Charmides
by
Plato
Charmides
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[2] PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, who is the narrator, Charmides,
[3] Chaerephon, Critias.
[4]
[5] SCENE: The Palaestra of Taureas, which is near the Porch of the King
[6] Archon.
[7]
[8] Yesterday evening I returned from the army at Potidaea, and having been a
[9] good while away, I thought that I should like to go and look at my old
[10] haunts. So I went into the palaestra of Taureas, which is over against the
[11] temple adjoining the porch of the King Archon, and there I found a number
[12] of persons, most of whom I knew, but not all. My visit was unexpected, and
[13] no sooner did they see me entering than they saluted me from afar on all
[14] sides; and Chaerephon, who is a kind of madman, started up and ran to me,
[15] seizing my hand, and saying, How did you escape, Socrates?--(I should
[16] explain that an engagement had taken place at Potidaea not long before we
[17] came away, of which the news had only just reached Athens.)
[18]
[19] You see, I replied, that here I am.
[20]
[21] There was a report, he said, that the engagement was very severe, and that
[22] many of our acquaintance had fallen.
[23]
[24] That, I replied, was not far from the truth.
[25]
[26] I suppose, he said, that you were present.
[27]
[28] I was.
[29]
[30] Then sit down, and tell us the whole story, which as yet we have only heard
[31] imperfectly.
[32]
[33] I took the place which he assigned to me, by the side of Critias the son of
[34] Callaeschrus, and when I had saluted him and the rest of the company, I
[35] told them the news from the army, and answered their several enquiries.
[36]
[37] Then, when there had been enough of this, I, in my turn, began to make
[38] enquiries about matters at home--about the present state of philosophy, and
[39] about the youth. I asked whether any of them were remarkable for wisdom or
[40] beauty, or both. Critias, glancing at the door, invited my attention to
[41] some youths who were coming in, and talking noisily to one another,
[42] followed by a crowd. Of the beauties, Socrates, he said, I fancy that you
[43] will soon be able to form a judgment. For those who are just entering are
[44] the advanced guard of the great beauty, as he is thought to be, of the day,
[45] and he is likely to be not far off himself.
[46]
[47] Who is he, I said; and who is his father?
[48]
[49] Charmides, he replied, is his name; he is my cousin, and the son of my
[50] uncle Glaucon: I rather think that you know him too, although he was not
[51] grown up at the time of your departure.
[52]
[53] Certainly, I know him, I said, for he was remarkable even then when he was
[54] still a child, and I should imagine that by this time he must be almost a
[55] young man.
[56]
[57] You will see, he said, in a moment what progress he has made and what he is
[58] like. He had scarcely said the word, when Charmides entered.
[59]
[60] Now you know, my friend, that I cannot measure anything, and of the
[61] beautiful, I am simply such a measure as a white line is of chalk; for
[62] almost all young persons appear to be beautiful in my eyes. But at that
[63] moment, when I saw him coming in, I confess that I was quite astonished at
[64] his beauty and stature; all the world seemed to be enamoured of him;
[65] amazement and confusion reigned when he entered; and a troop of lovers
[66] followed him. That grown-up men like ourselves should have been affected
[67] in this way was not surprising, but I observed that there was the same
[68] feeling among the boys; all of them, down to the very least child, turned
[69] and looked at him, as if he had been a statue.
[70]
[71] Chaerephon called me and said: What do you think of him, Socrates? Has he
[72] not a beautiful face?
[73]
[74] Most beautiful, I said.
[75]
[76] But you would think nothing of his face, he replied, if you could see his
[77] naked form: he is absolutely perfect.
[78]
[79] And to this they all agreed.
[80]
[81] By Heracles, I said, there never was such a paragon, if he has only one
[82] other slight addition.
[83]
[84] What is that? said Critias.
[85]
[86] If he has a noble soul; and being of your house, Critias, he may be
[87] expected to have this.
[88]
[89] He is as fair and good within, as he is without, replied Critias.
[90]
[91] Then, before we see his body, should we not ask him to show us his soul,
[92] naked and undisguised? he is just of an age at which he will like to talk.
[93]
[94] That he will, said Critias, and I can tell you that he is a philosopher
[95] already, and also a considerable poet, not in his own opinion only, but in
[96] that of others.
[97]
[98] That, my dear Critias, I replied, is a distinction which has long been in
[99] your family, and is inherited by you from Solon. But why do you not call
[100] him, and show him to us? for even if he were younger than he is, there
[101] could be no impropriety in his talking to us in the presence of you, who
[102] are his guardian and cousin.
[103]
[104] Very well, he said; then I will call him; and turning to the attendant, he
[105] said, Call Charmides, and tell him that I want him to come and see a
[106] physician about the illness of which he spoke to me the day before
[107] yesterday. Then again addressing me, he added: He has been complaining
[108] lately of having a headache when he rises in the morning: now why should
[109] you not make him believe that you know a cure for the headache?
[110]
[111] Why not, I said; but will he come?
[112]
[113] He will be sure to come, he replied.
[114]
[115] He came as he was bidden, and sat down between Critias and me. Great
[116] amusement was occasioned by every one pushing with might and main at his
[117] neighbour in order to make a place for him next to themselves, until at the
[118] two ends of the row one had to get up and the other was rolled over
[119] sideways. Now I, my friend, was beginning to feel awkward; my former bold
[120] belief in my powers of conversing with him had vanished. And when Critias
[121] told him that I was the person who had the cure, he looked at me in such an
[122] indescribable manner, and was just going to ask a question. And at that
[123] moment all the people in the palaestra crowded about us, and, O rare! I
[124] caught a sight of the inwards of his garment, and took the flame. Then I
[125] could no longer contain myself. I thought how well Cydias understood the
[126] nature of love, when, in speaking of a fair youth, he warns some one 'not
[127] to bring the fawn in the sight of the lion to be devoured by him,' for I
[128] felt that I had been overcome by a sort of wild-beast appetite. But I
[129] controlled myself, and when he asked me if I knew the cure of the headache,
[130] I answered, but with an effort, that I did know.
[131]
[132] And what is it? he said.
[133]
[134] I replied that it was a kind of leaf, which required to be accompanied by a
[135] charm, and if a person would repeat the charm at the same time that he used
[136] the cure, he would be made whole; but that without the charm the leaf would
[137] be of no avail.
[138]
[139] Then I will write out the charm from your dictation, he said.
[140]
[141] With my consent? I said, or without my consent?
[142]
[143] With your consent, Socrates, he said, laughing.
[144]
[145] Very good, I said; and are you quite sure that you know my name?
[146]
[147] I ought to know you, he replied, for there is a great deal said about you
[148] among my companions; and I remember when I was a child seeing you in
[149] company with my cousin Critias.
[150]
[151] I am glad to find that you remember me, I said; for I shall now be more at
[152] home with you and shall be better able to explain the nature of the charm,
[153] about which I felt a difficulty before. For the charm will do more,
[154] Charmides, than only cure the headache. I dare say that you have heard
[155] eminent physicians say to a patient who comes to them with bad eyes, that
[156] they cannot cure his eyes by themselves, but that if his eyes are to be
[157] cured, his head must be treated; and then again they say that to think of
[158] curing the head alone, and not the rest of the body also, is the height of
[159] folly. And arguing in this way they apply their methods to the whole body,
[160] and try to treat and heal the whole and the part together. Did you ever
[161] observe that this is what they say?
[162]
[163] Yes, he said.
[164]
[165] And they are right, and you would agree with them?
[166]
[167] Yes, he said, certainly I should.
[168]
[169] His approving answers reassured me, and I began by degrees to regain
[170] confidence, and the vital heat returned. Such, Charmides, I said, is the
[171] nature of the charm, which I learned when serving with the army from one of
[172] the physicians of the Thracian king Zamolxis, who are said to be so skilful
[173] that they can even give immortality. This Thracian told me that in these
[174] notions of theirs, which I was just now mentioning, the Greek physicians
[175] are quite right as far as they go; but Zamolxis, he added, our king, who is
[176] also a god, says further, 'that as you ought not to attempt to cure the
[177] eyes without the head, or the head without the body, so neither ought you
[178] to attempt to cure the body without the soul; and this,' he said, 'is the
[179] reason why the cure of many diseases is unknown to the physicians of
[180] Hellas, because they are ignorant of the whole, which ought to be studied
[181] also; for the part can never be well unless the whole is well.' For all
[182] good and evil, whether in the body or in human nature, originates, as he
[183] declared, in the soul, and overflows from thence, as if from the head into
[184] the eyes. And therefore if the head and body are to be well, you must
[185] begin by curing the soul; that is the first thing. And the cure, my dear
[186] youth, has to be effected by the use of certain charms, and these charms
[187] are fair words; and by them temperance is implanted in the soul, and where
[188] temperance is, there health is speedily imparted, not only to the head, but
[189] to the whole body. And he who taught me the cure and the charm at the same
[190] time added a special direction: 'Let no one,' he said, 'persuade you to
[191] cure the head, until he has first given you his soul to be cured by the
[192] charm. For this,' he said, 'is the great error of our day in the treatment
[193] of the human body, that physicians separate the soul from the body.' And
[194] he added with emphasis, at the same time making me swear to his words, 'Let
[195] no one, however rich, or noble, or fair, persuade you to give him the cure,
[196] without the charm.' Now I have sworn, and I must keep my oath, and
[197] therefore if you will allow me to apply the Thracian charm first to your
[198] soul, as the stranger directed, I will afterwards proceed to apply the cure
[199] to your head. But if not, I do not know what I am to do with you, my dear
[200] Charmides.
[201]
[202] Critias, when he heard this, said: The headache will be an unexpected gain
[203] to my young relation, if the pain in his head compels him to improve his
[204] mind: and I can tell you, Socrates, that Charmides is not only pre-eminent
[205] in beauty among his equals, but also in that quality which is given by the
[206] charm; and this, as you say, is temperance?
[207]
[208] Yes, I said.
[209]
[210] Then let me tell you that he is the most temperate of human beings, and for
[211] his age inferior to none in any quality.
[212]
[213] Yes, I said, Charmides; and indeed I think that you ought to excel others
[214] in all good qualities; for if I am not mistaken there is no one present who
[215] could easily point out two Athenian houses, whose union would be likely to
[216] produce a better or nobler scion than the two from which you are sprung.
[217] There is your father's house, which is descended from Critias the son of
[218] Dropidas, whose family has been commemorated in the panegyrical verses of
[219] Anacreon, Solon, and many other poets, as famous for beauty and virtue and
[220] all other high fortune: and your mother's house is equally distinguished;
[221] for your maternal uncle, Pyrilampes, is reputed never to have found his
[222] equal, in Persia at the court of the great king, or on the continent of
[223] Asia, in all the places to which he went as ambassador, for stature and
[224] beauty; that whole family is not a whit inferior to the other. Having such
[225] ancestors you ought to be first in all things, and, sweet son of Glaucon,
[226] your outward form is no dishonour to any of them. If to beauty you add
[227] temperance, and if in other respects you are what Critias declares you to
[228] be, then, dear Charmides, blessed art thou, in being the son of thy mother.
[229] And here lies the point; for if, as he declares, you have this gift of
[230] temperance already, and are temperate enough, in that case you have no need
[231] of any charms, whether of Zamolxis or of Abaris the Hyperborean, and I may
[232] as well let you have the cure of the head at once; but if you have not yet
[233] acquired this quality, I must use the charm before I give you the medicine.
[234] Please, therefore, to inform me whether you admit the truth of what Critias
[235] has been saying;--have you or have you not this quality of temperance?
[236]
[237] Charmides blushed, and the blush heightened his beauty, for modesty is
[238] becoming in youth; he then said very ingenuously, that he really could not
[239] at once answer, either yes, or no, to the question which I had asked: For,
[240] said he, if I affirm that I am not temperate, that would be a strange thing
[241] for me to say of myself, and also I should give the lie to Critias, and
[242] many others who think as he tells you, that I am temperate: but, on the
[243] other hand, if I say that I am, I shall have to praise myself, which would
[244] be ill manners; and therefore I do not know how to answer you.
[245]
[246] I said to him: That is a natural reply, Charmides, and I think that you
[247] and I ought together to enquire whether you have this quality about which I
[248] am asking or not; and then you will not be compelled to say what you do not
[249] like; neither shall I be a rash practitioner of medicine: therefore, if
[250] you please, I will share the enquiry with you, but I will not press you if
[251] you would rather not.
[252]
[253] There is nothing which I should like better, he said; and as far as I am
[254] concerned you may proceed in the way which you think best.
[255]
[256] I think, I said, that I had better begin by asking you a question; for if
[257] temperance abides in you, you must have an opinion about her; she must give
[258] some intimation of her nature and qualities, which may enable you to form a
[259] notion of her. Is not that true?
[260]
[261] Yes, he said, that I think is true.
[262]
[263] You know your native language, I said, and therefore you must be able to
[264] tell what you feel about this.
[265]
[266] Certainly, he said.
[267]
[268] In order, then, that I may form a conjecture whether you have temperance
[269] abiding in you or not, tell me, I said, what, in your opinion, is
[270] Temperance?
[271]
[272] At first he hesitated, and was very unwilling to answer: then he said that
[273] he thought temperance was doing things orderly and quietly, such things for
[274] example as walking in the streets, and talking, or anything else of that
[275] nature. In a word, he said, I should answer that, in my opinion,
[276] temperance is quietness.
[277]
[278] Are you right, Charmides? I said. No doubt some would affirm that the
[279] quiet are the temperate; but let us see whether these words have any
[280] meaning; and first tell me whether you would not acknowledge temperance to
[281] be of the class of the noble and good?
[282]
[283] Yes.
[284]
[285] But which is best when you are at the writing-master's, to write the same
[286] letters quickly or quietly?
[287]
[288] Quickly.
[289]
[290] And to read quickly or slowly?
[291]
[292] Quickly again.
[293]
[294] And in playing the lyre, or wrestling, quickness or sharpness are far
[295] better than quietness and slowness?
[296]
[297] Yes.
[298]
[299] And the same holds in boxing and in the pancratium?
[300]
[301] Certainly.
[302]
[303] And in leaping and running and in bodily exercises generally, quickness and
[304] agility are good; slowness, and inactivity, and quietness, are bad?
[305]
[306] That is evident.
[307]
[308] Then, I said, in all bodily actions, not quietness, but the greatest
[309] agility and quickness, is noblest and best?
[310]
[311] Yes, certainly.
[312]
[313] And is temperance a good?
[314]
[315] Yes.
[316]
[317] Then, in reference to the body, not quietness, but quickness will be the
[318] higher degree of temperance, if temperance is a good?
[319]
[320] True, he said.
[321]
[322] And which, I said, is better--facility in learning, or difficulty in
[323] learning?
[324]
[325] Facility.
[326]
[327] Yes, I said; and facility in learning is learning quickly, and difficulty
[328] in learning is learning quietly and slowly?
[329]
[330] True.
[331]
[332] And is it not better to teach another quickly and energetically, rather
[333] than quietly and slowly?
[334]
[335] Yes.
[336]
[337] And which is better, to call to mind, and to remember, quickly and readily,
[338] or quietly and slowly?
[339]
[340] The former.
[341]
[342] And is not shrewdness a quickness or cleverness of the soul, and not a
[343] quietness?
[344]
[345] True.
[346]
[347] And is it not best to understand what is said, whether at the writing-
[348] master's or the music-master's, or anywhere else, not as quietly as
[349] possible, but as quickly as possible?
[350]
[351] Yes.
[352]
[353] And in the searchings or deliberations of the soul, not the quietest, as I
[354] imagine, and he who with difficulty deliberates and discovers, is thought
[355] worthy of praise, but he who does so most easily and quickly?
[356]
[357] Quite true, he said.
[358]
[359] And in all that concerns either body or soul, swiftness and activity are
[360] clearly better than slowness and quietness?
[361]
[362] Clearly they are.
[363]
[364] Then temperance is not quietness, nor is the temperate life quiet,--
[365] certainly not upon this view; for the life which is temperate is supposed
[366] to be the good. And of two things, one is true,--either never, or very
[367] seldom, do the quiet actions in life appear to be better than the quick and
[368] energetic ones; or supposing that of the nobler actions, there are as many
[369] quiet, as quick and vehement: still, even if we grant this, temperance
[370] will not be acting quietly any more than acting quickly and energetically,
[371] either in walking or talking or in anything else; nor will the quiet life
[372] be more temperate than the unquiet, seeing that temperance is admitted by
[373] us to be a good and noble thing, and the quick have been shown to be as
[374] good as the quiet.
[375]
[376] I think, he said, Socrates, that you are right.
[377]
[378] Then once more, Charmides, I said, fix your attention, and look within;
[379] consider the effect which temperance has upon yourself, and the nature of
[380] that which has the effect. Think over all this, and, like a brave youth,
[381] tell me--What is temperance?
[382]
[383] After a moment's pause, in which he made a real manly effort to think, he
[384] said: My opinion is, Socrates, that temperance makes a man ashamed or
[385] modest, and that temperance is the same as modesty.
[386]
[387] Very good, I said; and did you not admit, just now, that temperance is
[388] noble?
[389]
[390] Yes, certainly, he said.
[391]
[392] And the temperate are also good?
[393]
[394] Yes.
[395]
[396] And can that be good which does not make men good?
[397]
[398] Certainly not.
[399]
[400] And you would infer that temperance is not only noble, but also good?
[401]
[402] That is my opinion.
[403]
[404] Well, I said; but surely you would agree with Homer when he says,
[405]
[406] 'Modesty is not good for a needy man'?
[407]
[408] Yes, he said; I agree.
[409]
[410] Then I suppose that modesty is and is not good?
[411]
[412] Clearly.
[413]
[414] But temperance, whose presence makes men only good, and not bad, is always
[415] good?
[416]
[417] That appears to me to be as you say.
[418]
[419] And the inference is that temperance cannot be modesty--if temperance is a
[420] good, and if modesty is as much an evil as a good?
[421]
[422] All that, Socrates, appears to me to be true; but I should like to know
[423] what you think about another definition of temperance, which I just now
[424] remember to have heard from some one, who said, 'That temperance is doing
[425] our own business.' Was he right who affirmed that?
[426]
[427] You monster! I said; this is what Critias, or some philosopher has told
[428] you.
[429]
[430] Some one else, then, said Critias; for certainly I have not.
[431]
[432] But what matter, said Charmides, from whom I heard this?
[433]
[434] No matter at all, I replied; for the point is not who said the words, but
[435] whether they are true or not.
[436]
[437] There you are in the right, Socrates, he replied.
[438]
[439] To be sure, I said; yet I doubt whether we shall ever be able to discover
[440] their truth or falsehood; for they are a kind of riddle.
[441]
[442] What makes you think so? he said.
[443]
[444] Because, I said, he who uttered them seems to me to have meant one thing,
[445] and said another. Is the scribe, for example, to be regarded as doing
[446] nothing when he reads or writes?
[447]
[448] I should rather think that he was doing something.
[449]
[450] And does the scribe write or read, or teach you boys to write or read, your
[451] own names only, or did you write your enemies' names as well as your own
[452] and your friends'?
[453]
[454] As much one as the other.
[455]
[456] And was there anything meddling or intemperate in this?
[457]
[458] Certainly not.
[459]
[460] And yet if reading and writing are the same as doing, you were doing what
[461] was not your own business?
[462]
[463] But they are the same as doing.
[464]
[465] And the healing art, my friend, and building, and weaving, and doing
[466] anything whatever which is done by art,--these all clearly come under the
[467] head of doing?
[468]
[469] Certainly.
[470]
[471] And do you think that a state would be well ordered by a law which
[472] compelled every man to weave and wash his own coat, and make his own shoes,
[473] and his own flask and strigil, and other implements, on this principle of
[474] every one doing and performing his own, and abstaining from what is not his
[475] own?
[476]
[477] I think not, he said.
[478]
[479] But, I said, a temperate state will be a well-ordered state.
[480]
[481] Of course, he replied.
[482]
[483] Then temperance, I said, will not be doing one's own business; not at least
[484] in this way, or doing things of this sort?
[485]
[486] Clearly not.
[487]
[488] Then, as I was just now saying, he who declared that temperance is a man
[489] doing his own business had another and a hidden meaning; for I do not think
[490] that he could have been such a fool as to mean this. Was he a fool who
[491] told you, Charmides?
[492]
[493] Nay, he replied, I certainly thought him a very wise man.
[494]
[495] Then I am quite certain that he put forth his definition as a riddle,
[496] thinking that no one would know the meaning of the words 'doing his own
[497] business.'
[498]
[499] I dare say, he replied.
[500]
[501] And what is the meaning of a man doing his own business? Can you tell me?
[502]
[503] Indeed, I cannot; and I should not wonder if the man himself who used this
[504] phrase did not understand what he was saying. Whereupon he laughed slyly,
[505] and looked at Critias.
[506]
[507] Critias had long been showing uneasiness, for he felt that he had a
[508] reputation to maintain with Charmides and the rest of the company. He had,
[509] however, hitherto managed to restrain himself; but now he could no longer
[510] forbear, and I am convinced of the truth of the suspicion which I
[511] entertained at the time, that Charmides had heard this answer about
[512] temperance from Critias. And Charmides, who did not want to answer
[513] himself, but to make Critias answer, tried to stir him up. He went on
[514] pointing out that he had been refuted, at which Critias grew angry, and
[515] appeared, as I thought, inclined to quarrel with him; just as a poet might
[516] quarrel with an actor who spoiled his poems in repeating them; so he looked
[517] hard at him and said--
[518]
[519] Do you imagine, Charmides, that the author of this definition of temperance
[520] did not understand the meaning of his own words, because you do not
[521] understand them?
[522]
[523] Why, at his age, I said, most excellent Critias, he can hardly be expected
[524] to understand; but you, who are older, and have studied, may well be
[525] assumed to know the meaning of them; and therefore, if you agree with him,
[526] and accept his definition of temperance, I would much rather argue with you
[527] than with him about the truth or falsehood of the definition.
[528]
[529] I entirely agree, said Critias, and accept the definition.
[530]
[531] Very good, I said; and now let me repeat my question--Do you admit, as I
[532] was just now saying, that all craftsmen make or do something?
[533]
[534] I do.
[535]
[536] And do they make or do their own business only, or that of others also?
[537]
[538] They make or do that of others also.
[539]
[540] And are they temperate, seeing that they make not for themselves or their
[541] own business only?
[542]
[543] Why not? he said.
[544]
[545] No objection on my part, I said, but there may be a difficulty on his who
[546] proposes as a definition of temperance, 'doing one's own business,' and
[547] then says that there is no reason why those who do the business of others
[548] should not be temperate.
[549]
[550] Nay (The English reader has to observe that the word 'make' (Greek), in
[551] Greek, has also the sense of 'do' (Greek).), said he; did I ever
[552] acknowledge that those who do the business of others are temperate? I
[553] said, those who make, not those who do.
[554]
[555] What! I asked; do you mean to say that doing and making are not the same?
[556]
[557] No more, he replied, than making or working are the same; thus much I have
[558] learned from Hesiod, who says that 'work is no disgrace.' Now do you
[559] imagine that if he had meant by working and doing such things as you were
[560] describing, he would have said that there was no disgrace in them--for
[561] example, in the manufacture of shoes, or in selling pickles, or sitting for
[562] hire in a house of ill-fame? That, Socrates, is not to be supposed: but I
[563] conceive him to have distinguished making from doing and work; and, while
[564] admitting that the making anything might sometimes become a disgrace, when
[565] the employment was not honourable, to have thought that work was never any
[566] disgrace at all. For things nobly and usefully made he called works; and
[567] such makings he called workings, and doings; and he must be supposed to
[568] have called such things only man's proper business, and what is hurtful,
[569] not his business: and in that sense Hesiod, and any other wise man, may be
[570] reasonably supposed to call him wise who does his own work.
[571]
[572] O Critias, I said, no sooner had you opened your mouth, than I pretty well
[573] knew that you would call that which is proper to a man, and that which is
[574] his own, good; and that the makings (Greek) of the good you would call
[575] doings (Greek), for I am no stranger to the endless distinctions which
[576] Prodicus draws about names. Now I have no objection to your giving names
[577] any signification which you please, if you will only tell me what you mean
[578] by them. Please then to begin again, and be a little plainer. Do you mean
[579] that this doing or making, or whatever is the word which you would use, of
[580] good actions, is temperance?
[581]
[582] I do, he said.
[583]
[584] Then not he who does evil, but he who does good, is temperate?
[585]
[586] Yes, he said; and you, friend, would agree.
[587]
[588] No matter whether I should or not; just now, not what I think, but what you
[589] are saying, is the point at issue.
[590]
[591] Well, he answered; I mean to say, that he who does evil, and not good, is
[592] not temperate; and that he is temperate who does good, and not evil: for
[593] temperance I define in plain words to be the doing of good actions.
[594]
[595] And you may be very likely right in what you are saying; but I am curious
[596] to know whether you imagine that temperate men are ignorant of their own
[597] temperance?
[598]
[599] I do not think so, he said.
[600]
[601] And yet were you not saying, just now, that craftsmen might be temperate in
[602] doing another's work, as well as in doing their own?
[603]
[604] I was, he replied; but what is your drift?
[605]
[606] I have no particular drift, but I wish that you would tell me whether a
[607] physician who cures a patient may do good to himself and good to another
[608] also?
[609]
[610] I think that he may.
[611]
[612] And he who does so does his duty?
[613]
[614] Yes.
[615]
[616] And does not he who does his duty act temperately or wisely?
[617]
[618] Yes, he acts wisely.
[619]
[620] But must the physician necessarily know when his treatment is likely to
[621] prove beneficial, and when not? or must the craftsman necessarily know when
[622] he is likely to be benefited, and when not to be benefited, by the work
[623] which he is doing?
[624]
[625] I suppose not.
[626]
[627] Then, I said, he may sometimes do good or harm, and not know what he is
[628] himself doing, and yet, in doing good, as you say, he has done temperately
[629] or wisely. Was not that your statement?
[630]
[631] Yes.
[632]
[633] Then, as would seem, in doing good, he may act wisely or temperately, and
[634] be wise or temperate, but not know his own wisdom or temperance?
[635]
[636] But that, Socrates, he said, is impossible; and therefore if this is, as
[637] you imply, the necessary consequence of any of my previous admissions, I
[638] will withdraw them, rather than admit that a man can be temperate or wise
[639] who does not know himself; and I am not ashamed to confess that I was in
[640] error. For self-knowledge would certainly be maintained by me to be the
[641] very essence of knowledge, and in this I agree with him who dedicated the
[642] inscription, 'Know thyself!' at Delphi. That word, if I am not mistaken,
[643] is put there as a sort of salutation which the god addresses to those who
[644] enter the temple; as much as to say that the ordinary salutation of 'Hail!'
[645] is not right, and that the exhortation 'Be temperate!' would be a far
[646] better way of saluting one another. The notion of him who dedicated the
[647] inscription was, as I believe, that the god speaks to those who enter his
[648] temple, not as men speak; but, when a worshipper enters, the first word
[649] which he hears is 'Be temperate!' This, however, like a prophet he
[650] expresses in a sort of riddle, for 'Know thyself!' and 'Be temperate!' are
[651] the same, as I maintain, and as the letters imply (Greek), and yet they may
[652] be easily misunderstood; and succeeding sages who added 'Never too much,'
[653] or, 'Give a pledge, and evil is nigh at hand,' would appear to have so
[654] misunderstood them; for they imagined that 'Know thyself!' was a piece of
[655] advice which the god gave, and not his salutation of the worshippers at
[656] their first coming in; and they dedicated their own inscription under the
[657] idea that they too would give equally useful pieces of advice. Shall I
[658] tell you, Socrates, why I say all this? My object is to leave the previous
[659] discussion (in which I know not whether you or I are more right, but, at
[660] any rate, no clear result was attained), and to raise a new one in which I
[661] will attempt to prove, if you deny, that temperance is self-knowledge.
[662]
[663] Yes, I said, Critias; but you come to me as though I professed to know
[664] about the questions which I ask, and as though I could, if I only would,
[665] agree with you. Whereas the fact is that I enquire with you into the truth
[666] of that which is advanced from time to time, just because I do not know;
[667] and when I have enquired, I will say whether I agree with you or not.
[668] Please then to allow me time to reflect.
[669]
[670] Reflect, he said.
[671]
[672] I am reflecting, I replied, and discover that temperance, or wisdom, if
[673] implying a knowledge of anything, must be a science, and a science of
[674] something.
[675]
[676] Yes, he said; the science of itself.
[677]
[678] Is not medicine, I said, the science of health?
[679]
[680] True.
[681]
[682] And suppose, I said, that I were asked by you what is the use or effect of
[683] medicine, which is this science of health, I should answer that medicine is
[684] of very great use in producing health, which, as you will admit, is an
[685] excellent effect.
[686]
[687] Granted.
[688]
[689] And if you were to ask me, what is the result or effect of architecture,
[690] which is the science of building, I should say houses, and so of other
[691] arts, which all have their different results. Now I want you, Critias, to
[692] answer a similar question about temperance, or wisdom, which, according to
[693] you, is the science of itself. Admitting this view, I ask of you, what
[694] good work, worthy of the name wise, does temperance or wisdom, which is the
[695] science of itself, effect? Answer me.
[696]
[697] That is not the true way of pursuing the enquiry, Socrates, he said; for
[698] wisdom is not like the other sciences, any more than they are like one
[699] another: but you proceed as if they were alike. For tell me, he said,
[700] what result is there of computation or geometry, in the same sense as a
[701] house is the result of building, or a garment of weaving, or any other work
[702] of any other art? Can you show me any such result of them? You cannot.
[703]
[704] That is true, I said; but still each of these sciences has a subject which
[705] is different from the science. I can show you that the art of computation
[706] has to do with odd and even numbers in their numerical relations to
[707] themselves and to each other. Is not that true?
[708]
[709] Yes, he said.
[710]
[711] And the odd and even numbers are not the same with the art of computation?
[712]
[713] They are not.
[714]
[715] The art of weighing, again, has to do with lighter and heavier; but the art
[716] of weighing is one thing, and the heavy and the light another. Do you
[717] admit that?
[718]
[719] Yes.
[720]
[721] Now, I want to know, what is that which is not wisdom, and of which wisdom
[722] is the science?
[723]
[724] You are just falling into the old error, Socrates, he said. You come
[725] asking in what wisdom or temperance differs from the other sciences, and
[726] then you try to discover some respect in which they are alike; but they are
[727] not, for all the other sciences are of something else, and not of
[728] themselves; wisdom alone is a science of other sciences, and of itself.
[729] And of this, as I believe, you are very well aware: and that you are only
[730] doing what you denied that you were doing just now, trying to refute me,
[731] instead of pursuing the argument.
[732]
[733] And what if I am? How can you think that I have any other motive in
[734] refuting you but what I should have in examining into myself? which motive
[735] would be just a fear of my unconsciously fancying that I knew something of
[736] which I was ignorant. And at this moment I pursue the argument chiefly for
[737] my own sake, and perhaps in some degree also for the sake of my other
[738] friends. For is not the discovery of things as they truly are, a good
[739] common to all mankind?
[740]
[741] Yes, certainly, Socrates, he said.
[742]
[743] Then, I said, be cheerful, sweet sir, and give your opinion in answer to
[744] the question which I asked, never minding whether Critias or Socrates is
[745] the person refuted; attend only to the argument, and see what will come of
[746] the refutation.
[747]
[748] I think that you are right, he replied; and I will do as you say.
[749]
[750] Tell me, then, I said, what you mean to affirm about wisdom.
[751]
[752] I mean to say that wisdom is the only science which is the science of
[753] itself as well as of the other sciences.
[754]
[755] But the science of science, I said, will also be the science of the absence
[756] of science.
[757]
[758] Very true, he said.
[759]
[760] Then the wise or temperate man, and he only, will know himself, and be able
[761] to examine what he knows or does not know, and to see what others know and
[762] think that they know and do really know; and what they do not know, and
[763] fancy that they know, when they do not. No other person will be able to do
[764] this. And this is wisdom and temperance and self-knowledge--for a man to
[765] know what he knows, and what he does not know. That is your meaning?
[766]
[767] Yes, he said.
[768]
[769] Now then, I said, making an offering of the third or last argument to Zeus
[770] the Saviour, let us begin again, and ask, in the first place, whether it is
[771] or is not possible for a person to know that he knows and does not know
[772] what he knows and does not know; and in the second place, whether, if
[773] perfectly possible, such knowledge is of any use.
[774]
[775] That is what we have to consider, he said.
[776]
[777] And here, Critias, I said, I hope that you will find a way out of a
[778] difficulty into which I have got myself. Shall I tell you the nature of
[779] the difficulty?
[780]
[781] By all means, he replied.
[782]
[783] Does not what you have been saying, if true, amount to this: that there
[784] must be a single science which is wholly a science of itself and of other
[785] sciences, and that the same is also the science of the absence of science?
[786]
[787] Yes.
[788]
[789] But consider how monstrous this proposition is, my friend: in any parallel
[790] case, the impossibility will be transparent to you.
[791]
[792] How is that? and in what cases do you mean?
[793]
[794] In such cases as this: Suppose that there is a kind of vision which is not
[795] like ordinary vision, but a vision of itself and of other sorts of vision,
[796] and of the defect of them, which in seeing sees no colour, but only itself
[797] and other sorts of vision: Do you think that there is such a kind of
[798] vision?
[799]
[800] Certainly not.
[801]
[802] Or is there a kind of hearing which hears no sound at all, but only itself
[803] and other sorts of hearing, or the defects of them?
[804]
[805] There is not.
[806]
[807] Or take all the senses: can you imagine that there is any sense of itself
[808] and of other senses, but which is incapable of perceiving the objects of
[809] the senses?
[810]
[811] I think not.
[812]
[813] Could there be any desire which is not the desire of any pleasure, but of
[814] itself, and of all other desires?
[815]
[816] Certainly not.
[817]
[818] Or can you imagine a wish which wishes for no good, but only for itself and
[819] all other wishes?
[820]
[821] I should answer, No.
[822]
[823] Or would you say that there is a love which is not the love of beauty, but
[824] of itself and of other loves?
[825]
[826] I should not.
[827]
[828] Or did you ever know of a fear which fears itself or other fears, but has
[829] no object of fear?
[830]
[831] I never did, he said.
[832]
[833] Or of an opinion which is an opinion of itself and of other opinions, and
[834] which has no opinion on the subjects of opinion in general?
[835]
[836] Certainly not.
[837]
[838] But surely we are assuming a science of this kind, which, having no
[839] subject-matter, is a science of itself and of the other sciences?
[840]
[841] Yes, that is what is affirmed.
[842]
[843] But how strange is this, if it be indeed true: we must not however as yet
[844] absolutely deny the possibility of such a science; let us rather consider
[845] the matter.
[846]
[847] You are quite right.
[848]
[849] Well then, this science of which we are speaking is a science of something,
[850] and is of a nature to be a science of something?
[851]
[852] Yes.
[853]
[854] Just as that which is greater is of a nature to be greater than something
[855] else? (Socrates is intending to show that science differs from the object
[856] of science, as any other relative differs from the object of relation. But
[857] where there is comparison--greater, less, heavier, lighter, and the like--a
[858] relation to self as well as to other things involves an absolute
[859] contradiction; and in other cases, as in the case of the senses, is hardly
[860] conceivable. The use of the genitive after the comparative in Greek,
[861] (Greek), creates an unavoidable obscurity in the translation.)
[862]
[863] Yes.
[864]
[865] Which is less, if the other is conceived to be greater?
[866]
[867] To be sure.
[868]
[869] And if we could find something which is at once greater than itself, and
[870] greater than other great things, but not greater than those things in
[871] comparison of which the others are greater, then that thing would have the
[872] property of being greater and also less than itself?
[873]
[874] That, Socrates, he said, is the inevitable inference.
[875]
[876] Or if there be a double which is double of itself and of other doubles,
[877] these will be halves; for the double is relative to the half?
[878]
[879] That is true.
[880]
[881] And that which is greater than itself will also be less, and that which is
[882] heavier will also be lighter, and that which is older will also be younger:
[883] and the same of other things; that which has a nature relative to self will
[884] retain also the nature of its object: I mean to say, for example, that
[885] hearing is, as we say, of sound or voice. Is that true?
[886]
[887] Yes.
[888]
[889] Then if hearing hears itself, it must hear a voice; for there is no other
[890] way of hearing.
[891]
[892] Certainly.
[893]
[894] And sight also, my excellent friend, if it sees itself must see a colour,
[895] for sight cannot see that which has no colour.
[896]
[897] No.
[898]
[899] Do you remark, Critias, that in several of the examples which have been
[900] recited the notion of a relation to self is altogether inadmissible, and in
[901] other cases hardly credible--inadmissible, for example, in the case of
[902] magnitudes, numbers, and the like?
[903]
[904] Very true.
[905]
[906] But in the case of hearing and sight, or in the power of self-motion, and
[907] the power of heat to burn, this relation to self will be regarded as
[908] incredible by some, but perhaps not by others. And some great man, my
[909] friend, is wanted, who will satisfactorily determine for us, whether there
[910] is nothing which has an inherent property of relation to self, or some
[911] things only and not others; and whether in this class of self-related
[912] things, if there be such a class, that science which is called wisdom or
[913] temperance is included. I altogether distrust my own power of determining
[914] these matters: I am not certain whether there is such a science of science
[915] at all; and even if there be, I should not acknowledge this to be wisdom or
[916] temperance, until I can also see whether such a science would or would not
[917] do us any good; for I have an impression that temperance is a benefit and a
[918] good. And therefore, O son of Callaeschrus, as you maintain that
[919] temperance or wisdom is a science of science, and also of the absence of
[920] science, I will request you to show in the first place, as I was saying
[921] before, the possibility, and in the second place, the advantage, of such a
[922] science; and then perhaps you may satisfy me that you are right in your
[923] view of temperance.
[924]
[925] Critias heard me say this, and saw that I was in a difficulty; and as one
[926] person when another yawns in his presence catches the infection of yawning
[927] from him, so did he seem to be driven into a difficulty by my difficulty.
[928] But as he had a reputation to maintain, he was ashamed to admit before the
[929] company that he could not answer my challenge or determine the question at
[930] issue; and he made an unintelligible attempt to hide his perplexity. In
[931] order that the argument might proceed, I said to him, Well then Critias, if
[932] you like, let us assume that there is this science of science; whether the
[933] assumption is right or wrong may hereafter be investigated. Admitting the
[934] existence of it, will you tell me how such a science enables us to
[935] distinguish what we know or do not know, which, as we were saying, is
[936] self-knowledge or wisdom: so we were saying?
[937]
[938] Yes, Socrates, he said; and that I think is certainly true: for he who has
[939] this science or knowledge which knows itself will become like the knowledge
[940] which he has, in the same way that he who has swiftness will be swift, and
[941] he who has beauty will be beautiful, and he who has knowledge will know.
[942] In the same way he who has that knowledge which is self-knowing, will know
[943] himself.
[944]
[945] I do not doubt, I said, that a man will know himself, when he possesses
[946] that which has self-knowledge: but what necessity is there that, having
[947] this, he should know what he knows and what he does not know?
[948]
[949] Because, Socrates, they are the same.
[950]
[951] Very likely, I said; but I remain as stupid as ever; for still I fail to
[952] comprehend how this knowing what you know and do not know is the same as
[953] the knowledge of self.
[954]
[955] What do you mean? he said.
[956]
[957] This is what I mean, I replied: I will admit that there is a science of
[958] science;--can this do more than determine that of two things one is and the
[959] other is not science or knowledge?
[960]
[961] No, just that.
[962]
[963] But is knowledge or want of knowledge of health the same as knowledge or
[964] want of knowledge of justice?
[965]
[966] Certainly not.
[967]
[968] The one is medicine, and the other is politics; whereas that of which we
[969] are speaking is knowledge pure and simple.
[970]
[971] Very true.
[972]
[973] And if a man knows only, and has only knowledge of knowledge, and has no
[974] further knowledge of health and justice, the probability is that he will
[975] only know that he knows something, and has a certain knowledge, whether
[976] concerning himself or other men.
[977]
[978] True.
[979]
[980] Then how will this knowledge or science teach him to know what he knows?
[981] Say that he knows health;--not wisdom or temperance, but the art of
[982] medicine has taught it to him;--and he has learned harmony from the art of
[983] music, and building from the art of building,--neither, from wisdom or
[984] temperance: and the same of other things.
[985]
[986] That is evident.
[987]
[988] How will wisdom, regarded only as a knowledge of knowledge or science of
[989] science, ever teach him that he knows health, or that he knows building?
[990]
[991] It is impossible.
[992]
[993] Then he who is ignorant of these things will only know that he knows, but
[994] not what he knows?
[995]
[996] True.
[997]
[998] Then wisdom or being wise appears to be not the knowledge of the things
[999] which we do or do not know, but only the knowledge that we know or do not
[1000] know?
[1001]
[1002] That is the inference.
[1003]
[1004] Then he who has this knowledge will not be able to examine whether a
[1005] pretender knows or does not know that which he says that he knows: he will
[1006] only know that he has a knowledge of some kind; but wisdom will not show
[1007] him of what the knowledge is?
[1008]
[1009] Plainly not.
[1010]
[1011] Neither will he be able to distinguish the pretender in medicine from the
[1012] true physician, nor between any other true and false professor of
[1013] knowledge. Let us consider the matter in this way: If the wise man or any
[1014] other man wants to distinguish the true physician from the false, how will
[1015] he proceed? He will not talk to him about medicine; and that, as we were
[1016] saying, is the only thing which the physician understands.
[1017]
[1018] True.
[1019]
[1020] And, on the other hand, the physician knows nothing of science, for this
[1021] has been assumed to be the province of wisdom.
[1022]
[1023] True.
[1024]
[1025] And further, since medicine is science, we must infer that he does not know
[1026] anything of medicine.
[1027]
[1028] Exactly.
[1029]
[1030] Then the wise man may indeed know that the physician has some kind of
[1031] science or knowledge; but when he wants to discover the nature of this he
[1032] will ask, What is the subject-matter? For the several sciences are
[1033] distinguished not by the mere fact that they are sciences, but by the
[1034] nature of their subjects. Is not that true?
[1035]
[1036] Quite true.
[1037]
[1038] And medicine is distinguished from other sciences as having the subject-
[1039] matter of health and disease?
[1040]
[1041] Yes.
[1042]
[1043] And he who would enquire into the nature of medicine must pursue the
[1044] enquiry into health and disease, and not into what is extraneous?
[1045]
[1046] True.
[1047]
[1048] And he who judges rightly will judge of the physician as a physician in
[1049] what relates to these?
[1050]
[1051] He will.
[1052]
[1053] He will consider whether what he says is true, and whether what he does is
[1054] right, in relation to health and disease?
[1055]
[1056] He will.
[1057]
[1058] But can any one attain the knowledge of either unless he have a knowledge
[1059] of medicine?
[1060]
[1061] He cannot.
[1062]
[1063] No one at all, it would seem, except the physician can have this knowledge;
[1064] and therefore not the wise man; he would have to be a physician as well as
[1065] a wise man.
[1066]
[1067] Very true.
[1068]
[1069] Then, assuredly, wisdom or temperance, if only a science of science, and of
[1070] the absence of science or knowledge, will not be able to distinguish the
[1071] physician who knows from one who does not know but pretends or thinks that
[1072] he knows, or any other professor of anything at all; like any other artist,
[1073] he will only know his fellow in art or wisdom, and no one else.
[1074]
[1075] That is evident, he said.
[1076]
[1077] But then what profit, Critias, I said, is there any longer in wisdom or
[1078] temperance which yet remains, if this is wisdom? If, indeed, as we were
[1079] supposing at first, the wise man had been able to distinguish what he knew
[1080] and did not know, and that he knew the one and did not know the other, and
[1081] to recognize a similar faculty of discernment in others, there would
[1082] certainly have been a great advantage in being wise; for then we should
[1083] never have made a mistake, but have passed through life the unerring guides
[1084] of ourselves and of those who are under us; and we should not have
[1085] attempted to do what we did not know, but we should have found out those
[1086] who knew, and have handed the business over to them and trusted in them;
[1087] nor should we have allowed those who were under us to do anything which
[1088] they were not likely to do well; and they would be likely to do well just
[1089] that of which they had knowledge; and the house or state which was ordered
[1090] or administered under the guidance of wisdom, and everything else of which
[1091] wisdom was the lord, would have been well ordered; for truth guiding, and
[1092] error having been eliminated, in all their doings, men would have done
[1093] well, and would have been happy. Was not this, Critias, what we spoke of
[1094] as the great advantage of wisdom--to know what is known and what is unknown
[1095] to us?
[1096]
[1097] Very true, he said.
[1098]
[1099] And now you perceive, I said, that no such science is to be found anywhere.
[1100]
[1101] I perceive, he said.
[1102]
[1103] May we assume then, I said, that wisdom, viewed in this new light merely as
[1104] a knowledge of knowledge and ignorance, has this advantage:--that he who
[1105] possesses such knowledge will more easily learn anything which he learns;
[1106] and that everything will be clearer to him, because, in addition to the
[1107] knowledge of individuals, he sees the science, and this also will better
[1108] enable him to test the knowledge which others have of what he knows
[1109] himself; whereas the enquirer who is without this knowledge may be supposed
[1110] to have a feebler and weaker insight? Are not these, my friend, the real
[1111] advantages which are to be gained from wisdom? And are not we looking and
[1112] seeking after something more than is to be found in her?
[1113]
[1114] That is very likely, he said.
[1115]
[1116] That is very likely, I said; and very likely, too, we have been enquiring
[1117] to no purpose; as I am led to infer, because I observe that if this is
[1118] wisdom, some strange consequences would follow. Let us, if you please,
[1119] assume the possibility of this science of sciences, and further admit and
[1120] allow, as was originally suggested, that wisdom is the knowledge of what we
[1121] know and do not know. Assuming all this, still, upon further
[1122] consideration, I am doubtful, Critias, whether wisdom, such as this, would
[1123] do us much good. For we were wrong, I think, in supposing, as we were
[1124] saying just now, that such wisdom ordering the government of house or state
[1125] would be a great benefit.
[1126]
[1127] How so? he said.
[1128]
[1129] Why, I said, we were far too ready to admit the great benefits which
[1130] mankind would obtain from their severally doing the things which they knew,
[1131] and committing the things of which they are ignorant to those who were
[1132] better acquainted with them.
[1133]
[1134] Were we not right in making that admission?
[1135]
[1136] I think not.
[1137]
[1138] How very strange, Socrates!
[1139]
[1140] By the dog of Egypt, I said, there I agree with you; and I was thinking as
[1141] much just now when I said that strange consequences would follow, and that
[1142] I was afraid we were on the wrong track; for however ready we may be to
[1143] admit that this is wisdom, I certainly cannot make out what good this sort
[1144] of thing does to us.
[1145]
[1146] What do you mean? he said; I wish that you could make me understand what
[1147] you mean.
[1148]
[1149] I dare say that what I am saying is nonsense, I replied; and yet if a man
[1150] has any feeling of what is due to himself, he cannot let the thought which
[1151] comes into his mind pass away unheeded and unexamined.
[1152]
[1153] I like that, he said.
[1154]
[1155] Hear, then, I said, my own dream; whether coming through the horn or the
[1156] ivory gate, I cannot tell. The dream is this: Let us suppose that wisdom
[1157] is such as we are now defining, and that she has absolute sway over us;
[1158] then each action will be done according to the arts or sciences, and no one
[1159] professing to be a pilot when he is not, or any physician or general, or
[1160] any one else pretending to know matters of which he is ignorant, will
[1161] deceive or elude us; our health will be improved; our safety at sea, and
[1162] also in battle, will be assured; our coats and shoes, and all other
[1163] instruments and implements will be skilfully made, because the workmen will
[1164] be good and true. Aye, and if you please, you may suppose that prophecy,
[1165] which is the knowledge of the future, will be under the control of wisdom,
[1166] and that she will deter deceivers and set up the true prophets in their
[1167] place as the revealers of the future. Now I quite agree that mankind, thus
[1168] provided, would live and act according to knowledge, for wisdom would watch
[1169] and prevent ignorance from intruding on us. But whether by acting
[1170] according to knowledge we shall act well and be happy, my dear Critias,--
[1171] this is a point which we have not yet been able to determine.
[1172]
[1173] Yet I think, he replied, that if you discard knowledge, you will hardly
[1174] find the crown of happiness in anything else.
[1175]
[1176] But of what is this knowledge? I said. Just answer me that small question.
[1177] Do you mean a knowledge of shoemaking?
[1178]
[1179] God forbid.
[1180]
[1181] Or of working in brass?
[1182]
[1183] Certainly not.
[1184]
[1185] Or in wool, or wood, or anything of that sort?
[1186]
[1187] No, I do not.
[1188]
[1189] Then, I said, we are giving up the doctrine that he who lives according to
[1190] knowledge is happy, for these live according to knowledge, and yet they are
[1191] not allowed by you to be happy; but I think that you mean to confine
[1192] happiness to particular individuals who live according to knowledge, such
[1193] for example as the prophet, who, as I was saying, knows the future. Is it
[1194] of him you are speaking or of some one else?
[1195]
[1196] Yes, I mean him, but there are others as well.
[1197]
[1198] Yes, I said, some one who knows the past and present as well as the future,
[1199] and is ignorant of nothing. Let us suppose that there is such a person,
[1200] and if there is, you will allow that he is the most knowing of all living
[1201] men.
[1202]
[1203] Certainly he is.
[1204]
[1205] Yet I should like to know one thing more: which of the different kinds of
[1206] knowledge makes him happy? or do all equally make him happy?
[1207]
[1208] Not all equally, he replied.
[1209]
[1210] But which most tends to make him happy? the knowledge of what past,
[1211] present, or future thing? May I infer this to be the knowledge of the game
[1212] of draughts?
[1213]
[1214] Nonsense about the game of draughts.
[1215]
[1216] Or of computation?
[1217]
[1218] No.
[1219]
[1220] Or of health?
[1221]
[1222] That is nearer the truth, he said.
[1223]
[1224] And that knowledge which is nearest of all, I said, is the knowledge of
[1225] what?
[1226]
[1227] The knowledge with which he discerns good and evil.
[1228]
[1229] Monster! I said; you have been carrying me round in a circle, and all this
[1230] time hiding from me the fact that the life according to knowledge is not
[1231] that which makes men act rightly and be happy, not even if knowledge
[1232] include all the sciences, but one science only, that of good and evil.
[1233] For, let me ask you, Critias, whether, if you take away this, medicine will
[1234] not equally give health, and shoemaking equally produce shoes, and the art
[1235] of the weaver clothes?--whether the art of the pilot will not equally save
[1236] our lives at sea, and the art of the general in war?
[1237]
[1238] Quite so.
[1239]
[1240] And yet, my dear Critias, none of these things will be well or beneficially
[1241] done, if the science of the good be wanting.
[1242]
[1243] True.
[1244]
[1245] But that science is not wisdom or temperance, but a science of human
[1246] advantage; not a science of other sciences, or of ignorance, but of good
[1247] and evil: and if this be of use, then wisdom or temperance will not be of
[1248] use.
[1249]
[1250] And why, he replied, will not wisdom be of use? For, however much we
[1251] assume that wisdom is a science of sciences, and has a sway over other
[1252] sciences, surely she will have this particular science of the good under
[1253] her control, and in this way will benefit us.
[1254]
[1255] And will wisdom give health? I said; is not this rather the effect of
[1256] medicine? Or does wisdom do the work of any of the other arts,--do they
[1257] not each of them do their own work? Have we not long ago asseverated that
[1258] wisdom is only the knowledge of knowledge and of ignorance, and of nothing
[1259] else?
[1260]
[1261] That is obvious.
[1262]
[1263] Then wisdom will not be the producer of health.
[1264]
[1265] Certainly not.
[1266]
[1267] The art of health is different.
[1268]
[1269] Yes, different.
[1270]
[1271] Nor does wisdom give advantage, my good friend; for that again we have just
[1272] now been attributing to another art.
[1273]
[1274] Very true.
[1275]
[1276] How then can wisdom be advantageous, when giving no advantage?
[1277]
[1278] That, Socrates, is certainly inconceivable.
[1279]
[1280] You see then, Critias, that I was not far wrong in fearing that I could
[1281] have no sound notion about wisdom; I was quite right in depreciating
[1282] myself; for that which is admitted to be the best of all things would never
[1283] have seemed to us useless, if I had been good for anything at an enquiry.
[1284] But now I have been utterly defeated, and have failed to discover what that
[1285] is to which the imposer of names gave this name of temperance or wisdom.
[1286] And yet many more admissions were made by us than could be fairly granted;
[1287] for we admitted that there was a science of science, although the argument
[1288] said No, and protested against us; and we admitted further, that this
[1289] science knew the works of the other sciences (although this too was denied
[1290] by the argument), because we wanted to show that the wise man had knowledge
[1291] of what he knew and did not know; also we nobly disregarded, and never even
[1292] considered, the impossibility of a man knowing in a sort of way that which
[1293] he does not know at all; for our assumption was, that he knows that which
[1294] he does not know; than which nothing, as I think, can be more irrational.
[1295] And yet, after finding us so easy and good-natured, the enquiry is still
[1296] unable to discover the truth; but mocks us to a degree, and has gone out of
[1297] its way to prove the inutility of that which we admitted only by a sort of
[1298] supposition and fiction to be the true definition of temperance or wisdom:
[1299] which result, as far as I am concerned, is not so much to be lamented, I
[1300] said. But for your sake, Charmides, I am very sorry--that you, having such
[1301] beauty and such wisdom and temperance of soul, should have no profit or
[1302] good in life from your wisdom and temperance. And still more am I grieved
[1303] about the charm which I learned with so much pain, and to so little profit,
[1304] from the Thracian, for the sake of a thing which is nothing worth. I think
[1305] indeed that there is a mistake, and that I must be a bad enquirer, for
[1306] wisdom or temperance I believe to be really a great good; and happy are
[1307] you, Charmides, if you certainly possess it. Wherefore examine yourself,
[1308] and see whether you have this gift and can do without the charm; for if you
[1309] can, I would rather advise you to regard me simply as a fool who is never
[1310] able to reason out anything; and to rest assured that the more wise and
[1311] temperate you are, the happier you will be.
[1312]
[1313] Charmides said: I am sure that I do not know, Socrates, whether I have or
[1314] have not this gift of wisdom and temperance; for how can I know whether I
[1315] have a thing, of which even you and Critias are, as you say, unable to
[1316] discover the nature?--(not that I believe you.) And further, I am sure,
[1317] Socrates, that I do need the charm, and as far as I am concerned, I shall
[1318] be willing to be charmed by you daily, until you say that I have had
[1319] enough.
[1320]
[1321] Very good, Charmides, said Critias; if you do this I shall have a proof of
[1322] your temperance, that is, if you allow yourself to be charmed by Socrates,
[1323] and never desert him at all.
[1324]
[1325] You may depend on my following and not deserting him, said Charmides: if
[1326] you who are my guardian command me, I should be very wrong not to obey you.
[1327]
[1328] And I do command you, he said.
[1329]
[1330] Then I will do as you say, and begin this very day.
[1331]
[1332] You sirs, I said, what are you conspiring about?
[1333]
[1334] We are not conspiring, said Charmides, we have conspired already.
[1335]
[1336] And are you about to use violence, without even going through the forms of
[1337] justice?
[1338]
[1339] Yes, I shall use violence, he replied, since he orders me; and therefore
[1340] you had better consider well.
[1341]
[1342] But the time for consideration has passed, I said, when violence is
[1343] employed; and you, when you are determined on anything, and in the mood of
[1344] violence, are irresistible.
[1345]
[1346] Do not you resist me then, he said.
[1347]
[1348] I will not resist you, I replied.