Abduction with Negation as Failure for Active Databases and Agents

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Abstract. Recent work has suggested abductive logic programming as a suitable formalism to represent active databases and intelligent agents. In particular, abducibles and integrity constaints in abductive logic programs can be used respectively to represent actions and active/reactive rules. One would expect that, in this approach, abductive proof procedures could provide the engine underlying active database management systems and agents. We analyse existing abductive proof procedures and argue that they are inadequate in handling these applications. The inadequacy is due to the "incorrect" treatment of negative literals in integrity constraints. We propose a new abductive proof procedure and give examples of how this proof procedure can be used to achieve active behaviour in (deductive) databases and proactivity and reactivity in agents.

1 Introduction

Abductive logic programming is a powerful knowledge representation framework, that can be used to realise many diverse applications [9]. An **abductive logic program** $\langle P, \mathcal{A}, I \rangle$ consists of a logic program, P, seen as an "incomplete" theory, a set of **abducible predicates**, $\mathcal{A}$, whose (variable-free) **abducible atoms** are used to expand the theory, a set of first-order sentences, I, the integrity constraints, that must be "satisfied" by any sets of abducibles expanding the theory.

Earlier work [11, 16] shows promise in using abductive logic programming to understand and implement active databases (e.g. see [17]) and intelligent agents (e.g. see [7]). In particular, *beliefs* and *desires* of agents as conceptualised in the BDI architectures [15] can be understood as logic programs and integrity constraints, respectively.

In general, (many) active rules in active databases and rules determining the reactive behaviour of agents in multi-agent systems (reactive rules) can be understood as integrity constraints in abductive logic programming. For example, the active/reactive rule

on *rise-temperature-to(T)*, if $T>90$ then *raise-alarm*

can be understood declaratively as an integrity constraint

$\forall T$ [*rise-temperature-to(T)* $\wedge$ $T>90 \rightarrow$ *raise-alarm*], or, more accurately

$\forall T, T'$ [*rise-temperature-to(T,T')* $\wedge$ $T>90 \rightarrow$ *raise-alarm(T'+1)*].

Reactive rules like the one above can be interpreted as production rules.

Given a goal (conjunction of literals) G, a set of abducible atoms $\mathcal{D}$, and a variable substitution θ for the variables in G, a pair $(\mathcal{D}, \theta)$ is an **abductive**

answer for G, wrt an abductive logic program $\langle P, \mathcal{A}, I \rangle$, iff 1) $P \cup \mathcal{D}$ entails $G\theta$, and 2) $P \cup \mathcal{D}$ satisfies I. Various notions of entailment and satisfaction can be adopted (see [9]). Fulfillment of other properties is sometimes required, e.g. minimality, wrt set inclusion, of the set of abducibles in the answer.

Under the abductive interpretation of multi-agent systems and active databases, abductive answers are understood as acceptable sets of actions to be performed as a consequence of given transactions, in the case of active databases, and of given observations and goals, in the case of agents. In the above example, given the observation *rise-temperature-to(95)* (or more accurately *rise-temperature-to(95,now)*), the only acceptable set of actions (abductive answer) is {*raise-alarm*} (or more accurately {*raise-alarm(now + 1)*}). In general the actions can be internal, for example changing the database, or external, affecting the environment, for example communication actions. Any selected abductive answer corresponds to an *intention* in the BDI architecture for agents [15].

A number of proof procedures for the computation of abductive answers (**abductive proof procedures**) have been proposed, e.g. [10, 2, 5, 3, 12, 14, 16]. [1] Reactivity in active database management systems and agents can be obtained by interleaving the execution of the proof procedures, the selection of abducibles (actions) in partially computed abductive answers (plans) and the processing of outside observations, that might trigger active/reactive rules. This interleaving gives rise to an observe-think-act cycle [11, 16].

Our investigation indicates that none of the existing procedures produces the required active/reactive behaviour, due to the inadequate treatment of negative literals in integrity constraints. We propose an alternative abductive proof procedure, obtained by modifying the proof procedure of [5]. We prove soundness of the new proof procedure wrt the semantics of abductive answers in [5] and, in a special case, soundness and completeness wrt the stable model semantics [6].

2 Preliminaries

A **logic program** is a set of rules of the form $A \leftarrow L_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge L_n$, with A atom, $L_1, \ldots, L_n$ (positive or negative) literals, and $n \geq 0$. All variables in A, L_i are implicitly universally quantified, with scope the entire rule. If $A = p(t)$, for some vector of terms t, the rule is said to *define* p. In the sequel, t, s and t_i represent vectors of terms and X represents a vector of variables.

Our proof procedure relies upon the **completion** [1] of logic programs. The completion of a predicate p defined by the set of rules $\{p(t_1) \leftarrow D_1 \ldots p(t_k) \leftarrow D_k\}$ is the **iff-definition** $p(X) \leftrightarrow [X = t_1 \wedge D_1] \vee \ldots \vee [X = t_k \wedge D_k]$ where X is a vector of variables, implicitly universally quantified with scope the entire definition, and every variable in D_j not in X is implicitly existentially quantified on the righthand side of the definition. The left and righthand side are called the *head* and the *body*, respectively. The completion of a predicate p not defined in a given logic program is $p(X) \leftrightarrow false$.

[1] Theorist, the procedure presented in [14], computes answers wrt more general logic programs where P and I are sets of first-order sentences.

The **selective completion** $comp_S(P)$ of a logic program P wrt a set of predicates S in the language of P is the union of the completions of all the predicates in S.

In this paper, **integrity constraints** are implications of the form $L_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge L_n \rightarrow A$ with $L_1, \ldots, L_n$ literals, possibly $true$, $n > 0$, and A atom, possibly $false$. All variables in A, L_i are implicitly universally quantified, with scope the entire implication. A is called the *head* and $L_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge L_n$ is called the *body*.

Without loss of generality [9] we can assume that the abducible predicates in an abductive logic program $\langle P, \mathcal{A}, I \rangle$ are not defined in P. In the sequel, $\overline{\mathcal{A}}$ will refer to the complement of the set $\mathcal{A}$ wrt the set of all predicates in the language of P, i.e. $\overline{\mathcal{A}}$ is the set of non-abducible predicates.

3 Motivating examples

A number of abductive proof procedures have been defined, e.g. [14, 10, 2, 5, 3]. In this section, we will examine the behaviour of the proof procedures of [10, 5, 3], referred to as KM, FK and SLDNFA, respectively, for some simple abductive logic programs. Analogous considerations apply for the remaining proof procedures. Note that KM and SLDNFA employ only (*denial*) integrity constraints with the special atom $false$ in the head, and assume that integrity constraints $L_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge L_n \rightarrow A$, with $A \neq false$, are rewritten as $L_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge L_n \wedge not\, A \rightarrow false$. Also, the literal $not\, false$ is implicitly conjoined to every initial goal in SLDNFA. Finally, similarly to [2], FK uses $comp_{\overline{\mathcal{A}}}(P)$ rather than P.

In the absence of negation, KM, FK and SLDNFA all produce the required results, as illustrated by the following example.

Example 1. Let $\langle P, \mathcal{A}, I \rangle$ be the abductive logic program with

$P = \{\ emp(mary), emp(joe), tax\text{-}form(mary, 32B98), tax\text{-}form(joe, nil)\}$

$\mathcal{A} = \{print, date\}$

$I = \{date(may) \wedge emp(E) \wedge tax\text{-}form(E, nil) \rightarrow print(\text{“E to fill tax form”})\}$.

The program P represents a database for the personnel of a department store, defined in terms of the relations $emp(Employee)$ and $tax\text{-}form(Employee, Code)$. The integrity constraint in I represents the active rule

on $date(may)$, if $emp(E)$ and $tax\text{-}form(E, nil)$
then $print(\text{“E to fill tax form”})$

whose procedural interpretation is: when the event $date(may)$ takes place, the rule is triggered, the condition “$emp(E)$ and $tax\text{-}form(E, nil)$” is evaluated, and, for each instance of E satisfying the condition, the printing action is executed.

Given the input $date(may)$, KM, FK and SLDNFA compute the only intuitively correct answer $\{print(\text{“joe to fill tax form”})\}$.

However, in the presence of negation KM, FK and SLDNFA can produce unintuitive answers, as illustrated by the following examples.

Example 2. Let $\langle P, \mathcal{A}, I \rangle$ be the abductive logic program with $P = \emptyset$ and

$\mathcal{A} = \{cleaning\text{-}day, temperature\text{-}rise, dust, sound\text{-}alarm, evacuate\}$

$I = \{$ *cleaning-day* $\wedge$ *not sound-alarm* $\rightarrow$ *dust*,
temperature-rise $\rightarrow$ *sound-alarm*, *sound-alarm* $\rightarrow$ *evacuate*$\}$.

Intuitively, the integrity constraints represent the reactive rules
on *cleaning-day*, if *not sound-alarm*, then *dust*
on *temperature-rise*, then *sound-alarm*
on *sound-alarm*, then *evacuate*

Given only the observation *cleaning-day*, KM, FK and SLDNFA compute the intuitively correct answer $\{$*cleaning-day*, *dust*$\}$ as well as the unintuitive answer $\{$*cleaning-day*, *sound-alarm*, *evacuate*$\}$. The second answer arbitrarily abduces *sound-alarm*, and is incorrect according to the active database and multi-agent system interpretations. (Note that both answers are minimal wrt set inclusion.)

Example 3. Let $\langle P, \mathcal{A}, I\rangle$ be the abductive logic program with
$P = \{$ *pregnant* $\leftarrow$ *naturally-inseminated*,
pregnant $\leftarrow$ *artificially-inseminated*$\}$
$\mathcal{A} = \{$*weight-gain*, *naturally-inseminated*, *diet*, *artificially-inseminated*$\}$
$I = \{$*weight-gain* $\wedge$ *not pregnant* $\rightarrow$ *diet*$\}$.

Intuitively, the integrity constraint represents the reactive rule
on *weight-gain*, if *not pregnant*, then *diet*

whose procedural interpretation is: when the event *weight-gain* occurs and the condition *pregnant* does not hold, the action *diet* is executed. Given the observation *weight-gain*, KM, FK and SLDNFA compute three alternative (minimal) answers, $\{$*weight-gain*, *diet*$\}$, $\{$*weight-gain*, *naturally-inseminated*$\}$, and $\{$*weight-gain*, *artificially-inseminated*$\}$. Only the first is intuitively correct.

The unintuitive behaviour of KM, FK and SLDNFA is due to the inappropriate treatment of the negative literals, occurring in the body of integrity constraints, whose atoms are either abducibles or are defined via abducibles. Indeed, these proof procedures seem to treat negations, implicitly, classically rather than as negation as failure, and the implication $\rightarrow$ as material implication. In example 3, the classical interpretation of negation occurring in the body of integrity constraints leads to treating *weight-gain* $\wedge$ *not pregnant* $\rightarrow$ *diet* as the material implication *weight-gain* $\rightarrow$ [*diet* $\vee$ *pregnant*] rather than as the reactive rule the integrity constraint aims at representing.

We will define a modification of FK computing only the intuitively correct answers to goals and observations in an active database/agent perspective.

4 The proof procedure

Like FK, our proposed proof procedure uses the selective completion $comp_{\overline{\mathcal{A}}}(P)$ of P in the given abductive logic program $\langle P, \mathcal{A}, I\rangle$. Moreover, like FK, it derives a sequence of goals, starting from an **initial goal**, which is a conjunction of literals, conjoined with the integrity constraints in I. All variables in the literals in the initial goal are free. All variables in the integrity constraints in the initial goal are universally quantified. Goals in the sequence are derived by applying a number of inference rules. To simplify the treatment of quantifiers, both iff-definitions in $comp_{\overline{\mathcal{A}}}(P)$ and integrity constraints in I are assumed to be range-

restricted, i.e. all variables in the head must appear in at least one atom in the body, and this atom must not be an equality between two variables.

In the simplest case, goals derived by the proof procedure are disjunctions of **simple goals**, which are conjunctions of the form

$A_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge A_n \wedge I_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge I_m \wedge D_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge D_k$

where $n, m, k \geq 0$, $n + m + k > 0$, and the A_i are atoms, the I_i are **implications**, with the same syntax of integrity constraints, except that in addition to universally quantified variables, they can also contain existentially quantified or free variables, occurring elsewhere in the goal, and the D_i are disjunctions of conjunctions of literals and implications. Implications are obtained by repeatedly applying the inference rules of the proof procedure to either integrity constraints in the given $\langle P, \mathcal{A}, I\rangle$ or to the result of rewriting negative literals $not\, A$ as $A \rightarrow false$. Simple goals are a declarative representation of and-or trees of depth two, with literals and implications as leaves of the trees.

FK assumes that the inference rules below are applied in such a way that every goal in a sequence derived by the proof procedure is a disjunction of simple goals. (Note that every initial goal is a simple goal with the integrity constraints and the rewriting of negative literals as the only implications.) Our proof procedure will make the same assumption.

4.1 FK proof procedure

Given an abductive logic program $\langle P, \mathcal{A}, I\rangle$ and an initial goal G, a **derivation** for G wrt $comp_{\overline{\mathcal{A}}}(P), I$ is a sequence of goals, $G_1, \ldots, G_n$, such that $G_1 = G \wedge I$ and each G_{i+1} is obtained from the previous formula G_i by application of one of the following (basic) inference rules:

Unfolding: given an atom $p(t)$ and $p(X) \leftrightarrow D_1 \vee \ldots \vee D_n$ in $comp_{\overline{\mathcal{A}}}(P)$

- if the atom is a conjunct of a simple goal in G_i, then G_{i+1} is G_i with the atom replaced by $(D_1 \vee \ldots \vee D_n)\theta$, where $\theta = \{X/t\}$;
- if the atom is a conjunct L_i in the body of an implication $L_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge L_m \rightarrow A$, $m \geq 1$ which is a conjunct of a simple goal of G_i, then G_{i+1} is G_i with the implication replaced by the conjunction $[L_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge D_1\theta \wedge \ldots \wedge L_m \rightarrow A] \wedge \ldots \wedge [L_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge D_n\theta \wedge \ldots \wedge L_m \rightarrow A]$, where $\theta = \{X/t\}$.

Propagation: given an atom $p(s)$ and an implication $L_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge L_m \rightarrow A$, $m \geq 1$, with $L_i = p(t)$, both conjuncts of the same simple goal in G_i, then G_{i+1} is G_i with $L_1 \wedge \ldots L_{i-1} \wedge t = s \wedge L_{i+1} \wedge \ldots \wedge L_m \rightarrow A$ conjoined to it.

Negation elimination: given an implication $not\, A_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge not\, A_m \rightarrow A$ which is a conjunct of a simple goal in G_i, then G_{i+1} is G_i with the implication replaced by the disjunction $A \vee A_1 \vee \ldots \vee A_m$. [2]

Logical simplification replaces:

$[B \vee C] \wedge E$ *by* $[B \wedge E] \vee [C \wedge E]$ (**splitting**)

$B \wedge true$ *by* B; $B \wedge B$ *by* B; $B \wedge false$ *by* $false$; *etc.*

Equality rewriting applies the equality rewrite rules, simulating the unification algorithm [13] and the application of substitution.

[2] In [5], negation elimination is defined as follows: $not\, A_1 \wedge Rest \rightarrow A$ is replaced by $Rest \rightarrow A \vee A_1$. Operationally, our definition is equivalent to the one in [5].

Case analysis: given an implication $B \wedge X = t \rightarrow A$, where X is a free or existentially quantified variable and t does not contain X and is not a universally quantified variable, if the implication is a conjunct in a simple goal in G_i, then G_{i+1} is G_i with the implication replaced by the disjunction $[X = t \wedge [B \rightarrow A]] \vee [X = t \rightarrow false]$. Any variables in t which are universally quantified in the implication correctly become existentially quantified in the first disjunct and universally quantified in the second disjunct.

Factoring: given a simple goal $a(t) \wedge a(s) \wedge C$ in G_i, with a abducible, G_{i+1} is G_i with the given simple goal replaced by the disjunction $[a(t) \wedge a(s) \wedge C \wedge [t = s \rightarrow false]] \vee [a(t) \wedge C \wedge t = s]$.

Note that for goals in a derivation to be guaranteed to be disjunctions of simple goals, it is sufficient that every step of unfolding, negation elimination and case analysis is followed by a step of splitting.

Given an initial goal G, an FK-derivation $(G_1 = G \wedge I), \ldots (G_n = N \vee Rest)$, for some conjunction N of literals and implications, is a **successful FK-derivation** for G iff no inference rule can be applied to N and $N \neq false$. Given such a successful FK-derivation, an **FK-answer extracted from** N is a pair $(\mathcal{D}, \sigma)$ such that

- σ' is a substitution replacing all free and existentially quantified variables in N by ground terms, and σ' satisfies all equalities and disequalities in N,
- σ is the restriction of σ' to the variables in G,
- $\mathcal{D}$ is the set of all abducible atoms in $N\sigma$.

Every FK-answer extracted from a disjunct in a successful FK-derivation for an initial goal G is called an **FK-computed answer** for G.

In example 3, a possible FK-derivation for *weight-gain* is

$G_1 = weight\text{-}gain \wedge [weight\text{-}gain \wedge not\, pregnant \rightarrow diet]$

$G_2 = G_1 \wedge [not\, pregnant \rightarrow diet]$ by propagation

$G_3 = G_1 \wedge [pregnant \vee diet]$ by negation elimination

$G_4 = [G_1 \wedge pregnant] \vee [G_1 \wedge diet]$ by splitting

$G_5 = [G_1 \wedge [naturally\text{-}inseminated \vee artificially\text{-}inseminated]] \vee [G_1 \wedge diet]$ by unfolding in the first disjunct

$G_6 = [G_1 \wedge naturally\text{-}inseminated] \vee$
$[G_1 \wedge artificially\text{-}inseminated] \vee$ by splitting
$[G_1 \wedge diet]$.

Since no inference rule can be applied to any of the resulting disjuncts, the derivation $G_1, \ldots, G_6$ is a successful derivation. The FK-answers

$\{weight\text{-}gain, naturally\text{-}inseminated\}$,

$\{weight\text{-}gain, artificially\text{-}inseminated\}$ and $\{weight\text{-}gain, diet\}$

can be extracted from the first, second and third disjunct of G_6, respectively. Note that the derivation $G_1, \ldots, G_4$ is also a successful derivation, since no inference rule can be applied to the second disjunct in G_4. The answer $\{weight\text{-}gain, diet\}$ can be extracted from this disjunct.

4.2 Modified proof procedure

In the modified proof procedure, implications in goals are either **marked** (by means of the * symbol) or **non-marked**. In the initial goal, integrity constraints

are marked whereas implications obtained by rewriting negative literals are non-marked. All inference rules of FK except negation elimination can be applied to marked implications. Instead, we define a new inference rule to handle negation in the conditions of marked implications.

Negation rewriting: a *marked* implication $*[not\, A_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge not\, A_m \rightarrow A]$, $m \geq 1$, is replaced by the disjunction $[provable(A_1)] \vee \ldots \vee [provable(A_m)] \vee [*[A_1 \rightarrow false] \wedge \ldots \wedge *[A_m \rightarrow false] \wedge A]$. [3]

All inference rules of FK leave the marked/non-marked status unchanged.

Example 4. In example 2, a possible derivation for *cleaning-day* is

$G_1 = cleaning\text{-}day \wedge *[cleaning\text{-}day \wedge not\, sound\text{-}alarm \rightarrow dust] \wedge$
$*[temperature\text{-}rise \rightarrow sound\text{-}alarm] \wedge *[sound\text{-}alarm \rightarrow evacuate]$

$G_2 = G_1 \wedge *[not\, sound\text{-}alarm \rightarrow dust]$ by propagation

$G_3 = G_1 \wedge [[[*[sound\text{-}alarm \rightarrow false] \wedge dust] \vee [provable(sound\text{-}alarm)]]$ by negation rewriting

$G_4 = [G_1 \wedge [*[sound\text{-}alarm \rightarrow false] \wedge dust] \vee [G_1 \wedge [provable(sound\text{-}alarm)]]$ by splitting

to which no inference rule can be applied.

Given an initial goal G, a derivation $(G_1 = G \wedge I), \ldots (G_n = N \vee Rest)$, for some conjunction N of literals and implications, is a **successful derivation** for G iff no inference rule can be applied to N. Given such a successful derivation, an **answer extracted from** N is a pair $(\mathcal{D}, \sigma)$ such that

- if no conjunct in N is of the form $provable(A)$ then $(\mathcal{D}, \sigma)$ is an FK-answer extracted from N,
- otherwise, let
  1. σ' be a Skolemisation for free and existentially quantified variables in N,
  2. $\mathcal{D}'$ be the set of all abducible atoms in $N\sigma'$, and T be $comp_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathcal{D}') \cup comp_{\overline{\mathcal{A}}}(P)$,
  3. $provable(A)$ be a conjunct of $N\sigma'$,
  4. $G'_1 = A, \ldots, G'_k$ be a derivation wrt $T, \emptyset$ such that $G'_k \neq false$ and $G'_k = N' \vee Rest'$ for some conjunction $N' \neq false$ to which no inference rule can be applied,
  5. N'' be the deSkolemisation of N' wrt σ'.

  If N'' satisfies all (in)equalities in N, $(\mathcal{D}, \sigma)$ is an *answer extracted from* the conjunction obtained by replacing $provable(A)$ in N by N''.

Every answer extracted from a disjunct in a successful derivation for an initial goal G is called a **computed answer** for G.

Given the derivation in example 4, $(\{dust\}, \emptyset)$ is the only (FK-)answer extracted from the first disjunct in G_4. No answer can be extracted from the second disjunct in G_4. Indeed, $provable(sound\text{-}alarm)$ belongs to it, and the only derivation from *sound-alarm*, wrt $T = comp_{\overline{\mathcal{A}}}(\emptyset) \cup comp_{\mathcal{A}}(\{cleaning\text{-}day\}) = \{dust \leftrightarrow false, sound\text{-}alarm \leftrightarrow false, temperature\text{-}rise \leftrightarrow false, cleaning\text{-}day \leftrightarrow true\}$ is the derivation $sound\text{-}alarm, false$.

[3] We assume that everywhere $*[true \rightarrow A]$ is automatically rewritten as A.

To illustrates the requirement that equalities and inequalities must be satisfied during the answer extraction process, let $\langle P, \mathcal{A}, I\rangle$ be

$P = \{p(a) \leftarrow r(a)\}$

$\mathcal{A} = \{r, s, t\}$

$I = \{t(X) \wedge not\, p(X) \rightarrow s(X)\}$.

A possible derivation for $G = r(Y) \wedge t(Y) \wedge [Y = a \rightarrow false]$ is

$G_1 = G \wedge *[t(X) \wedge not\, p(X) \rightarrow s(X)]$

$G_2 = G_1 \wedge *[not\, p(Y) \rightarrow s(Y)]$

$G_3 = [G_1 \wedge *[p(Y) \rightarrow false] \wedge s(Y)] \vee$
$[G_1 \wedge [Y = a \rightarrow false] \wedge provable(p(Y))]$.

G_1, G_2, G_3 is a successful derivation, as no inference rule can be applied to the second disjunct in G_3. To extract an answer from the second disjunct, let

1. σ' be the Skolemisation $\{Y/\alpha\}$,
2. T be $comp_{\overline{\mathcal{A}}}(P) \cup comp_{\mathcal{A}}(\{r(\alpha), t(\alpha)\}) =$
   $\{p(X) \leftrightarrow r(X) \wedge X = a, r(X) \leftrightarrow X = \alpha, t(X) \leftrightarrow X = \alpha, s(X) \leftrightarrow false\}$
3. $provable(p(\alpha))$ be the chosen conjunct of the Skolemised disjunct,
4. $G'_1 = p(\alpha)$, $G'_2 = [r(\alpha) \wedge \alpha = a]$, $G'_3 = [\alpha = \alpha \wedge \alpha = a]$, $G'_4 = [\alpha = a]$ be a derivation, wrt $T, \emptyset$,
5. $Y = a$ be the deSkolemisation of $\alpha = a$ wrt σ'.

Since $Y = a$ does not satisfy the denial $Y = a \rightarrow false$ in the second disjunct in G_3, correctly no answer for G can be extracted from that disjunct.

5 Formal results

Our proof procedure is a specialisation of FK in the sense that every answer computed by our modified proof procedure is also computed by FK.

Theorem 1. *If (D, σ) is a computed answer for an initial goal G then (D, σ) is an FK-computed answer for G.*

The proof of this and all later results are given in an extended version of this paper at `http://laotzu.doc.ic.ac.uk/UserPages/staff/ft/bibliography.html`.

The converse of this theorem does not hold, e.g. for example 2.

FK is sound wrt the semantics of abductive answers in [5], i.e. every FK-computed answer $(\mathcal{D}, \sigma)$ for an initial goal G satisfies the following conditions: 1. $comp(P \cup \mathcal{D}) \cup CET \models G\sigma$, and 2. $comp(P \cup \mathcal{D}) \cup CET \models I$, where $\models$ is either ordinary two-valued logical consequence or logical consequence in Kunen's three-valued logic. We will refer to abductive answers as defined above as **FK-abductive answers**. The following soundness result wrt the semantics of FK-abductive answers is a direct corollary of theorem 1:

Corollary 1 *If $(\mathcal{D}, \sigma)$ is a computed answer for an initial goal G then $(\mathcal{D}, \sigma)$ is an FK-abductive answer for G.*

FK is complete (in a weak sense) wrt the semantics of FK-abductive answers: for every FK-abductive answer $(\mathcal{D}, \sigma)$ for an initial goal G, there exists a subset $\mathcal{D}'$ of $\mathcal{D}$ such that $(\mathcal{D}', \sigma)$ is an FK- computed answer for G. Our procedure is not complete, even in the weak sense, wrt the semantics of FK- abductive answers.

Indeed, it was specifically designed not to compute the unintuitive FK-computed answers. So, it is the semantics, rather than the proof procedure, that is at fault here. However, our procedure is complete wrt the semantics of FK- abductive answers in some cases, e.g when no negation occurs in integrity constraints and goals (in this case our procedure is equivalent to FK).

In the special case in which the given logic program is empty and all atoms occurring in the integrity constraints and the initial goal are abducibles, then our proof procedure computes the *stable model semantics* [6] of the integrity constraints and the goal, both seen as logic programs. In the agent setting, this special case corresponds to purely reactive agents. Every ground negative literal $not\, p$ in the goal is seen as a logic programming rule $false \leftarrow p$.

Theorem 2. *Let $\langle P, \mathcal{A}, I\rangle$ be an abductive logic program with $\mathcal{P} = \emptyset$ and G be an initial goal, and let all predicates occurring in I and G belong to $\mathcal{A}$. Then:*

- *if $(\mathcal{D}, \sigma)$ is a computed answer for G then $\mathcal{D}$ is a stable model of $I \cup G\sigma$;*
- *if M is a stable model of $I \cup G\sigma$, for some variable-free substitution σ for the variables of G, and $false \notin M$, then (M, σ) is a computed answer for G.*

Note that $false$ might be the head of some rule in $I \cup G\sigma$ and thus belong to some stable model of $I \cup G\sigma$.

This theorem is a corollary of theorem 3 below, relating our procedure, in the special case considered in theorem 2, and the procedure of [8], which is proved sound and complete wrt the stable model semantics. Given a logic program T, the proof procedure of [8] applies the model generation theorem prover (MGTP) to the disjunctive logic program $tr(T)$ obtained from T by replacing every rule of the form $A \leftarrow A_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge A_n \wedge not\, A_{n+1} \wedge \ldots \wedge not\, A_{n+m}$ with A, A_i atoms and $n \geq 0$, $m \geq 1$, by a (disjunctive) rule of the form

$[A, \neg KA_{n+1}, \ldots, \neg KA_{n+m}] \vee [KA_{n+1}] \vee \ldots \vee [KA_{n+m}] \leftarrow A_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge A_n$.

[8] computes the set $MGTP(tr(T), \{\emptyset\})$ of all (minimal) models of $tr(T)$ satisfying the denials $\leftarrow A \wedge \neg KA$ and $\leftarrow KA \wedge \neg KA$, for all atoms A, and ignoring the models containing KA but not containing A, for some atom A. [8] proves that for each model M in $MGTP(tr(T), \{\emptyset\})$, the set of all atoms in M is a stable model of T and, conversely, every stable model of T is the set of all atoms of some model in $MGTP(tr(T), \{\emptyset\})$.

Theorem 3. *Let $\langle P, \mathcal{A}, I\rangle$ and G be as in theorem 2.*

- *if $(\mathcal{D}, \sigma)$ is a computed answer for G then $\mathcal{D} \in MGTP(tr(I \wedge G\sigma), \{\emptyset\})$;*
- *if $M \in MGTP(tr(I \wedge G\sigma), \{\emptyset\})$, for some variable-free substitution σ for the variables of G, and $false \notin M$, then (M, σ) is a computed answer for G.*

6 Conclusions and future work

We have defined a new abductive proof procedure and compared it to a number of existing similar proof procedures. We have argued that the new procedure is suitable as the engine underlying active database management systems as well as (rational and reactive) logic-based agents. Indeed, our proof procedure can be used as the underlying procedure in the agent architecture of [11].

Our integrity constraints seem closely related to the production rules with negation as failure proposed by [4]. The formal study of the relationships between the two is a subject for future work.

Our proof procedure needs to be extended to handle built-ins such as $<$, e.g. as in [12]. This extension is needed, in particular, to cater for temporal reasoning in agents.

Finally, future work includes refining existing prototype implementations of the proof procedure.

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