.

$= \{\text{reset}\}$, $P_{\mathfrak{S}}(\text{end}) = \{\lambda\}$, $P_{\mathfrak{R}}(\epsilon) = P_{\mathfrak{R}}(k_1\text{-ack} \dots k_j\text{-ack}) = \{\lambda\}$, $P_{\mathfrak{R}}(k_1\text{-ack} \dots k_{j-1}\text{-ack} k_j) = \{\text{sendack}\}$, $P_{\mathfrak{R}}(k_1\text{-ack} \dots k_{n-1}\text{-ack} k_n) = \{\text{sendend}\}$, $P_{\mathfrak{E}}(\cdot) = \{\leftrightarrow, \rightarrow, \leftarrow, -\}$, where $k_1, \dots, k_j, k_n \in \{0, 1\}$ and $j < n$.

The evolution of the BTP is defined by means of an evolution function $t : (L_{\mathfrak{S}} \times L_{\mathfrak{R}} \times L_{\mathfrak{E}}) \times Act \rightarrow 2^{L_{\mathfrak{S}} \times L_{\mathfrak{R}} \times L_{\mathfrak{E}}}$, where Act is a subset of $Act_{\mathfrak{S}} \times Act_{\mathfrak{R}} \times Act_{\mathfrak{E}}$. It is straightforward to infer a definition of this function from the informal description of the scenario we considered above together with the local states and protocols defined above; the function t not only determines the set of reachable global states $S \subseteq L_{\mathfrak{S}} \times L_{\mathfrak{R}} \times L_{\mathfrak{E}}$, but it also gives us the transition relation T . Namely, for all states $s, s' \in S$, $(s, s') \in T$ iff there exists $act \in Act$ such that $t(s, act) = s'$.

To complete the description of M for BTP, we introduce the set of propositional variables: $\mathcal{PV} = \{\mathbf{ack}\} \cup \{\mathbf{jBit} = 0, \mathbf{jBit} = 1, \mathbf{reset}_j \mid 0 < j \leq n\}$, and we define the valuation function $\mathcal{V} : S \rightarrow 2^{\mathcal{PV}}$ as:

- $\mathbf{ack} \in \mathcal{V}(s)$ if $l_{\mathfrak{S}}(s) = 0\text{-ack}$ or $l_{\mathfrak{S}}(s) = 1\text{-ack}$,
- $\mathbf{jBit} = 0 \in \mathcal{V}(s)$ if $l_{\mathfrak{R}}(s) = (k_1 \dots k_j \dots k_k)$ and $(k_j = 0$ or $k_j = 0\text{-ack})$ for $0 < j \leq k \leq n$,
- $\mathbf{jBit} = 1 \in \mathcal{V}(s)$ if $l_{\mathfrak{R}}(s) = (k_1 \dots k_j \dots k_k)$ and $(k_j = 1$ or $k_j = 1\text{-ack})$ for $0 < j \leq k \leq n$,
- $\mathbf{reset}_j \in \mathcal{V}(s)$ if $l_{\mathfrak{R}}(s) = (k_1 \dots k_j \dots k_k)$ and $k_k \notin \{0, 1\}$ for $0 < j \leq k \leq n$.

Let us consider the following property (\star): “whenever a fresh bit has been sent, \mathfrak{S} knows that whenever he receives an acknowledgement, \mathfrak{R} knows the value of that bit”. One can try to express this property with the following CTLK formula, for $0 < j \leq n$:

$$\text{AG}[\mathbf{reset}_j \Rightarrow \text{AGK}_{\mathfrak{S}}(\mathbf{ack} \Rightarrow (\text{K}_{\mathfrak{R}}(\mathbf{jBit} = 0) \vee \text{K}_{\mathfrak{R}}(\mathbf{jBit} = 1)))]$$

But one can check that the above formula is not valid in M . The problem is that a bit received before a reset may account for the receiver’s knowledge about the current bit. What we need to do is to express explicitly that past states should not be considered in \mathfrak{S} ’s accessible states, following the reset operation. The epistemic modality R_i enables us not to include past states, and can be used to capture this intuition. Indeed, property (\star) can be formalised by the following \mathcal{L} formula:

$$\text{AG}[\mathbf{reset}_j \Rightarrow \text{AGR}_{\mathfrak{S}}(\mathbf{ack} \Rightarrow (\text{K}_{\mathfrak{R}}(\mathbf{jBit} = 0) \vee \text{K}_{\mathfrak{R}}(\mathbf{jBit} = 1)))]$$

It can be checked manually that this formula is valid in M .

4. FINITE MODEL PROPERTY

We now focus on proving that the language \mathcal{L} has the *finite model property* (FMP); recall a logic has the FMP if any satisfiable formula is also satisfiable in a finite model. To prove this normally a quotient (or “filtration”) is constructed, and then it is shown that the resulting finite structure is still a model for the formula in question. This technique, for example, has been used in [8, 17] to prove that PDL and a temporal deontic logic have FMP, respectively.

For some logics (in particular for \mathcal{L}) the quotient construction yields a quotient structure that is not a model; however, it still contains enough information to be unwound into a genuine model. In this specific case; to prove FMP for \mathcal{L} , we follow [5], where a combination of the filtration and unwinding technique has been applied to prove the FMP for CTL. We begin with providing definitions of two auxiliary structures: a *Hintikka structure* for a given \mathcal{L} formula,

and the *quotient structure* for a given model. We follow the constructions and the scheme of the proofs presented in [10].

DEFINITION 6 (HINTIKKA STRUCTURE). *Let $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}$, and Ag be a set of agents. A Hintikka structure for φ is a tuple $H = (S, T, \{\sim_i\}_{i \in Ag}, \mathbb{L}, \{\Pi_i\}_{i \in Ag})$ such that S is a set of states, T is a serial binary relations on S , \sim_i and Π_i are binary relations on S , and $\mathbb{L} : S \rightarrow 2^{\mathcal{L}}$ is a labelling function assigning a set of formulae to each state such that $\varphi \in \mathbb{L}(s)$ for some $s \in S$. Moreover, \mathbb{L} satisfies the following conditions:*

- H.1. *if $\neg\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(s)$, then $\alpha \notin \mathbb{L}(s)$*
- H.2. *if $\neg\neg\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(s)$, then $\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(s)$*
- H.3. *if $(\alpha \wedge \beta) \in \mathbb{L}(s)$, then $\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(s)$ and $\beta \in \mathbb{L}(s)$*
- H.4. *if $\neg(\alpha \wedge \beta) \in \mathbb{L}(s)$, then $\neg\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(s)$ or $\neg\beta \in \mathbb{L}(s)$*
- H.5. *if $E(\alpha U \beta) \in \mathbb{L}(s)$, then $\beta \in \mathbb{L}(s)$ or $\alpha \wedge EXE(\alpha U \beta) \in \mathbb{L}(s)$*
- H.6. *if $\neg E(\alpha U \beta) \in \mathbb{L}(s)$, then $\neg\beta \wedge \neg\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(s)$ or $\neg\beta \wedge \neg EXE(\alpha U \beta) \in \mathbb{L}(s)$*
- H.7. *if $A(\alpha U \beta) \in \mathbb{L}(s)$, then $\beta \in \mathbb{L}(s)$ or $\alpha \wedge \neg EX(\neg A(\alpha U \beta)) \in \mathbb{L}(s)$*
- H.8. *if $\neg A(\alpha U \beta) \in \mathbb{L}(s)$, then $\neg\beta \wedge \neg\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(s)$ or $\neg\beta \wedge EX(\neg A(\alpha U \beta)) \in \mathbb{L}(s)$*
- H.9. *if $EX\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(s)$, then $(\exists t \in S)((s, t) \in T$ and $\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(t))$*
- H.10. *if $\neg EX\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(s)$, then $(\forall t \in S)((s, t) \in T$ implies $\neg\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(t))$*
- H.11. *if $E(\alpha U \beta) \in \mathbb{L}(s)$, then $(\exists \pi \in \Pi(s))(\exists n \geq 0)(\beta \in \mathbb{L}(\pi(n))$ and $(\forall j < n)\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(\pi(j)))$*
- H.12. *if $A(\alpha U \beta) \in \mathbb{L}(s)$, then $(\forall \pi \in \Pi(s))(\exists n \geq 0)(\beta \in \mathbb{L}(\pi(n))$ and $(\forall j < n)\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(\pi(j)))$*
- H.13. *if $K_i\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(s)$ and $s \sim_i t$, then $\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(t)$*
- H.14. *if $\neg K_i\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(s)$, then $(\exists t \in S)(s \sim_i t$ and $\neg\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(t))$*
- H.15. *if $K_i\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(s)$, then $\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(s)$*
- H.16. *if $s \sim_i t$ then $K_i\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(s)$ iff $K_i\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(t)$*
- H.17. *if $s \sim_i t$ and $s \sim_i u$ and $K_i\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(t)$, then both $\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(u)$ and $K_i\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(u)$*
- H.18. *if $R_i\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(s)$ and $(s \sqcap_i t)$, then $\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(t)$*
- H.19. *if $\neg R_i\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(s)$, then $(\exists t \in S)(s \sqcap_i t$ and $\neg\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(t))$*
- H.20. *if $R_i\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(s)$, then $\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(s)$*
- H.21. *if $R_i\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(s)$ and $(s \sqcap_i t)$, then $R_i\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(t)$*
- H.22. *if $K_i\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(s)$, then $R_i\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(s)$*
- H.23. *if $AG\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(s)$, then $R_i\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(s)$*

Note that, intuitively, rule H16 corresponds to transitivity and symmetry for the relations associated with the epistemic modality, while rules H14, H15, and H17 correspond, respectively, to seriality, reflexivity and Euclideaness. Rules H19, H20 and H21 correspond, respectively, to seriality, reflexivity, and transitivity for the relation of the “reset” operator. A consequence of such a definition of the Hintikka structure is the following:

LEMMA 2 (HINTIKKA’S LEMMA FOR \mathcal{L}). *$\varphi \in \mathcal{L}$ is satisfiable (i.e., φ has a model) if and only if there is a Hintikka structure for φ .*

Proof. It is easy to check that if $M = (S, T, \{\sim_i\}_{i \in Ag}, \mathcal{V}, \{\Pi_i\}_{i \in Ag})$ is a model for φ then the tuple $H = (S, T, \{\sim_i\}_{i \in Ag}, \mathbb{L}, \{\Pi_i\}_{i \in Ag})$ with \mathbb{L} defined by $\alpha \in \mathbb{L}(s)$ if $(M, s) \models \alpha$, for all $s \in S$, is a Hintikka structure for φ .

Conversely, suppose that $H = (S, T, \{\sim_i\}_{i \in Ag}, \mathbb{L}, \{\Pi_i\}_{i \in Ag})$ is a Hintikka structure for φ . Let $M = (S, T, \{\sim'_i\}_{i \in Ag}, \mathcal{V}, \{\Pi'_i\}_{i \in Ag})$, where each \sim'_i is the reflexive, symmetric and transitive closure of \sim_i ; each Π'_i is reflexive, serial, and transitive closure of Π_i ; $\mathcal{V} : S \rightarrow 2^{\mathcal{P}\mathcal{V}}$ is defined by $\mathcal{V}(s) = \{p \mid p \in \mathbb{L}(s)\}$. We now show by induction on the structure of formulae that if $\psi \in Sub(\varphi)$, then $\psi \in \mathbb{L}(s)$ implies $M, s \models \psi$ and $\neg\psi \in \mathbb{L}(s)$ implies $M, s \models \neg\psi$.

1. The propositional case as well as all the temporal ones can be shown in similar way to [10].
2. ψ is of the form $K_i\beta$. Suppose that $K_i\beta \in \mathbb{L}(s)$. We have to show that $(M, s) \models K_i\beta$. It suffices to show that $(M, t) \models \beta$ for all states t such that $s \sim'_i t$. But since \sim'_i is the reflexive, symmetric and transitive closure of \sim_i , if $s \sim'_i t$ then there exist $n \geq 0$ and a sequence s_0, \dots, s_n of states such that $s = s_0$, $t = s_n$ and either $s_j \sim_i s_{j+1}$ or $s_{j+1} \sim_i s_j$ for all $j \in \{0, \dots, n-1\}$. Thus, since $K_i\beta \in \mathbb{L}(s)$ and $s = s_0$, we have that $K_i\beta \in \mathbb{L}(s_0)$. Now, since either $s_0 \sim_i s_1$ or $s_1 \sim_i s_0$ by rule H16, we have that $K_i\beta \in \mathbb{L}(s_1)$. So, by the simple induction on $j = 0, \dots, n-1$ and rule H16, we have that $K_i\beta \in \mathbb{L}(s_n)$. Since $s_n = t$, we have that $K_i\beta \in \mathbb{L}(t)$. Thus by rule H15 we have that $\beta \in \mathbb{L}(t)$. So, by induction we have that $(M, t) \models \beta$. Since the above holds for an arbitrary t such that $s \sim'_i t$ we can conclude that $(M, s) \models K_i\beta$. Now, suppose that $\neg K_i\beta \in \mathbb{L}(s)$. By rule H14, there exists a state t such that $s \sim_i t$ and $\neg\beta \in \mathbb{L}(t)$. Since $\sim_i \subseteq \sim'_i$, and given that by induction we have that $(M, t) \models \neg\beta$, we must have $(M, s) \models \neg K_i\beta$.
3. ψ is of the form $R_i\beta$. This can be shown similarly to the case above by using H19 – H21.

Now we proceed to define the quotient structure for a given model M . The quotient construction depends on an equivalence relation on states of M of a finite index, therefore we first have to provide such a relation. We define it with respect to the *Fischer-Ladner closure* of a formula $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}$ (denoted by $FL(\varphi)$) that is defined by: $FL(\varphi) = CL(\varphi) \cup \{\neg\alpha \mid \alpha \in CL(\varphi)\}$, where $CL(\varphi)$ is the smallest set of formulae that contains φ and satisfies the following conditions: (a) if $\neg\alpha$ or $EX\alpha$ or $K_i\alpha$ or $R_i\alpha \in CL(\varphi)$, then $\alpha \in CL(\varphi)$; (b) if $\alpha \wedge \beta \in CL(\varphi)$, then $\alpha, \beta \in CL(\varphi)$; (c) if $E(\alpha U \beta) \in CL(\varphi)$, then $\alpha, \beta, EXE(\alpha U \beta) \in CL(\varphi)$; (d) if $A(\alpha U \beta) \in CL(\varphi)$, then $\alpha, \beta, \neg EX(\neg A(\alpha U \beta)) \in CL(\varphi)$.

Denote the size of a set A by $Card(A)$. Then, note that for a given formula $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}$, $FL(\varphi)$ is a finite set of formulae. In particular, it can be shown by induction on the length of φ that $Card(FL(\varphi)) \leq 2 \cdot |\varphi|$.

DEFINITION 7 (QUOTIENT STRUCTURE). *Let $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}$, $M = (S, T, \{\sim_i\}_{i \in Ag}, \mathcal{V}, \{\Pi_i\}_{i \in Ag})$ be a model for φ , and $\leftrightarrow_{FL(\varphi)}$ a binary relation on S defined by $s \leftrightarrow_{FL(\varphi)} s'$ if $(\forall \alpha \in FL(\varphi))((M, s) \models \alpha$ iff $(M, s') \models \alpha)$. Moreover, let $[s] = \{w \in S \mid w \leftrightarrow_{FL(\varphi)} s\}$. The quotient structure of M by $\leftrightarrow_{FL(\varphi)}$ is defined as $M_{\leftrightarrow_{FL(\varphi)}} = (S', T', \{\sim'_i\}_{i \in Ag}, \mathbb{L}', \{\Pi'_i\}_{i \in Ag})$, where $S' = \{[s] \mid s \in S\}$, $T' = \{([s], [s']) \in S' \times S' \mid (\exists w \in [s])(\exists w' \in [s']) s.t. (w, w') \in T\}$, \sim'_i is a transitive closure of $\{([s], [s']) \in S' \times S' \mid (\exists w \in [s])(\exists w' \in [s']) s.t. (w, w') \in \sim_i\}$, $\mathbb{L}' : S' \rightarrow 2^{FL(\varphi)}$ is defined by: $\mathbb{L}'([s]) = \{\alpha \in FL(\varphi) \mid$*

$(M, s) \models \alpha$, and Γ'_i is a transitive closure of $\{([s], [s']) \in S' \times S' \mid (\exists w \in [s])(\exists w' \in [s']) \text{ s.t. } (w, w') \in \Pi_i\}$.

Note that the set S' is finite as it is the result of collapsing states satisfying formulae that belong to the finite set $FL(\varphi)$. In fact we have $Card(S') \leq 2^{Card(FL(\varphi))}$. Note also that the relation T' is serial, \sim'_i is reflexive, symmetric and transitive (i.e., it is an equivalence relation), Γ'_i is serial, reflexive, and transitive. Further, since \mathcal{L} is an extension of CTL, the resulting quotient structure may not be a model. In particular, similarly to Theorem 3.6 [5], the following lemma holds:

LEMMA 3. *The quotient construction does not preserve satisfiability of formulae of the form $A(\alpha U \beta)$, where $\alpha, \beta \in \mathcal{L}$. In particular, there is a model M for $A(\top U p)$ with $p \in \mathcal{PV}$ such that $M_{\leftrightarrow_{FL(A(\top U p))}}$ is not a model for $A(\top U p)$.*

Although $M_{\leftrightarrow_{FL(\varphi)}}$ may not be a model, it satisfies another important property, which allows us to view it as a *pseudo-model*; it can be unwound into a proper model that can be used to show that \mathcal{L} has the FMP property. To make this idea precise, we introduce the following auxiliary definitions.

An *interior* (respectively *frontier*) node of a *directed acyclic graph* (DAG)² is one which has (respectively does not have) a successor. The *root* of a DAG is the node (if it exists) from which all other nodes are reachable. A *fragment* $M' = (S', T', \{\sim'_i\}_{i \in Ag}, \mathbb{L}', \{\Gamma'_i\}_{i \in Ag})$ of a Hintikka structure $H = (S, T, \{\sim_i\}_{i \in Ag}, \mathbb{L}, \{\Pi_i\}_{i \in Ag})$ is a structure such that (S', T') generates a finite DAG, in which the interior nodes satisfy H1-H10 and H13-H23, and the frontier nodes satisfy H1-H8, and H13-H23. Given $M = (S, T, \{\sim_i\}_{i \in Ag}, \mathbb{L}, \{\Pi_i\}_{i \in Ag})$ and $M' = (S', T', \{\sim'_i\}_{i \in Ag}, \mathbb{L}', \{\Gamma'_i\}_{i \in Ag})$, we say that M is *contained in* M' , and write $M \subseteq M'$, if $S \subseteq S'$, $T = T' \cap (S \times S)$, $\sim_i = \sim'_i \cap (S \times S)$, $\mathbb{L} = \mathbb{L}' \upharpoonright S$, $\Pi_i = \Gamma'_i \cap (S \times S)$.

DEFINITION 8 (PSEUDO-MODEL). *A pseudo-model $M = (S, T, \{\sim_i\}_{i \in Ag}, \mathbb{L}, \{\Pi_i\}_{i \in Ag})$ for $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}$ is defined in the same manner as a Hintikka structure for φ in Definition 6, except that condition H12 is replaced by the following condition H12': for all $s \in S$, if $A(\alpha U \beta) \in \mathbb{L}(s)$, then there is a fragment $(S', T', \{\sim'_i\}_{i \in Ag}, \mathbb{L}', \{\Gamma'_i\}_{i \in Ag}) \subseteq M$ such that: (a) (S', T') generates a DAG with root s ; (b) for all frontier nodes $t \in S'$, $\beta \in \mathbb{L}'(t)$; (c) for all interior nodes $u \in S'$, $\alpha \in \mathbb{L}'(u)$.*

It can be proven that the following lemma holds.

LEMMA 4. *Let $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}$, $FL(\varphi)$ be the Fischer-Ladner closure of φ , $M = (S, T, \{\sim_i\}_{i \in Ag}, \mathcal{V}, \{\Pi_i\}_{i \in Ag})$ a model for φ , and $M_{\leftrightarrow_{FL(\varphi)}} = (S', T', \{\sim'_i\}_{i \in Ag}, \mathbb{L}, \{\Gamma'_i\}_{i \in Ag})$ the quotient structure of M by $\leftrightarrow_{FL(\varphi)}$. Then, $M_{\leftrightarrow_{FL(\varphi)}}$ is a pseudo-model for φ .*

Now we can prove the main claim of the section, i.e., the fact that \mathcal{L} has the finite model property (FMP).

THEOREM 1. *Let $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}$. Then the following are equivalent: (1) φ is satisfiable; (2) There is a finite pseudo-model for φ ; (3) There is a Hintikka structure for φ .*

²Recall that a directed acyclic graph is a directed graph such that for any node v , there is no nonempty directed path starting and ending on v .

Proof. (1) \Rightarrow (2) follows from Lemma 4. To prove (2) \Rightarrow (3) it is enough to construct a Hintikka structure for φ by “unwinding” the pseudo-model for φ . This can be done in the same way as is described in [5] for the proof of Theorem 4.1. (3) \Rightarrow (1) follows from Lemma 2.

5. DECIDABILITY

Let $FL(\varphi)$ be the Fischer-Ladner closure of $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}$. We define $\Delta \subseteq FL(\varphi)$ to be *maximal* if for every formula $\alpha \in FL(\varphi)$, either $\alpha \in \Delta$ or $\neg\alpha \in \Delta$. Note that maximal sets may be inconsistent.

THEOREM 2. *There is an algorithm for deciding whether any formula of \mathcal{L} is satisfiable.*

Proof. Given a formula $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}$, we will construct a finite pseudo-model for φ . We proceed as follows.

1. Build a structure $M^0 = (S^0, T^0, \{\sim_i^0\}_{i \in Ag}, \mathbb{L}^0, \{\Pi_i^0\}_{i \in Ag})$ for φ as follows: $S^0 = \{\Delta \mid \Delta \subseteq FL(\varphi) \text{ with } \Delta \text{ maximal and satisfying the rules H1-H8, H15, H20}\}$; $T^0 \subseteq S^0 \times S^0$ is a relation such that $(\Delta_1, \Delta_2) \in T^0$ iff $\neg EX\alpha \in \Delta_1$ implies that $\neg\alpha \in \Delta_2$ for any $\alpha \in \mathcal{L}$; for each agent $i \in Ag$, $\sim_i^0 \subseteq S^0 \times S^0$ is a relation such that $(\Delta_1, \Delta_2) \in \sim_i^0$ iff $\{\alpha \mid K_i\alpha \in \Delta_1\} \subseteq \Delta_2$; for all $\Delta \in S^0$, $\mathbb{L}^0(\Delta) = \Delta$; for each agent $i \in Ag$, $\Pi_i^0 \subseteq S^0 \times S^0$ is the relation such that $(\Delta_1, \Delta_2) \in \Pi_i^0$ iff $\{\alpha \mid R_i\alpha \in \Delta_1\} \subseteq \Delta_2$. Note that M^0 satisfies conditions H1-H8, H15, H20, by construction. It can also be checked that M^0 satisfies H10, H13, and H18 (because of the definition of T^0 , \sim_i^0 and Π_i^0 respectively).

2. Test the structure M^0 for fulfilment of the properties H9, H11, H12', H14, H16, H17, H19, H21, H22, and H23 by repeatedly applying the following deletion rules until no more states in M^0 can be deleted.

H9 Delete any state which has no T^0 -successors.

H11-H12' Delete any state $\Delta_1 \in S^0$ such that either $E(\alpha U \beta) \in \Delta_1$ or $A(\alpha U \beta) \in \Delta_1$ and there does not exist a fragment $M'' \subseteq M^0$ such that: (i) (S'', T'') is a DAG with root Δ_1 ; (ii) for all frontier nodes $\Delta_2 \in S''$, $\beta \in \Delta_2$; (iii) for all interior nodes $\Delta_3 \in S''$, $\alpha \in \Delta_3$.

H14 Delete any state $\Delta_1 \in S^0$ such that $\neg K_i\alpha \in \Delta_1$, and Δ_1 does not have any \sim_i^0 successor $\Delta_2 \in S^0$ with $\neg\alpha \in \Delta_2$.

H16 Delete any state $\Delta_1 \in S^0$ such that $\Delta_1 \sim_i^0 \Delta_2$ and $K_i\alpha \in \Delta_1$ and $\neg K_i\alpha \in \Delta_2$.

H17 Delete any state $\Delta_1 \in S^0$ such that $\Delta_1 \sim_i^0 \Delta_2$ and $\Delta_1 \sim_i^0 \Delta_3$ and $\alpha \in \Delta_2$ and $K_i\neg\alpha \in \Delta_3$

H19 Delete any state $\Delta_1 \in S^0$ such that $\neg R_i\alpha \in \Delta_1$, and Δ_1 does not have any Π_i^0 successor $\Delta_2 \in S^0$ with $\neg\alpha \in \Delta_2$.

H21 Delete any state $\Delta_1 \in S^0$ such that $\Delta_1 \Pi_i^0 \Delta_2$ and $R_i\alpha \in \Delta_1$ and $\neg R_i\alpha \in \Delta_2$.

H22 Delete any state $\Delta \in S^0$ such that $K_i\alpha \in \Delta$ and $R_i\alpha \in \Delta$.

H23 Delete any state $\Delta \in S^0$ such that $AG\alpha \in \Delta$ and $R_i\alpha \in \Delta$.

We call the above the *decidability algorithm* for \mathcal{L} .

Note that the algorithm terminates since S^0 is finite.

CLAIM 1. *Let $M = (S, T, \{\sim_i\}_{i \in Ag}, \mathbb{L}, \{\Pi_i\}_{i \in Ag})$ be the resulting structure of the algorithm. The formula $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}$ is satisfiable iff $\varphi \in s$, for some $s \in S$.*

Proof. In order to show the right-to-left implication of the above property, note that either the resulting structure is a pseudo-model for φ , or $S = \emptyset$ (this can be shown inductively on the structure of the algorithm). So, if $\varphi \in s$ for some $s \in S$, φ is satisfiable by Theorem 1.

Conversely, if φ is satisfiable, then there exists a model M^* such that $M^* \models \varphi$. Let $M^* \leftrightarrow_{FL(\varphi)} M' = (S', T', \{\sim'_i\}_{i \in Ag}, \mathbb{L}', \{\sqcap'_i\}_{i \in Ag})$ be the quotient structure of M^* by $\leftrightarrow_{FL(\varphi)}$. By Lemma 4 we have that M' is a pseudo-model for φ . By the definition of \mathbb{L}' in the quotient structure, $\mathbb{L}'(s)$ is maximal with respect to $FL(\varphi)$ for all $s \in S'$. Now, let $M'' = (S'', T'', \{\sim''_i\}_{i \in Ag}, \mathbb{L}'', \{\sqcap''_i\}_{i \in Ag})$ be the structure defined by step 1 of the decidability algorithm, and $f : S' \rightarrow S''$ a function defined by $f(s) = \mathbb{L}'(s)$. The following hold:

- (a) If $(s, t) \in T'$, then $(f(s), f(t)) \in T''$;

Proof (via contradiction): Let $(s, t) \in T'$ and $(f(s), f(t)) \notin T''$. By the definition of T'' we have that $\neg EX\alpha \in f(s)$ and $\alpha \in f(t)$. Then, by the definition of f , we have that $\neg EX\alpha \in \mathbb{L}'(s)$ and $\alpha \in \mathbb{L}'(t)$. So, by the definition of \mathbb{L}' in the quotient structure we have that $M^*, s' \models \neg EX\alpha$ for any M^* state s' in the class s and $M^*, t' \models \alpha$ for any M^* state t' in the class t . Thus (s', t') is not in T (where T is the relation in M^*) for any such s', t' , and thus (s, t) , is not in T' .

- (b) If $(s, t) \in \sim'_i$, then $(f(s), f(t)) \in \sim''_i$;

Proof (via contradiction): Let $(s, t) \in \sim'_i$ and $(f(s), f(t)) \notin \sim''_i$. By the definition of \sim''_i we have that $K_i\alpha \in f(s)$ and $\alpha \notin f(t)$. Then, by the definition of f , we have that $K_i\alpha \in \mathbb{L}'(s)$ and $\alpha \notin \mathbb{L}'(t)$.

So, by the definition of \mathbb{L}' in the quotient structure we have that $M^*, s' \models K_i\alpha$ for any M^* state s' in the class s and $M^*, t' \models \neg\alpha$ for any M^* state t' in the class t . Thus (s', t') is not in \sim_i (where \sim_i is the relation in M^*) for any such s', t' , and thus (s, t) , is not in \sim'_i .

- (c) if $(s, t) \in \sqcap'_i$, then $(f(s), f(t)) \in \sqcap''_i$;

Proof (via contradiction): Let $(s, t) \in \sqcap'_i$ and $(f(s), f(t)) \notin \sqcap''_i$. Then, by the definition of \sqcap''_i we have that $R_i\alpha \in f(s)$ and $\alpha \notin f(t)$. By the definition of f , we have that $R_i\alpha \in \mathbb{L}'(s)$ and $\alpha \notin \mathbb{L}'(t)$. So, by the definition of \mathbb{L}' in the quotient structure we have that $M^*, s' \models R_i\alpha$ for any M^* state s' in the class s and $M^*, t' \models \neg\alpha$ for any M^* state t' in the class t . Thus (s', t') is not in \sqcap_i (where \sqcap_i is the relation in M^*) for any such s', t' , and thus (s, t) , is not in \sqcap'_i .

Thus, the image of M' under f is contained in M'' , i.e., $M' \subseteq M''$. It remains to show that if $s \in S'$, then $f(s) \in S''$ will not be eliminated in step 2 of the decidability algorithm. This can be checked by induction on the order in which states of S'' are eliminated. For instance, assume that $s \in S'$, and $A(\alpha U \beta) \in f(s)$. By the definition of f , we have that $A(\alpha U \beta) \in \mathbb{L}'(s)$. Now, since M' is a pseudo-model, by Definition 8 we have that there exists a fragment rooted at s that is contained in M' and it satisfies property $H12'$. Thus, since f preserves the above condition (a), we have that there exists a fragment rooted at $f(s)$ that is contained in M'' and it satisfies property $H12'$. This implies that $f(s) \in S''$ will not be eliminated in $H12'$ step of the decidability algorithm. Other cases can be proven similarly. Therefore, it follows that for some $s \in S$ we have $\varphi \in \mathbb{L}(s)$.

6. A COMPLETE AXIOMATIC SYSTEM

An *axiomatic system* consists of a collection of *axioms*

schemes and *inference rules*. An axiom scheme is a rule for generating an infinite number of axioms. An inference rule has the form “from formulae $\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_m$ infer formula φ ”. We say that φ is *provable* (written $\vdash \varphi$) if there is a sequence of formulae ending with φ , such that each formula is either an instance of an axiom, or follows from other provable formulae by applying an inference rule. We say that a formula φ is *consistent* if $\neg\varphi$ is not provable. A finite set $\{\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_m\}$ of formulae is *consistent* exactly if and only if the conjunction $\varphi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \varphi_m$ of its members is consistent. A set F of formulae is a *maximally consistent set* if it is consistent and for all $\varphi \notin F$, the set $F \cup \{\varphi\}$ is inconsistent. An axiom system is *sound* (respectively *complete*) with respect to the class of models, if $\vdash \varphi$ implies $\models \varphi$ (respectively if $\models \varphi$ implies $\vdash \varphi$).

Let $i \in Ag$. We define the following axiomatic system:

PC. All substitution instances of classical tautologies.

T1. EXT T2. $EX(\alpha \vee \beta) \Leftrightarrow EX\alpha \vee EX\beta$

T3. $E(\alpha U \beta) \Leftrightarrow \beta \vee (\alpha \wedge EXE(\alpha U \beta))$

T4. $A(\alpha U \beta) \Leftrightarrow \beta \vee (\alpha \wedge AXA(\alpha U \beta))$

\mathbf{K}_{K_i} . $(K_i\alpha \wedge K_i(\alpha \Rightarrow \beta)) \Rightarrow K_i\beta$ $\mathbf{5}_{K_i}$. $\neg K_i\alpha \Rightarrow K_i\neg K_i\alpha$

\mathbf{K}_{R_i} . $(R_i\alpha \wedge R_i(\alpha \Rightarrow \beta)) \Rightarrow R_i\beta$ $\mathbf{4}_{R_i}$. $K_i\alpha \Rightarrow K_iK_i\alpha$

\mathbf{T}_{R_i} . $R_i\alpha \Rightarrow \alpha$ $\mathbf{4}_{R_i}$. $R_i\alpha \Rightarrow R_iR_i\alpha$

\mathbf{I}_1 . $K_i\alpha \Rightarrow R_i\alpha$ \mathbf{I}_2 . $AG\alpha \Rightarrow R_i\alpha$

R1. From α and $\alpha \Rightarrow \beta$ infer β R2. From α infer $K_i\alpha$

R3. From $\alpha \Rightarrow \beta$ infer $EX\alpha \Rightarrow EX\beta$

R4. From $\gamma \Rightarrow (\neg\beta \wedge EX\gamma)$ infer $\gamma \Rightarrow \neg A(\alpha U \beta)$

R5. From $\gamma \Rightarrow (\neg\beta \wedge AX(\gamma \vee \neg E(\alpha U \beta)))$ infer $\gamma \Rightarrow \neg E(\alpha U \beta)$

THEOREM 3. *The axiomatic system above is sound and complete with respect to the class of models of Definition 2, i.e., $\models \varphi$ iff $\vdash \varphi$, for any formula $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}$.*

Proof. This proof is an in [10], we simply extend the claims to cover all cases here.

Soundness can be checked inductively as standard. For completeness, we show that any consistent formula φ is satisfiable. To do this, we first consider the structure $M = (S, T, \{\sim_i\}_{i \in Ag}, \mathbb{L}, \{\sqcap_i\}_{i \in Ag})$ for φ as defined in step 1 of the decidability algorithm. We then execute step 2 of the algorithm, obtaining a pseudo-model for φ . Crucially we show below that if a state $s \in S$ is eliminated at step 2 of the algorithm, then the formula $\psi_s = \bigwedge_{\alpha \in s} \alpha$ is inconsistent. Observe now that for any $\alpha \in FL(\varphi)$ we have $\vdash \alpha \Leftrightarrow \bigvee_{\substack{\{s \mid \alpha \in s \text{ and} \\ \psi_s \text{ is consistent}\}} \psi_s$. In particular, $\vdash \varphi \Leftrightarrow \bigvee_{\substack{\{s \mid \varphi \in s \text{ and} \\ \psi_s \text{ is consistent}\}} \psi_s$. Thus, if φ is consistent, then ψ_s is consistent as well for some $s \in S$. It follows by Claim 1 of Theorem 2 that this particular s is present in the pseudo-model resulting from the execution of the algorithm. So, by Theorem 1, φ is satisfiable. Note that pseudo-models share the structural properties of models, i.e., their underlying frames have the same properties.

It remains to show that if a state $s \in S$ is eliminated at step 2 of the algorithm then the formula ψ_s is inconsistent. Before we do it, we need some auxiliary claims.

CLAIM 2. *Let $s \in S$ and $\alpha \in FL(\varphi)$. Then, $\alpha \in s$ iff $\vdash \psi_s \Rightarrow \alpha$.*

Proof. (‘if’). Let $\alpha \in s$. By the definition of S , we have that any s in S is maximal. Thus, $\neg\alpha \notin s$. So, $\vdash \psi_s \Rightarrow \alpha$.

(‘only if’). Let $\vdash \psi_s \Rightarrow \alpha$. So, since s is maximal we have that $\alpha \in s$.

CLAIM 3. Let $s, t \in S$, both of them be maximal and propositionally consistent, and $s \sim_i t$ (respectively $s \sqcap_i t$). If $\alpha \in t$, then $\neg K_i \neg \alpha \in s$ (respectively $\neg R_i \neg \alpha \in s$).

Proof. [By contraposition] Let $\alpha \in t$ and $\neg K_i \neg \alpha \notin s$. Then, since s is maximal we have that $K_i \neg \alpha \in s$. Thus, since $s \sim_i t$, we have that $\neg \alpha \in t$. This contradicts the fact that $\alpha \in t$, since t is propositionally consistent; The same proof applies to R_i .

CLAIM 4. Let $s \in S$ be a maximal and consistent set of formulae and α such that $\vdash \alpha$. Then $\alpha \in s$.

Proof. Suppose $\alpha \notin s$ and $\vdash \alpha$. Since s is maximal then $\neg \alpha \in s$. So $\neg \alpha \wedge \psi_s$ is consistent where $\psi_s = \bigwedge_{\beta \in s} \beta$. So by definition of consistency we have that $\not\vdash \neg(\neg \alpha \wedge \psi_s)$, so $\not\vdash \alpha \vee \neg \psi_s$. But we have $\vdash \alpha \vee \psi_s$, so this is a contradiction.

We now show, by induction on the structure of the decidability algorithm for \mathcal{L} , that if a state $s \in S$ is eliminated at step 2 of the decidability algorithm, then $\vdash \neg \psi_s$.

CLAIM 5. If ψ_s is consistent, then s is not eliminated at step 2 of the decidability algorithm for \mathcal{L} .

Proof.

H9 Let $EX\alpha \in s$ and ψ_s be consistent. By the same reasoning as in the proof of Claim 4(a) in [5], we conclude that s satisfies H9. So s is not eliminated.

H11-H12' Let $E(\alpha U \beta) \in s$ (respectively $A(\alpha U \beta) \in s$) and suppose s is eliminated at step 2 because H11 (respectively H12') is not satisfied. Then ψ_s is inconsistent. The proof showing that fact is the same as the proof of Claim 4(c) (respectively Claim 4(d)) in [5].

H14 Let $\neg K_i \alpha \in s$ and ψ_s be consistent. Consider the set $S_{-\alpha} = \{\neg \alpha\} \cup \{\beta \mid K_i \beta \in s\}$. We will show that $S_{-\alpha}$ is consistent. Suppose that $S_{-\alpha}$ is inconsistent. Then, $\vdash \beta_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \beta_m \Rightarrow \alpha$, where $\beta_j \in \{\beta \mid K_i \beta \in s\}$ for $j \in \{1, \dots, m\}$. By rule R2 we have $\vdash K_i((\beta_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \beta_m) \Rightarrow \alpha)$. By axioms \mathbf{K}_{K_i} and PC we have $\vdash (K_i \beta_1 \wedge \dots \wedge K_i \beta_m) \Rightarrow K_i \alpha$. Thus, since each $K_i \beta_j \in s$ for $j \in \{1, \dots, m\}$ and s is maximal and propositionally consistent, we have $R_i \alpha \in s$. This contradicts the fact that ψ_s is consistent. So, $S_{-\alpha}$ is consistent.

Now, we have to show that $S_{-\alpha}$ can be extended to a maximal set that is in S^0 . To show this, as standard, we first construct a sequence t_0, t_1, \dots of \mathcal{L} -consistent sets as follows. Because \mathcal{L} is a countable language, let ψ_1, ψ_2, \dots be an enumeration of the formulae in \mathcal{L} . Let $t_0 = S_{-\alpha} \cup \{CL(\beta) \mid \beta \in S_{-\alpha}\}$, and inductively construct the rest of the sequence by taking $t_{i+1} = t_i \cup \{\psi_{i+1}\}$ if this set is \mathcal{L} -consistent and satisfies rules: H1 – H8, H10, H13 H15, H18, and H20, and otherwise by taking $t_{i+1} = t_i$. It is easy to see that each set in the sequence t_0, t_1, \dots is \mathcal{L} -consistent and satisfies rules: H1 – H8, H10, H13 H15, H18, and H20, Let $t = \bigcup_{i=0}^{\infty} t_i$. Each finite subset of t must be contained in t_j for some j , and thus must be \mathcal{L} -consistent and satisfies the adequate rules. It follows that t itself is \mathcal{L} -consistent and satisfies the adequate rules, so t is in S^0 . We claim that t is maximal. For suppose $\psi \in \mathcal{L}$ and $\psi \notin t$. Since ψ is a formula in \mathcal{L} , it must appear in our enumeration, say as ψ_k . If $t_k \cup \{\psi_k\}$ were \mathcal{L} -consistent, then our construction would not guarantee that $\psi_k \in t_{k+1}$, and hence $\psi_k \in t$. Because $\psi_k = \psi \notin t$, it follows that $t_k \cup \{\psi\}$ is not \mathcal{L} -

consistent. Hence $t \cup \{\psi\}$ is also not \mathcal{L} -consistent. It follows that t is a maximal \mathcal{L} -consistent set. It follows that $S_{-\alpha}$ is contained in some maximal set t that is in S^0 . So by the definition of $S_{-\alpha}$ we have that $\neg \alpha \in t$, and by the definition of \sim_i in M we have that $s \sim_i t$. Thus, s satisfies H14, and it is not eliminated by step H14 of the decidability algorithm.

H16 Suppose that ψ_s is consistent and s is eliminated at step (H16) of the decidability algorithm. Then, we have that $s \sim_i t$, $K_i \alpha \in s$ and $\neg K_i \alpha \in t$. Thus, since s and t are maximal and propositionally consistent, by Claim 4 we have that $\neg K_i K_i \alpha \in s$. By axiom 4_{K_i} and Claim 5 we have that $K_i \alpha \Rightarrow K_i K_i \alpha \in s$. So, since $K_i \alpha \in s$ we have that $K_i K_i \alpha \in s$. So s is inconsistent. Therefore s cannot be eliminated at step (H16) of the decidability algorithm.

H17 Suppose that s is consistent and it is eliminated at step (H17) of the decidability algorithm. Thus, we have that $s \sim_i t$, $s \sim_i u$, $\alpha \in t$, and $K_i \neg \alpha \in u$. So, since $s \sim_i t$, $\alpha \in t$, s and t are maximal and propositionally consistent, by Claim 4 we have that $\neg K_i \neg \alpha \in s$. Since s is maximal and consistent, by axiom 5_{K_i} and Claim 5, we have that $\neg K_i \neg \alpha \Rightarrow K_i \neg K_i \neg \alpha \in s$. Therefore, we have that $K_i \neg K_i \neg \alpha \in s$. Thus, since $s \sim_i u$, we have that $\neg K_i \neg \alpha \in u$. But this is a contradiction given that $K_i \neg \alpha \in u$ and u is propositionally consistent. So s is inconsistent. Therefore s cannot be eliminated at step (H17) of the decidability algorithm.

H19 Let $\neg R_i \alpha \in s$ and ψ_s be consistent. Consider the set $S_{-\alpha} = \{\neg \alpha\} \cup \{\beta \mid R_i \beta \in s\}$. We will show that $S_{-\alpha}$ is consistent. Suppose that $S_{-\alpha}$ is inconsistent. Then, $\vdash \beta_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \beta_m \Rightarrow \alpha$, where $\beta_j \in \{\beta \mid R_i \beta \in s\}$ for $j \in \{1, \dots, m\}$. By rule R2 we have $\vdash K_i((\beta_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \beta_m) \Rightarrow \alpha)$. By axioms \mathbf{K}_{K_i} and PC we have $\vdash (K_i \beta_1 \wedge \dots \wedge K_i \beta_m) \Rightarrow K_i \alpha$. By axiom \mathbf{I}_1 we have that $\vdash (R_i \beta_1 \wedge \dots \wedge R_i \beta_m) \Rightarrow R_i \alpha$. Thus, since each $R_i \beta_j \in s$ for $j \in \{1, \dots, m\}$ and s is maximal and propositionally consistent, we have $R_i \alpha \in s$. This contradicts the fact that ψ_s is consistent. So, $S_{-\alpha}$ is consistent. Now, we have to show that $S_{-\alpha}$ can be extended to a maximal set that is in S^0 . This can be done in the same way as in H14 case. So, we can now say that $S_{-\alpha}$ is contained in some maximal set t and thus $\neg \alpha \in t$. By the definitions of \sqcap_i in M and $S_{-\alpha}$ we have that $s \sqcap_i t$. Thus, s satisfies H19, and it is not eliminated by step H19 of the decidability algorithm.

H21 Suppose that ψ_s is consistent and s is eliminated at step (H21) of the decidability algorithm. Then, we have that $s \sqcap_i t$, $R_i \alpha \in s$ and $\neg R_i \alpha \in t$. Thus, since s and t are maximal and propositionally consistent, by Claim 4 we have that $\neg R_i R_i \alpha \in s$. By axiom 4_{R_i} and Claim 5 we have that $R_i \alpha \Rightarrow R_i R_i \alpha \in s$. So, since $R_i \alpha \in s$ we have that $R_i R_i \alpha \in s$. So ψ_s is inconsistent. Therefore s cannot be eliminated at step (H21) of the decidability algorithm.

H22 Suppose that ψ_s is consistent and s is eliminated at step (H22) of the decidability algorithm. Then, we have $K_i \alpha \in s$ and $\neg R_i \alpha \in s$. By axiom \mathbf{I}_1 , since $K_i \alpha \in s$ we have that $R_i \alpha \in s$. So ψ_s is inconsistent. Therefore s cannot be eliminated at step (H22) of the decidability algorithm.

H23 Suppose that ψ_s is consistent and s is eliminated at step (H23) of the decidability algorithm. Then, we have $AG\alpha \in s$ and $\neg R_i\alpha \in s$. By axiom I_2 , since $AG\alpha \in s$ we have that $R_i\alpha \in s$. So ψ_s is inconsistent. Therefore s cannot be eliminated at step (H23) of the decidability algorithm.

We have now shown that only states s with ψ_s inconsistent are eliminated. This ends the completeness proof.

Given the above we have the following.

COROLLARY 1. *The axiomatic system above is sound and complete with respect to the class of interpreted systems.*

Proof. We need to show that if ϕ is valid on the class of all interpreted systems it is provable in the axiom system. Suppose ϕ is not provable, then $\neg\phi$ is consistent in the axiom system. By Theorem 3 $\neg\phi$ has a model M . But then by Lemma 1 there is an interpreted system IS whose generated model is isomorphic to M . But then by definition IS does not satisfy $\neg\phi$ and so $\neg\phi$ is not satisfied in the whole class of interpreted systems.

7. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we have shown completeness and decidability of a logic which includes CTL, epistemic operators and a further modality, defined on the intersection between the temporal and the epistemic relation, expressing knowledge under the assumption of being able to distinguish the future of a time instant.

As it is known, the standard canonical model technique cannot normally be used for providing axiomatisations for modalities that are defined on intersections of relations. Still intersections can be axiomatised by ad-hoc techniques; for instance see distributed knowledge [7, 12] and dynamic knowledge [1]. We were unable to replicate the use of these techniques for the logic in hand and used, instead, the basic schema of [5] used there for axiomatising plain CTL.

Our motivation for studying the reset operator is also rather practical. When studying temporal/epistemic properties of multi-agent systems scenario by using model checking [20, 19] it is often the case that the agents are able to distinguish the past from the present. In such cases, because of efficiency to be gained in model checking optimisations, it is efficient to have epistemic operators that “forget about the past” such as the one presented in this paper. Given we now understand the behaviour of such operator we plan to investigate possible extensions of an open source model checker for knowledge and time such as [14, 9] to evaluate experimentally the performance speed-up it offers.

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