# Knowledge Representation (Overview)

Marek Sergot

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# Knowledge Representation\*

\* includes reasoning

- a huge sub-field of AI
- a variety of representation/modelling formalisms, mostly (these days, always) based on logic
- assorted representation problems

So these days, more or less: applied (computational) logic

# COMMONSENSE REASONING

An Event Calculus Based Approach





SECOND Edition

# KR 2016: 15th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, Cape Town

- Argumentation
- Belief revision and update, belief merging, etc.
- Commonsense reasoning
- Contextual reasoning
- Description logics
- Diagnosis, abduction, explanation
- Inconsistency- and exception tolerant reasoning, paraconsistent logics
- KR and autonomous agents: intelligent agents, cognitive robotics, multi-agent systems
- KR and data management, data analytics
- KR and decision making, game theory, social choice
- KR and machine learning, inductive logic programming, knowledge discovery and acquisition
- KR and natural language processing
- KR and the Web, Semantic Web

# KR 2016: 15th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, Cape Town

- Logic programming, answer set programming, constraint logic programming
- Nonmonotonic logics, default logics, conditional logics
- Ontology formalisms and models
- Philosophical foundations of KR
- Preferences: modeling and representation, preference-based reasoning
- Reasoning about action and change: action languages, situation calculus, causality
- Reasoning about knowledge and belief, dynamic epistemic logic, epistemic and doxastic logics
- Reasoning systems and solvers, knowledge compilation
- Spatial and temporal reasoning, qualitative reasoning
- Uncertainty, vagueness, many-valued and fuzzy logics

### KR 2016: Programme

- KR and Data Management 1 Argumentation 1 Short Papers: Automated Reasoning – Logic prog/inconsistency
- Temporal and Spatial Reasoning 1 Automated Reasoning and Computation 1 Short Papers: Reasoning about Action – Uncertainty
- Planning and Strategies KR and Data Management 2
- Description Logic 1 Epistemic Reasoning 1 Short Papers: Description Logic – Argumentation
- Automated Reasoning and Computation 2 Decision Theory, Rationality, and Uncertainty KR and Data Management 3 Belief Revision and Nonmonotonicity
- Description Logic 2 Reasoning about Action, Causality Argumentation 2 Epistemic Reasoning 2
- Argumentation 3 Temporal and Spatial Reasoning 2

Logic

Logic  $\neq$  classical (propositional) logic !!

- Logic Logic ≠ classical (propositional) logic !!
- Computational logic Logic programming ≠ Prolog !!

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- Computational logic Logic programming ≠ Prolog !!
- Non-monotonic logics (methods and examples)
- Some examples
  - defeasible (non-monotonic) rules
  - action + 'inertia' + causality
  - priorities (preferences)
  - 'practical reasoning': what should I do?

### From SOLE 2014 ...

The most interesting of all the courses offered ... My only suggestion for improvement would be to offer this course in the first term and ...

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This happened on several occasions and I believe it is not acceptable.

# Logic of conditionals ('if ... then ...')

- material implication  $(A \rightarrow B = \neg A \lor B)$
- 'strict implication'
- causal conditionals
- counterfactuals

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- conditional obligations
- defeasible (non-monotonic) conditionals

### Example

A recent article about the Semantic Web was critical about the use of logic for performing useful inferences in the Semantic Web, citing the following example, among others:

'People who live in Brooklyn speak with a Brooklyn accent. I live in Brooklyn. Yet I do not speak with a Brooklyn accent.'

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'each of these statements is true, but each is true in a different way. The first is a generalization that can only be understood in context.'

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'each of these statements is true, but each is true in a different way. The first is a generalization that can only be understood in context.'

The article was doubtful that there are any practical ways of representing such statements.

www.shirky.com/writings/semantic syllogism.html.

His point (the classical syllogism)

 $\begin{array}{l} \forall x \left( p(x) \rightarrow q(x) \right) \\ p(a) \\ \hline q(a) \end{array}$ 

In logic programming notation:

 $q(x) \leftarrow p(x)$ p(a)q(a)

### Solution

We need either or both of:

- a new kind of conditional ~>>
- a special kind of defeasible entailment

 $\begin{array}{l} \forall x \left( p(x) \rightsquigarrow q(x) \right) \\ p(a) \\ \hline q(a) \end{array}$ 

There is a huge amount of work on this in AI!

This is the main technical core of the course

### Non-monotonic logics

Classical logic is monotonic:

#### If $KB \models \alpha$ then $KB \cup X \models \alpha$

New information *X* always preserves old conclusions  $\alpha$ .

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BIRDS  $\cup$  {bird(frank)}  $\models_{\Delta}$  flies(frank)

But

BIRDS  $\cup$  {bird(frank)}  $\cup$  {penguin(frank)}  $\not\models_{\Delta}$  flies(frank)

Can Susan Vote in the US?

 $res\_Cuba \leftarrow$  $res\_NAmerica \leftarrow res\_Cuba$ 

$\delta_1$ :	cit_US ↔ res_NAmerica	$\delta_3 > \delta_2 > \delta_1$
$\delta_2$ :	cit_Cuba ↔ res_Cuba	
$\delta_3$ :	vote_US ↔ cit_US	
	$\neg cit\_US \leftarrow cit\_Cuba$	$\% \neg (cit\_Cuba \land cit\_US)$
	$\neg cit\_Cuba \leftarrow cit\_US$	

 $\neg vote\_US \leftarrow cit\_Cuba$ 

 $\% \neg (cit\_Cuba \land vote\_US)$ 

# Multiple extensions: "The Nixon diamond"

- Quakers are typically pacifists.
- Republicans are typically not pacifists.

# Multiple extensions: "The Nixon diamond"

- Quakers are typically pacifists.
- Republicans are typically not pacifists.
- Richard Nixon is a Quaker.
- Richard Nixon is a Republican

Is Nixon is a pacifist or not?

### Defeasible conditional imperatives

 $F \rightsquigarrow ! \alpha$ 

law:	$\rightsquigarrow ! \neg (drink \land drive)$
wife:	$\rightsquigarrow ! drive$
friends:	$\rightsquigarrow ! drink$

*law* > *wife law* > *friends* 

### Defeasible conditional imperatives

 $F \rightsquigarrow ! \alpha$ 

law:	$\rightsquigarrow ! \neg (drink \land drive)$
wife:	$\rightsquigarrow$ ! drive
friends:	$\rightsquigarrow ! drink$

*law* > *wife law* > *friends* 

wife > friends:  $\{drive, \neg drink\}$ 

friends > wife:  $\{drink, \neg drive\}$ 

# Example: a problem of practical moral reasoning (Katie Atkinson and Trevor Bench-Capon)

Hal, a diabetic, has no insulin. Without insulin he will die.

Carla, also a diabetic, has (plenty of) insulin.

Should Hal take Carla's insulin? (Is he so justified?)

If he takes it, should he leave money to compensate?

Suppose Hal *does not know* whether Carla needs all her insulin. Is he still justified in taking it? Should he compensate her?

(Why?)

has\_insulin(Carla) has\_insulin(Dave) diabetic(Dave)

- $has\_insulin(X) \rightsquigarrow ! take\_from(X) :: life(Hal)$ 
  - $\rightsquigarrow$  !  $\neg$  take\_from(X) :: property(X)
  - $diabetic(X) \rightsquigarrow ! \neg take\_from(X) :: life(X)$ 
    - $!take\_from(X) \rightsquigarrow !pay(X) :: property(X)$ 
      - $\rightsquigarrow ! \neg pay(X) :: property(Hal)$

 $\neg$ take\_from(X)  $\leftarrow$  not has\_insulin(X)  $\neg$ take\_from(X)  $\leftarrow$  take\_from(Y), X  $\neq$  Y

has\_insulin(Carla) has\_insulin(Dave) diabetic(Dave)

Altruistic Hal: life(X) > life(Hal) > property(Y) > property(Hal){ $\neg take_from(Dave), take_from(Carla), \neg pay(Dave), pay(Carla)$ }

has\_insulin(Carla) has\_insulin(Dave) diabetic(Dave)

 $\begin{aligned} \text{Altruistic Hal:} \quad life(X) > life(Hal) > property(Y) > property(Hal) \\ \{ \neg take\_from(Dave), take\_from(Carla), \neg pay(Dave), pay(Carla) \} \end{aligned}$ 

Selfish Hal: life(Hal) > life(X) > property(Hal) > property(Y) {¬take\_from(Dave), take\_from(Carla), ¬pay(Dave), ¬pay(Carla)} {take\_from(Dave), ¬take\_from(Carla), ¬pay(Dave), ¬pay(Carla)}

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 $\begin{aligned} \mbox{Callous Hal:} & life(Hal) > property(Hal) > life(X) > property(Y) \\ & \{\neg take\_from(Dave), take\_from(Carla), \neg pay(Dave), \neg pay(Carla)\} \\ & \{take\_from(Dave), \neg take\_from(Carla), \neg pay(Dave), \neg pay(Carla)\} \end{aligned}$ 

### Some sources of defeasible reasoning

- Typical and stereotypical situations
- Generalisations and exceptions
  - -
  - •

### The Qualification Problem (1)

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"... unless they are penguins ... " flies(X)  $\leftarrow$  bird(X),  $\neg$  penguin(X)

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"All birds can fly ..."
flies(X) \leftarrow bird(X)
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"... unless they are penguins ... " flies(X)  $\leftarrow$  bird(X),  $\neg$  penguin(X)

"... or ostriches ... "

 $flies(X) \gets bird(X), \neg penguin(X), \neg ostrich(X)$ 

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flies(X) \leftarrow bird(X)
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- "... unless they are penguins ..." flies(X)  $\leftarrow$  bird(X),  $\neg$  penguin(X)
- "...or ostriches ..."
  flies(X) ← bird(X), ¬ penguin(X), ¬ ostrich(X)
  "...or wounded ..."

```
\begin{array}{l} {\sf flies}({\sf X}) \gets {\sf bird}({\sf X}), \, \neg \, {\sf penguin}({\sf X}), \, \neg \, {\sf ostrich}({\sf X}), \\ \neg \, {\sf wounded}({\sf X}) \end{array}
```

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- "... unless they are penguins ..." flies(X)  $\leftarrow$  bird(X),  $\neg$  penguin(X)
- "... or ostriches ..." flies(X) ← bird(X), ¬ penguin(X), ¬ ostrich(X)
  "... or wounded ..." flies(X) ← bird(X), ¬ penguin(X), ¬ ostrich(X), ¬ wounded(X)
- "... or dead, or sick, or glued to the ground, or ... "

# The Qualification Problem (2)

Let BIRDS be the set of rules about flying birds.

Even if we could list all these exceptions, classical logic would still not allow

```
BIRDS \cup \{bird(frank)\} \models flies(frank)
```

# The Qualification Problem (2)

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We would also have to affirm all the qualifications:

# The Qualification Problem (2)

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Even if we could list all these exceptions, classical logic would still not allow

```
BIRDS \cup \{bird(frank)\} \models flies(frank)
```

We would also have to affirm all the qualifications:

- ¬ penguin(frank)
- ¬ ostrich(frank)
- ¬ wounded(frank)
- ¬ dead(frank)
- $\neg$  sick(frank)
- ¬ glued\_to\_ground(frank)
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# Some sources of defeasible reasoning

- Typical and stereotypical situations
- Generalisations and exceptions
- Conventions of communication
  - 'Closed World Assumptions'
  - 'Circumscription'

:

- Autoepistemic reasoning (reasoning about your own beliefs)
- Burdens of proof (e.g. in legal reasoning)
- Persistence and change in temporal reasoning

Actions change the truth value of some facts, but almost everything else remains unchanged.

Painting my house pink changes the colour of the house to pink . . .

but does not change:

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the age of my house is 93 years the father of Brian is Bill the capital of France is Paris

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but does not change:

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Qualification problems!

Temporal reasoning: Default Persistence ('Inertia')

Actions change the truth value of some facts, but almost everything else remains unchanged.

 $p[t] \leadsto p[t+1]$ 

Some facts persist 'by inertia', until disturbed by some action.

Closely connected to forms of causality

win causes rich

win causes rich lose causes ¬rich

win causes rich lose causes  $\neg$ rich rich  $\Rightarrow$  happy

win causes rich lose causes  $\neg$ rich rich  $\Rightarrow$  happy

So an occurrence of win indirectly causes happy.

# Material implication

Everyone in Ward 16 has cancer.

 $\forall x (in\_ward\_16(x) \rightarrow has\_cancer(x))$ 

But compare:

## Material implication

Everyone in Ward 16 has cancer.

 $\forall x (in\_ward\_16(x) \rightarrow has\_cancer(x))$ 

But compare:

 $\forall x (in\_ward\_16(x) \Rightarrow has\_cancer(x))$ 

Being in Ward 16 causes you to have cancer. x has cancer because x is in Ward 16.

The 'paradoxes of material implication'

- $\blacktriangleright A \to (B \to A)$
- $\blacktriangleright \neg A \to (A \to B)$
- $\blacktriangleright \ (\neg A \land A) \to B$
- $((A \land B) \to C) \to ((A \to C) \lor (B \to C))$
- $\blacktriangleright (A \to B) \lor (B \to A)$

# Logic of conditionals ('if ... then ...')

- material implication (classical  $\rightarrow$ )
- 'strict implication'
- intuitionistic implication
- causal conditionals
- counterfactuals
- conditional obligations
- defeasible (non-monotonic) conditionals
  - :

# A favourite topic — action


Action

- state change/transition
- agency + causality
- what is it 'to act'?

'Actual cause'

- something happened
- who caused it?
- what caused it?

#### Agency: an example of 'proximate cause'



J.A. McLaughlin. Proximate Cause. Harvard Law Review 39(2):149-199 (Dec. 1925)

# Aims

- Logic Logic ≠ classical (propositional) logic !!
- Computational logic Logic programming ≠ Prolog !!
- Non-monotonic logics (core methods and examples)
- Some examples (temporal reasoning, action + causality, 'practical reasoning', ...)

# Contents (not necessarily in this order)

- Logic: models, theories, consequence relations
- Logic databases/knowledge bases (in general)
- Defeasible reasoning, defaults, non-monotonic logics, non-monotonic consequence
- Some specific non-monotonic formalisms
  - normal logic programs, extended logic programs, Reiter default logic, ..., 'nonmonotonic causal theories', ... Answer Set Programming
  - priorities and preferences
- Temporal reasoning: action, change, persistence (and various related concepts)
- If time permits, examples from
  - 'practical reasoning', action, norms ...
  - more about priorities and preferences

## Assumed knowledge

- Basic logic: syntax and semantics; propositional and first-order logic.
- Elementary set theory
- Basic logic programming: syntax and semantics, inference and procedural readings (Prolog), negation as failure helpful but not essential
- Previous AI course(s) definitely not essential.

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There is no (compulsory) practical lab work — though you are encouraged to implement/run the various examples that come up.

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#### **Recommended reading**

References for specific topics will be given in the notes.

For background: any standard textbook on AI (not esssential)

## Other possible topics, not covered in this course

- Assorted rule-based formalisms; procedural representations
- Structured representations (1) old fashioned (frames, semantic nets, conceptual graphs), and their new manifestations
- Structured representations (2) VERY fashionable
  - description logics (previously 'terminological logics')
    See e.g: http://www.dl.kr.org
- "Ontologies"
  - Develop 'ontology' for application *X* and world-fragment *Y*.
  - Ontology' as used in AI means 'conceptual framework'.

# Other possible topics, not covered in this course

- Goals, plans, mentalistic structures (belief, desire, intention, ...)
  - associated in particular with multi-agent systems.
- Belief system dynamics: belief revision no time
- Argumentation
- Probabilistic approaches (various)

Some of these topics are covered in other MEng/MAC courses.

Bavaria  $\sqsubseteq$  Germany Person Lager  $\sqsubseteq$  Beer Sam: Person

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Person *drinks* Beer Person *lives\_in* Germany

Bavaria  $\sqsubseteq$  Germany Person Lager  $\sqsubseteq$  Beer Sam: Person

Person *drinks* Beer Person *lives\_in* Germany

Person ⊓ ∃*lives\_in*.Bavaria Sam: Person ⊓ ∃*lives\_in*.Bavaria

Bavaria  $\sqsubseteq$  Germany Person Lager  $\sqsubseteq$  Beer Sam: Person

Person *drinks* Beer Person *lives\_in* Germany

Person ⊓ ∃lives\_in.Bavaria Sam: Person ⊓ ∃lives\_in.Bavaria

Person  $\sqcap \exists lives_in.Bavaria \sqsubseteq$  Person  $\sqcap \forall drinks.Lager$ 

Bavaria  $\sqsubseteq$  Germany Person Lager  $\sqsubseteq$  Beer Sam: Person

Person *drinks* Beer Person *lives\_in* Germany

Person ⊓ ∃lives\_in.Bavaria Sam: Person ⊓ ∃lives\_in.Bavaria

Person  $\sqcap \exists lives_in.Bavaria \sqsubseteq Person \sqcap \forall drinks.Lager$ 

Conclude: Sam: Person ⊓ ∀drinks.Lager