

# A Method of Bounded Model Checking for a Temporal Epistemic Logic Based on Reduced Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams


Andrew JONES  
<avj05@doc.ic.ac.uk>

*Supervisor:* Dr. Alessio R. LOMUSCIO


Department of Computing  
Imperial College London

June, 2009

# Teach Yourself Model Checking in 1 Minute



# An Illustrative Scenario



## The Mars Rover


NASA want to ensure that their Mars Rovers *always* transmit data.

So, someone suggests that they should use model checking to *verify* this. . .

## Specifying the Property

Assume that  $\varphi$  represents that the data has been transmitted

# An Illustrative Scenario



## The Mars Rover


NASA want to ensure that their Mars Rovers *always* transmit data.

So, someone suggests that they should use model checking to *verify* this...

## Specifying the Property

Assume that  $\varphi$  represents that the data has been transmitted

# An Illustrative Scenario



## The Mars Rover


NASA want to ensure that their Mars Rovers *always* transmit data.

So, someone suggests that they should use model checking to *verify* this...

## Specifying the Property

Assume that  $\varphi$  represents that the data has been transmitted

# An Illustrative Scenario – “Global” Model Checking




Original Approach

*On all possible paths through the model, does the rover always transmit the data?*

$$\mathcal{M}, \text{start} \models AF(\varphi)$$

# An Illustrative Scenario – “Bounded” Model Checking



## A New Approach

*Does there exist a path through the model in which the rover never transmits the data?*

$$\mathcal{M}, \text{start} \models EG(\neg\varphi)$$

# Wait ... Doesn't that already exist?

Yes, but ...

- The majority of “symbolic” model checkers use *binary decision diagrams*
- Current bounded model checkers, either:
  - Require a translation of the problem to SAT, or
  - Aren't very expressive
- And – they concentrate on “bug hunting”, not verifying correctness

SAT-based-BMC and conventional model checking techniques are, at the moment, seen as complementary to each other.



**Is it possible to convert an existing model checker to a bounded one?**

What is an agent?

“An **agent** is a computer system that is **situated** in some **environment**, and that is capable of **autonomous action** in this environment in order to meet its design objectives.” – Weiss

# Temporal Epistemic Interpreted Systems

- A system is composed of a set of agents  $A = \{1, \dots, n\}$  and an environment  $e$ .
- Each agent,  $i$ , is described by
  - A set of local *states* –  $\mathcal{L}_i$
  - A set of local *actions* –  $\text{Act}_i$
  - A local *protocol* function –  $\mathcal{P}_i : \mathcal{L}_i \rightarrow 2^{\text{Act}_i}$
  - An *evolution* function –  $\tau_i : \mathcal{L}_i \times \text{Act} \rightarrow \mathcal{L}_i$
- $\text{Act}$  is the set of *joint actions* –  
 $\text{Act} \subseteq \text{Act}_1 \times \dots \times \text{Act}_n \times \text{Act}_e$

# Temporal Epistemic Interpreted Systems

- $G$  is the set of *possible global states* –  
 $G \subseteq \mathcal{L}_1 \times \dots \times \mathcal{L}_n \times \mathcal{L}_e$ 
  - A *global state*  $g = (l_1, \dots, l_n, l_e) \in G$  represents a “snapshot” of the system
  - $l_i : G \rightarrow \mathcal{L}_i$  is a *projection* of agent  $i$ 's local state from the given global state
  - Each agent  $i$  has an *epistemic relation* –  $g \sim_i g'$  iff  $l_i(g) = l_i(g')$
- $T$  is a *transition* function for the system –  $T \subseteq G \times \text{Act} \times G$ 
  - $g T g'$  if there exists actions  $a_1, \dots, a_n$  such that for all  $i$ ,  $a_i \in \mathcal{P}_i(l_i(g))$  and  $\tau_i(l_i(g), a_1, \dots, a_n) = l_i(g')$

# Temporal Epistemic Models

A *model*  $\mathcal{M}_{IS}$  is a tuple  $(G, \iota, T, \sim_1, \dots, \sim_n, \mathcal{V})$

- $\iota \in G$  is an *initial* global state
- $G$  is the set of *reachable* states accessible from  $\iota$  via  $T$
- $\mathcal{V}$  is a mapping from global states to propositional variables  
( $\mathcal{PV}$ ) –  $\mathcal{V} : G \rightarrow 2^{\mathcal{PV}}$

A *path*  $\pi = (\iota, g_1, \dots)$  is a sequence of global states such that  $(g_k, g_{k+1}) \in T$ .

- $\pi(k)$  is the  $k^{\text{th}}$  global state of the path  $\pi$
- $\Pi(g)$  is the set of all paths starting at  $g \in G$

- Syntax

$$\varphi ::= p \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi \vee \varphi \mid EX\varphi \mid EG\varphi \mid E[\varphi U \psi] \mid K_i\varphi$$

- Derived Modalities

- $EF\varphi \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} E[\text{true}U\varphi]$

- $AX\varphi \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \neg EX\neg\varphi$

- $AF\varphi \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \neg EG\neg\varphi$

- $AG\varphi \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \neg EF\neg\varphi$

- $K_i\varphi \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \neg\overline{K}_i\neg\varphi$

- $A[\varphi U \psi]$  – Takes the expected meaning

$K_i\varphi$  – “agent  $i$  knows that  $\varphi$ ”

$\mathcal{M}_{IS}, g \models K_i\varphi$  iff  $\forall g' \in G, g \sim_i g'$  implies  $\mathcal{M}_{IS}, g' \models \varphi$

$\overline{K}_i\varphi$  – “agent  $i$  considers it possible that  $\varphi$ ”

$\mathcal{M}_{IS}, g \models \overline{K}_i\varphi$  iff  $\exists g' \in G : g \sim_i g'$  and  $\mathcal{M}_{IS}, g' \models \varphi$

Conventional “symbolic” model checkers use a canonical representation called ROBDDs. These can be used to efficiently represent a boolean function.

Two Main stages:


- ① Calculate the entire reachable state space
- ② Recursively evaluate the property using fix point methods

Interpreted Systems Reachable State Space


$$\text{lfp}(Q) = (I(g) \vee \exists g' (T(g, a, g') \wedge Q(g')))$$



# ROBDD Variable Ordering



$$x_1 < x_2 < x'_1 < x'_2$$



$$x_1 < x'_1 < x_2 < x'_2$$

## MCMAS:

- Symbolic model checker for verifying *certain* aspects of multi-agent systems
- Based on BDDs from the CUDD library
- Based on the “Interpreted Systems Programming Language”

Interpreted Systems Programming Language – ISPL – allows for the definition of multi-agent systems following the “interpreted systems” formalisation.

## CUDD ExistAbstract

- Quantification –  $\mathcal{B}_h = \exists x \mathcal{B}_f$
- Shannon’s expression –  $h = (\neg x \wedge f|_{x \leftarrow 0}) \vee (x \wedge f|_{x \leftarrow 1})$

# The Existential and Universal Fragments

## ECTLK

CTLK as before:

- Restricts negation to *only* appear in front of elements of  $\mathcal{PV}$ .
- Contains  $\overline{K}_i$  *not*  $K_i$

## ACTLK

A formula is in ACTLK if the negation is ECTLK. . .

$$\{\varphi \mid \neg\varphi \in \text{ECTLK}\}$$

# Current Approaches to Bounded Model Checking

## SAT-based-BMC

### Idea

- “Unroll” the transition relation  $k$  times
- Translate the **negated** property and unrolled model
- Use a SAT solver

### Problem

- Requires a SAT solver
- Not straightforward to convert a BDD model checker to a SAT one

## BDD-based-BMC

### Idea

- Represent the “error” as a bad state
- Find all of the reachable states at a depth  $k$
- Check the intersection

### Problem

How does one specify properties as a *single* error state? Okay for *invariant* properties – but apart from that?

BDD-BMC( $\psi$  : ACTLK FORMULA,  $\mathcal{I}$  : INITIAL STATE, Trans : TRANSITION RELATION) : BOOLEAN

```
1:  $\varphi \leftarrow \neg\psi$  { $\varphi$  : ECLTK FORMULA}
2: Reach  $\leftarrow \mathcal{I}$  {Reach : BDD}
3: while TRUE do
4:   if  $\llbracket \iota \rightarrow \varphi \rrbracket = \text{Reach}$  then
5:     return FALSE {Counterexample found}
6:   end if
7:   Reach  $\leftarrow \text{Reach} \vee (\text{Reach} \wedge \text{Trans})$ 
8:   if Reach Unchanged then
9:     break {Fixed point reached}
10:  end if
11: end while
12: return  $\llbracket \iota \rightarrow \psi \rrbracket = \text{Reach}$ 
```

Current fix point methods work even when using **non-serial** transition relations, but we need a symbolic method for  $\overline{K}_i \dots$

We could just use  $\overline{K}_i \varphi \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \neg K_i \neg \varphi \dots$

$SAT_{\overline{K}}(\varphi : \text{FORMULA}, i : \text{AGENT}) : \textit{set of STATE}$

- 1:  $X \leftarrow SAT_{CTLK}(\varphi)$
- 2:  $Y \leftarrow pre_K(X, i)$
- 3: **return**  $Y$

```
BDD basic_agent::project_local_state(BDD *state, BDDvector* v)
{
    BDD tmp = bddmgr->bddOne();


    // For all of the state variables before the agent ...
    for (int j = 0; j < get_var_index_start(); j++)
    {
        // ‘and’ them on
        tmp = tmp * (*v)[j];
    }

    // and after the agent ...
    for (int j = get_var_index_end() + 1; j < v->count(); j++)
    {
        // ‘and’ them on
        tmp = tmp * (*v)[j];
    }

    return state->ExistAbstract(tmp);
}
```


Figure: The *simplified* project\_local\_state method

# Distributed Verification of Invariant Properties






# Distributed Verification of Invariant Properties




# Distributed Verification of Invariant Properties




# The Faulty Train Gate Controller – Train

Faulty trains now have a **service counter** and a **breaking depth**...



Label	Action
$t_1, t_3$	SERVICE
$t_2$	BACK
$t_4$	SIGNAL
$t_5$	ENTER
$t_6, t_7$	BREAK
$t_8$	LEAVE

# The Faulty Train Gate Controller – Controller



Label	Action
$c_1$	IDLE
$c_2$	EXIT_TRAIN
$c_3$	IDLE
$c_4$	IDLE
$c_5$	ENTER_TRAIN?

# Initial Results

Model			Decrease	
T	M	B	Memory	States
2	10	4	0.9750	3.6318
2	10	6	0.9632	3.2970
3	10	4	0.1561	1.4815
4	10	2	0.2338	1.2672

Table: *vanilla* CUDD ( $\varphi_{\text{TGC5}}$ )

Model			# Reorderings		# Garbage Collections	
T	M	B	Original	BDD-BMC	Original	BDD-BMC
2	10	4	6	11	10	16
2	10	6	12	9	17	11
3	10	4	13	55	27	69
4	10	2	17	26	30	61

Table: Reorderings and garbage collections performed by CUDD

## Bounded Model Checking Resource Usage




Figure: Resource use of BMC against regular model checking, with a model containing two type 1 trains, with a maximum depth of 100 and various breaking depths -  $\varphi_{TGC2}$

## Bounded Model Checking Memory Usage




Figure: Memory usage for two *type 2* trains, with a full service depth of 20 – when checking various formulae

### Bounded Model Checking Time Usage




Figure: Time required for two *type 2* trains, with a full service depth of 20 – when checking various formulae





# Counterexamples

- Biere et al (1999): bounded model checking “finds counterexamples of minimal length” .
- Groce et al (2005): “bounded model checkers often produce counterexamples that are difficult to understand due to the values chosen by a SAT solver” .

Method	Formula				
	$\varphi_{TGC1}$	$\varphi_{TGC2}$	$\varphi_{TGC3}$	$\varphi_{TGC4}$	$\varphi_{TGC5}$
Regular	25	17	4	4	12
BMC	13	16	4	4	FAIL

Table: Length of counterexamples generated between BMC and full verification





# Effectiveness of One-Shot BMC

- Zero initial CUDD cache
- Garbage collection and asynchronous reordering enabled

B	Decrease	
	Memory	Time
5	1.00	0.50
10	1.78	1.24
15	1.70	0.63
WORKING	1.00	0.05

Table: 2 Trains, Max Counter 20

B	Decrease	
	Memory	Time
2	1.13	0.91
4	1.88	0.39
6	1.70	0.82
WORKING	1.00	0.14

Table: 3 Trains, Max Counter 7

# Evaluating Distributed Bounded Model Checking

Model	Decrease		
	Memory	Time	States
Type 1	1.033	0.772	1.002
Type 2	1.730	4.429	1.709
Type 3	0.907	0.005	0.003

Table: A comparison between BMC and seeded BMC, at a seed state generation depth of 4.

# Hosts	Time	Decrease
2	118.88	0.016
4	58.78	0.032
6	39.93	0.048
8	30.37	0.063

Table: The length of time for seeded BMC compared to BMC, for a varying number of hosts when a counterexample cannot be found.

BDD-based-BMC is shown to be effective with variable reordering **disabled**; for satisfiable formulae the overhead imposed is negligible.

## Further work

- Intersection-based-BMC using MCMAS's RedStates
- More Models
- Comparison to VERICS
- Smarter use of CUDD using Cudd\_RecursiveDeref

Questions?

## Backup Slides



# SAT requires an encoding of a “back loop”

## Semantics of ECTLK


$\mathcal{M}_{IS}, g \models EG\varphi$  iff  $\exists \pi \in \Pi(g) \forall_{m \geq 0} \mathcal{M}_{IS}, \pi(m) \models \varphi$

## Bounded Semantics of ECLTK

$\mathcal{M}_k, g \models EG\varphi$  iff  $\exists \pi \in P_k(\pi(0) = g$  and  $\forall_{0 \leq j \leq k} \mathcal{M}_k, \pi(j) \models \varphi$ )  
... requires  $loop(\pi) \neq \emptyset$



$$loop(\pi) = \emptyset$$



$$loop(\pi) = \{2\}$$

# BDD approaches require an explicit “error state”

BOUNDEDTRAVERSAL(Trans : Transition Relation,  $\mathcal{I}$  : Initial States, Err : Error State,  $k$  : Depth)

```
1: Frontier0 ←  $\mathcal{I}$ 
2: for ( $i = 0$ ;  $i < k$ ;  $i++$ ) do
3:   if (Frontier $i$  · Err  $\neq \emptyset$ ) then
4:     return (FAILURE)
5:   end if
6:   Frontier $i+1$  ← IMG(Trans, Frontier $i$ )
7: end for
8: return (PASS)
```

# One-Shot BMC

“ONE-SHOT” BMC( $\psi$  : ACTLK FORMULA,  $\mathcal{I}$  : INITIAL STATE, Trans : TRANSITION RELATION, OneShotBound : INT) : STRING  $\times$  BOOLEAN

- 1:  $\varphi \leftarrow \neg\psi$  { $\varphi$  : ECLTK FORMULA}
- 2: Reach  $\leftarrow \mathcal{I}$  {Reach : BDD}
- 3: **for**  $k \leftarrow 0$  to OneShotBound **do**
- 4:   Reach  $\leftarrow$  Reach  $\vee$  (Reach  $\wedge$  Trans)
- 5:   **if** Reach *Unchanged* **then**
- 6:     **return** FIXED POINT CASE :  $\llbracket \iota \rightarrow \psi \rrbracket =$  Reach
- 7:   **end if**
- 8: **end for**
- 9: **return** ONE SHOT CASE :  $\llbracket \iota \rightarrow \varphi \rrbracket =$  Reach

# Regular Specifications

$\varphi_{\text{TGC1}}$

$AG (AF (\neg \text{TRAIN}_1\_IN\_TUNNEL))$

$\varphi_{\text{TGC2}}$  – “Mutual Exclusion”

$AG (\neg \text{TRAIN}_1\_IN\_TUNNEL \vee \neg \text{TRAIN}_2\_IN\_TUNNEL)$

$\varphi_{\text{TGC3}}$

$AG (K_{\text{TRAIN}_1} (\neg \text{TRAIN}_1\_IN\_TUNNEL \vee \neg \text{TRAIN}_2\_IN\_TUNNEL))$

# Parameterised Specifications

$\varphi_{\text{TGC4}}(N)$

$$AG \left( \text{TRAIN}_i\text{-IN\_TUNNEL} \rightarrow K_{\text{TRAIN}_i} \left( \bigwedge_{j=1}^{i-1} \left( \neg \text{TRAIN}_j\text{-IN\_TUNNEL} \right) \wedge \bigwedge_{j=i+1}^N \left( \neg \text{TRAIN}_j\text{-IN\_TUNNEL} \right) \right) \right)$$

# Parameterised Specifications

$\varphi_{\text{TGC5}}(N)$

$$AG \left( \text{TRAIN}_i\text{-IN\_TUNNEL} \rightarrow K_{\text{TRAIN}_i} \left( \bigwedge_{j=1}^{i-1} AX \left( \neg \text{TRAIN}_j\text{-IN\_TUNNEL} \right) \wedge \bigwedge_{j=i+1}^N AX \left( \neg \text{TRAIN}_j\text{-IN\_TUNNEL} \right) \right) \right)$$