

ZØ: An Optimizing Distributing Zero-Knowledge Compiler

Matthew Fredrikson
University of Wisconsin

Benjamin Livshits
Microsoft Research

Abstract

Traditionally, confidentiality and integrity have been two desirable design goals that have been difficult to combine. *Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge* (ZKPK) offer a rigorous set of cryptographic mechanisms to balance these concerns. However, published uses of ZKPK have been difficult for regular developers to integrate into their code and, on top of that, have not been demonstrated to scale as required by most realistic applications.

This paper presents ZØ (pronounced “zee-not”), a compiler that consumes applications written in C# into code that automatically produces scalable zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge, while automatically splitting applications into distributed multi-tier code. ZØ builds detailed cost models and uses two existing zero-knowledge back-ends with varying performance characteristics to select the most efficient translation. Our case studies have been directly inspired by existing sophisticated widely-deployed commercial products that require both privacy and integrity. The performance delivered by ZØ is as much as 40× faster across six complex applications. We find that when applications are scaled to real-world settings, existing zero-knowledge compilers often produce code that fails to run or even *compile* in a reasonable amount of time. In these cases, ZØ is the only solution we know about that is able to provide an application that works at scale.

1 Introduction

As popular applications rely on personal, privacy-sensitive information about users, factors such as legal regulations, industry self-regulation, and a growing body of privacy-conscious users all pressure developers to respond to demands for privacy. Storing user’s data in the cloud creates downsides for the application provider, both immediately and down the road. While policy measures such as DoNotTrack and anonymous advertising identifiers become increasingly popular, a recent trend explored in several research projects has been to move functionality to the *client* [14, 18, 38, 41]. Because execution happens on the client, such as a mobile device or even in the browser, this alone provides a degree of privacy in the computation: only relevant data, if any, is disclosed (to a server). However, in many cases, moving

functionality to the client conflicts with a need for computational *integrity*: a malicious client can simply forge the results of a computation.

Traditionally, confidentiality and integrity have been two desirable design goals that have been difficult to combine. *Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge* (ZKPK) offer a rigorous set of cryptographic mechanisms to balance these concerns, and recent theoretical developments suggest that they might translate well into practice. In the last several years, zero-knowledge approaches have received a fair bit of attention [24]. The premise of zero-knowledge computation is its promise of both privacy *and* integrity through the mechanism cryptographic proofs. However, published uses of ZKPK [4, 6, 8, 9, 20, 37] have been difficult for regular developers to integrate into their code and, on top of that, have not been demonstrated to scale, as required by most realistic applications.

Zero-knowledge example: pay as you drive insurance: A frequently mentioned application and a good example of where zero-knowledge techniques excel is the practice of *mileage metering* to bill for car insurance: pay as you drive auto insurance is an emerging scheme that involves paying a rate proportional to the number of miles driven, either linearly, or using several billing brackets [4, 39, 42]. Of course, given that the insurance company knows much about the customer, including their address, if daily mileage data is provided, much can be inferred about user’s daily activities, where they shop, etc. [16, 30, 31]. The user in this scheme performs a calculation on their own data, but of course the insurance company wants to prevent cheating. Zero-knowledge proofs provide a way to ensure both privacy and integrity, which involves performing the billing computation on the user’s hardware (on the *client*), perhaps, monthly, and providing the insurance company with 1) the final bill and 2) a proof of correctness of the accounting calculation, which can be verified by the insurance company (on the *server*) [4, 19, 36, 40].

What we did: In this paper, we present ZØ, a compiler that consumes applications written in a subset of C# into code that produces scalable zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge, while automatically splitting applications into distributed code, to be executed on two (or more)

execution tiers. We are building on very recent developments in zero-knowledge cryptographic techniques [17, 32], exposing to the developer the ability to take advantage of these advances. $Z\emptyset$ builds detailed cost models of the code regions that require ZKPK, and uses existing zero-knowledge back-ends with varying performance characteristics to select the most efficient translation, by formulating and solving constrained numeric optimization problems. Our cost modeling takes advantage of the strengths of both back-ends, while avoiding their weaknesses, both for local and global (distributed) optimization. Using a set of realistic applications that perform tasks such as distributed data mining and crowd-sourced data aggregation, we demonstrate $Z\emptyset$'s ability to produce privacy-preserving code which runs significantly faster than previously possible.

High-level goals: $Z\emptyset$ aims to provide an attractive combination of high-level goals of *privacy*, *integrity*, *expressiveness*, and *performance*. While the first two goals are achieved through the use of zero-knowledge, to support ease of programming and expressiveness, $Z\emptyset$ accepts (a subset of) C#, a widely-used general purpose language as input that can run in many settings. Of course, we are not tied to C# and could support another high-level language such as JavaScript, Java, or C++. Our use of a general-purpose language allows developers to include hundreds or thousands of lines of C# or other .NET code, allowing the construction of full-featured GUI-based distributed applications that support zero-knowledge instead of small examples written in a domain-specific language.

To enable distributed programming wherever .NET code can run, $Z\emptyset$ supports automatic tier-splitting, inspired by distributing compilers such as GWT [21] and Volta [25]. We primarily target client-server computations (two tiers), although other options such as P2P are also supported by $Z\emptyset$. Code produced by $Z\emptyset$ can be run on desktops, in the cloud, on mobile devices (Windows Phone) and on the web (Silverlight).

Applications: Much of the inspiration for $Z\emptyset$ came from our desire to be able to use ZKPK techniques to build applications directly analogous to some widely-deployed commercial products, as opposed to toy benchmarks. In our studies detailed in Section 7, we show how they can be (re-)built in a privacy- and integrity-preserving way. For example, our FitBit study was inspired by wireless activity tracking devices manufactured by FitBit (fitbit.com) and Earndit (earndit.com). The Slice study was inspired by purchase tracking software from Slice, Inc. (slice.com). The study Waze app was inspired by Waze, a popular crowd-sourced, real-time traffic app for mobile platforms (waze.com).

Contributions: We make these contributions:

- This paper proposes $Z\emptyset$, a distributing compiler that allows developers to create highly performant, large distributed applications, while preserving both privacy and integrity. $Z\emptyset$ uses precisely calibrated *cost models* to choose which underlying zero-knowledge back-end to employ. Based on the cost model, $Z\emptyset$ statically determines the appropriate *splitting perimeter* for the application to achieve best performance and rewrites it to be run on multiple tiers.
- **Developer:** $Z\emptyset$ is designed to be easily accessible to a regular developer; to this end, we expose zero-knowledge functionality via LINQ, language-integrated-queries built into .NET. We demonstrate the expressiveness of the $Z\emptyset$ approach by developing six case studies directly inspired by commercial applications which we hope will become benchmarks for zero-knowledge tools, ranging from personal fitness tracking (Fitbit) to crowd-sourced traffic-based routing (Waze), to personalized shopping scenarios.
- **Cost modeling:** We develop cost models for the individual back-ends, allowing us to perform global cross-tier optimizations. Our cost-fitting models provide an excellent match with the observed performance, with R^2 scores between .98 and .99.
- **Speedup:** We evaluate $Z\emptyset$ on six complex real-life large-scale applications of zero knowledge, focusing on latency and throughput of zero-knowledge tasks. Our global optimizer is fast, completing in under 3 seconds on all programs. $Z\emptyset$ produces code that achieves as much as 40 \times speedups compared to state-of-the-art zero-knowledge systems. We also find that $Z\emptyset$ is able to effectively optimize *across tiers* in a distributed application: while the code it generates may be slower on one tier (we observed one case that was 2 \times slower for the server), the savings at other tiers are always greater (e.g., 4 \times faster on the client).
- **Scale:** At scale, existing zero-knowledge compilers often produce code that fails to run in a reasonable amount of time, or exhaust system resources during compilation. In these cases, $Z\emptyset$ is the *only* solution that is able to provide a working application.

Paper Organization: The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides motivating examples and some background on zero-knowledge. Section 3 gives an overview of the $Z\emptyset$ approach. Section 5 describes the $Z\emptyset$ compiler implementation. Section 4 talks about cost models and both local and global optimizations $Z\emptyset$ performs. Section 5 describes $Z\emptyset$ implementation. Section 6 discusses how $Z\emptyset$ translates C# into ZK proof-generating code. Section 7 presents six case studies. Section 8 describes our experimental evaluation. Related work is discussed in Section 10 and Section 11 concludes the paper. The PDF version of this paper has

```

1 public class LoyaltyCard : DistributedRuntime
2 {
3     // Local variable declarations
4     [Location(Client)] IEnumerable<int> shophist;
5     [Location(Client)] IEnumerable<int> items;
6     IEnumerable<Triple> automaton;
7     IEnumerable<Pair> transducer;
8
9     public void Initialize(string[] args)
10    {...}
11
12    public void DoWork(string[] args)
13    {
14        var discount =
15            GetDiscounts(shophist, items,
16                        automata, transducer);
17        ApplyDiscount(discount);
18    }
19
20    [Location(Client)]
21    IEnumerable<Pair> GetDiscounts(
22        [MaxSize(Purchases)] IEnumerable<int> history,
23        [MaxSize(Items)] IEnumerable<int> items,
24        [MaxSize(Edges)] IEnumerable<Triple> automata,
25        [MaxSize(States)] IEnumerable<Pair> transducer)
26    {
27        ZeroKnowledgeBegin();
28        // Check that the history is in ascending order
29        var historyAscendingCheck = history.Aggregate(
30            0,
31            (last, curel) => check(last <= curel));
32        // Get the "discount state"
33        var purch_state = history.Aggregate(
34            0,
35            (state, purch) =>
36                automaton.First(
37                    trans => (trans.fld(1) == state) &&
38                            (trans.fld(2) == purch)).
39                            fld(3));
40        var discount = history.Aggregate(
41            new Pair(purch_state, 0),
42            (state, purch) =>
43                new Pair(
44                    // Get the next automata state
45                    automata.First(
46                        trans => (trans.fld(1) == state.fld(1))
47                                && (trans.fld(2) == purch)).
48                                fld(3),
49                    // Total the current state discount
50                    state.fld(2) + transducer.First(
51                        edge => edge.fld(1) == state.fld(1)));
52        ZeroKnowledgeEnd();
53
54        return new IEnumerable<Pair>(discount);
55    }
56
57    [Location(External)] void ApplyDiscount(...)
58    {...}
59 }

```

Figure 1: Example application: a personalized retail loyalty card.

an [embedded file](#) with additional diagrams to supplement the main text.

2 Background

To explain the goals of $Z\emptyset$ concretely, we will demonstrate its functionality on a smartphone application with conflicting privacy and integrity needs.

2.1 Example: Retail Loyalty Card

Figure 1 shows the $Z\emptyset$ code for a personalized retail loyalty card mobile app, with functionality similar to Safe-




Figure 2: Personalized loyalty card application.

way’s “Just for U” application or Walgreens’ iOS application. Each time the customer reaches the check-out line, this application interacts with the retail terminal in a bi-directional exchange of information. The exchange takes place using the phone’s built-in NFC sensor.

First, the application sends a *discount claim* to the retail terminal, pertaining to the items the customer is about to purchase. This discount is computed based on the customer’s previous purchases, using personalization to provide enhanced value and incentive for the customer. Zero-knowledge proofs are supplied to ensure the privacy of the customer’s shopping history, without sacrificing the trustworthiness of their discount claim.

Second, the terminal sends a list of purchases to the client, corresponding to the current check-out transaction. This list, along with the customer’s other previous purchases, will be stored in a client-side database used to compute a discount the next time the user shops with this retailer.

Application Code: Figure 1 contains C# code for computing the core functionality of this application: using the customer’s purchase history to produce a discount, and sending that discount to the retail terminal. It is important to notice that this is standard C#, capable of seamless incorporation into larger bodies of C# code. In fact, $Z\emptyset$ extends the standard C# compiler, and only applies specialized reasoning to classes that inherit from $Z\emptyset$ ’s `DistributedRuntime` class. All of the UI and external library code can remain in the application, without affecting the performance and functionality of $Z\emptyset$. This allows $Z\emptyset$ to scale to large applications with arbitrary legacy dependencies, provided that the sections requiring zero-knowledge reasoning are localized and moderate in size. Several important points bear mentioning.

First, of the four functions, two of them, which we call *worker functions*, contain *location annotations*: `GetDiscounts` is constrained to execute on the client (e.g., the user’s smartphone), and `ApplyDiscount` to `External` (e.g., the retail terminal). $Z\emptyset$ generates separate object code for each of these locations, and inserts code to handle the network transfer and data marshalling for any dependencies between these two functions. In order to streamline the code generated by $Z\emptyset$, the worker functions must always return `void` or `IEnumerable` ob-

jects, which $Z\emptyset$'s underlying runtime is optimized to quickly marshal and transfer.

Second, the target functionality is computed from the main function `DoWork`, which is called after `Initialize`. `Initialize` gives the application an opportunity to prepare the class's local state by reading sensors, buffering data, etc., and can contain arbitrary C# code. `DoWork` is more constrained: it can contain a sequence of calls to worker functions, with no intermediate local computations, branching statements, or loop statements. This allows $Z\emptyset$ to efficiently compute the dependencies between different tiers. In this case, $Z\emptyset$ determines that the return value of `GetDiscounts` (computed on the smartphone) is always used by `ApplyDiscount` (computed on the retail terminal), and inserts code to package and send, or receive and unpack, the necessary data as well as any accompanying zero-knowledge proofs.

Third, the main code is located in `GetDiscounts`, which takes a list of the user's previous purchases (`history`), the user's current check-out items (`items`), and a finite-state transducer (`automata` and `transducer`), and produces a discount dollar value for transfer to the retail terminal. The transducer is produced by the retailer, and is designed to associate past purchases to items that the customer may be interested in buying in the future; the details of designing the transducer are beyond the scope of this work. `GetDiscounts` begins by checking that the purchases are given in ascending order, by their ID numbers; this is a simple optimization that allows the retailer to minimize the size of the transducer. This check is performed using LINQ's `Aggregate` operator, and $Z\emptyset$'s check function, which behaves like an assertion. It then proceeds to traverse the transducer's finite-state machine using the customer's shopping history, effectively loading the history into the transducer's memory in preparation for emitting discount values.

Finally, the customer's current items are processed by traversing the finite-state machine, starting in the final state of the previous traversal, and summing the output of the transducer relation. The final sum is returned to `DoWork` as a discount claim.

Zero-knowledge: The entirety of `GetDiscounts` is computed in zero-knowledge, as indicated by the `ZeroKnowledgeBegin()` and `ZeroKnowledgeEnd()` annotations. Notice that each statement of this method consists of a LINQ query, giving the computation an overall functional form, without using language features such as references, loops, or conditionals. This is necessary to accommodate faithful translation into code that produces zero-knowledge proofs using the zero-knowledge back-ends discussed in Section 2.2. However, the programmer is still able to express computations in this fragment of standard C#, without dealing with the overhead of inter-language binding between the engines and the main pro-

gram, and without needing to learn the different input languages understood by each engine.

Finally, a few subtle details of this code bear mentioning. Two of the class variable declarations, `shophist` and `items`, have location annotations that tell $Z\emptyset$ that they should not leave the customer's smartphone without first being processed by zero-knowledge code. This gives the programmer an extra degree of assurance of the code's privacy properties, letting her treat the zero-knowledge code regions like *declassifiers* with additional integrity guarantees. Finally, notice that the parameters to `GetDiscounts` contain `MaxSize` attribute annotations. These optional size annotations allow the $Z\emptyset$ compiler to do precise cost modeling, as explained in Section 4.

2.2 Zero-Knowledge Back-ends

$Z\emptyset$ relies on two zero-knowledge back-ends, Pinocchio [32] and ZQL [17], to produce code that balances privacy and integrity. Each of these back-ends takes an expression, in the form of executable code in a high-level source language, and produces object code that computes the expression over dynamically-provided inputs while building zero-knowledge proofs for the expression on the given input. These engines have very different characteristics that affect performance and usability in different ways, which we outline here.

Pinocchio: Pinocchio utilizes a novel underlying computation model, *Quadratic Arithmetic Polynomials*, to evaluate an expression and produce zero-knowledge proofs [32]. For some computations, it yields performance gains several orders of magnitude beyond previous systems that gave similar functionality, producing proofs of a *constant size* regardless of the size or structure of the target expression.

The expression language supported by Pinocchio is a strict subset of C, and the object created for evaluation is an *arithmetic circuit* [32]. The fact that the target circuit must be finite, and cannot encode *side-effects*, imposes necessary conditions on the parts of C that are available. Loops and conditionals are "unrolled" during compilation, so all loops must have static bounds. Likewise, pointers and array indices must be compile-time constants, or simple loop variables (as these are unrolled), thus simplifying cost modeling. For this paper we used a publicly released version of Pinocchio 0.4 obtained from the public distribution¹.

ZQL: ZQL utilizes several fairly recent advances in the theory of zero-knowledge proofs to produce efficient verified private code that operates over functional lists [17]. The underlying cryptographic machinery used by ZQL is more traditional than that of Pinocchio, relying heavily on homomorphic commitment schemes to provide its

¹<https://vc.codeplex.com/downloads/get/714129>




Figure 3: ZØ architecture. ZQL and Pinocchio are used as sample back-ends for illustrative purposes.

guarantees. The expression language supported by ZQL is a simple functional language without side effects, and limited operator support. In a nutshell, ZQL supports map and fold operations, as well as find operations over tuples of integers. Boolean expressions can only be used inside of find operations, and are currently limited to conjunctions of equality tests; all forms of inequality are not explicitly supported, although the authors plan to support these operations in future versions. In terms of arithmetic, addition, subtraction, and multiplication are supported. Finally, multiple operations can be sequenced using classic functional let bindings. Although these constructs might seem modest at first blush, the ability to perform table lookups using find allows for the evaluation of logic gates, and the list-based map and fold operations place no upper-bound on the size of the program’s input, as in the case of Pinocchio. We obtained a version of ZQL from its authors.

3 Overview

Figure 3 shows the architecture of the ZØ compiler. The developer provides as input a set of C# source files, which may include arbitrary regions of legacy and library code as well as functionality targeted towards zero-knowledge proof generation. ZØ then enters a *cost modeling* stage, analyzing the zero-knowledge regions, building performance models that characterize the cost of providing zero-knowledge proof generation and verification code for each available zero-knowledge back-end. These models take the form of polynomials over the size of the input data to the zero-knowledge region in the original C# application. ZØ then compares the models to determine which engine the application should use for each C# statement in the region, and translates the C# code (depicted in the *zero-knowledge translation* stage of Figure 3) into expressions understood by the appropriate zero-knowledge engine. In the *final output* stage (Fig-




Figure 4: Comparison of times for several applications.

ure 3), ZØ decides how to split the application across tiers to maximize performance, given privacy annotations as well as relative *costs* for transmitting data and computing at each tier.

This translation yields a separate module which is callable from the original application, either as an *arithmetic circuit* (Pinocchio) or standard .NET bytecode (ZQL). Finally, ZØ partitions the original C# code, along with the zero-knowledge modules compiled in the previous step, into multiple applications to run at each *service tier*. During partitioning, ZØ inserts code to perform communication, synchronization, data marshaling, and zero-knowledge proof transfer in parallel to the original application code. The resulting modules are standard .NET bytecode that can be run on the proper tiers without the need for additional specialized software.

Optimization & cost models: Even apparently straightforward applications like the personalized loyalty card app discussed in Section 2.1 contain subtle characteristics that might make zero-knowledge proof generation expensive. It is often the case that one zero-knowledge engine offers significantly better performance for a particular statement, and selecting the appropriate engine for each computation in the zero-knowledge region means the difference between a scalable, low-latency implementation and one that requires hours or days to execute.

For the loyalty card application in Figure 1, it turns out that the inequality comparisons are better handled by Pinocchio, whereas the table lookups needed to execute the transducer are very inexpensive when performed by ZQL. A comparison of the times to perform the operation on the y-axis for several applications from Section 7 is shown in Figure 4. We can see dramatic differences in performance between the back-ends, with the $Z\emptyset$ approach out-performing either of the two back-ends. $Z\emptyset$ addresses these performance differences by building detailed performance models for each statement in the zero-knowledge region.

Distributed configuration: To support a variety of distributed scenarios, $Z\emptyset$ allows the developer to place code on several different tiers, which are specified using the following *tier labels*: *Client* (end-user’s primary device), *External* (provider’s servers), *ClientShare* (peer-to-peer nodes), and *ClientResource* (additional hosts owned by end-user). Tiers impose data confidentiality and integrity constraints, as $Z\emptyset$ makes assumptions about the *trust relationships* between tiers.

The figure in this paragraph shows these relationships; white cells indicate trust, and gray the opposite. At compile time, the user can modify the configuration by specifying *weights* on each tier label indicating the relative cost of computation at that tier, as well as the cost of communication between tiers. $Z\emptyset$ uses these weights during optimization to determine the best placement of code and data amongst the tiers, and are only necessary to fine-tune the performance of certain applications; they can be ignored and left at the default value of 1 by default. Data privacy constraints are given by the programmer by marking certain variables as *private* to a particular tier using the attribute $[Private(T_L)]$, where T_L specifies the tier to which the data is considered private (e.g., *Client*, *External*, ...).

	C	CS	CR	E
C				
CS				
CR				
E				

Note that by design, these annotations are lightweight: they are only needed on (the few) variables that must be kept confidential. Most can be declared without any annotations at all.

When $Z\emptyset$ compiles the application and runs a global optimization described in Section 4.2 to place each worker method on a specific tier, privacy annotations are used in part to determine on which tiers a method may reside. These constraints are *hard*, meaning that a privacy annotation that requires a less performant compilation configuration will always be respected; if the privacy constraints conflict with each other, then compilation will not terminate early. Privacy annotations are propagated transitively using a local dataflow analysis, so that dependent variables have matching annotations.

Threat model: Because of its reliance on zero-

knowledge back-ends, $Z\emptyset$ makes all of the assumptions needed for security by ZQL [17] and Pinocchio [32]. The result of $Z\emptyset$ compilation will be executed on one or more tiers. Privacy is violated when the trust relationships given in the previous section are violated. We assume that tiers cannot learn information by means other than direct communication, i.e. *Server* cannot obtain the list of purchases through side channels, for instance, unless it is directly shared by *Client*. Our applications that use secret sharing (Waze and Slice in Section 7) also assume that P2P clients do not collude.

4 Cost Models & Optimizations

This section discusses $Z\emptyset$ ’s cost modeling approach to optimizing zero-knowledge computations. As outlined in Section 3, in many cases one zero-knowledge engine will outperform the other on a particular computation by a significant factor, giving $Z\emptyset$ a key opportunity to optimize the code it produces. $Z\emptyset$ optimizes zero-knowledge regions by building detailed performance models that characterize the cost of building and verifying zero-knowledge proofs in each engine. We are able to accomplish this with reasonable accuracy because the execution depth of zero-knowledge regions is statically-bounded (a necessary condition imposed by the underlying engines), and the evaluation of zero-knowledge code universally relies on a few primitive operations. This allows $Z\emptyset$ to build static *cost models* as polynomials over the number of primitive operations each region must execute.

Section 4.1 discusses local optimizations within a given zero-knowledge region to decide which back-end to use. Section 4.2 proposes a split for the entire application designed for maximal performance.

4.1 Local Optimization

In order to build cost models for ZQL code, we execute the F# “object code” generated by ZQL’s compiler *symbolically*. Symbolic data is represented by polynomials that characterize the size of the corresponding concrete data, or structured sets of polynomials in the case of structured data types. The symbolic operation for each ZQL operation accumulates terms on a polynomial that characterize the cost of that operation in terms of the size of its input data, and returns a new polynomial that characterizes the cost of producing of the result. Because the execution depth of iteration commands is always a polynomial function of the size of the inputs, and ZQL programs do not contain branching, accumulating a cost polynomial by symbolic execution necessarily accounts for *all* of the operations contained in a ZQL program.

Recall that Pinocchio compiles C code into a circuit, which is evaluated by a specialized runtime to produce and verify zero-knowledge proofs. The Pinocchio runtime executes roughly the same code to evaluate every

	ZQL			Pinocchio		
	Setup	Prover	Verif.	Keygen	Prover	Verif.
FitBit	0.01	1.81	0.10	0.39	0.20	0.00
Waze	0.11	0.29	0.25	0.04	0.02	0.00
Loyalty	0.03	0.35	0.11	0.31	0.20	0.00
Slice	0.06	0.41	0.32	0.05	0.03	0.00
Average	0.05	0.72	0.20	0.20	0.11	0.00

Figure 5: Absolute regression error (in seconds).

circuit, varying only on the number of times each operation is executed to handle every element of each input list and every operation in the circuit. We build a set of static polynomials that characterize the execution time of the runtime in terms of the size of the input circuit, i.e., the number of I/O wires and multiplication gates it contains. For example, the cost of the verification stage is given by the polynomial:

$$ExpMulB \times NInputs + 12 \times Pair + VerifyConst$$

In this polynomial, $ExpMulB$ corresponds to the amount of time taken to complete a multi-Exponentiation on the Pinocchio’s base elliptic curve, $NInputs$ to the number of input wires in the circuit, $Pair$ to the field pairing cost [32], and $VerifyConst$ to a fixed setup cost for the verification stage. Similar polynomials are derived for the other stages of Pinocchio’s runtime.

We use least-squares regression to derive coefficients for all models except those for Pinocchio’s compute-stage model, which contains a non-linear term corresponding to the $O(n \cdot \log^2 n)$ runtime of polynomial interpolation. To cope with the non-linearity in Pinocchio’s compute-stage model, we use the Gauss-Newton method [34] with at most 1,000 iterations and a randomly-chosen starting point.

Cost-fitting results: To derive the necessary coefficients for our models, we built a regression training application in $Z\emptyset$ consisting of several basic operations likely to appear in zero-knowledge applications. The training application takes as input a list of integers, and computes an aggregate sum, scalar product, second-degree polynomial, boolean mapping, and table lookup on the list. We compiled this application to use both all-ZQL and all-Pinocchio zero knowledge computations, and ran it ten times for each zero-knowledge engine using a fixed list size ($n = 100$). We performed regression to learn coefficients corresponding to the execution time of each primitive operation appearing in the cost model. We then compiled a representative subset of the applications described in Section 7 to use either all-ZQL or all-Pinocchio zero-knowledge computations, executed each zero-knowledge region ten times, and recorded the deviation between execution time predicted by the regression-trained cost models and the mean execution time observed over all experiments for a given application. Figure 5 presents

the prediction error of the trained cost models in terms of the total zero-knowledge execution time in seconds. Note that the models derived for Pinocchio are generally more accurate in terms of relative error than those for ZQL, but the error in both cases is quite small: the greatest Pinocchio error is 0.39 seconds (on FitBit’s key generation routine), while the greatest ZQL error is 1.81 seconds (on FitBit’s prover routine). The coefficient of determination (R^2) for each performance model is at least 0.98, indicating a precise fit of the models to the execution time.

Summary: To summarize, $Z\emptyset$ is able to build performance models of zero-knowledge regions that predict actual execution time within tenths of a second in most cases, which provides ample accuracy to make a correct decision when selecting zero-knowledge engines at compile-time.

4.2 Global Optimization

$Z\emptyset$ builds cost polynomials to characterize the expense of each zero-knowledge operation in the target application. However, selecting the least expensive engine for each operation is oftentimes not as straightforward as evaluating each polynomial at a target input size and choosing the engine corresponding to the lesser value — it may be the case that a less expensive operation on the prover’s side requires a more expensive operation on the verifier’s side, and depending on the application computation may be more expensive for the verifier. Alternatively, there may be several ways to partition an application between tiers while preserving the privacy of variables at each tier, with each partition yielding a different trade-off between computation and communication cost. To address these concerns, $Z\emptyset$ performs *global optimization* on the application to balance the cost of computation and communication among differentiated tiers.

Performance of global optimization: We implemented our global optimization algorithm as part of the $Z\emptyset$ compiler. We use CCI2 to traverse the AST of the target code, and our cost modeler to generate the objective function.

To perform the constrained optimization needed to find an optimal solution, we used the Nelder-Mead method [34] with at most 100 iterations. We looked for integer solutions over the full space of tier splittings.

The results are presented in Figure 6. Each application resulted in between 30 and 300 constraints, and the constraint solver found an optimal solution in under three seconds for all applications. Because Nelder-Mead is an

	Constr. Time	
FitBit	179	1.50
Loyalty	38	0.01
Waze	263	2.65
Slice	230	2.14

Figure 6: Global optimization performance, showing solver time in seconds for the benchmarks in Section 7.




Figure 7: Splits produced by global $Z\emptyset$ optimizations, for FitBit and Slice. For each phase of the computation, grey cells indicate computation location (or tier) chosen by the optimizer, with **P** and **Z** denoting ZQL and Pinocchio back-ends, respectively.

approximate numerical optimization algorithm, it is possible that it would return a *local* minimum.

However, we checked the solution returned for each application, and verified that it corresponded to the true global minimum. Figure 7 shows examples of $Z\emptyset$ -computed global splits for two representative applications.

5 Implementation

In order to make privacy analysis, zero-knowledge translation, and aggressive optimization feasible for the programmer, $Z\emptyset$ supports a subset of C# that includes certain LINQ (language integrated queries [35]) functionality and support for external code. To ensure that the external code does not interfere with the privacy, integrity, and optimization goals of $Z\emptyset$, the contexts in which it is allowed are limited in some cases. The syntax accepted by $Z\emptyset$ is summarized in Figure 8.

The main program is structured into three parts: an initialization routine (`InitBlock`, contained in a method `Initialize`), the main body (`MainBlock`, contained in a method `DoWork`), and the worker methods (`MethodDef`). The initialization routine may consist of a sequence of arbitrary C# assignment statements, including calls to methods in external libraries not written in $Z\emptyset$'s input language. The main block consists of a sequence of method calls, assignment statements, and sleep statements. Each method call in the main body must be to a worker method defined in the $Z\emptyset$ application.

Zero-knowledge regions: The body of each worker method can contain calls to external methods, standard C# arithmetic and Boolean operations, and a subset of the standard LINQ data processing operations. Regions comprised of LINQ operations can be converted into zero-knowledge proof-generating object code using either available zero-knowledge engine (ZQL or Pinoc-

Main program definition

```

Program      ::= InitBlock MainBlock MethodDef* TypeDef*
InitBlock    ::= CSMethodSig VarDecl*
MainBlock    ::= CSMethodSig WorkerStmt+
MethodDef    ::= CSMethodSig (ExternCall | LinqStmt)+
TypeDef      ::= class Id { CSFieldDef + }
CSMethodSig ::= PrivacyAnnot CSType Id(...){ ... }

```

Statements

```

WorkerStmt  ::= SleepStmt | CallStmt | ZKAnnot
SleepStmt   ::= WorkerSleep(Integer, Integer, Integer)
CallStmt    ::= (Id =)? MethodCall
ExternCall  ::= return External.Id(("Id**"))
LinqStmt    ::= (Id =)? LinqExpr
VarDecl     ::= (PrivacyAnnot | SizeAnnot)? Id(= CSEExpr)?

```

Expressions

```

Lambda      ::= ("Id**") => LambdaExpr
LambdaExpr  ::= MethodCall | ArithOrBoolExpr
              | FieldExpr | NewObj
LinqExpr    ::= LambdaLinqExpr | ZipLinqExpr
LambdaLinqExpr ::= Id.LambdaLinqId(Lambda)
LambdaLinqId ::= Select | Aggregate | First
ZipLinqExpr ::= Id.Zip(Id, NewAnonObj)
MethodCall  ::= Id(("LambdaExpr**"))
NewObj      ::= NewAnonObj | NewStaticObj
NewAnonObj  ::= new {(Id = LambdaExpr)+}
NewStaticObj ::= new MethodCall
FieldExpr   ::= Id.f1d<Type>(Int)

```

Annotations

```

ZKAnnot     ::= ZeroKnowledgeBegin()
              | ZeroKnowledgeEnd()
PrivacyAnnot ::= [Private( $T_L$ )]
SizeAnnot   ::= [MaximumInputSize(Int+)]

```

Figure 8: BNF syntax for the subset of C# supported by $Z\emptyset$. Entities prefixed with **CS** correspond to the corresponding C# syntax entity.

chio). The supported LINQ operations include `Select`, `Aggregate`, `First`, and `Zip`. `Select` provides the ability to project the data in one list into a new list, while performing arithmetic and Boolean operations on each item in the original source list. `Aggregate` provides the ability to compute iterated functions over a list, maintaining an order-sensitive state through the iteration, which is eventually returned as the result of the operation. `First` provides the ability to perform searches over lists, using a programmer-defined predicate to determine which element of the list to match. Finally, `Zip` provides the ability to combine multiple lists, applying arithmetic and Boolean operations to each pair of items from the original source lists.

Zero-knowledge regions are specified by the programmer using a pair of methods `ZeroKnowledgeBegin` and `ZeroKnowledgeEnd`. Because zero-knowledge computations provide both integrity and privacy, these annotations serve a dual purpose. First, the programmer is denoting that the variables which are *live* [1] at the end of a zero-knowledge region are trusted across all tiers: the values have accompanying proofs that any tier can examine to verify that the computations in the zero-knowledge

region are performed correctly. Second, these regions serve to *declassify* private values that are used as inputs to a zero-knowledge region; this is in line with the approach taken by ZQL [17]. Because the inputs to zero-knowledge regions are kept private, except in cases where the computations are in some way invertible, the output values that depend on these inputs are considered public to all tiers.

Formal reasoning about composing proofs obtained from different zero-knowledge back-ends remains an avenue for future work. Because this work involves experimentation with very recent cryptographic tools, we are not aware of a readily-available composition theorem that would support reasoning about Pinocchio and ZQL.

Code splitting: $Z\emptyset$ partitions the given target application into code that runs on multiple tiers, inserting marshalling and synchronization code [21, 25] as necessary to ensure that the compiled functionality matches that specified in the original input program. The rewrite process is implemented as a bytecode-to-bytecode transformation within the CCI 2 rewriting framework for .NET [28]. We assume that the target tier for each method is provided as input to the compiler by the optimizer, as described in Section 4.2.

Code partitioning between tiers takes place at method granularity, and data partitioning is determined by the chosen code partition; data is transmitted between tiers on-demand, with all of the data represented by a variable used by a particular method being transmitted at once as it becomes available. Only worker methods can be split between different tiers, so all external code referenced by the application is present on each tier. This allows the compiler to avoid a potentially expensive deep-dependency analysis of the referenced external code, while keeping the dependency analysis of the target application localized to DoWork.

Runtime support: The architectural principle that guides $Z\emptyset$'s tier-splitting algorithm can be summarized as follows: *whenever possible, delegate the data communication and synchronization operations necessary to support functionality to a runtime API*. Each application compiled by $Z\emptyset$ is linked to a runtime library that provides an API for communicating data and synchronization between separate tiers. When the compiler performs tier splitting, rather than inlining complex code to perform the tasks, simple calls to this API are inserted to perform the “heavy lifting” of tier crossings at runtime.

6 Translating LINQ to Zero-Knowledge

Our compiler translates specified statements containing `LinqExpr` components in the worker methods into code that generates zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge. To accomplish this, $Z\emptyset$ relies on two *zero-knowledge back-ends*: ZQL [17] and Pinocchio [32]. Each back-end is

itself a compiler, accepting as input an expression of a computation, and producing executable code to produce a zero-knowledge proof of the computation for a given set of inputs. As such, each back-end supports its own *expression language* with significantly different characteristics. The challenge addressed in this section is the translation of the common subset of LINQ supported by $Z\emptyset$ into the expression languages of these back-ends.

Figure 1 in the [PDF attachment](#) gives an overview of our back-end compilation process for ZQL and Pinocchio. The details differ widely for each back-end, converging only on the first and last steps which correspond to lifting low-level intermediate language code into a higher representation and inserting I/O marshalling instructions before and after the compiled object code. This divergence of functionality is necessary given the differences between the two expression languages: ZQL's expression language is essentially a small subset of pure standard ML, whereas Pinocchio's is a subset of C with restrictions on data types and loop bounds. Because the subset of LINQ functions supported by $Z\emptyset$ corresponds to a small core of functional expressions, translating from $Z\emptyset$ to Pinocchio is much more involved than to ZQL.

6.1 Pinocchio

The structure of C code is substantially different from the types of LINQ queries allowed by $Z\emptyset$, and Pinocchio's additional restrictions make translation more complicated yet. First, all list sizes used in the Pinocchio expression must be statically-declared, and any operation over a list requires a static value to bound the corresponding loop statement. The LINQ commands in $Z\emptyset$ do not have these restrictions, so we must find a way to derive the needed information. Second, many expression forms in $Z\emptyset$'s LINQ commands have no corresponding expression form in C: they must be converted into statements whose side-effects are available as sub-expressions to enclosing expressions.

To perform translation to Pinocchio, $Z\emptyset$ follows a three-step process. First, static values for the size of each identifier that refers to a list value are derived using a constraint solver. The basis for this computation is a set of annotations provided by the developer, which indicate upper bounds on the sizes of certain input lists.

List Size Resolution: As previously discussed, Pinocchio requires static sizes for all lists and list operations, so our translation procedure requires a mapping from identifiers (for those that refer to list objects) to size constants. To produce such a mapping, we use a constraint resolution procedure over a set of bounding constraints generated by traversing the source expression. The rules for generating the constraints are given in Figure 9. Each rule is of the form $\Gamma, \textit{Syntactic Element} \Rightarrow \Gamma'$, where Γ

$$\begin{array}{l}
\text{con}(expr) = \\
\quad \{id.elt\} \quad \text{when } expr \text{ is } id.\text{First}(\dots) \\
\quad \{id_1, id_2\} \quad \text{when } expr \text{ is } id_1.\text{Zip}(id_2, \dots) \\
\quad \{id\} \quad \text{when } expr \text{ is } id.\text{Aggregate}(\dots) \\
\quad \{id\} \quad \text{when } expr \text{ is } id.\text{Select}(\dots) \\
\quad \{id.n\} \quad \text{when } expr \text{ is } id.\text{Fld}(n) \\
\text{con}(id) = \{id\} \\
\\
\text{C-Basic} \frac{\text{Command} \in \{\text{Select}, \text{First}\}}{\Gamma, id_1.\text{Command}(id_2 \rightarrow \dots) \Rightarrow \Gamma \cup \{id_1.elt = id_2\}} \\
\text{C-Zip} \frac{}{\Gamma, id_1.\text{Zip}(id_2, (id_3, id_4) \rightarrow \dots) \Rightarrow \Gamma \cup \{id_1.elt = id_3 \wedge id_2.elt = id_4\}} \\
\text{C-FieldDef1} \frac{\varphi \leq id = x \wedge id.elt = 1}{\Gamma, [\text{MaximumInputSize}(x)] \text{IEnumerable}(T) id \Rightarrow \Gamma \cup \{\varphi\}} \\
\text{C-FieldDef2} \frac{\varphi = \begin{array}{l} id \leq x \wedge id.elt \leq n_1 \wedge id.elt.elt \\ \leq n_2 \wedge \dots \wedge id.(elt)^k \leq n_k \wedge id.elt^{k+1} = 1 \end{array}}{\Gamma, [\text{MaximumInputSize}(x, \{n_1, \dots, n_k\})] \text{IEnumerable}(T) id \Rightarrow \Gamma \cup \{\varphi\}} \\
\text{C-Method} \frac{id(id_1, \dots, id_n) \text{ is a call site}}{\Gamma, \text{Type } id(id_1^f, \dots, id_n^f) \{ \dots \} \Rightarrow \Gamma \cup \{id_1^f \geq id_1, \dots, id_n^f \geq id_n\}} \\
\text{C-New} \frac{V_i = \text{con}(expr_i)}{\Gamma, \text{new } id(expr_1, \dots, expr_n) \Rightarrow \Gamma \cup \bigcup_{1 \leq i \leq n} \{\wedge_{v \in V_i} id.i = v\}} \\
\text{C-Aggregate} \frac{}{\Gamma, id_1.\text{Aggregate}((id_2, id_3) \rightarrow \dots) \Rightarrow \Gamma \cup \{id_1.elt = id_3\}} \\
\text{C-Assign} \frac{V = \text{con}(expr)}{\Gamma, id = expr \Rightarrow \Gamma \cup \{\wedge_{v \in V} id = v\}}
\end{array}$$

Figure 9: List size constraint generation rules. Γ is a set of constraints.

and Γ' are sets of constraints. The constraints for each LINQ command are straightforward. The outcome of **Select**, **Aggregate**, and **Zip** operations has the same size as the input variable(s). The outcome of a **First** statement has the size of the elements contained in the input list.

The rules are invoked by a procedure that traverses each node of the program's AST, and performs syntactic matching on the entity represented by each node and the *Syntactic Element* of each rule. As the traversal proceeds, a list of constraints is maintained, and updated when rules match AST nodes. When the AST traversal completes, the set of constraints generated is passed to Z3 for resolution. If the constraints are satisfiable, Z3 will produce a model that associates constraint variables to integers that satisfy the original constraints. This model contains all of the information needed to derive the needed mapping between identifiers and list sizes.

Type Generation and Function Isolation: Pinocchio requires static sizes on all arrays and loop bounds. To accomplish this, ZØ creates a new struct type for each list with a distinct base type and size in the original program. Each new type has two fields: a static array and a constant defining the size.

Once types for each identifier are established, each sub-expression in the source statement is converted to a function body. To see the need for this step, consider the statement $x.\text{Select}(el \rightarrow el.\text{Select}(\dots))$. C has no expression form for the functionality needed by the **Select** command, so both expressions must be converted into loop statements. Rather than placing the loop statements in the same method body and carefully managing side effects and sequencing with other sub-expressions, we isolate the emitted code for the inner **Select** in a separate function, and emit a call to the new function in its place in the context of the outer **Select** expression.

The statements generated for each LINQ command are straightforward translations of their defined behavior into basic C; in general, the input loop is iterated over, and the

lambda passed to the command is invoked over each element. Field lookups, new object construction, and function calls are rewritten to their C equivalents.

6.2 ZQL

Recall that we only attempt to convert **LinqStmt** statements into zero-knowledge, so there are four primary functions to convert, in addition to a few additional expression forms. By no coincidence, the four primary LINQ functions correspond closely to the operations supported by ZQL. Figure 2 in the [PDF attachment](#) gives a set of rewrite rules that can be used to translate a **LinqExpr** to ZQL's expression language. **Select**, **Aggregate**, **Zip**, and **First** calls are translated to **map**, **fold**, **map2**, and **find** expressions. Lambda definitions and functions calls are translated compositionally, by first translating sub-expressions and then building a new construct in the target language. Object creation using **new** is translated into tuple construction. Recall that user-defined types in a ZØ program must expose a single constructor that assigns all fields of the type; field names are translated into a tuple order using the constructor signature. Similarly, field accesses using **fld** are translated into a **let** binding that returns the appropriate tuple component; the translation consults the target identifier's type constructor to deduce the number of fields in the type.

7 Motivating Case Studies

This section presents six case studies in ZØ, that are the focus of our experiments in Section 8. Similarly to [17], we assume that the sensor readings devices can be trusted and untampered with, and come signed by their producer, but the machine or mobile phone (**Client** tier) that performs the distance computation is not.

1) Walk for Charity with FitBit: Several programs exist for paying users for the amount of physical exercise they perform, either directly in the form of rewards, or indirectly by making charitable donations on their behalf,

such as earndit.com. This works by requiring users to log their exercise habits using a FitBit or other sensor device to measure the distance the user walks, runs, or bikes, and send the logs to a centralized server.

Privacy: The user may not want to reveal their *detailed physical activities* or *exercise route* to a relatively untrusted third party.

Integrity: The service is spending money on the basis of distance derived from sensor logs. If the distance computation can be subverted, the possibility for fraud arises, analogously to pay as you drive insurance [4, 39, 42].

Solution: Keep all sensor readings local to the user's machine (laptop or mobile device), perform the distance computation locally, on the client, send the result of the distance computation to the centralized third-party server. Use ZKPK to ensure that the distance computation is performed correctly. This approach is similar to what has been advocated for smart metering [36].

2) Supervised Studies in Social Sciences: Many scientific studies, especially in medical and social sciences, require subjects to wear sensors and undergo protocols that provide information about their physiological and psychological state. A study that seeks to understand the effect of common workplace events on worker's stress levels might require a participant to wear a galvanic skin response sensor and a camera to detect face-to-face interactions.

Privacy: Participants may have concerns about the use of their physiological measurements or, most prominently, the processing of images taken from their cameras.

Integrity: These studies typically involve payment given to subjects. Subjects concerned about their privacy, or those who simply do not want to wear intrusive sensor devices, have an incentive to *fake* their data.

Solution: Have all sensors associated with the study report readings to the subject's machine (desktop or mobile phone). This machine performs aggregate computations relevant to the actual study on the readings, reporting results and discarding the raw sensor readings. ZKPK is used to ensure that the readings are processed correctly.

3) Personalized Loyalty Cards: Many of today's large retailers such as Target, BestBuy, etc. use customer loyalty cards to encourage repeat visits. Typically, the customer must enroll in a loyalty program, and receive a card that can be applied to receive discounts in future visits. Recently, certain retailers (e.g., Safeway) have begun personalizing this process by using the customer's past purchase history (available because of the association between checkout and loyalty card) to create discounts available only to one particular customer. Depending on the retailer, these discounts can be sent to the customer's mobile phone, or applied automatically at checkout.

Privacy: Many people are not comfortable with a retailer tracking their purchases. This is most readily illustrated by a recent scandal with Target discovering that a teenage girl was pregnant before her parents did [15].

Integrity: Retailers offer discounts on the basis of past purchase history. If a customer could fake a purchase history, they might be able to obtain a discount for an item of their choosing. Moreover, having a reproducible strategy for "generating" discounts might create a serious problem for the retailer, similar to those experienced by some retailers that were overly generous in offering Groupons [33].

Solution: The solution is discussed in Section 2.1.

4) Crowd-sourced Traffic Statistics: Several mobile applications such as Waze (waze.com) and Google Maps provide traffic congestion information to end-users based on the combined GPS readings of the users.

Privacy: Users do not want to share their location with the app's servers, or the general public (in the case of a distributed protocol).

Integrity: The app needs reliable GPS readings from users to provide its core functionality. If users wish to "game" the system by providing fake GPS readings while receiving the end-product, the integrity of traffic data is compromised for everyone.

Solution: Let the users keep their GPS readings local, and take part in a distributed protocol to compute local density information for transmission to the app's central server. Clients represent their location on a map using a vector, represented as a set of secret shares, which can be added to the other clients' vector shares to derive the overall traffic density map. When each client sends their summed shares to the server, it can reconstruct the density map by combining the shares, as detailed in the appendix.

5) CNIDS: Collaborative intrusion detection (CNIDS) has long been a goal of security practitioners [26]. In the CNIDS scenario, multiple (distrustful) organizations share the results of their network intrusion detection sensors, to provide their peers with advanced warning about possible threats. A practical approach involves sharing IP blacklists: when an IP generates a valid NIDS alert on one organization's network, the IP is recorded and sent to the other participating organizations.

Privacy: NIDS operate on highly sensitive data — raw network traces. Organizations participating in CNIDS do not want to share their traces with other organizations, and in many cases, may be prohibited from doing so by law or organizational policy.

Integrity: Given the privacy concern and the benefits of participating, some organizations may want to freeload by suppressing their own NIDS alerts. Additionally, if

an adversary manages to compromise a participating network, it may choose to suppress or even generate false alerts, which may result in a denial of service for the targeted IP address.

Solution: Provide a ZKPK for the NIDS signature-matching process, to prove that a claimed intrusion is correct according to the signature. Note that this approach assumes that raw network data coming into the NIDS has not been tampered with, but that the machine performing the signature matching may not be trusted.

6) Slice: Organizing Shopping: Slice (`slice.com`) is a service that takes as input a user’s past purchase history from their email mailbox, and provides various services using that data. One such service is product recommendation — given everybody’s past purchase history, slice can build classifiers that predict a likely “next” purchase.

Privacy: Handing one’s entire purchase history to a profit-driven third party has obvious privacy implications. So does the troubling need to share one’s email credentials with Slice at the moment.

Integrity: A user, particularly one concerned about privacy, might provide fake data to Slice in order to obtain the useful classifier, which would pollute Slice’s data for everyone and jeopardize Slice’s ability to profit from the classifier.

Solution: Keep the user’s purchase history local, and have the users take part in a distributed protocol in order to produce the classifier for Slice. Use ZKPK to ensure that no user is able to subvert the distributed classifier computation.

8 Experimental Evaluation

All experiments were performed on a Windows Server 2012 R2 machine with two 3.0 GHz 64-bit cores with 8 GB of RAM. All reported timing measurements correspond only to the zero-knowledge portion of the application’s execution time, as this is the only portion that our compiler attempts to optimize.

The execution time of the ZK code is generally much higher than that of the rest of the application, so focusing on these parts gives an accurate picture of the overall execution time. Each zero-knowledge proof generation and verification task was terminated after ten minutes. Our implementation uses 1,024-bit RSA keys for ZQL computations. Integers in Pinocchio circuits were configured to have 32-bits for comparison operations, and operate over a 245-bit field.

Figure 11 summarizes the key performance results from our experiments. We found that the ZØ-generated code gave significant performance benefits both in terms of computation time and proof size: up to 40× runtime speedup, with most proofs below 1 MB (the largest being ≈ 1.9 MB). Furthermore, we saw that global opti-

Scaling	ZØ scales to all application configurations. Others may time out or fail to compile in fewer than 20 minutes on some parameter settings: 100-byte traces (NIDS), >100 peers (Slice), large automata (Loyalty).
Latency	ZØ improves up to 40×, ≈ 5 –13× on average
Proof size	ZØ almost always less than 1 MB, at most 1.5 MB. ZQL proofs can be tens or hundreds of MBs.
Global tradeoffs	ZØ may be slower at one tier (2× slower for Waze server), but savings at other tiers is always much greater (4× faster for Waze clients)

Figure 11: Performance summary.

mization is necessary to arrive at an ideal performance profile: some applications perform noticeably worse at one tier, but in each case the speedup at another tier was always greater. For example, the code ZØ generated for the Waze server ran ≈ 2 × slower than Pinocchio’s on average, but latency on the client tier was reduced ≈ 4 ×.

Figure 12 shows the latency speedups across all applications. The average speedup delivered by ZØ is 3.3× compared to Pinocchio and 7.4× compared to ZQL.

Results: Space limitations do not allow us to present our measurements exhaustively. Instead, Figure 10 shows a sample of the runtime characteristics for our target applications. Rather than giving raw execution times, the results are broken into three categories: *throughput*, *latency*, and *proof size*. These metrics were selected to more clearly depict the impact of zero-knowledge techniques on each application.

Throughput: Figure 10(a)–(c) shows the results of three experiments involving throughput. Figure 10(a) shows the server’s throughput for the Waze application, which corresponds to the number location updates per minute the server can handle as the number of users (n) increases. Notice that Pinocchio outpaces both the hybrid and ZQL compilations by about 2× on average. This is a result of the global optimization engine: verification in Pinocchio is very fast, whereas the time to construct a proof can be quite slow: in this case, the proof construction phase was up to 7× slower than the hybrid solution. This is critical, *as proof construction takes place on the client where resources are especially constrained for the application*. The discrepancy in resources is correctly used by ZØ to optimize for a lighter client workload at the expense of greater server overhead.

Figure 10(b) shows the number of random forest construction queries per minute the Slice server is able to handle, as the number of participating peers increases. As with Waze the Pinocchio solution dominates the ZØ solution at all data points because of the greater expensive of constructing proofs on the client, where the Pinocchio solution is up to 4× slower than ZØ.

Figure 10(c) shows the number of intrusion alerts per minute the collaborative NIDS server can handle as the number of bytes in the intrusion trace increases. Notice




Figure 10: (1) Throughput, (2) latency, and (3) proof size for a characteristic sample of application functionality.

that Pinocchio outperforms at a few small data points, but fails to scale to any larger points. This is not because the server-side component is unable to scale, but rather the client timed out at these settings. For the remaining points, the $Z\emptyset$ solution outperforms the others by about 4 \times , and is the only solution that is able to scale to even the modest intrusion trace length of 1 KB.

Latency: Figure 10(d)–(f) shows the results of three experiments involving latency. Latency is always measured in seconds, and has a uniform upper bound of 600 seconds, which corresponds to our experimental timeout.

Figure 10(d) shows the latency of the client side of the Loyalty application as the number of purchases used to personalize discounts (n) increases. The $Z\emptyset$ solution far outpaces both alternatives at all data points (4–22 \times improvement). These experiments were performed for an automaton with about 75 edges. We found that when we scaled the automaton to more realistic sizes (a few thousand edges), the $Z\emptyset$ solution was the only one capable of completing *any* number of purchases before timing out, and the Pinocchio compiler timed out after 20

	Pinocchio		ZQL	
	Mean	Max	Mean	Max
FitBit	6.4	6.6	4.5	4.7
Study	1.0	1.0	39.7	40.3
Loyalty	4.1	4.2	10.1	21.8
Waze	4.0	7.1	4.3	4.7
CNIDS	5.3	7.3	2.7	2.7
Slice	2.5	4.1	8.1	12.9
Mean	3.3		7.4	

Figure 12: Latency speedup factors for each application; averages use geometric mean for proportional speedup.

minutes. For longer purchase histories, the $Z\emptyset$ solution completes in just over 1.5 minutes, which is ample time if the application is location-aware and begins proving a set of discounts when the user enters the store.

Figure 10(e) shows the NIDS client’s latency to demonstrate that a single intrusion is present in a trace. Pinocchio times out at all points beyond 300 bytes, whereas $Z\emptyset$ is about 2.7 \times faster than ZQL. Otherwise, we see that as long as intrusions are spaced more than two-and-a-half minutes (159 seconds) apart, the NIDS client has enough time to build proofs for each intrusion trace.

Figure 10(f) shows the latency of the Waze client to send traffic statistics for a single location query as the size of the map (n) increases. First notice that the $Z\emptyset$ solution is essentially constant, not varying by more than 1.5 seconds between any two data points. The other solutions require as much as 4–7 \times as long to process a query on the client, which will limit the quality (i.e., recency) of the statistics the server is able to gather over time. Second, notice that at about $n = 700$, ZQL becomes more performant than Pinocchio. This is because as the map increases, the size of the lookup table needed to encode the regions increases. Pinocchio is not able to perform lookups as quickly as ZQL, so the portion of the computation needed for lookups becomes more significant at higher values of n . ZQL performs worse at lower values because most of the computation corresponds to the multiplications needed to compute secret

shares, which it does not complete as quickly as Pinocchio.

Proof Size: Figure 10(g)–(i) shows the results of experiments involving the size of the zero-knowledge proof in various applications. We always measure in bytes, and do not display a curve for the Pinocchio solutions, as it is constant across input size and is usually too small to distinguish on the same scale as the ZQL and ZØ solutions. Figure 10(g) shows the proof size for the Loyalty application as the number of past purchases (n) varies. While the Pinocchio solution of course dominates the others by this metric (864 bytes), as we know from previous experiments (Figure 10(d)) it does not scale in terms of Latency. The ZØ proof size remains nearly constant, always under 500 KB, whereas the ZQL solution requires at least three megabytes (to perform the inequality checks at the beginning), and finishes at about 100 megabytes. Note that we obtained the point at $n = 300$ despite the timeout, by letting the prover run for longer in this single instance. Because the Loyalty application needs to communicate this proof wirelessly to a POS terminal, size is crucial, and the ZØ solution offers the best overall characteristics in terms of size and latency.

Figure 10(h) shows the proof size for the Waze application as the number of peers varies. Again, Pinocchio dominates (2 KB), but the tradeoff in latency for this proof size is quite high (Figure 10(f)). The ZØ proof size remains constant at around 5 KB because the only processing done by ZQL is table lookups, which have a constant proof size. The ZQL solution requires 20 megabytes for 2,500 clients, and 8 megabytes for 1,000 clients, making it untenable given that the clients need to transmit proofs frequently over cellular networks.

Figure 10(i) shows the proof size for the NIDS application as the intrusion trace length increases. The Pinocchio proof is about 1 KB, but again the tradeoff in latency makes this characteristic mostly irrelevant. The sizes for the ZØ and ZQL solutions are both linear, with the ZØ solution offering a savings of about 4× at all data points. This is a significant savings, considering that false positives may be frequent, so the client may need to send proofs to the server almost continuously.

9 Limitations and Future Work

Proof of security: The main piece of outstanding work for ZØ is a formal argument of security. Because ZØ composes non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs from distinct back-ends, the security guarantees given by the original back-ends do not necessarily readily translate to the final optimized code produced by the compiler. In future work, we hope to characterize a unified threat model that encompasses those of both back-ends, as well as a composition theorem that demonstrates the safety of ZØ’s modular compilation philosophy.

Optimization robustness: One concern is that a developer may unwittingly write code in a zero-knowledge block that ZØ compiles into very inefficient code. In general, ZØ’s cost models should allow it to select the best back-end most of the time. In certain close cases, where the performance difference between back-ends is slight, discrepancies between ZØ’s model coefficients and the characteristics of the target architecture may lead it to select the less-efficient back-end. However, as the difference between back-ends is small to begin with in such cases, the absolute performance penalty will likely be small as well.

As non-interactive zero-knowledge is still significantly more expensive than “normal” computation even in the best cases, the programmer must be careful not to place unnecessary statements inside of a zero-knowledge block. Additionally, if the programmer places inaccurate size annotations on data structures, i.e., annotations that are significantly larger than the average workloads encountered in practice, then the cost models used by ZØ during optimization might not characterize the actual performance requirements of the application; this can lead to sub-optimal performance.

Hardware integrity: Many of the applications discussed in this paper gather data from trusted hardware devices. The zero-knowledge facilities in ZØ ensure that the results of computations performed on such data can also be trusted, i.e., they were derived by the code originally intended by the application developer. However, zero-knowledge proofs might not provide all of the guarantees needed to realize an intended high-level security goal in some cases.

For example, nothing prevents a malicious user from “fooling” the FitBit application by physically manipulating the hardware to register more steps than were actually taken. In these cases, ZØ increases security by ensuring that attacks on the application code will not succeed, so that more-expensive hardware-layer attacks are necessary. Whether this makes an attack on a given application sufficiently difficult, or economically infeasible, is a point to be carefully considered as part of an end-to-end security strategy.

10 Related Work

Tier-Splitting and Language Methods: A number of compilers exist that enable automated tier-splitting in some form. In the context of web programming, Google Web Toolkit (GWT) [21], Volta [25], Links [12], and Hilda [44] are among the pioneering efforts. ZØ is closest to Volta and GWT, allowing developers to supply a single piece of code that is compiled into separate modules for the client and server. Unlike those projects, ZØ uses cost models of execution time and data size to derive an optimization problem whose solution represents

an ideal division of functionality between tiers.

Others have used tier splitting to provide security and privacy guarantees. SWIFT [11] builds on the JIF [29] language, incorporating security types for confidentiality and tier-splitting for web applications. To accomplish this, information flow constraints are embodied in an integer programming problem whose solution corresponds to a valid (e.g., secure)

placement of code onto tiers that minimizes the number of messages that must be transferred. Unlike $Z\emptyset$, SWIFT does not explicitly account for data size and transfer time when looking for a split that is likely to maximize performance.

Backes *et al.* [3] presented a compiler for distributed authorization policies written in Evidential DKAL [7], an authorization logic that supports signature-based proofs. The use of zero-knowledge proofs allows principals to prove access rights based on sensitive data without directly revealing its content. $Z\emptyset$ differs in its applicability: $Z\emptyset$ allows developers to use C# as part of a larger .NET application, whereas this work translates authorization logic formulas into cryptographic code.

Others have addressed the problem of untrusted client-side computation in various contexts [22, 23, 41, 43]. A similar notion of integrity was presented in Ripley [41], which prevents client-side cheating in web applications by efficiently replicating client-side computations on the server. Unlike $Z\emptyset$, Ripley’s mechanism does not preserve privacy.

Zero-Knowledge Proofs: Zero-Knowledge proofs of knowledge [6] have been extensively studied. Schemes have been developed for various types of relations and computations [8, 9, 20, 37]. Several projects have sought to provide zero-knowledge compilers [2, 3, 17, 27, 32] that take a proof goal and produce executable zero-knowledge code. The first set of zero-knowledge compilers [2, 3, 27] required specifications of cryptographic protocols [10], and so are difficult for non-cryptographers to use. The second generation [17, 32] are geared towards generating ZK code for general computations expressed in restricted high-level languages. Our work makes extensive use of these compilers to op-

References	TS	P	I	IL	O
[12, 21, 25, 44]	✓				
[11]	✓	✓			
[3]	✓	✓	✓		
[41]	✓		✓		
[2, 3, 17, 27, 32]	✓	✓			
[17]	✓	✓	✓		
[32]	✓	✓	✓	✓	
$Z\emptyset$	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Figure 13: Comparison of distributed and secure compiler efforts. **TS** = Automatic tier-splitting; **P** = Privacy enforcement; **I** = Integrity enforcement; **IL** = Integration with widely-used languages and runtimes; **O** = Optimizing code generation.

imize zero-knowledge computation. There are a number of larger projects that incorporate zero-knowledge proofs in order to manage integrity without sacrificing privacy. Applications include privacy-preserving smart metering [36], random forest and hidden Markov model classification [13], and privacy-preserving automotive toll charges [4].

11 Conclusions

This paper paves the way for using zero-knowledge techniques for day-to-day programming. We have described the design and implementation of $Z\emptyset$, a distributing zero-knowledge compiler which produces distributed applications that rely on ZKPK to provide simultaneous guarantees for privacy and integrity. We build on recent developments in zero-knowledge cryptographic techniques, exposing to the developer the ability to take advantage of these advances without requiring domain-specific knowledge or learning a new specialized language. Most of the heavy lifting is done by the compiler, including cost modeling to decide which zero-knowledge back-end to use and how to split the application for optimal performance, together with the actual code splitting.

Our cost-fitting models provide an excellent match with the observed performance, with R^2 scores at least and .98. Our global application optimizer is fast, completing in under 3 seconds on all programs. Our manual and experimental examination of program splits and back-end choices proposed by $Z\emptyset$ confirms that they are indeed optimal. Using six applications based on real-life commercial products, we show how $Z\emptyset$ makes it viable to use zero-knowledge technology. We observe performance improvements of over 40×. Perhaps most importantly, $Z\emptyset$ allowed many of the applications to scale to large data sizes with thousands of users while remaining practical in terms of computation time and data size. This means that applications which were not feasible using state-of-the-art zero-knowledge tools are now practical in realistic settings.

Acknowledgments

We thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. We thank the ZQL and Pinocchio developers for graciously providing code and support for our effort.

References

- [1] A. V. Aho, M. Lam, R. Sethi, and J. D. Ullman. *Compilers: Principles, Techniques, and Tools*. Addison-Wesley, 2007.
- [2] J. B. Almeida, E. Bangerter, M. Barbosa, S. Krenn, A.-R. Sadeghi, and T. Schneider. A certifying compiler for zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge based on σ -protocols. In *Proceedings of the European Conference on Research in Computer Security*, 2010.
- [3] M. Backes, M. Maffei, and K. Pecina. Automated synthesis of privacy-preserving distributed applications. In *Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium*, 2012.
- [4] J. Balasch, A. Rial, C. Troncoso, B. Preneel, I. Verbauwhede, and C. Geuens. Pretp: privacy-preserving electronic toll pricing. In *Proceedings of the Usenix Security Conference*, 2010.
- [5] J. Balasch, A. Rial, C. Troncoso, B. Preneel, I. Verbauwhede, and C. Geuens. Pretp: Privacy-preserving electronic toll pricing. In *Proceedings of the Usenix Security Symposium*, 2010.
- [6] M. Bellare and O. Goldreich. On defining proofs of knowledge. In *Proceedings of the International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology*, 1993.
- [7] A. Blass, Y. Gurevich, M. Moskal, and I. Neeman. Evidential authorization*. In S. Nanz, editor, *The Future of Software Engineering*. 2011.
- [8] S. Brands. Rapid demonstration of linear relations connected by boolean operators. In *Proceedings of the International Conference on Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques*, 1997.
- [9] J. Camenisch, R. Chaabouni, and A. Shelat. Efficient protocols for set membership and range proofs. In *Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology*, 2008.
- [10] J. Camenisch and M. Stadler. Efficient group signature schemes for large groups. In *Proceedings of the International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology*, 1997.
- [11] S. Chong, J. Liu, A. C. Myers, X. Qi, K. Vikram, L. Zheng, and X. Zheng. Secure Web applications via automatic partitioning. *SIGOPS Operating Systems Review*, 41(6), 2007.
- [12] E. Cooper, S. Lindley, P. Wadler, and J. Yallop. Links: Web programming without tiers. In *Formal Methods for Components and Objects*. 2007.
- [13] G. Danezis, M. Kohlweiss, B. Livshits, and A. Rial. Private client-side profiling with random forests and hidden Markov models. In *Proceedings of the International Conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies*, 2012.
- [14] D. Davidson, M. Fredrikson, and B. Livshits. MoRePriv: Mobile OS Support for Application Personalization and Privacy (Tech Report). Technical Report MSR-TR-2012-50, Microsoft Research, May 2012.
- [15] C. Duhigg. How companies learn your secrets. <http://nyti.ms/SZryP4>, Feb. 2012.
- [16] T. Fechner and C. Kray. Attacking location privacy: exploring human strategies. In *Proceedings of the Conference on Ubiquitous Computing*, 2012.
- [17] C. Fournet, M. Kohlweiss, and G. Danezis. Zql: A compiler for privacy-preserving data processing. In *Usenix Security Symposium*, 2013.
- [18] M. Fredrikson and B. Livshits. RePriv: Re-envisioning in-browser privacy. In *IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*, May 2011.
- [19] F. D. Garcia, E. R. Verheul, and B. Jacobs. Cell-based roadpricing. In *Proceedings of the European Conference on Public Key Infrastructures, Services, and Applications*, 2012.
- [20] R. Gennaro, C. Gentry, B. Parno, and M. Raykova. Quadratic span programs and succinct nizks without pcps. In *Proceedings of the IACR Eurocrypt Conference*, 2013.
- [21] Google Web Toolkit. <http://code.google.com/webtoolkit>.
- [22] G. Hoglund and G. McGraw. *Exploiting Online Games: Cheating Massively Distributed Systems*. Addison-Wesley, 2007.
- [23] S. Jha, S. Katzenbeisser, and H. Veith. Enforcing semantic integrity on untrusted clients in networked virtual environments. In *Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*, 2007.
- [24] F. Kerschbaum. Privacy-preserving computation (position paper). <http://www.fkerschbaum.org/apf12.pdf>, 2012.
- [25] D. Manolescu, B. Beckman, and B. Livshits. Volta: Developing distributed applications by recompiling. *IEEE Software*, 25(5):53–59, 2008.
- [26] M. Marchetti, M. Messori, and M. Colajanni. Peer-to-peer architecture for collaborative intrusion and malware detection on a large scale. In *Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Security*, 2009.
- [27] S. Meiklejohn, C. C. Erway, A. K p c , T. Hinkle, and A. Lysyanskaya. Zkpd: a language-based system for efficient zero-knowledge proofs and electronic cash. In *Proceedings of the Usenix Conference on Security*, 2010.
- [28] Microsoft Research. Common compiler infrastructure. <http://ccimetadata.codeplex.com>, 2012.
- [29] A. C. Myers and B. Liskov. A decentralized model for information flow control. In *SOSP*, 1997.
- [30] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov. Robust de-anonymization of large sparse datasets. In *Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*, 2008.
- [31] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov. De-anonymizing social networks. In *Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*, 2009.
- [32] B. Parno, C. Gentry, J. Howell, and M. Raykova. Pinocchio: Nearly practical verifiable computation. In *Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*, 2013.
- [33] C. Pontoriero. Is groupon a raw deal for publishers? <http://risnews.edg1.com/retail-trends/Is-Groupon-a-Raw-Deal-for-Retailers-73442>, June 2011.
- [34] W. H. Press, S. A. Teukolsky, W. T. Vetterling, and B. P. Flannery. *Numerical Recipes, 3rd edition: The Art of Scientific Computing*. Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- [35] J. Rattz and A. Freeman. *Pro LINQ: Language Integrated Query in C# 2010*. Apress, 2010.
- [36] A. Rial and G. Danezis. Privacy-preserving smart metering. In *Proceedings of the Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society*, 2011.
- [37] C.-P. Schnorr. Efficient signature generation by smart cards. *Journal of Cryptology*, 4:161–174, 1991.
- [38] V. Toubiana, A. Narayanan, D. Boneh, H. Nissenbaum, and S. Barocas. Adnostic: Privacy preserving targeted advertising. In *Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium*, Feb. 2010.
- [39] C. Troncoso, G. Danezis, E. Kosta, and B. Preneel. PriPAYD: privacy friendly pay-as-you-drive insurance. In P. Ning and T. Yu, editors, *Proceedings of the 2007 ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society*, pages 99–107. ACM, 2007.
- [40] C. Troncoso, G. Danezis, E. Kosta, and B. Preneel. PriPAYD: privacy friendly pay-as-you-drive insurance. In *Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in electronic society*, 2007.
- [41] K. Vikram, A. Prateek, and B. Livshits. Ripley: Automatically securing distributed Web applications through replicated execution. In *Conference on Computer and Communications Security*, Oct. 2009.
- [42] Wikipedia. Usage-based insurance. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Usage-based_insurance, 2013.
- [43] J. Yan. Security design in online games. In *Proceedings of the Annual Computer Security Applications Conference*, 1993.
- [44] F. Yang, J. Shanmugasundaram, M. Riedewald, and J. Gehrke. Hilda: A high-level language for data-driven Web applications. In *Proceedings of the International Conference on Data Engineering*, 2006.