Apology
by
Plato
Apology
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[2] How you, O Athenians, have been affected by my accusers, I cannot tell; but
[3] I know that they almost made me forget who I was--so persuasively did they
[4] speak; and yet they have hardly uttered a word of truth. But of the many
[5] falsehoods told by them, there was one which quite amazed me;--I mean when
[6] they said that you should be upon your guard and not allow yourselves to be
[7] deceived by the force of my eloquence. To say this, when they were certain
[8] to be detected as soon as I opened my lips and proved myself to be anything
[9] but a great speaker, did indeed appear to me most shameless--unless by the
[10] force of eloquence they mean the force of truth; for is such is their
[11] meaning, I admit that I am eloquent. But in how different a way from
[12] theirs! Well, as I was saying, they have scarcely spoken the truth at all;
[13] but from me you shall hear the whole truth: not, however, delivered after
[14] their manner in a set oration duly ornamented with words and phrases. No,
[15] by heaven! but I shall use the words and arguments which occur to me at the
[16] moment; for I am confident in the justice of my cause (Or, I am certain
[17] that I am right in taking this course.): at my time of life I ought not to
[18] be appearing before you, O men of Athens, in the character of a juvenile
[19] orator--let no one expect it of me. And I must beg of you to grant me a
[20] favour:--If I defend myself in my accustomed manner, and you hear me using
[21] the words which I have been in the habit of using in the agora, at the
[22] tables of the money-changers, or anywhere else, I would ask you not to be
[23] surprised, and not to interrupt me on this account. For I am more than
[24] seventy years of age, and appearing now for the first time in a court of
[25] law, I am quite a stranger to the language of the place; and therefore I
[26] would have you regard me as if I were really a stranger, whom you would
[27] excuse if he spoke in his native tongue, and after the fashion of his
[28] country:--Am I making an unfair request of you? Never mind the manner,
[29] which may or may not be good; but think only of the truth of my words, and
[30] give heed to that: let the speaker speak truly and the judge decide
[31] justly.
[32]
[33] And first, I have to reply to the older charges and to my first accusers,
[34] and then I will go on to the later ones. For of old I have had many
[35] accusers, who have accused me falsely to you during many years; and I am
[36] more afraid of them than of Anytus and his associates, who are dangerous,
[37] too, in their own way. But far more dangerous are the others, who began
[38] when you were children, and took possession of your minds with their
[39] falsehoods, telling of one Socrates, a wise man, who speculated about the
[40] heaven above, and searched into the earth beneath, and made the worse
[41] appear the better cause. The disseminators of this tale are the accusers
[42] whom I dread; for their hearers are apt to fancy that such enquirers do not
[43] believe in the existence of the gods. And they are many, and their charges
[44] against me are of ancient date, and they were made by them in the days when
[45] you were more impressible than you are now--in childhood, or it may have
[46] been in youth--and the cause when heard went by default, for there was none
[47] to answer. And hardest of all, I do not know and cannot tell the names of
[48] my accusers; unless in the chance case of a Comic poet. All who from envy
[49] and malice have persuaded you--some of them having first convinced
[50] themselves--all this class of men are most difficult to deal with; for I
[51] cannot have them up here, and cross-examine them, and therefore I must
[52] simply fight with shadows in my own defence, and argue when there is no one
[53] who answers. I will ask you then to assume with me, as I was saying, that
[54] my opponents are of two kinds; one recent, the other ancient: and I hope
[55] that you will see the propriety of my answering the latter first, for these
[56] accusations you heard long before the others, and much oftener.
[57]
[58] Well, then, I must make my defence, and endeavour to clear away in a short
[59] time, a slander which has lasted a long time. May I succeed, if to succeed
[60] be for my good and yours, or likely to avail me in my cause! The task is
[61] not an easy one; I quite understand the nature of it. And so leaving the
[62] event with God, in obedience to the law I will now make my defence.
[63]
[64] I will begin at the beginning, and ask what is the accusation which has
[65] given rise to the slander of me, and in fact has encouraged Meletus to
[66] proof this charge against me. Well, what do the slanderers say? They
[67] shall be my prosecutors, and I will sum up their words in an affidavit:
[68] 'Socrates is an evil-doer, and a curious person, who searches into things
[69] under the earth and in heaven, and he makes the worse appear the better
[70] cause; and he teaches the aforesaid doctrines to others.' Such is the
[71] nature of the accusation: it is just what you have yourselves seen in the
[72] comedy of Aristophanes (Aristoph., Clouds.), who has introduced a man whom
[73] he calls Socrates, going about and saying that he walks in air, and talking
[74] a deal of nonsense concerning matters of which I do not pretend to know
[75] either much or little--not that I mean to speak disparagingly of any one
[76] who is a student of natural philosophy. I should be very sorry if Meletus
[77] could bring so grave a charge against me. But the simple truth is, O
[78] Athenians, that I have nothing to do with physical speculations. Very many
[79] of those here present are witnesses to the truth of this, and to them I
[80] appeal. Speak then, you who have heard me, and tell your neighbours
[81] whether any of you have ever known me hold forth in few words or in many
[82] upon such matters...You hear their answer. And from what they say of this
[83] part of the charge you will be able to judge of the truth of the rest.
[84]
[85] As little foundation is there for the report that I am a teacher, and take
[86] money; this accusation has no more truth in it than the other. Although,
[87] if a man were really able to instruct mankind, to receive money for giving
[88] instruction would, in my opinion, be an honour to him. There is Gorgias of
[89] Leontium, and Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis, who go the round of
[90] the cities, and are able to persuade the young men to leave their own
[91] citizens by whom they might be taught for nothing, and come to them whom
[92] they not only pay, but are thankful if they may be allowed to pay them.
[93] There is at this time a Parian philosopher residing in Athens, of whom I
[94] have heard; and I came to hear of him in this way:--I came across a man who
[95] has spent a world of money on the Sophists, Callias, the son of Hipponicus,
[96] and knowing that he had sons, I asked him: 'Callias,' I said, 'if your two
[97] sons were foals or calves, there would be no difficulty in finding some one
[98] to put over them; we should hire a trainer of horses, or a farmer probably,
[99] who would improve and perfect them in their own proper virtue and
[100] excellence; but as they are human beings, whom are you thinking of placing
[101] over them? Is there any one who understands human and political virtue?
[102] You must have thought about the matter, for you have sons; is there any
[103] one?' 'There is,' he said. 'Who is he?' said I; 'and of what country? and
[104] what does he charge?' 'Evenus the Parian,' he replied; 'he is the man, and
[105] his charge is five minae.' Happy is Evenus, I said to myself, if he really
[106] has this wisdom, and teaches at such a moderate charge. Had I the same, I
[107] should have been very proud and conceited; but the truth is that I have no
[108] knowledge of the kind.
[109]
[110] I dare say, Athenians, that some one among you will reply, 'Yes, Socrates,
[111] but what is the origin of these accusations which are brought against you;
[112] there must have been something strange which you have been doing? All
[113] these rumours and this talk about you would never have arisen if you had
[114] been like other men: tell us, then, what is the cause of them, for we
[115] should be sorry to judge hastily of you.' Now I regard this as a fair
[116] challenge, and I will endeavour to explain to you the reason why I am
[117] called wise and have such an evil fame. Please to attend then. And
[118] although some of you may think that I am joking, I declare that I will tell
[119] you the entire truth. Men of Athens, this reputation of mine has come of a
[120] certain sort of wisdom which I possess. If you ask me what kind of wisdom,
[121] I reply, wisdom such as may perhaps be attained by man, for to that extent
[122] I am inclined to believe that I am wise; whereas the persons of whom I was
[123] speaking have a superhuman wisdom which I may fail to describe, because I
[124] have it not myself; and he who says that I have, speaks falsely, and is
[125] taking away my character. And here, O men of Athens, I must beg you not to
[126] interrupt me, even if I seem to say something extravagant. For the word
[127] which I will speak is not mine. I will refer you to a witness who is
[128] worthy of credit; that witness shall be the God of Delphi--he will tell you
[129] about my wisdom, if I have any, and of what sort it is. You must have
[130] known Chaerephon; he was early a friend of mine, and also a friend of
[131] yours, for he shared in the recent exile of the people, and returned with
[132] you. Well, Chaerephon, as you know, was very impetuous in all his doings,
[133] and he went to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle to tell him whether--as I
[134] was saying, I must beg you not to interrupt--he asked the oracle to tell
[135] him whether anyone was wiser than I was, and the Pythian prophetess
[136] answered, that there was no man wiser. Chaerephon is dead himself; but his
[137] brother, who is in court, will confirm the truth of what I am saying.
[138]
[139] Why do I mention this? Because I am going to explain to you why I have
[140] such an evil name. When I heard the answer, I said to myself, What can the
[141] god mean? and what is the interpretation of his riddle? for I know that I
[142] have no wisdom, small or great. What then can he mean when he says that I
[143] am the wisest of men? And yet he is a god, and cannot lie; that would be
[144] against his nature. After long consideration, I thought of a method of
[145] trying the question. I reflected that if I could only find a man wiser
[146] than myself, then I might go to the god with a refutation in my hand. I
[147] should say to him, 'Here is a man who is wiser than I am; but you said that
[148] I was the wisest.' Accordingly I went to one who had the reputation of
[149] wisdom, and observed him--his name I need not mention; he was a politician
[150] whom I selected for examination--and the result was as follows: When I
[151] began to talk with him, I could not help thinking that he was not really
[152] wise, although he was thought wise by many, and still wiser by himself; and
[153] thereupon I tried to explain to him that he thought himself wise, but was
[154] not really wise; and the consequence was that he hated me, and his enmity
[155] was shared by several who were present and heard me. So I left him, saying
[156] to myself, as I went away: Well, although I do not suppose that either of
[157] us knows anything really beautiful and good, I am better off than he is,--
[158] for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows; I neither know nor think
[159] that I know. In this latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly the
[160] advantage of him. Then I went to another who had still higher pretensions
[161] to wisdom, and my conclusion was exactly the same. Whereupon I made
[162] another enemy of him, and of many others besides him.
[163]
[164] Then I went to one man after another, being not unconscious of the enmity
[165] which I provoked, and I lamented and feared this: but necessity was laid
[166] upon me,--the word of God, I thought, ought to be considered first. And I
[167] said to myself, Go I must to all who appear to know, and find out the
[168] meaning of the oracle. And I swear to you, Athenians, by the dog I swear!
[169] --for I must tell you the truth--the result of my mission was just this: I
[170] found that the men most in repute were all but the most foolish; and that
[171] others less esteemed were really wiser and better. I will tell you the
[172] tale of my wanderings and of the 'Herculean' labours, as I may call them,
[173] which I endured only to find at last the oracle irrefutable. After the
[174] politicians, I went to the poets; tragic, dithyrambic, and all sorts. And
[175] there, I said to myself, you will be instantly detected; now you will find
[176] out that you are more ignorant than they are. Accordingly, I took them
[177] some of the most elaborate passages in their own writings, and asked what
[178] was the meaning of them--thinking that they would teach me something. Will
[179] you believe me? I am almost ashamed to confess the truth, but I must say
[180] that there is hardly a person present who would not have talked better
[181] about their poetry than they did themselves. Then I knew that not by
[182] wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration; they
[183] are like diviners or soothsayers who also say many fine things, but do not
[184] understand the meaning of them. The poets appeared to me to be much in the
[185] same case; and I further observed that upon the strength of their poetry
[186] they believed themselves to be the wisest of men in other things in which
[187] they were not wise. So I departed, conceiving myself to be superior to
[188] them for the same reason that I was superior to the politicians.
[189]
[190] At last I went to the artisans. I was conscious that I knew nothing at
[191] all, as I may say, and I was sure that they knew many fine things; and here
[192] I was not mistaken, for they did know many things of which I was ignorant,
[193] and in this they certainly were wiser than I was. But I observed that even
[194] the good artisans fell into the same error as the poets;--because they were
[195] good workmen they thought that they also knew all sorts of high matters,
[196] and this defect in them overshadowed their wisdom; and therefore I asked
[197] myself on behalf of the oracle, whether I would like to be as I was,
[198] neither having their knowledge nor their ignorance, or like them in both;
[199] and I made answer to myself and to the oracle that I was better off as I
[200] was.
[201]
[202] This inquisition has led to my having many enemies of the worst and most
[203] dangerous kind, and has given occasion also to many calumnies. And I am
[204] called wise, for my hearers always imagine that I myself possess the wisdom
[205] which I find wanting in others: but the truth is, O men of Athens, that
[206] God only is wise; and by his answer he intends to show that the wisdom of
[207] men is worth little or nothing; he is not speaking of Socrates, he is only
[208] using my name by way of illustration, as if he said, He, O men, is the
[209] wisest, who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth worth
[210] nothing. And so I go about the world, obedient to the god, and search and
[211] make enquiry into the wisdom of any one, whether citizen or stranger, who
[212] appears to be wise; and if he is not wise, then in vindication of the
[213] oracle I show him that he is not wise; and my occupation quite absorbs me,
[214] and I have no time to give either to any public matter of interest or to
[215] any concern of my own, but I am in utter poverty by reason of my devotion
[216] to the god.
[217]
[218] There is another thing:--young men of the richer classes, who have not much
[219] to do, come about me of their own accord; they like to hear the pretenders
[220] examined, and they often imitate me, and proceed to examine others; there
[221] are plenty of persons, as they quickly discover, who think that they know
[222] something, but really know little or nothing; and then those who are
[223] examined by them instead of being angry with themselves are angry with me:
[224] This confounded Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader of youth!--
[225] and then if somebody asks them, Why, what evil does he practise or teach?
[226] they do not know, and cannot tell; but in order that they may not appear to
[227] be at a loss, they repeat the ready-made charges which are used against all
[228] philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under the earth,
[229] and having no gods, and making the worse appear the better cause; for they
[230] do not like to confess that their pretence of knowledge has been detected--
[231] which is the truth; and as they are numerous and ambitious and energetic,
[232] and are drawn up in battle array and have persuasive tongues, they have
[233] filled your ears with their loud and inveterate calumnies. And this is the
[234] reason why my three accusers, Meletus and Anytus and Lycon, have set upon
[235] me; Meletus, who has a quarrel with me on behalf of the poets; Anytus, on
[236] behalf of the craftsmen and politicians; Lycon, on behalf of the
[237] rhetoricians: and as I said at the beginning, I cannot expect to get rid
[238] of such a mass of calumny all in a moment. And this, O men of Athens, is
[239] the truth and the whole truth; I have concealed nothing, I have dissembled
[240] nothing. And yet, I know that my plainness of speech makes them hate me,
[241] and what is their hatred but a proof that I am speaking the truth?--Hence
[242] has arisen the prejudice against me; and this is the reason of it, as you
[243] will find out either in this or in any future enquiry.
[244]
[245] I have said enough in my defence against the first class of my accusers; I
[246] turn to the second class. They are headed by Meletus, that good man and
[247] true lover of his country, as he calls himself. Against these, too, I must
[248] try to make a defence:--Let their affidavit be read: it contains something
[249] of this kind: It says that Socrates is a doer of evil, who corrupts the
[250] youth; and who does not believe in the gods of the state, but has other new
[251] divinities of his own. Such is the charge; and now let us examine the
[252] particular counts. He says that I am a doer of evil, and corrupt the
[253] youth; but I say, O men of Athens, that Meletus is a doer of evil, in that
[254] he pretends to be in earnest when he is only in jest, and is so eager to
[255] bring men to trial from a pretended zeal and interest about matters in
[256] which he really never had the smallest interest. And the truth of this I
[257] will endeavour to prove to you.
[258]
[259] Come hither, Meletus, and let me ask a question of you. You think a great
[260] deal about the improvement of youth?
[261]
[262] Yes, I do.
[263]
[264] Tell the judges, then, who is their improver; for you must know, as you
[265] have taken the pains to discover their corrupter, and are citing and
[266] accusing me before them. Speak, then, and tell the judges who their
[267] improver is.--Observe, Meletus, that you are silent, and have nothing to
[268] say. But is not this rather disgraceful, and a very considerable proof of
[269] what I was saying, that you have no interest in the matter? Speak up,
[270] friend, and tell us who their improver is.
[271]
[272] The laws.
[273]
[274] But that, my good sir, is not my meaning. I want to know who the person
[275] is, who, in the first place, knows the laws.
[276]
[277] The judges, Socrates, who are present in court.
[278]
[279] What, do you mean to say, Meletus, that they are able to instruct and
[280] improve youth?
[281]
[282] Certainly they are.
[283]
[284] What, all of them, or some only and not others?
[285]
[286] All of them.
[287]
[288] By the goddess Here, that is good news! There are plenty of improvers,
[289] then. And what do you say of the audience,--do they improve them?
[290]
[291] Yes, they do.
[292]
[293] And the senators?
[294]
[295] Yes, the senators improve them.
[296]
[297] But perhaps the members of the assembly corrupt them?--or do they too
[298] improve them?
[299]
[300] They improve them.
[301]
[302] Then every Athenian improves and elevates them; all with the exception of
[303] myself; and I alone am their corrupter? Is that what you affirm?
[304]
[305] That is what I stoutly affirm.
[306]
[307] I am very unfortunate if you are right. But suppose I ask you a question:
[308] How about horses? Does one man do them harm and all the world good? Is
[309] not the exact opposite the truth? One man is able to do them good, or at
[310] least not many;--the trainer of horses, that is to say, does them good, and
[311] others who have to do with them rather injure them? Is not that true,
[312] Meletus, of horses, or of any other animals? Most assuredly it is; whether
[313] you and Anytus say yes or no. Happy indeed would be the condition of youth
[314] if they had one corrupter only, and all the rest of the world were their
[315] improvers. But you, Meletus, have sufficiently shown that you never had a
[316] thought about the young: your carelessness is seen in your not caring
[317] about the very things which you bring against me.
[318]
[319] And now, Meletus, I will ask you another question--by Zeus I will: Which
[320] is better, to live among bad citizens, or among good ones? Answer, friend,
[321] I say; the question is one which may be easily answered. Do not the good
[322] do their neighbours good, and the bad do them evil?
[323]
[324] Certainly.
[325]
[326] And is there anyone who would rather be injured than benefited by those who
[327] live with him? Answer, my good friend, the law requires you to answer--
[328] does any one like to be injured?
[329]
[330] Certainly not.
[331]
[332] And when you accuse me of corrupting and deteriorating the youth, do you
[333] allege that I corrupt them intentionally or unintentionally?
[334]
[335] Intentionally, I say.
[336]
[337] But you have just admitted that the good do their neighbours good, and the
[338] evil do them evil. Now, is that a truth which your superior wisdom has
[339] recognized thus early in life, and am I, at my age, in such darkness and
[340] ignorance as not to know that if a man with whom I have to live is
[341] corrupted by me, I am very likely to be harmed by him; and yet I corrupt
[342] him, and intentionally, too--so you say, although neither I nor any other
[343] human being is ever likely to be convinced by you. But either I do not
[344] corrupt them, or I corrupt them unintentionally; and on either view of the
[345] case you lie. If my offence is unintentional, the law has no cognizance of
[346] unintentional offences: you ought to have taken me privately, and warned
[347] and admonished me; for if I had been better advised, I should have left off
[348] doing what I only did unintentionally--no doubt I should; but you would
[349] have nothing to say to me and refused to teach me. And now you bring me up
[350] in this court, which is a place not of instruction, but of punishment.
[351]
[352] It will be very clear to you, Athenians, as I was saying, that Meletus has
[353] no care at all, great or small, about the matter. But still I should like
[354] to know, Meletus, in what I am affirmed to corrupt the young. I suppose
[355] you mean, as I infer from your indictment, that I teach them not to
[356] acknowledge the gods which the state acknowledges, but some other new
[357] divinities or spiritual agencies in their stead. These are the lessons by
[358] which I corrupt the youth, as you say.
[359]
[360] Yes, that I say emphatically.
[361]
[362] Then, by the gods, Meletus, of whom we are speaking, tell me and the court,
[363] in somewhat plainer terms, what you mean! for I do not as yet understand
[364] whether you affirm that I teach other men to acknowledge some gods, and
[365] therefore that I do believe in gods, and am not an entire atheist--this you
[366] do not lay to my charge,--but only you say that they are not the same gods
[367] which the city recognizes--the charge is that they are different gods. Or,
[368] do you mean that I am an atheist simply, and a teacher of atheism?
[369]
[370] I mean the latter--that you are a complete atheist.
[371]
[372] What an extraordinary statement! Why do you think so, Meletus? Do you
[373] mean that I do not believe in the godhead of the sun or moon, like other
[374] men?
[375]
[376] I assure you, judges, that he does not: for he says that the sun is stone,
[377] and the moon earth.
[378]
[379] Friend Meletus, you think that you are accusing Anaxagoras: and you have
[380] but a bad opinion of the judges, if you fancy them illiterate to such a
[381] degree as not to know that these doctrines are found in the books of
[382] Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, which are full of them. And so, forsooth, the
[383] youth are said to be taught them by Socrates, when there are not
[384] unfrequently exhibitions of them at the theatre (Probably in allusion to
[385] Aristophanes who caricatured, and to Euripides who borrowed the notions of
[386] Anaxagoras, as well as to other dramatic poets.) (price of admission one
[387] drachma at the most); and they might pay their money, and laugh at Socrates
[388] if he pretends to father these extraordinary views. And so, Meletus, you
[389] really think that I do not believe in any god?
[390]
[391] I swear by Zeus that you believe absolutely in none at all.
[392]
[393] Nobody will believe you, Meletus, and I am pretty sure that you do not
[394] believe yourself. I cannot help thinking, men of Athens, that Meletus is
[395] reckless and impudent, and that he has written this indictment in a spirit
[396] of mere wantonness and youthful bravado. Has he not compounded a riddle,
[397] thinking to try me? He said to himself:--I shall see whether the wise
[398] Socrates will discover my facetious contradiction, or whether I shall be
[399] able to deceive him and the rest of them. For he certainly does appear to
[400] me to contradict himself in the indictment as much as if he said that
[401] Socrates is guilty of not believing in the gods, and yet of believing in
[402] them--but this is not like a person who is in earnest.
[403]
[404] I should like you, O men of Athens, to join me in examining what I conceive
[405] to be his inconsistency; and do you, Meletus, answer. And I must remind
[406] the audience of my request that they would not make a disturbance if I
[407] speak in my accustomed manner:
[408]
[409] Did ever man, Meletus, believe in the existence of human things, and not of
[410] human beings?...I wish, men of Athens, that he would answer, and not be
[411] always trying to get up an interruption. Did ever any man believe in
[412] horsemanship, and not in horses? or in flute-playing, and not in flute-
[413] players? No, my friend; I will answer to you and to the court, as you
[414] refuse to answer for yourself. There is no man who ever did. But now
[415] please to answer the next question: Can a man believe in spiritual and
[416] divine agencies, and not in spirits or demigods?
[417]
[418] He cannot.
[419]
[420] How lucky I am to have extracted that answer, by the assistance of the
[421] court! But then you swear in the indictment that I teach and believe in
[422] divine or spiritual agencies (new or old, no matter for that); at any rate,
[423] I believe in spiritual agencies,--so you say and swear in the affidavit;
[424] and yet if I believe in divine beings, how can I help believing in spirits
[425] or demigods;--must I not? To be sure I must; and therefore I may assume
[426] that your silence gives consent. Now what are spirits or demigods? Are
[427] they not either gods or the sons of gods?
[428]
[429] Certainly they are.
[430]
[431] But this is what I call the facetious riddle invented by you: the demigods
[432] or spirits are gods, and you say first that I do not believe in gods, and
[433] then again that I do believe in gods; that is, if I believe in demigods.
[434] For if the demigods are the illegitimate sons of gods, whether by the
[435] nymphs or by any other mothers,