Multi-valued Logics for MAS Verification

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The Verification Problem: given a system S and specification P, does S satisfy P?

• errors cost lives (e.g., Therac-25) and money (e.g., Pentium 5).

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Model-checking in a nutshell [Clarke, Emerson, Sifakis]

- Model S as some transition system M_S
- Represent specification P as a formula φ_P in some logic-based language
- Check whether $M_S \models \phi_P$



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- Coalition Logic [Pau02]
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Notions of strategies, equilibria from Game Theory \rightarrow Rational Synthesis

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So far, so good ...

The Problem with MAS Verification

MAS exhibit imperfect information:

- Agents have partial observability/imperfect information about the system.
- Imperfect information makes things hard(er).
 - Model checking ATL:

	perfect inf. (PI)	imperfect inf. (II)
imp. recall (IR)	PTIME-complete (A. H. K., 2002)	Δ_2^P -complete (Jamroga, Dix, 2006)
perf. recall (PR)		undecidable (Dima, Tiplea, 2011)

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This talk:

• 3-valued logic to approximate PR with BR [BLM18].

One of several applications of multi-valued logics to formal verification [BK06, BG03, GJ03, SG04].

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Specification Language: ATL
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\varphi ::= \text{ atom } q \mid \neg \varphi \mid \varphi \land \varphi \mid \langle\!\langle A \rangle\!\rangle X \varphi \mid \langle\!\langle A \rangle\!\rangle \varphi U \varphi \mid \langle\!\langle A \rangle\!\rangle G \varphi
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Semantics for *n*-bounded recall

 $(M, s) \models_n \langle\!\!\langle A \rangle\!\!\rangle \psi$ iff coalition A has *n*-bounded strategies F_A s.t. for all paths *p* consistent with F_A , $(M, p) \models_n \psi$

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For $n = \omega$, we have strategies with PR \Rightarrow undecidable model checking problem.

Approximating Perfect Recall - first attempt

Naive idea: approximate PR via BR with an increasing bound.

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Negative Result Let $m, n \in \mathbb{N}^+ \cup \{\omega\}$ with m < n. There exists formulas φ and $\varphi' = \neg \varphi$ in ATL s.t. **(**M, p) $\not\models_m \varphi$ and $(M, p) \models_n \varphi$ **(**M, p) $\models_m \varphi'$ and $(M, p) \not\models_n \varphi'$

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Consequence

Any naive attempt to approximate PR by increasing the bound n will not succeed.

 \Rightarrow To solve this problem, we consider a 3-valued semantics.

3-valued Semantics for ATL

We consider Kleene's 3-valued logic:

• Besides true (\top) and false (\bot) , we have a third truth value: undefined uu.

 $\begin{array}{ll} ((M,s)\models_n^3\langle\!\langle A\rangle\!\rangle\psi)=\top & \text{iff} & \text{coalition }A \text{ has }n\text{-bounded strategies }F_A \text{ s.t.} \\ & \text{for all paths }p \text{ consistent with }F_A, \ ((M,p)\models_n^3\psi)=\top \\ ((M,s)\models_n^3\langle\!\langle A\rangle\!\rangle\psi)=\bot & \text{iff} & \text{adversary }\overline{A} \text{ has }n\text{-bounded strategies }F_{\overline{A}} \text{ s.t.} \\ & \text{for all paths }p \text{ consistent with }F_{\overline{A}}, \ ((M,p)\models_n^3\psi)=\bot \\ \text{In all other cases the value is undefined (uu).} \end{array}$

For a formula $\langle\!\langle A \rangle\!\rangle \psi$ to be false (\perp) is not enough the lack of a successful strategy for A. We need a fasifying strategy for \overline{A} !

Key Features of the 3V Semantics

Defined truth values are preserved when increasing memory.

Let $m, n \in \mathbb{N}^+ \cup \{\omega\}$ be such that $m \le n$: $((M, s) \models_m^3 \phi) = \top \Rightarrow ((M, s) \models_n^3 \phi) = \top$ $((M, s) \models_m^3 \phi) = \bot \Rightarrow ((M, s) \models_n^3 \phi) = \bot$

Defined truth values are preserved from 3V to 2V semantics:

$$((M,s) \models_n^3 \phi) = \top \quad \Rightarrow \quad (M,s) \models_n^2 \phi ((M,s) \models_n^3 \phi) = \bot \quad \Rightarrow \quad (M,s) \not\models_n^2 \phi$$

Approximating Perfect Recall - second attempt

• ATL formulas are checked in the 3V semantics for increasingly larger bounds.

② If \top or \perp is returned, this is also the value for the 2V semantics under PR.

Iterative Model Checking Procedure

Algorithm Iterative_ $MC(M, \psi, n)$: j := 0; k := uu;while $(j < n \land k = uu)$ j := j + 1; $k := MC3(M, \psi, j);$ end while:

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if k \neq uu then return (j, k);
else return -1;
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- The procedure is sound and it terminates for $n \in \mathbb{N}$.
- It might not terminate for $n = \omega$.
- This is as expected, as the problem is undecidable in general.

Conclusions

- We introduced a 3V semantics for ATL to tackle undecidability under PR and II.
- · We proved preservation results for defined truth values
 - from BR to PR
 - from 3V to 2V
- We introduced an iterative procedure that, in some cases, solves the MC problem under PR by taking a bounded amount of memory.
- We implemented this approach in MCMAS_{BR}.

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The temporal logic of programs