Cratylus by Plato
Cratylus

Plato Cratylus

This is a hypertextual, self-referential edition of
Cratylus by Plato.
The text was prepared using the Project Gutenberg edition.

Click on any word to see its occurrences in the text;
click on line numbers to go to that line;
click on chapter names to go to that chapter;
or search using the form below.
Search terms can contain spaces and punctuation.

The concordance for Cratylus ordered alphanumerically,
and listed in order of word frequency. Click here for more texts.

[1]        PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Hermogenes, Cratylus.
[2]        
[3]        
[4]        HERMOGENES: Suppose that we make Socrates a party to the argument?
[5]        
[6]        CRATYLUS: If you please.
[7]        
[8]        HERMOGENES: I should explain to you, Socrates, that our friend Cratylus
[9]        has been arguing about names; he says that they are natural and not
[10]       conventional; not a portion of the human voice which men agree to use; but
[11]       that there is a truth or correctness in them, which is the same for
[12]       Hellenes as for barbarians. Whereupon I ask him, whether his own name of
[13]       Cratylus is a true name or not, and he answers 'Yes.' And Socrates?
[14]       'Yes.' Then every man's name, as I tell him, is that which he is called.
[15]       To this he replies--'If all the world were to call you Hermogenes, that
[16]       would not be your name.' And when I am anxious to have a further
[17]       explanation he is ironical and mysterious, and seems to imply that he has a
[18]       notion of his own about the matter, if he would only tell, and could
[19]       entirely convince me, if he chose to be intelligible. Tell me, Socrates,
[20]       what this oracle means; or rather tell me, if you will be so good, what is
[21]       your own view of the truth or correctness of names, which I would far
[22]       sooner hear.
[23]       
[24]       SOCRATES: Son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying, that 'hard is the
[25]       knowledge of the good.' And the knowledge of names is a great part of
[26]       knowledge. If I had not been poor, I might have heard the fifty-drachma
[27]       course of the great Prodicus, which is a complete education in grammar and
[28]       language--these are his own words--and then I should have been at once able
[29]       to answer your question about the correctness of names. But, indeed, I
[30]       have only heard the single-drachma course, and therefore, I do not know the
[31]       truth about such matters; I will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus
[32]       in the investigation of them. When he declares that your name is not
[33]       really Hermogenes, I suspect that he is only making fun of you;--he means
[34]       to say that you are no true son of Hermes, because you are always looking
[35]       after a fortune and never in luck. But, as I was saying, there is a good
[36]       deal of difficulty in this sort of knowledge, and therefore we had better
[37]       leave the question open until we have heard both sides.
[38]       
[39]       HERMOGENES: I have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus and
[40]       others, and cannot convince myself that there is any principle of
[41]       correctness in names other than convention and agreement; any name which
[42]       you give, in my opinion, is the right one, and if you change that and give
[43]       another, the new name is as correct as the old--we frequently change the
[44]       names of our slaves, and the newly-imposed name is as good as the old: for
[45]       there is no name given to anything by nature; all is convention and habit
[46]       of the users;--such is my view. But if I am mistaken I shall be happy to
[47]       hear and learn of Cratylus, or of any one else.
[48]       
[49]       SOCRATES: I dare say that you may be right, Hermogenes: let us see;--Your
[50]       meaning is, that the name of each thing is only that which anybody agrees
[51]       to call it?
[52]       
[53]       HERMOGENES: That is my notion.
[54]       
[55]       SOCRATES: Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city?
[56]       
[57]       HERMOGENES: Yes.
[58]       
[59]       SOCRATES: Well, now, let me take an instance;--suppose that I call a man a
[60]       horse or a horse a man, you mean to say that a man will be rightly called a
[61]       horse by me individually, and rightly called a man by the rest of the
[62]       world; and a horse again would be rightly called a man by me and a horse by
[63]       the world:--that is your meaning?
[64]       
[65]       HERMOGENES: He would, according to my view.
[66]       
[67]       SOCRATES: But how about truth, then? you would acknowledge that there is
[68]       in words a true and a false?
[69]       
[70]       HERMOGENES: Certainly.
[71]       
[72]       SOCRATES: And there are true and false propositions?
[73]       
[74]       HERMOGENES: To be sure.
[75]       
[76]       SOCRATES: And a true proposition says that which is, and a false
[77]       proposition says that which is not?
[78]       
[79]       HERMOGENES: Yes; what other answer is possible?
[80]       
[81]       SOCRATES: Then in a proposition there is a true and false?
[82]       
[83]       HERMOGENES: Certainly.
[84]       
[85]       SOCRATES: But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts
[86]       untrue?
[87]       
[88]       HERMOGENES: No; the parts are true as well as the whole.
[89]       
[90]       SOCRATES: Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or every
[91]       part?
[92]       
[93]       HERMOGENES: I should say that every part is true.
[94]       
[95]       SOCRATES: Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name?
[96]       
[97]       HERMOGENES: No; that is the smallest.
[98]       
[99]       SOCRATES: Then the name is a part of the true proposition?
[100]      
[101]      HERMOGENES: Yes.
[102]      
[103]      SOCRATES: Yes, and a true part, as you say.
[104]      
[105]      HERMOGENES: Yes.
[106]      
[107]      SOCRATES: And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood?
[108]      
[109]      HERMOGENES: Yes.
[110]      
[111]      SOCRATES: Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be true
[112]      and false?
[113]      
[114]      HERMOGENES: So we must infer.
[115]      
[116]      SOCRATES: And the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be the
[117]      name?
[118]      
[119]      HERMOGENES: Yes.
[120]      
[121]      SOCRATES: And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody says
[122]      that there are? and will they be true names at the time of uttering them?
[123]      
[124]      HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates, I can conceive no correctness of names other
[125]      than this; you give one name, and I another; and in different cities and
[126]      countries there are different names for the same things; Hellenes differ
[127]      from barbarians in their use of names, and the several Hellenic tribes from
[128]      one another.
[129]      
[130]      SOCRATES: But would you say, Hermogenes, that the things differ as the
[131]      names differ? and are they relative to individuals, as Protagoras tells us?
[132]      For he says that man is the measure of all things, and that things are to
[133]      me as they appear to me, and that they are to you as they appear to you.
[134]      Do you agree with him, or would you say that things have a permanent
[135]      essence of their own?
[136]      
[137]      HERMOGENES: There have been times, Socrates, when I have been driven in my
[138]      perplexity to take refuge with Protagoras; not that I agree with him at
[139]      all.
[140]      
[141]      SOCRATES: What! have you ever been driven to admit that there was no such
[142]      thing as a bad man?
[143]      
[144]      HERMOGENES: No, indeed; but I have often had reason to think that there
[145]      are very bad men, and a good many of them.
[146]      
[147]      SOCRATES: Well, and have you ever found any very good ones?
[148]      
[149]      HERMOGENES: Not many.
[150]      
[151]      SOCRATES: Still you have found them?
[152]      
[153]      HERMOGENES: Yes.
[154]      
[155]      SOCRATES: And would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and
[156]      the very evil very foolish? Would that be your view?
[157]      
[158]      HERMOGENES: It would.
[159]      
[160]      SOCRATES: But if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are as
[161]      they appear to any one, how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish?
[162]      
[163]      HERMOGENES: Impossible.
[164]      
[165]      SOCRATES: And if, on the other hand, wisdom and folly are really
[166]      distinguishable, you will allow, I think, that the assertion of Protagoras
[167]      can hardly be correct. For if what appears to each man is true to him, one
[168]      man cannot in reality be wiser than another.
[169]      
[170]      HERMOGENES: He cannot.
[171]      
[172]      SOCRATES: Nor will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus, that all things
[173]      equally belong to all men at the same moment and always; for neither on his
[174]      view can there be some good and others bad, if virtue and vice are always
[175]      equally to be attributed to all.
[176]      
[177]      HERMOGENES: There cannot.
[178]      
[179]      SOCRATES: But if neither is right, and things are not relative to
[180]      individuals, and all things do not equally belong to all at the same moment
[181]      and always, they must be supposed to have their own proper and permanent
[182]      essence: they are not in relation to us, or influenced by us, fluctuating
[183]      according to our fancy, but they are independent, and maintain to their own
[184]      essence the relation prescribed by nature.
[185]      
[186]      HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you have said the truth.
[187]      
[188]      SOCRATES: Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or
[189]      equally to the actions which proceed from them? Are not actions also a
[190]      class of being?
[191]      
[192]      HERMOGENES: Yes, the actions are real as well as the things.
[193]      
[194]      SOCRATES: Then the actions also are done according to their proper nature,
[195]      and not according to our opinion of them? In cutting, for example, we do
[196]      not cut as we please, and with any chance instrument; but we cut with the
[197]      proper instrument only, and according to the natural process of cutting;
[198]      and the natural process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail
[199]      and be of no use at all.
[200]      
[201]      HERMOGENES: I should say that the natural way is the right way.
[202]      
[203]      SOCRATES: Again, in burning, not every way is the right way; but the right
[204]      way is the natural way, and the right instrument the natural instrument.
[205]      
[206]      HERMOGENES: True.
[207]      
[208]      SOCRATES: And this holds good of all actions?
[209]      
[210]      HERMOGENES: Yes.
[211]      
[212]      SOCRATES: And speech is a kind of action?
[213]      
[214]      HERMOGENES: True.
[215]      
[216]      SOCRATES: And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases? Will
[217]      not the successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural way of
[218]      speaking, and as things ought to be spoken, and with the natural
[219]      instrument? Any other mode of speaking will result in error and failure.
[220]      
[221]      HERMOGENES: I quite agree with you.
[222]      
[223]      SOCRATES: And is not naming a part of speaking? for in giving names men
[224]      speak.
[225]      
[226]      HERMOGENES: That is true.
[227]      
[228]      SOCRATES: And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to acts,
[229]      is not naming also a sort of action?
[230]      
[231]      HERMOGENES: True.
[232]      
[233]      SOCRATES: And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had
[234]      a special nature of their own?
[235]      
[236]      HERMOGENES: Precisely.
[237]      
[238]      SOCRATES: Then the argument would lead us to infer that names ought to be
[239]      given according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument, and not
[240]      at our pleasure: in this and no other way shall we name with success.
[241]      
[242]      HERMOGENES: I agree.
[243]      
[244]      SOCRATES: But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with
[245]      something?
[246]      
[247]      HERMOGENES: Yes.
[248]      
[249]      SOCRATES: And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or
[250]      pierced with something?
[251]      
[252]      HERMOGENES: Certainly.
[253]      
[254]      SOCRATES: And that which has to be named has to be named with something?
[255]      
[256]      HERMOGENES: True.
[257]      
[258]      SOCRATES: What is that with which we pierce?
[259]      
[260]      HERMOGENES: An awl.
[261]      
[262]      SOCRATES: And with which we weave?
[263]      
[264]      HERMOGENES: A shuttle.
[265]      
[266]      SOCRATES: And with which we name?
[267]      
[268]      HERMOGENES: A name.
[269]      
[270]      SOCRATES: Very good: then a name is an instrument?
[271]      
[272]      HERMOGENES: Certainly.
[273]      
[274]      SOCRATES: Suppose that I ask, 'What sort of instrument is a shuttle?' And
[275]      you answer, 'A weaving instrument.'
[276]      
[277]      HERMOGENES: Well.
[278]      
[279]      SOCRATES: And I ask again, 'What do we do when we weave?'--The answer is,
[280]      that we separate or disengage the warp from the woof.
[281]      
[282]      HERMOGENES: Very true.
[283]      
[284]      SOCRATES: And may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of
[285]      instruments in general?
[286]      
[287]      HERMOGENES: To be sure.
[288]      
[289]      SOCRATES: And now suppose that I ask a similar question about names: will
[290]      you answer me? Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do when we
[291]      name?
[292]      
[293]      HERMOGENES: I cannot say.
[294]      
[295]      SOCRATES: Do we not give information to one another, and distinguish
[296]      things according to their natures?
[297]      
[298]      HERMOGENES: Certainly we do.
[299]      
[300]      SOCRATES: Then a name is an instrument of teaching and of distinguishing
[301]      natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the threads of the web.
[302]      
[303]      HERMOGENES: Yes.
[304]      
[305]      SOCRATES: And the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver?
[306]      
[307]      HERMOGENES: Assuredly.
[308]      
[309]      SOCRATES: Then the weaver will use the shuttle well--and well means like a
[310]      weaver? and the teacher will use the name well--and well means like a
[311]      teacher?
[312]      
[313]      HERMOGENES: Yes.
[314]      
[315]      SOCRATES: And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work will he be
[316]      using well?
[317]      
[318]      HERMOGENES: That of the carpenter.
[319]      
[320]      SOCRATES: And is every man a carpenter, or the skilled only?
[321]      
[322]      HERMOGENES: Only the skilled.
[323]      
[324]      SOCRATES: And when the piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be using
[325]      well?
[326]      
[327]      HERMOGENES: That of the smith.
[328]      
[329]      SOCRATES: And is every man a smith, or only the skilled?
[330]      
[331]      HERMOGENES: The skilled only.
[332]      
[333]      SOCRATES: And when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be using?
[334]      
[335]      HERMOGENES: There again I am puzzled.
[336]      
[337]      SOCRATES: Cannot you at least say who gives us the names which we use?
[338]      
[339]      HERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot.
[340]      
[341]      SOCRATES: Does not the law seem to you to give us them?
[342]      
[343]      HERMOGENES: Yes, I suppose so.
[344]      
[345]      SOCRATES: Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses the work of the
[346]      legislator?
[347]      
[348]      HERMOGENES: I agree.
[349]      
[350]      SOCRATES: And is every man a legislator, or the skilled only?
[351]      
[352]      HERMOGENES: The skilled only.
[353]      
[354]      SOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, not every man is able to give a name, but only
[355]      a maker of names; and this is the legislator, who of all skilled artisans
[356]      in the world is the rarest.
[357]      
[358]      HERMOGENES: True.
[359]      
[360]      SOCRATES: And how does the legislator make names? and to what does he
[361]      look? Consider this in the light of the previous instances: to what does
[362]      the carpenter look in making the shuttle? Does he not look to that which
[363]      is naturally fitted to act as a shuttle?
[364]      
[365]      HERMOGENES: Certainly.
[366]      
[367]      SOCRATES: And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, will he make
[368]      another, looking to the broken one? or will he look to the form according
[369]      to which he made the other?
[370]      
[371]      HERMOGENES: To the latter, I should imagine.
[372]      
[373]      SOCRATES: Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle?
[374]      
[375]      HERMOGENES: I think so.
[376]      
[377]      SOCRATES: And whatever shuttles are wanted, for the manufacture of
[378]      garments, thin or thick, of flaxen, woollen, or other material, ought all
[379]      of them to have the true form of the shuttle; and whatever is the shuttle
[380]      best adapted to each kind of work, that ought to be the form which the
[381]      maker produces in each case.
[382]      
[383]      HERMOGENES: Yes.
[384]      
[385]      SOCRATES: And the same holds of other instruments: when a man has
[386]      discovered the instrument which is naturally adapted to each work, he must
[387]      express this natural form, and not others which he fancies, in the
[388]      material, whatever it may be, which he employs; for example, he ought to
[389]      know how to put into iron the forms of awls adapted by nature to their
[390]      several uses?
[391]      
[392]      HERMOGENES: Certainly.
[393]      
[394]      SOCRATES: And how to put into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature to
[395]      their uses?
[396]      
[397]      HERMOGENES: True.
[398]      
[399]      SOCRATES: For the several forms of shuttles naturally answer to the
[400]      several kinds of webs; and this is true of instruments in general.
[401]      
[402]      HERMOGENES: Yes.
[403]      
[404]      SOCRATES: Then, as to names: ought not our legislator also to know how to
[405]      put the true natural name of each thing into sounds and syllables, and to
[406]      make and give all names with a view to the ideal name, if he is to be a
[407]      namer in any true sense? And we must remember that different legislators
[408]      will not use the same syllables. For neither does every smith, although he
[409]      may be making the same instrument for the same purpose, make them all of
[410]      the same iron. The form must be the same, but the material may vary, and
[411]      still the instrument may be equally good of whatever iron made, whether in
[412]      Hellas or in a foreign country;--there is no difference.
[413]      
[414]      HERMOGENES: Very true.
[415]      
[416]      SOCRATES: And the legislator, whether he be Hellene or barbarian, is not
[417]      therefore to be deemed by you a worse legislator, provided he gives the
[418]      true and proper form of the name in whatever syllables; this or that
[419]      country makes no matter.
[420]      
[421]      HERMOGENES: Quite true.
[422]      
[423]      SOCRATES: But who then is to determine whether the proper form is given to
[424]      the shuttle, whatever sort of wood may be used? the carpenter who makes, or
[425]      the weaver who is to use them?
[426]      
[427]      HERMOGENES: I should say, he who is to use them, Socrates.
[428]      
[429]      SOCRATES: And who uses the work of the lyre-maker? Will not he be the man
[430]      who knows how to direct what is being done, and who will know also whether
[431]      the work is being well done or not?
[432]      
[433]      HERMOGENES: Certainly.
[434]      
[435]      SOCRATES: And who is he?
[436]      
[437]      HERMOGENES: The player of the lyre.
[438]      
[439]      SOCRATES: And who will direct the shipwright?
[440]      
[441]      HERMOGENES: The pilot.
[442]      
[443]      SOCRATES: And who will be best able to direct the legislator in his work,
[444]      and will know whether the work is well done, in this or any other country?
[445]      Will not the user be the man?
[446]      
[447]      HERMOGENES: Yes.
[448]      
[449]      SOCRATES: And this is he who knows how to ask questions?
[450]      
[451]      HERMOGENES: Yes.
[452]      
[453]      SOCRATES: And how to answer them?
[454]      
[455]      HERMOGENES: Yes.
[456]      
[457]      SOCRATES: And him who knows how to ask and answer you would call a
[458]      dialectician?
[459]      
[460]      HERMOGENES: Yes; that would be his name.
[461]      
[462]      SOCRATES: Then the work of the carpenter is to make a rudder, and the
[463]      pilot has to direct him, if the rudder is to be well made.
[464]      
[465]      HERMOGENES: True.
[466]      
[467]      SOCRATES: And the work of the legislator is to give names, and the
[468]      dialectician must be his director if the names are to be rightly given?
[469]      
[470]      HERMOGENES: That is true.
[471]      
[472]      SOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, I should say that this giving of names can be
[473]      no such light matter as you fancy, or the work of light or chance persons;
[474]      and Cratylus is right in saying that things have names by nature, and that
[475]      not every man is an artificer of names, but he only who looks to the name
[476]      which each thing by nature has, and is able to express the true forms of
[477]      things in letters and syllables.
[478]      
[479]      HERMOGENES: I cannot answer you, Socrates; but I find a difficulty in
[480]      changing my opinion all in a moment, and I think that I should be more
[481]      readily persuaded, if you would show me what this is which you term the
[482]      natural fitness of names.
[483]      
[484]      SOCRATES: My good Hermogenes, I have none to show. Was I not telling you
[485]      just now (but you have forgotten), that I knew nothing, and proposing to
[486]      share the enquiry with you? But now that you and I have talked over the
[487]      matter, a step has been gained; for we have discovered that names have by
[488]      nature a truth, and that not every man knows how to give a thing a name.
[489]      
[490]      HERMOGENES: Very good.
[491]      
[492]      SOCRATES: And what is the nature of this truth or correctness of names?
[493]      That, if you care to know, is the next question.
[494]      
[495]      HERMOGENES: Certainly, I care to know.
[496]      
[497]      SOCRATES: Then reflect.
[498]      
[499]      HERMOGENES: How shall I reflect?
[500]      
[501]      SOCRATES: The true way is to have the assistance of those who know, and
[502]      you must pay them well both in money and in thanks; these are the Sophists,
[503]      of whom your brother, Callias, has--rather dearly--bought the reputation of
[504]      wisdom. But you have not yet come into your inheritance, and therefore you
[505]      had better go to him, and beg and entreat him to tell you what he has
[506]      learnt from Protagoras about the fitness of names.
[507]      
[508]      HERMOGENES: But how inconsistent should I be, if, whilst repudiating
[509]      Protagoras and his truth ('Truth' was the title of the book of Protagoras;
[510]      compare Theaet.), I were to attach any value to what he and his book
[511]      affirm!
[512]      
[513]      SOCRATES: Then if you despise him, you must learn of Homer and the poets.
[514]      
[515]      HERMOGENES: And where does Homer say anything about names, and what does
[516]      he say?
[517]      
[518]      SOCRATES: He often speaks of them; notably and nobly in the places where
[519]      he distinguishes the different names which Gods and men give to the same
[520]      things. Does he not in these passages make a remarkable statement about
[521]      the correctness of names? For the Gods must clearly be supposed to call
[522]      things by their right and natural names; do you not think so?
[523]      
[524]      HERMOGENES: Why, of course they call them rightly, if they call them at
[525]      all. But to what are you referring?
[526]      
[527]      SOCRATES: Do you not know what he says about the river in Troy who had a
[528]      single combat with Hephaestus?
[529]      
[530]      'Whom,' as he says, 'the Gods call Xanthus, and men call Scamander.'
[531]      
[532]      HERMOGENES: I remember.
[533]      
[534]      SOCRATES: Well, and about this river--to know that he ought to be called
[535]      Xanthus and not Scamander--is not that a solemn lesson? Or about the bird
[536]      which, as he says,
[537]      
[538]      'The Gods call Chalcis, and men Cymindis:'
[539]      
[540]      to be taught how much more correct the name Chalcis is than the name
[541]      Cymindis--do you deem that a light matter? Or about Batieia and Myrina?
[542]      (Compare Il. 'The hill which men call Batieia and the immortals the tomb of
[543]      the sportive Myrina.') And there are many other observations of the same
[544]      kind in Homer and other poets. Now, I think that this is beyond the
[545]      understanding of you and me; but the names of Scamandrius and Astyanax,
[546]      which he affirms to have been the names of Hector's son, are more within
[547]      the range of human faculties, as I am disposed to think; and what the poet
[548]      means by correctness may be more readily apprehended in that instance: you
[549]      will remember I dare say the lines to which I refer? (Il.)
[550]      
[551]      HERMOGENES: I do.
[552]      
[553]      SOCRATES: Let me ask you, then, which did Homer think the more correct of
[554]      the names given to Hector's son--Astyanax or Scamandrius?
[555]      
[556]      HERMOGENES: I do not know.
[557]      
[558]      SOCRATES: How would you answer, if you were asked whether the wise or the
[559]      unwise are more likely to give correct names?
[560]      
[561]      HERMOGENES: I should say the wise, of course.
[562]      
[563]      SOCRATES: And are the men or the women of a city, taken as a class, the
[564]      wiser?
[565]      
[566]      HERMOGENES: I should say, the men.
[567]      
[568]      SOCRATES: And Homer, as you know, says that the Trojan men called him
[569]      Astyanax (king of the city); but if the men called him Astyanax, the other
[570]      name of Scamandrius could only have been given to him by the women.
[571]      
[572]      HERMOGENES: That may be inferred.
[573]      
[574]      SOCRATES: And must not Homer have imagined the Trojans to be wiser than
[575]      their wives?
[576]      
[577]      HERMOGENES: To be sure.
[578]      
[579]      SOCRATES: Then he must have thought Astyanax to be a more correct name for
[580]      the boy than Scamandrius?
[581]      
[582]      HERMOGENES: Clearly.
[583]      
[584]      SOCRATES: And what is the reason of this? Let us consider:--does he not
[585]      himself suggest a very good reason, when he says,
[586]      
[587]      'For he alone defended their city and long walls'?
[588]      
[589]      This appears to be a good reason for calling the son of the saviour king of
[590]      the city which his father was saving, as Homer observes.
[591]      
[592]      HERMOGENES: I see.
[593]      
[594]      SOCRATES: Why, Hermogenes, I do not as yet see myself; and do you?
[595]      
[596]      HERMOGENES: No, indeed; not I.
[597]      
[598]      SOCRATES: But tell me, friend, did not Homer himself also give Hector his
[599]      name?
[600]      
[601]      HERMOGENES: What of that?
[602]      
[603]      SOCRATES: The name appears to me to be very nearly the same as the name of
[604]      Astyanax--both are Hellenic; and a king (anax) and a holder (ektor) have
[605]      nearly the same meaning, and are both descriptive of a king; for a man is
[606]      clearly the holder of that of which he is king; he rules, and owns, and
[607]      holds it. But, perhaps, you may think that I am talking nonsense; and
[608]      indeed I believe that I myself did not know what I meant when I imagined
[609]      that I had found some indication of the opinion of Homer about the
[610]      correctness of names.
[611]      
[612]      HERMOGENES: I assure you that I think otherwise, and I believe you to be
[613]      on the right track.
[614]      
[615]      SOCRATES: There is reason, I think, in calling the lion's whelp a lion,
[616]      and the foal of a horse a horse; I am speaking only of the ordinary course
[617]      of nature, when an animal produces after his kind, and not of extraordinary
[618]      births;--if contrary to nature a horse have a calf, then I should not call
[619]      that a foal but a calf; nor do I call any inhuman birth a man, but only a
[620]      natural birth. And the same may be said of trees and other things. Do you
[621]      agree with me?
[622]      
[623]      HERMOGENES: Yes, I agree.
[624]      
[625]      SOCRATES: Very good. But you had better watch me and see that I do not
[626]      play tricks with you. For on the same principle the son of a king is to be
[627]      called a king. And whether the syllables of the name are the same or not
[628]      the same, makes no difference, provided the meaning is retained; nor does
[629]      the addition or subtraction of a letter make any difference so long as the
[630]      essence of the thing remains in possession of the name and appears in it.
[631]      
[632]      HERMOGENES: What do you mean?
[633]      
[634]      SOCRATES: A very simple matter. I may illustrate my meaning by the names
[635]      of letters, which you know are not the same as the letters themselves with
[636]      the exception of the four epsilon, upsilon, omicron, omega; the names of
[637]      the rest, whether vowels or consonants, are made up of other letters which
[638]      we add to them; but so long as we introduce the meaning, and there can be
[639]      no mistake, the name of the letter is quite correct. Take, for example,
[640]      the letter beta--the addition of eta, tau, alpha, gives no offence, and
[641]      does not prevent the whole name from having the value which the legislator
[642]      intended--so well did he know how to give the letters names.
[643]      
[644]      HERMOGENES: I believe you are right.
[645]      
[646]      SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of a king? a king will often be the
[647]      son of a king, the good son or the noble son of a good or noble sire; and
[648]      similarly the offspring of every kind, in the regular course of nature, is
[649]      like the parent, and therefore has the same name. Yet the syllables may be
[650]      disguised until they appear different to the ignorant person, and he may
[651]      not recognize them, although they are the same, just as any one of us would
[652]      not recognize the same drugs under different disguises of colour and smell,
[653]      although to the physician, who regards the power of them, they are the
[654]      same, and he is not put out by the addition; and in like manner the
[655]      etymologist is not put out by the addition or transposition or subtraction
[656]      of a letter or two, or indeed by the change of all the letters, for this
[657]      need not interfere with the meaning. As was just now said, the names of
[658]      Hector and Astyanax have only one letter alike, which is tau, and yet they
[659]      have the same meaning. And how little in common with the letters of their
[660]      names has Archepolis (ruler of the city)--and yet the meaning is the same.
[661]      And there are many other names which just mean 'king.' Again, there are
[662]      several names for a general, as, for example, Agis (leader) and Polemarchus
[663]      (chief in war) and Eupolemus (good warrior); and others which denote a
[664]      physician, as Iatrocles (famous healer) and Acesimbrotus (curer of
[665]      mortals); and there are many others which might be cited, differing in
[666]      their syllables and letters, but having the same meaning. Would you not
[667]      say so?
[668]      
[669]      HERMOGENES: Yes.
[670]      
[671]      SOCRATES: The same names, then, ought to be assigned to those who follow
[672]      in the course of nature?
[673]      
[674]      HERMOGENES: Yes.
[675]      
[676]      SOCRATES: And what of those who follow out of the course of nature, and
[677]      are prodigies? for example, when a good and religious man has an
[678]      irreligious son, he ought to bear the name not of his father, but of the
[679]      class to which he belongs, just as in the case which was before supposed of
[680]      a horse foaling a calf.
[681]      
[682]      HERMOGENES: Quite true.
[683]      
[684]      SOCRATES: Then the irreligious son of a religious father should be called
[685]      irreligious?
[686]      
[687]      HERMOGENES: Certainly.
[688]      
[689]      SOCRATES: He should not be called Theophilus (beloved of God) or
[690]      Mnesitheus (mindful of God), or any of these names: if names are correctly
[691]      given, his should have an opposite meaning.
[692]      
[693]      HERMOGENES: Certainly, Socrates.
[694]      
[695]      SOCRATES: Again, Hermogenes, there is Orestes (the man of the mountains)
[696]      who appears to be rightly called; whether chance gave the name, or perhaps
[697]      some poet who meant to express the brutality and fierceness and mountain
[698]      wildness of his hero's nature.
[699]      
[700]      HERMOGENES: That is very likely, Socrates.
[701]      
[702]      SOCRATES: And his father's name is also according to nature.
[703]      
[704]      HERMOGENES: Clearly.
[705]      
[706]      SOCRATES: Yes, for as his name, so also is his nature; Agamemnon
[707]      (admirable for remaining) is one who is patient and persevering in the
[708]      accomplishment of his resolves, and by his virtue crowns them; and his
[709]      continuance at Troy with all the vast army is a proof of that admirable
[710]      endurance in him which is signified by the name Agamemnon. I also think
[711]      that Atreus is rightly called; for his murder of Chrysippus and his
[712]      exceeding cruelty to Thyestes are damaging and destructive to his
[713]      reputation--the name is a little altered and disguised so as not to be
[714]      intelligible to every one, but to the etymologist there is no difficulty in
[715]      seeing the meaning, for whether you think of him as ateires the stubborn,
[716]      or as atrestos the fearless, or as ateros the destructive one, the name is
[717]      perfectly correct in every point of view. And I think that Pelops is also
[718]      named appropriately; for, as the name implies, he is rightly called Pelops
[719]      who sees what is near only (o ta pelas oron).
[720]      
[721]      HERMOGENES: How so?
[722]      
[723]      SOCRATES: Because, according to the tradition, he had no forethought or
[724]      foresight of all the evil which the murder of Myrtilus would entail upon
[725]      his whole race in remote ages; he saw only what was at hand and immediate,
[726]      --or in other words, pelas (near), in his eagerness to win Hippodamia by
[727]      all means for his bride. Every one would agree that the name of Tantalus
[728]      is rightly given and in accordance with nature, if the traditions about him
[729]      are true.
[730]      
[731]      HERMOGENES: And what are the traditions?
[732]      
[733]      SOCRATES: Many terrible misfortunes are said to have happened to him in
[734]      his life--last of all, came the utter ruin of his country; and after his
[735]      death he had the stone suspended (talanteia) over his head in the world
[736]      below--all this agrees wonderfully well with his name. You might imagine
[737]      that some person who wanted to call him Talantatos (the most weighted down
[738]      by misfortune), disguised the name by altering it into Tantalus; and into
[739]      this form, by some accident of tradition, it has actually been transmuted.
[740]      The name of Zeus, who is his alleged father, has also an excellent meaning,
[741]      although hard to be understood, because really like a sentence, which is
[742]      divided into two parts, for some call him Zena, and use the one half, and
[743]      others who use the other half call him Dia; the two together signify the
[744]      nature of the God, and the business of a name, as we were saying, is to
[745]      express the nature. For there is none who is more the author of life to us
[746]      and to all, than the lord and king of all. Wherefore we are right in
[747]      calling him Zena and Dia, which are one name, although divided, meaning the
[748]      God through whom all creatures always have life (di on zen aei pasi tois
[749]      zosin uparchei). There is an irreverence, at first sight, in calling him
[750]      son of Cronos (who is a proverb for stupidity), and we might rather expect
[751]      Zeus to be the child of a mighty intellect. Which is the fact; for this is
[752]      the meaning of his father's name: Kronos quasi Koros (Choreo, to sweep),
[753]      not in the sense of a youth, but signifying to chatharon chai acheraton tou
[754]      nou, the pure and garnished mind (sc. apo tou chorein). He, as we are
[755]      informed by tradition, was begotten of Uranus, rightly so called (apo tou
[756]      oran ta ano) from looking upwards; which, as philosophers tell us, is the
[757]      way to have a pure mind, and the name Uranus is therefore correct. If I
[758]      could remember the genealogy of Hesiod, I would have gone on and tried more
[759]      conclusions of the same sort on the remoter ancestors of the Gods,--then I
[760]      might have seen whether this wisdom, which has come to me all in an
[761]      instant, I know not whence, will or will not hold good to the end.
[762]      
[763]      HERMOGENES: You seem to me, Socrates, to be quite like a prophet newly
[764]      inspired, and to be uttering oracles.
[765]      
[766]      SOCRATES: Yes, Hermogenes, and I believe that I caught the inspiration
[767]      from the great Euthyphro of the Prospaltian deme, who gave me a long
[768]      lecture which commenced at dawn: he talked and I listened, and his wisdom
[769]      and enchanting ravishment has not only filled my ears but taken possession
[770]      of my soul,and to-day I shall let his superhuman power work and finish the
[771]      investigation of names--that will be the way; but to-morrow, if you are so
[772]      disposed, we will conjure him away, and make a purgation of him, if we can
[773]      only find some priest or sophist who is skilled in purifications of this
[774]      sort.
[775]      
[776]      HERMOGENES: With all my heart; for am very curious to hear the rest of the
[777]      enquiry about names.
[778]      
[779]      SOCRATES: Then let us proceed; and where would you have us begin, now that
[780]      we have got a sort of outline of the enquiry? Are there any names which
[781]      witness of themselves that they are not given arbitrarily, but have a
[782]      natural fitness? The names of heroes and of men in general are apt to be
[783]      deceptive because they are often called after ancestors with whose names,
[784]      as we were saying, they may have no business; or they are the expression of
[785]      a wish like Eutychides (the son of good fortune), or Sosias (the Saviour),
[786]      or Theophilus (the beloved of God), and others. But I think that we had
[787]      better leave these, for there will be more chance of finding correctness in
[788]      the names of immutable essences;--there ought to have been more care taken
[789]      about them when they were named, and perhaps there may have been some more
[790]      than human power at work occasionally in giving them names.
[791]      
[792]      HERMOGENES: I think so, Socrates.
[793]      
[794]      SOCRATES: Ought we not to begin with the consideration of the Gods, and
[795]      show that they are rightly named Gods?
[796]      
[797]      HERMOGENES: Yes, that will be well.
[798]      
[799]      SOCRATES: My notion would be something of this sort:--I suspect that the
[800]      sun, moon, earth, stars, and heaven, which are still the Gods of many
[801]      barbarians, were the only Gods known to the aboriginal Hellenes. Seeing
[802]      that they were always moving and running, from their running nature they
[803]      were called Gods or runners (Theous, Theontas); and when men became
[804]      acquainted with the other Gods, they proceeded to apply the same name to
[805]      them all. Do you think that likely?
[806]      
[807]      HERMOGENES: I think it very likely indeed.
[808]      
[809]      SOCRATES: What shall follow the Gods?
[810]      
[811]      HERMOGENES: Must not demons and heroes and men come next?
[812]      
[813]      SOCRATES: Demons! And what do you consider to be the meaning of this
[814]      word? Tell me if my view is right.
[815]      
[816]      HERMOGENES: Let me hear.
[817]      
[818]      SOCRATES: You know how Hesiod uses the word?
[819]      
[820]      HERMOGENES: I do not.
[821]      
[822]      SOCRATES: Do you not remember that he speaks of a golden race of men who
[823]      came first?
[824]      
[825]      HERMOGENES: Yes, I do.
[826]      
[827]      SOCRATES: He says of them--
[828]      
[829]      'But now that fate has closed over this race
[830]      They are holy demons upon the earth,
[831]      Beneficent, averters of ills, guardians of mortal men.' (Hesiod, Works and
[832]      Days.)
[833]      
[834]      HERMOGENES: What is the inference?
[835]      
[836]      SOCRATES: What is the inference! Why, I suppose that he means by the
[837]      golden men, not men literally made of gold, but good and noble; and I am
[838]      convinced of this, because he further says that we are the iron race.
[839]      
[840]      HERMOGENES: That is true.
[841]      
[842]      SOCRATES: And do you not suppose that good men of our own day would by him
[843]      be said to be of golden race?
[844]      
[845]      HERMOGENES: Very likely.
[846]      
[847]      SOCRATES: And are not the good wise?
[848]      
[849]      HERMOGENES: Yes, they are wise.
[850]      
[851]      SOCRATES: And therefore I have the most entire conviction that he called
[852]      them demons, because they were daemones (knowing or wise), and in our older
[853]      Attic dialect the word itself occurs. Now he and other poets say truly,
[854]      that when a good man dies he has honour and a mighty portion among the
[855]      dead, and becomes a demon; which is a name given to him signifying wisdom.
[856]      And I say too, that every wise man who happens to be a good man is more
[857]      than human (daimonion) both in life and death, and is rightly called a
[858]      demon.
[859]      
[860]      HERMOGENES: Then I rather think that I am of one mind with you; but what
[861]      is the meaning of the word 'hero'? (Eros with an eta, in the old writing
[862]      eros with an epsilon.)
[863]      
[864]      SOCRATES: I think that there is no difficulty in explaining, for the name
[865]      is not much altered, and signifies that they were born of love.
[866]      
[867]      HERMOGENES: What do you mean?
[868]      
[869]      SOCRATES: Do you not know that the heroes are demigods?
[870]      
[871]      HERMOGENES: What then?
[872]      
[873]      SOCRATES: All of them sprang either from the love of a God for a mortal
[874]      woman, or of a mortal man for a Goddess; think of the word in the old
[875]      Attic, and you will see better that the name heros is only a slight
[876]      alteration of Eros, from whom the heroes sprang: either this is the
[877]      meaning, or, if not this, then they must have been skilful as rhetoricians
[878]      and dialecticians, and able to put the question (erotan), for eirein is
[879]      equivalent to legein. And therefore, as I was saying, in the Attic dialect
[880]      the heroes turn out to be rhetoricians and questioners. All this is easy
[881]      enough; the noble breed of heroes are a tribe of sophists and rhetors. But
[882]      can you tell me why men are called anthropoi?--that is more difficult.
[883]      
[884]      HERMOGENES: No, I cannot; and I would not try even if I could, because I
[885]      think that you are the more likely to succeed.
[886]      
[887]      SOCRATES: That is to say, you trust to the inspiration of Euthyphro.
[888]      
[889]      HERMOGENES: Of course.
[890]      
[891]      SOCRATES: Your faith is not vain; for at this very moment a new and
[892]      ingenious thought strikes me, and, if I am not careful, before to-morrow's
[893]      dawn I shall be wiser than I ought to be. Now, attend to me; and first,
[894]      remember that we often put in and pull out letters in words, and give names
[895]      as we please and change the accents. Take, for example, the word Dii
[896]      Philos; in order to convert this from a sentence into a noun, we omit one
[897]      of the iotas and sound the middle syllable grave instead of acute; as, on
[898]      the other hand, letters are sometimes inserted in words instead of being
[899]      omitted, and the acute takes the place of the grave.
[900]      
[901]      HERMOGENES: That is true.
[902]      
[903]      SOCRATES: The name anthropos, which was once a sentence, and is now a
[904]      noun, appears to be a case just of this sort, for one letter, which is the
[905]      alpha, has been omitted, and the acute on the last syllable has been
[906]      changed to a grave.
[907]      
[908]      HERMOGENES: What do you mean?
[909]      
[910]      SOCRATES: I mean to say that the word 'man' implies that other animals
[911]      never examine, or consider, or look up at what they see, but that man not
[912]      only sees (opope) but considers and looks up at that which he sees, and
[913]      hence he alone of all animals is rightly anthropos, meaning anathron a
[914]      opopen.
[915]      
[916]      HERMOGENES: May I ask you to examine another word about which I am
[917]      curious?
[918]      
[919]      SOCRATES: Certainly.
[920]      
[921]      HERMOGENES: I will take that which appears to me to follow next in order.
[922]      You know the distinction of soul and body?
[923]      
[924]      SOCRATES: Of course.
[925]      
[926]      HERMOGENES: Let us endeavour to analyze them like the previous words.
[927]      
[928]      SOCRATES: You want me first of all to examine the natural fitness of the
[929]      word psuche (soul), and then of the word soma (body)?
[930]      
[931]      HERMOGENES: Yes.
[932]      
[933]      SOCRATES: If I am to say what occurs to me at the moment, I should imagine
[934]      that those who first used the name psuche meant to express that the soul
[935]      when in the body is the source of life, and gives the power of breath and
[936]      revival (anapsuchon), and when this reviving power fails then the body
[937]      perishes and dies, and this, if I am not mistaken, they called psyche. But
[938]      please stay a moment; I fancy that I can discover something which will be
[939]      more acceptable to the disciples of Euthyphro, for I am afraid that they
[940]      will scorn this explanation. What do you say to another?
[941]      
[942]      HERMOGENES: Let me hear.
[943]      
[944]      SOCRATES: What is that which holds and carries and gives life and motion
[945]      to the entire nature of the body? What else but the soul?
[946]      
[947]      HERMOGENES: Just that.
[948]      
[949]      SOCRATES: And do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or soul is the
[950]      ordering and containing principle of all things?
[951]      
[952]      HERMOGENES: Yes; I do.
[953]      
[954]      SOCRATES: Then you may well call that power phuseche which carries and
[955]      holds nature (e phusin okei, kai ekei), and this may be refined away into
[956]      psuche.
[957]      
[958]      HERMOGENES: Certainly; and this derivation is, I think, more scientific
[959]      than the other.
[960]      
[961]      SOCRATES: It is so; but I cannot help laughing, if I am to suppose that
[962]      this was the true meaning of the name.
[963]      
[964]      HERMOGENES: But what shall we say of the next word?
[965]      
[966]      SOCRATES: You mean soma (the body).
[967]      
[968]      HERMOGENES: Yes.
[969]      
[970]      SOCRATES: That may be variously interpreted; and yet more variously if a
[971]      little permutation is allowed. For some say that the body is the grave
[972]      (sema) of the soul which may be thought to be buried in our present life;
[973]      or again the index of the soul, because the soul gives indications to
[974]      (semainei) the body; probably the Orphic poets were the inventors of the
[975]      name, and they were under the impression that the soul is suffering the
[976]      punishment of sin, and that the body is an enclosure or prison in which the
[977]      soul is incarcerated, kept safe (soma, sozetai), as the name soma implies,
[978]      until the penalty is paid; according to this view, not even a letter of the
[979]      word need be changed.
[980]      
[981]      HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that we have said enough of this class of
[982]      words. But have we any more explanations of the names of the Gods, like
[983]      that which you were giving of Zeus? I should like to know whether any
[984]      similar principle of correctness is to be applied to them.
[985]      
[986]      SOCRATES: Yes, indeed, Hermogenes; and there is one excellent principle
[987]      which, as men of sense, we must acknowledge,--that of the Gods we know
[988]      nothing, either of their natures or of the names which they give
[989]      themselves; but we are sure that the names by which they call themselves,
[990]      whatever they may be, are true. And this is the best of all principles;
[991]      and the next best is to say, as in prayers, that we will call them by any
[992]      sort or kind of names or patronymics which they like, because we do not
[993]      know of any other. That also, I think, is a very good custom, and one
[994]      which I should much wish to observe. Let us, then, if you please, in the
[995]      first place announce to them that we are not enquiring about them; we do
[996]      not presume that we are able to do so; but we are enquiring about the
[997]      meaning of men in giving them these names,--in this there can be small
[998]      blame.
[999]      
[1000]     HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you are quite right, and I would like
[1001]     to do as you say.
[1002]     
[1003]     SOCRATES: Shall we begin, then, with Hestia, according to custom?
[1004]     
[1005]     HERMOGENES: Yes, that will be very proper.
[1006]     
[1007]     SOCRATES: What may we suppose him to have meant who gave the name Hestia?
[1008]     
[1009]     HERMOGENES: That is another and certainly a most difficult question.
[1010]     
[1011]     SOCRATES: My dear Hermogenes, the first imposers of names must surely have
[1012]     been considerable persons; they were philosophers, and had a good deal to
[1013]     say.
[1014]     
[1015]     HERMOGENES: Well, and what of them?
[1016]     
[1017]     SOCRATES: They are the men to whom I should attribute the imposition of
[1018]     names. Even in foreign names, if you analyze them, a meaning is still
[1019]     discernible. For example, that which we term ousia is by some called esia,
[1020]     and by others again osia. Now that the essence of things should be called
[1021]     estia, which is akin to the first of these (esia = estia), is rational
[1022]     enough. And there is reason in the Athenians calling that estia which
[1023]     participates in ousia. For in ancient times we too seem to have said esia
[1024]     for ousia, and this you may note to have been the idea of those who
[1025]     appointed that sacrifices should be first offered to estia, which was
[1026]     natural enough if they meant that estia was the essence of things. Those
[1027]     again who read osia seem to have inclined to the opinion of Heracleitus,
[1028]     that all things flow and nothing stands; with them the pushing principle
[1029]     (othoun) is the cause and ruling power of all things, and is therefore
[1030]     rightly called osia. Enough of this, which is all that we who know nothing
[1031]     can affirm. Next in order after Hestia we ought to consider Rhea and
[1032]     Cronos, although the name of Cronos has been already discussed. But I dare
[1033]     say that I am talking great nonsense.
[1034]     
[1035]     HERMOGENES: Why, Socrates?
[1036]     
[1037]     SOCRATES: My good friend, I have discovered a hive of wisdom.
[1038]     
[1039]     HERMOGENES: Of what nature?
[1040]     
[1041]     SOCRATES: Well, rather ridiculous, and yet plausible.
[1042]     
[1043]     HERMOGENES: How plausible?
[1044]     
[1045]     SOCRATES: I fancy to myself Heracleitus repeating wise traditions of
[1046]     antiquity as old as the days of Cronos and Rhea, and of which Homer also
[1047]     spoke.
[1048]     
[1049]     HERMOGENES: How do you mean?
[1050]     
[1051]     SOCRATES: Heracleitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion and
[1052]     nothing at rest; he compares them to the stream of a river, and says that
[1053]     you cannot go into the same water twice.
[1054]     
[1055]     HERMOGENES: That is true.
[1056]     
[1057]     SOCRATES: Well, then, how can we avoid inferring that he who gave the
[1058]     names of Cronos and Rhea to the ancestors of the Gods, agreed pretty much
[1059]     in the doctrine of Heracleitus? Is the giving of the names of streams to
[1060]     both of them purely accidental? Compare the line in which Homer, and, as I
[1061]     believe, Hesiod also, tells of
[1062]     
[1063]     'Ocean, the origin of Gods, and mother Tethys (Il.--the line is not found
[1064]     in the extant works of Hesiod.).'
[1065]     
[1066]     And again, Orpheus says, that
[1067]     
[1068]     'The fair river of Ocean was the first to marry, and he espoused his sister
[1069]     Tethys, who was his mother's daughter.'
[1070]     
[1071]     You see that this is a remarkable coincidence, and all in the direction of
[1072]     Heracleitus.
[1073]     
[1074]     HERMOGENES: I think that there is something in what you say, Socrates; but
[1075]     I do not understand the meaning of the name Tethys.
[1076]     
[1077]     SOCRATES: Well, that is almost self-explained, being only the name of a
[1078]     spring, a little disguised; for that which is strained and filtered
[1079]     (diattomenon, ethoumenon) may be likened to a spring, and the name Tethys
[1080]     is made up of these two words.
[1081]     
[1082]     HERMOGENES: The idea is ingenious, Socrates.
[1083]     
[1084]     SOCRATES: To be sure. But what comes next?--of Zeus we have spoken.
[1085]     
[1086]     HERMOGENES: Yes.
[1087]     
[1088]     SOCRATES: Then let us next take his two brothers, Poseidon and Pluto,
[1089]     whether the latter is called by that or by his other name.
[1090]     
[1091]     HERMOGENES: By all means.
[1092]     
[1093]     SOCRATES: Poseidon is Posidesmos, the chain of the feet; the original
[1094]     inventor of the name had been stopped by the watery element in his walks,
[1095]     and not allowed to go on, and therefore he called the ruler of this element
[1096]     Poseidon; the epsilon was probably inserted as an ornament. Yet, perhaps,
[1097]     not so; but the name may have been originally written with a double lamda
[1098]     and not with a sigma, meaning that the God knew many things (Polla eidos).
[1099]     And perhaps also he being the shaker of the earth, has been named from
[1100]     shaking (seiein), and then pi and delta have been added. Pluto gives
[1101]     wealth (Ploutos), and his name means the giver of wealth, which comes out
[1102]     of the earth beneath. People in general appear to imagine that the term
[1103]     Hades is connected with the invisible (aeides) and so they are led by their
[1104]     fears to call the God Pluto instead.
[1105]     
[1106]     HERMOGENES: And what is the true derivation?
[1107]     
[1108]     SOCRATES: In spite of the mistakes which are made about the power of this
[1109]     deity, and the foolish fears which people have of him, such as the fear of
[1110]     always being with him after death, and of the soul denuded of the body
[1111]     going to him (compare Rep.), my belief is that all is quite consistent, and
[1112]     that the office and name of the God really correspond.
[1113]     
[1114]     HERMOGENES: Why, how is that?
[1115]     
[1116]     SOCRATES: I will tell you my own opinion; but first, I should like to ask
[1117]     you which chain does any animal feel to be the stronger? and which confines
[1118]     him more to the same spot,--desire or necessity?
[1119]     
[1120]     HERMOGENES: Desire, Socrates, is stronger far.
[1121]     
[1122]     SOCRATES: And do you not think that many a one would escape from Hades, if
[1123]     he did not bind those who depart to him by the strongest of chains?
[1124]     
[1125]     HERMOGENES: Assuredly they would.
[1126]     
[1127]     SOCRATES: And if by the greatest of chains, then by some desire, as I
[1128]     should certainly infer, and not by necessity?
[1129]     
[1130]     HERMOGENES: That is clear.
[1131]     
[1132]     SOCRATES: And there are many desires?
[1133]     
[1134]     HERMOGENES: Yes.
[1135]     
[1136]     SOCRATES: And therefore by the greatest desire, if the chain is to be the
[1137]     greatest?
[1138]     
[1139]     HERMOGENES: Yes.
[1140]     
[1141]     SOCRATES: And is any desire stronger than the thought that you will be
[1142]     made better by associating with another?
[1143]     
[1144]     HERMOGENES: Certainly not.
[1145]     
[1146]     SOCRATES: And is not that the reason, Hermogenes, why no one, who has been
[1147]     to him, is willing to come back to us? Even the Sirens, like all the rest
[1148]     of the world, have been laid under his spells. Such a charm, as I imagine,
[1149]     is the God able to infuse into his words. And, according to this view, he
[1150]     is the perfect and accomplished Sophist, and the great benefactor of the
[1151]     inhabitants of the other world; and even to us who are upon earth he sends
[1152]     from below exceeding blessings. For he has much more than he wants down
[1153]     there; wherefore he is called Pluto (or the rich). Note also, that he will
[1154]     have nothing to do with men while they are in the body, but only when the
[1155]     soul is liberated from the desires and evils of the body. Now there is a
[1156]     great deal of philosophy and reflection in that; for in their liberated
[1157]     state he can bind them with the desire of virtue, but while they are
[1158]     flustered and maddened by the body, not even father Cronos himself would
[1159]     suffice to keep them with him in his own far-famed chains.
[1160]     
[1161]     HERMOGENES: There is a deal of truth in what you say.
[1162]     
[1163]     SOCRATES: Yes, Hermogenes, and the legislator called him Hades, not from
[1164]     the unseen (aeides)--far otherwise, but from his knowledge (eidenai) of all
[1165]     noble things.
[1166]     
[1167]     HERMOGENES: Very good; and what do we say of Demeter, and Here, and
[1168]     Apollo, and Athene, and Hephaestus, and Ares, and the other deities?
[1169]     
[1170]     SOCRATES: Demeter is e didousa meter, who gives food like a mother; Here
[1171]     is the lovely one (erate)--for Zeus, according to tradition, loved and
[1172]     married her; possibly also the name may have been given when the legislator
[1173]     was thinking of the heavens, and may be only a disguise of the air (aer),
[1174]     putting the end in the place of the beginning. You will recognize the
[1175]     truth of this if you repeat the letters of Here several times over. People
[1176]     dread the name of Pherephatta as they dread the name of Apollo,--and with
[1177]     as little reason; the fear, if I am not mistaken, only arises from their
[1178]     ignorance of the nature of names. But they go changing the name into
[1179]     Phersephone, and they are terrified at this; whereas the new name means
[1180]     only that the Goddess is wise (sophe); for seeing that all things in the
[1181]     world are in motion (pheromenon), that principle which embraces and touches
[1182]     and is able to follow them, is wisdom. And therefore the Goddess may be
[1183]     truly called Pherepaphe (Pherepapha), or some name like it, because she
[1184]     touches that which is in motion (tou pheromenon ephaptomene), herein
[1185]     showing her wisdom. And Hades, who is wise, consorts with her, because she
[1186]     is wise. They alter her name into Pherephatta now-a-days, because the
[1187]     present generation care for euphony more than truth. There is the other
[1188]     name, Apollo, which, as I was saying, is generally supposed to have some
[1189]     terrible signification. Have you remarked this fact?
[1190]     
[1191]     HERMOGENES: To be sure I have, and what you say is true.
[1192]     
[1193]     SOCRATES: But the name, in my opinion, is really most expressive of the
[1194]     power of the God.
[1195]     
[1196]     HERMOGENES: How so?
[1197]     
[1198]     SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain, for I do not believe that any
[1199]     single name could have been better adapted to express the attributes of the
[1200]     God, embracing and in a manner signifying all four of them,--music, and
[1201]     prophecy, and medicine, and archery.
[1202]     
[1203]     HERMOGENES: That must be a strange name, and I should like to hear the
[1204]     explanation.
[1205]     
[1206]     SOCRATES: Say rather an harmonious name, as beseems the God of Harmony.
[1207]     In the first place, the purgations and purifications which doctors and
[1208]     diviners use, and their fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal, as
[1209]     well as their washings and lustral sprinklings, have all one and the same
[1210]     object, which is to make a man pure both in body and soul.
[1211]     
[1212]     HERMOGENES: Very true.
[1213]     
[1214]     SOCRATES: And is not Apollo the purifier, and the washer, and the absolver
[1215]     from all impurities?
[1216]     
[1217]     HERMOGENES: Very true.
[1218]     
[1219]     SOCRATES: Then in reference to his ablutions and absolutions, as being the
[1220]     physician who orders them, he may be rightly called Apolouon (purifier); or
[1221]     in respect of his powers of divination, and his truth and sincerity, which
[1222]     is the same as truth, he may be most fitly called Aplos, from aplous
[1223]     (sincere), as in the Thessalian dialect, for all the Thessalians call him
[1224]     Aplos; also he is aei Ballon (always shooting), because he is a master
[1225]     archer who never misses; or again, the name may refer to his musical
[1226]     attributes, and then, as in akolouthos, and akoitis, and in many other
[1227]     words the alpha is supposed to mean 'together,' so the meaning of the name
[1228]     Apollo will be 'moving together,' whether in the poles of heaven as they
[1229]     are called, or in the harmony of song, which is termed concord, because he
[1230]     moves all together by an harmonious power, as astronomers and musicians
[1231]     ingeniously declare. And he is the God who presides over harmony, and
[1232]     makes all things move together, both among Gods and among men. And as in
[1233]     the words akolouthos and akoitis the alpha is substituted for an omicron,
[1234]     so the name Apollon is equivalent to omopolon; only the second lambda is
[1235]     added in order to avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction (apolon). Now
[1236]     the suspicion of this destructive power still haunts the minds of some who
[1237]     do not consider the true value of the name, which, as I was saying just
[1238]     now, has reference to all the powers of the God, who is the single one, the
[1239]     everdarting, the purifier, the mover together (aplous, aei Ballon,
[1240]     apolouon, omopolon). The name of the Muses and of music would seem to be
[1241]     derived from their making philosophical enquiries (mosthai); and Leto is
[1242]     called by this name, because she is such a gentle Goddess, and so willing
[1243]     (ethelemon) to grant our requests; or her name may be Letho, as she is
[1244]     often called by strangers--they seem to imply by it her amiability, and her
[1245]     smooth and easy-going way of behaving. Artemis is named from her healthy
[1246]     (artemes), well-ordered nature, and because of her love of virginity,
[1247]     perhaps because she is a proficient in virtue (arete), and perhaps also as
[1248]     hating intercourse of the sexes (ton aroton misesasa). He who gave the
[1249]     Goddess her name may have had any or all of these reasons.
[1250]     
[1251]     HERMOGENES: What is the meaning of Dionysus and Aphrodite?
[1252]     
[1253]     SOCRATES: Son of Hipponicus, you ask a solemn question; there is a serious
[1254]     and also a facetious explanation of both these names; the serious
[1255]     explanation is not to be had from me, but there is no objection to your
[1256]     hearing the facetious one; for the Gods too love a joke. Dionusos is
[1257]     simply didous oinon (giver of wine), Didoinusos, as he might be called in
[1258]     fun,--and oinos is properly oionous, because wine makes those who drink,
[1259]     think (oiesthai) that they have a mind (noun) when they have none. The
[1260]     derivation of Aphrodite, born of the foam (aphros), may be fairly accepted
[1261]     on the authority of Hesiod.
[1262]     
[1263]     HERMOGENES: Still there remains Athene, whom you, Socrates, as an
[1264]     Athenian, will surely not forget; there are also Hephaestus and Ares.
[1265]     
[1266]     SOCRATES: I am not likely to forget them.
[1267]     
[1268]     HERMOGENES: No, indeed.
[1269]     
[1270]     SOCRATES: There is no difficulty in explaining the other appellation of
[1271]     Athene.
[1272]     
[1273]     HERMOGENES: What other appellation?
[1274]     
[1275]     SOCRATES: We call her Pallas.
[1276]     
[1277]     HERMOGENES: To be sure.
[1278]     
[1279]     SOCRATES: And we cannot be wrong in supposing that this is derived from
[1280]     armed dances. For the elevation of oneself or anything else above the
[1281]     earth, or by the use of the hands, we call shaking (pallein), or dancing.
[1282]     
[1283]     HERMOGENES: That is quite true.
[1284]     
[1285]     SOCRATES: Then that is the explanation of the name Pallas?
[1286]     
[1287]     HERMOGENES: Yes; but what do you say of the other name?
[1288]     
[1289]     SOCRATES: Athene?
[1290]     
[1291]     HERMOGENES: Yes.
[1292]     
[1293]     SOCRATES: That is a graver matter, and there, my friend, the modern
[1294]     interpreters of Homer may, I think, assist in explaining the view of the
[1295]     ancients. For most of these in their explanations of the poet, assert that
[1296]     he meant by Athene 'mind' (nous) and 'intelligence' (dianoia), and the
[1297]     maker of names appears to have had a singular notion about her; and indeed
[1298]     calls her by a still higher title, 'divine intelligence' (Thou noesis), as
[1299]     though he would say: This is she who has the mind of God (Theonoa);--using
[1300]     alpha as a dialectical variety for eta, and taking away iota and sigma
[1301]     (There seems to be some error in the MSS. The meaning is that the word
[1302]     theonoa = theounoa is a curtailed form of theou noesis, but the omitted
[1303]     letters do not agree.). Perhaps, however, the name Theonoe may mean 'she
[1304]     who knows divine things' (Theia noousa) better than others. Nor shall we
[1305]     be far wrong in supposing that the author of it wished to identify this
[1306]     Goddess with moral intelligence (en ethei noesin), and therefore gave her
[1307]     the name ethonoe; which, however, either he or his successors have altered
[1308]     into what they thought a nicer form, and called her Athene.
[1309]     
[1310]     HERMOGENES: But what do you say of Hephaestus?
[1311]     
[1312]     SOCRATES: Speak you of the princely lord of light (Phaeos istora)?
[1313]     
[1314]     HERMOGENES: Surely.
[1315]     
[1316]     SOCRATES: Ephaistos is Phaistos, and has added the eta by attraction; that
[1317]     is obvious to anybody.
[1318]     
[1319]     HERMOGENES: That is very probable, until some more probable notion gets
[1320]     into your head.
[1321]     
[1322]     SOCRATES: To prevent that, you had better ask what is the derivation of
[1323]     Ares.
[1324]     
[1325]     HERMOGENES: What is Ares?
[1326]     
[1327]     SOCRATES: Ares may be called, if you will, from his manhood (arren) and
[1328]     manliness, or if you please, from his hard and unchangeable nature, which
[1329]     is the meaning of arratos: the latter is a derivation in every way
[1330]     appropriate to the God of war.
[1331]     
[1332]     HERMOGENES: Very true.
[1333]     
[1334]     SOCRATES: And now, by the Gods, let us have no more of the Gods, for I am
[1335]     afraid of them; ask about anything but them, and thou shalt see how the
[1336]     steeds of Euthyphro can prance.
[1337]     
[1338]     HERMOGENES: Only one more God! I should like to know about Hermes, of
[1339]     whom I am said not to be a true son. Let us make him out, and then I shall
[1340]     know whether there is any meaning in what Cratylus says.
[1341]     
[1342]     SOCRATES: I should imagine that the name Hermes has to do with speech, and
[1343]     signifies that he is the interpreter (ermeneus), or messenger, or thief, or
[1344]     liar, or bargainer; all that sort of thing has a great deal to do with
[1345]     language; as I was telling you, the word eirein is expressive of the use of
[1346]     speech, and there is an often-recurring Homeric word emesato, which means
[1347]     'he contrived'--out of these two words, eirein and mesasthai, the
[1348]     legislator formed the name of the God who invented language and speech; and
[1349]     we may imagine him dictating to us the use of this name: 'O my friends,'
[1350]     says he to us, 'seeing that he is the contriver of tales or speeches, you
[1351]     may rightly call him Eirhemes.' And this has been improved by us, as we
[1352]     think, into Hermes. Iris also appears to have been called from the verb
[1353]     'to tell' (eirein), because she was a messenger.
[1354]     
[1355]     HERMOGENES: Then I am very sure that Cratylus was quite right in saying
[1356]     that I was no true son of Hermes (Ermogenes), for I am not a good hand at
[1357]     speeches.
[1358]     
[1359]     SOCRATES: There is also reason, my friend, in Pan being the double-formed
[1360]     son of Hermes.
[1361]     
[1362]     HERMOGENES: How do you make that out?
[1363]     
[1364]     SOCRATES: You are aware that speech signifies all things (pan), and is
[1365]     always turning them round and round, and has two forms, true and false?
[1366]     
[1367]     HERMOGENES: Certainly.
[1368]     
[1369]     SOCRATES: Is not the truth that is in him the smooth or sacred form which
[1370]     dwells above among the Gods, whereas falsehood dwells among men below, and
[1371]     is rough like the goat of tragedy; for tales and falsehoods have generally
[1372]     to do with the tragic or goatish life, and tragedy is the place of them?
[1373]     
[1374]     HERMOGENES: Very true.
[1375]     
[1376]     SOCRATES: Then surely Pan, who is the declarer of all things (pan) and the
[1377]     perpetual mover (aei polon) of all things, is rightly called aipolos (goat-
[1378]     herd), he being the two-formed son of Hermes, smooth in his upper part, and
[1379]     rough and goatlike in his lower regions. And, as the son of Hermes, he is
[1380]     speech or the brother of speech, and that brother should be like brother is
[1381]     no marvel. But, as I was saying, my dear Hermogenes, let us get away from
[1382]     the Gods.
[1383]     
[1384]     HERMOGENES: From these sort of Gods, by all means, Socrates. But why
[1385]     should we not discuss another kind of Gods--the sun, moon, stars, earth,
[1386]     aether, air, fire, water, the seasons, and the year?
[1387]     
[1388]     SOCRATES: You impose a great many tasks upon me. Still, if you wish, I
[1389]     will not refuse.
[1390]     
[1391]     HERMOGENES: You will oblige me.
[1392]     
[1393]     SOCRATES: How would you have me begin? Shall I take first of all him whom
[1394]     you mentioned first--the sun?
[1395]     
[1396]     HERMOGENES: Very good.
[1397]     
[1398]     SOCRATES: The origin of the sun will probably be clearer in the Doric
[1399]     form, for the Dorians call him alios, and this name is given to him because
[1400]     when he rises he gathers (alizoi) men together or because he is always
[1401]     rolling in his course (aei eilein ion) about the earth; or from aiolein, of
[1402]     which the meaning is the same as poikillein (to variegate), because he
[1403]     variegates the productions of the earth.
[1404]     
[1405]     HERMOGENES: But what is selene (the moon)?
[1406]     
[1407]     SOCRATES: That name is rather unfortunate for Anaxagoras.
[1408]     
[1409]     HERMOGENES: How so?
[1410]     
[1411]     SOCRATES: The word seems to forestall his recent discovery, that the moon
[1412]     receives her light from the sun.
[1413]     
[1414]     HERMOGENES: Why do you say so?
[1415]     
[1416]     SOCRATES: The two words selas (brightness) and phos (light) have much the
[1417]     same meaning?
[1418]     
[1419]     HERMOGENES: Yes.
[1420]     
[1421]     SOCRATES: This light about the moon is always new (neon) and always old
[1422]     (enon), if the disciples of Anaxagoras say truly. For the sun in his
[1423]     revolution always adds new light, and there is the old light of the
[1424]     previous month.
[1425]     
[1426]     HERMOGENES: Very true.
[1427]     
[1428]     SOCRATES: The moon is not unfrequently called selanaia.
[1429]     
[1430]     HERMOGENES: True.
[1431]     
[1432]     SOCRATES: And as she has a light which is always old and always new (enon
[1433]     neon aei) she may very properly have the name selaenoneoaeia; and this when
[1434]     hammered into shape becomes selanaia.
[1435]     
[1436]     HERMOGENES: A real dithyrambic sort of name that, Socrates. But what do
[1437]     you say of the month and the stars?
[1438]     
[1439]     SOCRATES: Meis (month) is called from meiousthai (to lessen), because
[1440]     suffering diminution; the name of astra (stars) seems to be derived from
[1441]     astrape, which is an improvement on anastrope, signifying the upsetting of
[1442]     the eyes (anastrephein opa).
[1443]     
[1444]     HERMOGENES: What do you say of pur (fire) and udor (water)?
[1445]     
[1446]     SOCRATES: I am at a loss how to explain pur; either the muse of Euthyphro
[1447]     has deserted me, or there is some very great difficulty in the word.
[1448]     Please, however, to note the contrivance which I adopt whenever I am in a
[1449]     difficulty of this sort.
[1450]     
[1451]     HERMOGENES: What is it?
[1452]     
[1453]     SOCRATES: I will tell you; but I should like to know first whether you can
[1454]     tell me what is the meaning of the pur?
[1455]     
[1456]     HERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot.
[1457]     
[1458]     SOCRATES: Shall I tell you what I suspect to be the true explanation of
[1459]     this and several other words?--My belief is that they are of foreign
[1460]     origin. For the Hellenes, especially those who were under the dominion of
[1461]     the barbarians, often borrowed from them.
[1462]     
[1463]     HERMOGENES: What is the inference?
[1464]     
[1465]     SOCRATES: Why, you know that any one who seeks to demonstrate the fitness
[1466]     of these names according to the Hellenic language, and not according to the
[1467]     language from which the words are derived, is rather likely to be at fault.
[1468]     
[1469]     HERMOGENES: Yes, certainly.
[1470]     
[1471]     SOCRATES: Well then, consider whether this pur is not foreign; for the
[1472]     word is not easily brought into relation with the Hellenic tongue, and the
[1473]     Phrygians may be observed to have the same word slightly changed, just as
[1474]     they have udor (water) and kunes (dogs), and many other words.
[1475]     
[1476]     HERMOGENES: That is true.
[1477]     
[1478]     SOCRATES: Any violent interpretations of the words should be avoided; for
[1479]     something to say about them may easily be found. And thus I get rid of pur
[1480]     and udor. Aer (air), Hermogenes, may be explained as the element which
[1481]     raises (airei) things from the earth, or as ever flowing (aei rei), or
[1482]     because the flux of the air is wind, and the poets call the winds 'air-
[1483]     blasts,' (aetai); he who uses the term may mean, so to speak, air-flux
[1484]     (aetorroun), in the sense of wind-flux (pneumatorroun); and because this
[1485]     moving wind may be expressed by either term he employs the word air (aer =
[1486]     aetes rheo). Aither (aether) I should interpret as aeitheer; this may be
[1487]     correctly said, because this element is always running in a flux about the
[1488]     air (aei thei peri tou aera reon). The meaning of the word ge (earth)
[1489]     comes out better when in the form of gaia, for the earth may be truly
[1490]     called 'mother' (gaia, genneteira), as in the language of Homer (Od.)
[1491]     gegaasi means gegennesthai.
[1492]     
[1493]     HERMOGENES: Good.
[1494]     
[1495]     SOCRATES: What shall we take next?
[1496]     
[1497]     HERMOGENES: There are orai (the seasons), and the two names of the year,
[1498]     eniautos and etos.
[1499]     
[1500]     SOCRATES: The orai should be spelt in the old Attic way, if you desire to
[1501]     know the probable truth about them; they are rightly called the orai
[1502]     because they divide (orizousin) the summers and winters and winds and the
[1503]     fruits of the earth. The words eniautos and etos appear to be the same,--
[1504]     'that which brings to light the plants and growths of the earth in their
[1505]     turn, and passes them in review within itself (en eauto exetazei)': this
[1506]     is broken up into two words, eniautos from en eauto, and etos from etazei,
[1507]     just as the original name of Zeus was divided into Zena and Dia; and the
[1508]     whole proposition means that his power of reviewing from within is one, but
[1509]     has two names, two words etos and eniautos being thus formed out of a
[1510]     single proposition.
[1511]     
[1512]     HERMOGENES: Indeed, Socrates, you make surprising progress.
[1513]     
[1514]     SOCRATES: I am run away with.
[1515]     
[1516]     HERMOGENES: Very true.
[1517]     
[1518]     SOCRATES: But am not yet at my utmost speed.
[1519]     
[1520]     HERMOGENES: I should like very much to know, in the next place, how you
[1521]     would explain the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in those
[1522]     charming words--wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest of them?
[1523]     
[1524]     SOCRATES: That is a tremendous class of names which you are disinterring;
[1525]     still, as I have put on the lion's skin, I must not be faint of heart; and
[1526]     I suppose that I must consider the meaning of wisdom (phronesis) and
[1527]     understanding (sunesis), and judgment (gnome), and knowledge (episteme),
[1528]     and all those other charming words, as you call them?
[1529]     
[1530]     HERMOGENES: Surely, we must not leave off until we find out their meaning.
[1531]     
[1532]     SOCRATES: By the dog of Egypt I have a not bad notion which came into my
[1533]     head only this moment: I believe that the primeval givers of names were
[1534]     undoubtedly like too many of our modern philosophers, who, in their search
[1535]     after the nature of things, are always getting dizzy from constantly going
[1536]     round and round, and then they imagine that the world is going round and
[1537]     round and moving in all directions; and this appearance, which arises out
[1538]     of their own internal condition, they suppose to be a reality of nature;
[1539]     they think that there is nothing stable or permanent, but only flux and
[1540]     motion, and that the world is always full of every sort of motion and
[1541]     change. The consideration of the names which I mentioned has led me into
[1542]     making this reflection.
[1543]     
[1544]     HERMOGENES: How is that, Socrates?
[1545]     
[1546]     SOCRATES: Perhaps you did not observe that in the names which have been
[1547]     just cited, the motion or flux or generation of things is most surely
[1548]     indicated.
[1549]     
[1550]     HERMOGENES: No, indeed, I never thought of it.
[1551]     
[1552]     SOCRATES: Take the first of those which you mentioned; clearly that is a
[1553]     name indicative of motion.
[1554]     
[1555]     HERMOGENES: What was the name?
[1556]     
[1557]     SOCRATES: Phronesis (wisdom), which may signify phoras kai rhou noesis
[1558]     (perception of motion and flux), or perhaps phoras onesis (the blessing of
[1559]     motion), but is at any rate connected with pheresthai (motion); gnome
[1560]     (judgment), again, certainly implies the ponderation or consideration
[1561]     (nomesis) of generation, for to ponder is the same as to consider; or, if
[1562]     you would rather, here is noesis, the very word just now mentioned, which
[1563]     is neou esis (the desire of the new); the word neos implies that the world
[1564]     is always in process of creation. The giver of the name wanted to express
[1565]     this longing of the soul, for the original name was neoesis, and not
[1566]     noesis; but eta took the place of a double epsilon. The word sophrosune is
[1567]     the salvation (soteria) of that wisdom (phronesis) which we were just now
[1568]     considering. Epioteme (knowledge) is akin to this, and indicates that the
[1569]     soul which is good for anything follows (epetai) the motion of things,
[1570]     neither anticipating them nor falling behind them; wherefore the word
[1571]     should rather be read as epistemene, inserting epsilon nu. Sunesis
[1572]     (understanding) may be regarded in like manner as a kind of conclusion; the
[1573]     word is derived from sunienai (to go along with), and, like epistasthai (to
[1574]     know), implies the progression of the soul in company with the nature of
[1575]     things. Sophia (wisdom) is very dark, and appears not to be of native
[1576]     growth; the meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things. You must
[1577]     remember that the poets, when they speak of the commencement of any rapid
[1578]     motion, often use the word esuthe (he rushed); and there was a famous
[1579]     Lacedaemonian who was named Sous (Rush), for by this word the
[1580]     Lacedaemonians signify rapid motion, and the touching (epaphe) of motion is
[1581]     expressed by sophia, for all things are supposed to be in motion. Good
[1582]     (agathon) is the name which is given to the admirable (agasto) in nature;
[1583]     for, although all things move, still there are degrees of motion; some are
[1584]     swifter, some slower; but there are some things which are admirable for
[1585]     their swiftness, and this admirable part of nature is called agathon.
[1586]     Dikaiosune (justice) is clearly dikaiou sunesis (understanding of the
[1587]     just); but the actual word dikaion is more difficult: men are only agreed
[1588]     to a certain extent about justice, and then they begin to disagree. For
[1589]     those who suppose all things to be in motion conceive the greater part of
[1590]     nature to be a mere receptacle; and they say that there is a penetrating
[1591]     power which passes through all this, and is the instrument of creation in
[1592]     all, and is the subtlest and swiftest element; for if it were not the
[1593]     subtlest, and a power which none can keep out, and also the swiftest,
[1594]     passing by other things as if they were standing still, it could not
[1595]     penetrate through the moving universe. And this element, which
[1596]     superintends all things and pierces (diaion) all, is rightly called
[1597]     dikaion; the letter k is only added for the sake of euphony. Thus far, as
[1598]     I was saying, there is a general agreement about the nature of justice; but
[1599]     I, Hermogenes, being an enthusiastic disciple, have been told in a mystery
[1600]     that the justice of which I am speaking is also the cause of the world:
[1601]     now a cause is that because of which anything is created; and some one
[1602]     comes and whispers in my ear that justice is rightly so called because
[1603]     partaking of the nature of the cause, and I begin, after hearing what he
[1604]     has said, to interrogate him gently: 'Well, my excellent friend,' say I,
[1605]     'but if all this be true, I still want to know what is justice.' Thereupon
[1606]     they think that I ask tiresome questions, and am leaping over the barriers,
[1607]     and have been already sufficiently answered, and they try to satisfy me
[1608]     with one derivation after another, and at length they quarrel. For one of
[1609]     them says that justice is the sun, and that he only is the piercing
[1610]     (diaionta) and burning (kaonta) element which is the guardian of nature.
[1611]     And when I joyfully repeat this beautiful notion, I am answered by the
[1612]     satirical remark, 'What, is there no justice in the world when the sun is
[1613]     down?' And when I earnestly beg my questioner to tell me his own honest
[1614]     opinion, he says, 'Fire in the abstract'; but this is not very
[1615]     intelligible. Another says, 'No, not fire in the abstract, but the
[1616]     abstraction of heat in the fire.' Another man professes to laugh at all
[1617]     this, and says, as Anaxagoras says, that justice is mind, for mind, as they
[1618]     say, has absolute power, and mixes with nothing, and orders all things, and
[1619]     passes through all things. At last, my friend, I find myself in far
[1620]     greater perplexity about the nature of justice than I was before I began to
[1621]     learn. But still I am of opinion that the name, which has led me into this
[1622]     digression, was given to justice for the reasons which I have mentioned.
[1623]     
[1624]     HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you are not improvising now; you must
[1625]     have heard this from some one else.
[1626]     
[1627]     SOCRATES: And not the rest?
[1628]     
[1629]     HERMOGENES: Hardly.
[1630]     
[1631]     SOCRATES: Well, then, let me go on in the hope of making you believe in
[1632]     the originality of the rest. What remains after justice? I do not think
[1633]     that we have as yet discussed courage (andreia),--injustice (adikia), which
[1634]     is obviously nothing more than a hindrance to the penetrating principle
[1635]     (diaiontos), need not be considered. Well, then, the name of andreia seems
[1636]     to imply a battle;--this battle is in the world of existence, and according
[1637]     to the doctrine of flux is only the counterflux (enantia rhon): if you
[1638]     extract the delta from andreia, the name at once signifies the thing, and
[1639]     you may clearly understand that andreia is not the stream opposed to every
[1640]     stream, but only to that which is contrary to justice, for otherwise
[1641]     courage would not have been praised. The words arren (male) and aner (man)
[1642]     also contain a similar allusion to the same principle of the upward flux
[1643]     (te ano rhon). Gune (woman) I suspect to be the same word as goun (birth):
[1644]     thelu (female) appears to be partly derived from thele (the teat), because
[1645]     the teat is like rain, and makes things flourish (tethelenai).
[1646]     
[1647]     HERMOGENES: That is surely probable.
[1648]     
[1649]     SOCRATES: Yes; and the very word thallein (to flourish) seems to figure
[1650]     the growth of youth, which is swift and sudden ever. And this is expressed
[1651]     by the legislator in the name, which is a compound of thein (running), and
[1652]     allesthai (leaping). Pray observe how I gallop away when I get on smooth
[1653]     ground. There are a good many names generally thought to be of importance,
[1654]     which have still to be explained.
[1655]     
[1656]     HERMOGENES: True.
[1657]     
[1658]     SOCRATES: There is the meaning of the word techne (art), for example.
[1659]     
[1660]     HERMOGENES: Very true.
[1661]     
[1662]     SOCRATES: That may be identified with echonoe, and expresses the
[1663]     possession of mind: you have only to take away the tau and insert two
[1664]     omichrons, one between the chi and nu, and another between the nu and eta.
[1665]     
[1666]     HERMOGENES: That is a very shabby etymology.
[1667]     
[1668]     SOCRATES: Yes, my dear friend; but then you know that the original names
[1669]     have been long ago buried and disguised by people sticking on and stripping
[1670]     off letters for the sake of euphony, and twisting and bedizening them in
[1671]     all sorts of ways: and time too may have had a share in the change. Take,
[1672]     for example, the word katoptron; why is the letter rho inserted? This must
[1673]     surely be the addition of some one who cares nothing about the truth, but
[1674]     thinks only of putting the mouth into shape. And the additions are often
[1675]     such that at last no human being can possibly make out the original meaning
[1676]     of the word. Another example is the word sphigx, sphiggos, which ought
[1677]     properly to be phigx, phiggos, and there are other examples.
[1678]     
[1679]     HERMOGENES: That is quite true, Socrates.
[1680]     
[1681]     SOCRATES: And yet, if you are permitted to put in and pull out any letters
[1682]     which you please, names will be too easily made, and any name may be
[1683]     adapted to any object.
[1684]     
[1685]     HERMOGENES: True.
[1686]     
[1687]     SOCRATES: Yes, that is true. And therefore a wise dictator, like
[1688]     yourself, should observe the laws of moderation and probability.
[1689]     
[1690]     HERMOGENES: Such is my desire.
[1691]     
[1692]     SOCRATES: And mine, too, Hermogenes. But do not be too much of a
[1693]     precisian, or 'you will unnerve me of my strength (Iliad.).' When you have
[1694]     allowed me to add mechane (contrivance) to techne (art) I shall be at the
[1695]     top of my bent, for I conceive mechane to be a sign of great accomplishment
[1696]     --anein; for mekos has the meaning of greatness, and these two, mekos and
[1697]     anein, make up the word mechane. But, as I was saying, being now at the
[1698]     top of my bent, I should like to consider the meaning of the two words
[1699]     arete (virtue) and kakia (vice); arete I do not as yet understand, but
[1700]     kakia is transparent, and agrees with the principles which preceded, for
[1701]     all things being in a flux (ionton), kakia is kakos ion (going badly); and
[1702]     this evil motion when existing in the soul has the general name of kakia,
[1703]     or vice, specially appropriated to it. The meaning of kakos ienai may be
[1704]     further illustrated by the use of deilia (cowardice), which ought to have
[1705]     come after andreia, but was forgotten, and, as I fear, is not the only word
[1706]     which has been passed over. Deilia signifies that the soul is bound with a
[1707]     strong chain (desmos), for lian means strength, and therefore deilia
[1708]     expresses the greatest and strongest bond of the soul; and aporia
[1709]     (difficulty) is an evil of the same nature (from a (alpha) not, and
[1710]     poreuesthai to go), like anything else which is an impediment to motion and
[1711]     movement. Then the word kakia appears to mean kakos ienai, or going badly,
[1712]     or limping and halting; of which the consequence is, that the soul becomes
[1713]     filled with vice. And if kakia is the name of this sort of thing, arete
[1714]     will be the opposite of it, signifying in the first place ease of motion,
[1715]     then that the stream of the good soul is unimpeded, and has therefore the
[1716]     attribute of ever flowing without let or hindrance, and is therefore called
[1717]     arete, or, more correctly, aeireite (ever-flowing), and may perhaps have
[1718]     had another form, airete (eligible), indicating that nothing is more
[1719]     eligible than virtue, and this has been hammered into arete. I daresay
[1720]     that you will deem this to be another invention of mine, but I think that
[1721]     if the previous word kakia was right, then arete is also right.
[1722]     
[1723]     HERMOGENES: But what is the meaning of kakon, which has played so great a
[1724]     part in your previous discourse?
[1725]     
[1726]     SOCRATES: That is a very singular word about which I can hardly form an
[1727]     opinion, and therefore I must have recourse to my ingenious device.
[1728]     
[1729]     HERMOGENES: What device?
[1730]     
[1731]     SOCRATES: The device of a foreign origin, which I shall give to this word
[1732]     also.
[1733]     
[1734]     HERMOGENES: Very likely you are right; but suppose that we leave these
[1735]     words and endeavour to see the rationale of kalon and aischron.
[1736]     
[1737]     SOCRATES: The meaning of aischron is evident, being only aei ischon roes
[1738]     (always preventing from flowing), and this is in accordance with our former
[1739]     derivations. For the name-giver was a great enemy to stagnation of all
[1740]     sorts, and hence he gave the name aeischoroun to that which hindered the
[1741]     flux (aei ischon roun), and that is now beaten together into aischron.
[1742]     
[1743]     HERMOGENES: But what do you say of kalon?
[1744]     
[1745]     SOCRATES: That is more obscure; yet the form is only due to the quantity,
[1746]     and has been changed by altering omicron upsilon into omicron.
[1747]     
[1748]     HERMOGENES: What do you mean?
[1749]     
[1750]     SOCRATES: This name appears to denote mind.
[1751]     
[1752]     HERMOGENES: How so?
[1753]     
[1754]     SOCRATES: Let me ask you what is the cause why anything has a name; is not
[1755]     the principle which imposes the name the cause?
[1756]     
[1757]     HERMOGENES: Certainly.
[1758]     
[1759]     SOCRATES: And must not this be the mind of Gods, or of men, or of both?
[1760]     
[1761]     HERMOGENES: Yes.
[1762]     
[1763]     SOCRATES: Is not mind that which called (kalesan) things by their names,
[1764]     and is not mind the beautiful (kalon)?
[1765]     
[1766]     HERMOGENES: That is evident.
[1767]     
[1768]     SOCRATES: And are not the works of intelligence and mind worthy of praise,
[1769]     and are not other works worthy of blame?
[1770]     
[1771]     HERMOGENES: Certainly.
[1772]     
[1773]     SOCRATES: Physic does the work of a physician, and carpentering does the
[1774]     works of a carpenter?
[1775]     
[1776]     HERMOGENES: Exactly.
[1777]     
[1778]     SOCRATES: And the principle of beauty does the works of beauty?
[1779]     
[1780]     HERMOGENES: Of course.
[1781]     
[1782]     SOCRATES: And that principle we affirm to be mind?
[1783]     
[1784]     HERMOGENES: Very true.
[1785]     
[1786]     SOCRATES: Then mind is rightly called beauty because she does the works
[1787]     which we recognize and speak of as the beautiful?
[1788]     
[1789]     HERMOGENES: That is evident.
[1790]     
[1791]     SOCRATES: What more names remain to us?
[1792]     
[1793]     HERMOGENES: There are the words which are connected with agathon and
[1794]     kalon, such as sumpheron and lusiteloun, ophelimon, kerdaleon, and their
[1795]     opposites.
[1796]     
[1797]     SOCRATES: The meaning of sumpheron (expedient) I think that you may
[1798]     discover for yourself by the light of the previous examples,--for it is a
[1799]     sister word to episteme, meaning just the motion (pora) of the soul
[1800]     accompanying the world, and things which are done upon this principle are
[1801]     called sumphora or sumpheronta, because they are carried round with the
[1802]     world.
[1803]     
[1804]     HERMOGENES: That is probable.
[1805]     
[1806]     SOCRATES: Again, cherdaleon (gainful) is called from cherdos (gain), but
[1807]     you must alter the delta into nu if you want to get at the meaning; for
[1808]     this word also signifies good, but in another way; he who gave the name
[1809]     intended to express the power of admixture (kerannumenon) and universal
[1810]     penetration in the good; in forming the word, however, he inserted a delta
[1811]     instead of a nu, and so made kerdos.
[1812]     
[1813]     HERMOGENES: Well, but what is lusiteloun (profitable)?
[1814]     
[1815]     SOCRATES: I suppose, Hermogenes, that people do not mean by the profitable
[1816]     the gainful or that which pays (luei) the retailer, but they use the word
[1817]     in the sense of swift. You regard the profitable (lusiteloun), as that
[1818]     which being the swiftest thing in existence, allows of no stay in things
[1819]     and no pause or end of motion, but always, if there begins to be any end,
[1820]     lets things go again (luei), and makes motion immortal and unceasing: and
[1821]     in this point of view, as appears to me, the good is happily denominated
[1822]     lusiteloun--being that which looses (luon) the end (telos) of motion.
[1823]     Ophelimon (the advantageous) is derived from ophellein, meaning that which
[1824]     creates and increases; this latter is a common Homeric word, and has a
[1825]     foreign character.
[1826]     
[1827]     HERMOGENES: And what do you say of their opposites?
[1828]     
[1829]     SOCRATES: Of such as are mere negatives I hardly think that I need speak.
[1830]     
[1831]     HERMOGENES: Which are they?
[1832]     
[1833]     SOCRATES: The words axumphoron (inexpedient), anopheles (unprofitable),
[1834]     alusiteles (unadvantageous), akerdes (ungainful).
[1835]     
[1836]     HERMOGENES: True.
[1837]     
[1838]     SOCRATES: I would rather take the words blaberon (harmful), zemiodes
[1839]     (hurtful).
[1840]     
[1841]     HERMOGENES: Good.
[1842]     
[1843]     SOCRATES: The word blaberon is that which is said to hinder or harm
[1844]     (blaptein) the stream (roun); blapton is boulomenon aptein (seeking to hold
[1845]     or bind); for aptein is the same as dein, and dein is always a term of
[1846]     censure; boulomenon aptein roun (wanting to bind the stream) would properly
[1847]     be boulapteroun, and this, as I imagine, is improved into blaberon.
[1848]     
[1849]     HERMOGENES: You bring out curious results, Socrates, in the use of names;
[1850]     and when I hear the word boulapteroun I cannot help imagining that you are
[1851]     making your mouth into a flute, and puffing away at some prelude to Athene.
[1852]     
[1853]     SOCRATES: That is the fault of the makers of the name, Hermogenes; not
[1854]     mine.
[1855]     
[1856]     HERMOGENES: Very true; but what is the derivation of zemiodes?
[1857]     
[1858]     SOCRATES: What is the meaning of zemiodes?--let me remark, Hermogenes, how
[1859]     right I was in saying that great changes are made in the meaning of words
[1860]     by putting in and pulling out letters; even a very slight permutation will
[1861]     sometimes give an entirely opposite sense; I may instance the word deon,
[1862]     which occurs to me at the moment, and reminds me of what I was going to say
[1863]     to you, that the fine fashionable language of modern times has twisted and
[1864]     disguised and entirely altered the original meaning both of deon, and also
[1865]     of zemiodes, which in the old language is clearly indicated.
[1866]     
[1867]     HERMOGENES: What do you mean?
[1868]     
[1869]     SOCRATES: I will try to explain. You are aware that our forefathers loved
[1870]     the sounds iota and delta, especially the women, who are most conservative
[1871]     of the ancient language, but now they change iota into eta or epsilon, and
[1872]     delta into zeta; this is supposed to increase the grandeur of the sound.
[1873]     
[1874]     HERMOGENES: How do you mean?
[1875]     
[1876]     SOCRATES: For example, in very ancient times they called the day either
[1877]     imera or emera (short e), which is called by us emera (long e).
[1878]     
[1879]     HERMOGENES: That is true.
[1880]     
[1881]     SOCRATES: Do you observe that only the ancient form shows the intention of
[1882]     the giver of the name? of which the reason is, that men long for
[1883]     (imeirousi) and love the light which comes after the darkness, and is
[1884]     therefore called imera, from imeros, desire.
[1885]     
[1886]     HERMOGENES: Clearly.
[1887]     
[1888]     SOCRATES: But now the name is so travestied that you cannot tell the
[1889]     meaning, although there are some who imagine the day to be called emera
[1890]     because it makes things gentle (emera different accents).
[1891]     
[1892]     HERMOGENES: Such is my view.
[1893]     
[1894]     SOCRATES: And do you know that the ancients said duogon and not zugon?
[1895]     
[1896]     HERMOGENES: They did so.
[1897]     
[1898]     SOCRATES: And zugon (yoke) has no meaning,--it ought to be duogon, which
[1899]     word expresses the binding of two together (duein agoge) for the purpose of
[1900]     drawing;--this has been changed into zugon, and there are many other
[1901]     examples of similar changes.
[1902]     
[1903]     HERMOGENES: There are.
[1904]     
[1905]     SOCRATES: Proceeding in the same train of thought I may remark that the
[1906]     word deon (obligation) has a meaning which is the opposite of all the other
[1907]     appellations of good; for deon is here a species of good, and is,
[1908]     nevertheless, the chain (desmos) or hinderer of motion, and therefore own
[1909]     brother of blaberon.
[1910]     
[1911]     HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates; that is quite plain.
[1912]     
[1913]     SOCRATES: Not if you restore the ancient form, which is more likely to be
[1914]     the correct one, and read dion instead of deon; if you convert the epsilon
[1915]     into an iota after the old fashion, this word will then agree with other
[1916]     words meaning good; for dion, not deon, signifies the good, and is a term
[1917]     of praise; and the author of names has not contradicted himself, but in all
[1918]     these various appellations, deon (obligatory), ophelimon (advantageous),
[1919]     lusiteloun (profitable), kerdaleon (gainful), agathon (good), sumpheron
[1920]     (expedient), euporon (plenteous), the same conception is implied of the
[1921]     ordering or all-pervading principle which is praised, and the restraining
[1922]     and binding principle which is censured. And this is further illustrated
[1923]     by the word zemiodes (hurtful), which if the zeta is only changed into
[1924]     delta as in the ancient language, becomes demiodes; and this name, as you
[1925]     will perceive, is given to that which binds motion (dounti ion).
[1926]     
[1927]     HERMOGENES: What do you say of edone (pleasure), lupe (pain), epithumia
[1928]     (desire), and the like, Socrates?
[1929]     
[1930]     SOCRATES: I do not think, Hermogenes, that there is any great difficulty
[1931]     about them--edone is e (eta) onesis, the action which tends to advantage;
[1932]     and the original form may be supposed to have been eone, but this has been
[1933]     altered by the insertion of the delta. Lupe appears to be derived from the
[1934]     relaxation (luein) which the body feels when in sorrow; ania (trouble) is
[1935]     the hindrance of motion (alpha and ienai); algedon (distress), if I am not
[1936]     mistaken, is a foreign word, which is derived from aleinos (grievous);
[1937]     odune (grief) is called from the putting on (endusis) sorrow; in achthedon
[1938]     (vexation) 'the word too labours,' as any one may see; chara (joy) is the
[1939]     very expression of the fluency and diffusion of the soul (cheo); terpsis
[1940]     (delight) is so called from the pleasure creeping (erpon) through the soul,
[1941]     which may be likened to a breath (pnoe) and is properly erpnoun, but has
[1942]     been altered by time into terpnon; eupherosune (cheerfulness) and epithumia
[1943]     explain themselves; the former, which ought to be eupherosune and has been
[1944]     changed euphrosune, is named, as every one may see, from the soul moving
[1945]     (pheresthai) in harmony with nature; epithumia is really e epi ton thumon
[1946]     iousa dunamis, the power which enters into the soul; thumos (passion) is
[1947]     called from the rushing (thuseos) and boiling of the soul; imeros (desire)
[1948]     denotes the stream (rous) which most draws the soul dia ten esin tes roes--
[1949]     because flowing with desire (iemenos), and expresses a longing after things
[1950]     and violent attraction of the soul to them, and is termed imeros from
[1951]     possessing this power; pothos (longing) is expressive of the desire of that
[1952]     which is not present but absent, and in another place (pou); this is the
[1953]     reason why the name pothos is applied to things absent, as imeros is to
[1954]     things present; eros (love) is so called because flowing in (esron) from
[1955]     without; the stream is not inherent, but is an influence introduced through
[1956]     the eyes, and from flowing in was called esros (influx) in the old time
[1957]     when they used omicron for omega, and is called eros, now that omega is
[1958]     substituted for omicron. But why do you not give me another word?
[1959]     
[1960]     HERMOGENES: What do you think of doxa (opinion), and that class of words?
[1961]     
[1962]     SOCRATES: Doxa is either derived from dioxis (pursuit), and expresses the
[1963]     march of the soul in the pursuit of knowledge, or from the shooting of a
[1964]     bow (toxon); the latter is more likely, and is confirmed by oiesis
[1965]     (thinking), which is only oisis (moving), and implies the movement of the
[1966]     soul to the essential nature of each thing--just as boule (counsel) has to
[1967]     do with shooting (bole); and boulesthai (to wish) combines the notion of
[1968]     aiming and deliberating--all these words seem to follow doxa, and all
[1969]     involve the idea of shooting, just as aboulia, absence of counsel, on the
[1970]     other hand, is a mishap, or missing, or mistaking of the mark, or aim, or
[1971]     proposal, or object.
[1972]     
[1973]     HERMOGENES: You are quickening your pace now, Socrates.
[1974]     
[1975]     SOCRATES: Why yes, the end I now dedicate to God, not, however, until I
[1976]     have explained anagke (necessity), which ought to come next, and ekousion
[1977]     (the voluntary). Ekousion is certainly the yielding (eikon) and
[1978]     unresisting--the notion implied is yielding and not opposing, yielding, as
[1979]     I was just now saying, to that motion which is in accordance with our will;
[1980]     but the necessary and resistant being contrary to our will, implies error
[1981]     and ignorance; the idea is taken from walking through a ravine which is
[1982]     impassable, and rugged, and overgrown, and impedes motion--and this is the
[1983]     derivation of the word anagkaion (necessary) an agke ion, going through a
[1984]     ravine. But while my strength lasts let us persevere, and I hope that you
[1985]     will persevere with your questions.
[1986]     
[1987]     HERMOGENES: Well, then, let me ask about the greatest and noblest, such as
[1988]     aletheia (truth) and pseudos (falsehood) and on (being), not forgetting to
[1989]     enquire why the word onoma (name), which is the theme of our discussion,
[1990]     has this name of onoma.
[1991]     
[1992]     SOCRATES: You know the word maiesthai (to seek)?
[1993]     
[1994]     HERMOGENES: Yes;--meaning the same as zetein (to enquire).
[1995]     
[1996]     SOCRATES: The word onoma seems to be a compressed sentence, signifying on
[1997]     ou zetema (being for which there is a search); as is still more obvious in
[1998]     onomaston (notable), which states in so many words that real existence is
[1999]     that for which there is a seeking (on ou masma); aletheia is also an
[2000]     agglomeration of theia ale (divine wandering), implying the divine motion
[2001]     of existence; pseudos (falsehood) is the opposite of motion; here is
[2002]     another ill name given by the legislator to stagnation and forced inaction,
[2003]     which he compares to sleep (eudein); but the original meaning of the word
[2004]     is disguised by the addition of psi; on and ousia are ion with an iota
[2005]     broken off; this agrees with the true principle, for being (on) is also
[2006]     moving (ion), and the same may be said of not being, which is likewise
[2007]     called not going (oukion or ouki on = ouk ion).
[2008]     
[2009]     HERMOGENES: You have hammered away at them manfully; but suppose that some
[2010]     one were to say to you, what is the word ion, and what are reon and doun?--
[2011]     show me their fitness.
[2012]     
[2013]     SOCRATES: You mean to say, how should I answer him?
[2014]     
[2015]     HERMOGENES: Yes.
[2016]     
[2017]     SOCRATES: One way of giving the appearance of an answer has been already
[2018]     suggested.
[2019]     
[2020]     HERMOGENES: What way?
[2021]     
[2022]     SOCRATES: To say that names which we do not understand are of foreign
[2023]     origin; and this is very likely the right answer, and something of this
[2024]     kind may be true of them; but also the original forms of words may have
[2025]     been lost in the lapse of ages; names have been so twisted in all manner of
[2026]     ways, that I should not be surprised if the old language when compared with
[2027]     that now in use would appear to us to be a barbarous tongue.
[2028]     
[2029]     HERMOGENES: Very likely.
[2030]     
[2031]     SOCRATES: Yes, very likely. But still the enquiry demands our earnest
[2032]     attention and we must not flinch. For we should remember, that if a person
[2033]     go on analysing names into words, and enquiring also into the elements out
[2034]     of which the words are formed, and keeps on always repeating this process,
[2035]     he who has to answer him must at last give up the enquiry in despair.
[2036]     
[2037]     HERMOGENES: Very true.
[2038]     
[2039]     SOCRATES: And at what point ought he to lose heart and give up the
[2040]     enquiry? Must he not stop when he comes to the names which are the
[2041]     elements of all other names and sentences; for these cannot be supposed to
[2042]     be made up of other names? The word agathon (good), for example, is, as we
[2043]     were saying, a compound of agastos (admirable) and thoos (swift). And
[2044]     probably thoos is made up of other elements, and these again of others.
[2045]     But if we take a word which is incapable of further resolution, then we
[2046]     shall be right in saying that we have at last reached a primary element,
[2047]     which need not be resolved any further.
[2048]     
[2049]     HERMOGENES: I believe you to be in the right.
[2050]     
[2051]     SOCRATES: And suppose the names about which you are now asking should turn
[2052]     out to be primary elements, must not their truth or law be examined
[2053]     according to some new method?
[2054]     
[2055]     HERMOGENES: Very likely.
[2056]     
[2057]     SOCRATES: Quite so, Hermogenes; all that has preceded would lead to this
[2058]     conclusion. And if, as I think, the conclusion is true, then I shall again
[2059]     say to you, come and help me, that I may not fall into some absurdity in
[2060]     stating the principle of primary names.
[2061]     
[2062]     HERMOGENES: Let me hear, and I will do my best to assist you.
[2063]     
[2064]     SOCRATES: I think that you will acknowledge with me, that one principle is
[2065]     applicable to all names, primary as well as secondary--when they are
[2066]     regarded simply as names, there is no difference in them.
[2067]     
[2068]     HERMOGENES: Certainly not.
[2069]     
[2070]     SOCRATES: All the names that we have been explaining were intended to
[2071]     indicate the nature of things.
[2072]     
[2073]     HERMOGENES: Of course.
[2074]     
[2075]     SOCRATES: And that this is true of the primary quite as much as of the
[2076]     secondary names, is implied in their being names.
[2077]     
[2078]     HERMOGENES: Surely.
[2079]     
[2080]     SOCRATES: But the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance from
[2081]     the primary.
[2082]     
[2083]     HERMOGENES: That is evident.
[2084]     
[2085]     SOCRATES: Very good; but then how do the primary names which precede
[2086]     analysis show the natures of things, as far as they can be shown; which
[2087]     they must do, if they are to be real names? And here I will ask you a
[2088]     question: Suppose that we had no voice or tongue, and wanted to
[2089]     communicate with one another, should we not, like the deaf and dumb, make
[2090]     signs with the hands and head and the rest of the body?
[2091]     
[2092]     HERMOGENES: There would be no choice, Socrates.
[2093]     
[2094]     SOCRATES: We should imitate the nature of the thing; the elevation of our
[2095]     hands to heaven would mean lightness and upwardness; heaviness and
[2096]     downwardness would be expressed by letting them drop to the ground; if we
[2097]     were describing the running of a horse, or any other animal, we should make
[2098]     our bodies and their gestures as like as we could to them.
[2099]     
[2100]     HERMOGENES: I do not see that we could do anything else.
[2101]     
[2102]     SOCRATES: We could not; for by bodily imitation only can the body ever
[2103]     express anything.
[2104]     
[2105]     HERMOGENES: Very true.
[2106]     
[2107]     SOCRATES: And when we want to express ourselves, either with the voice, or
[2108]     tongue, or mouth, the expression is simply their imitation of that which we
[2109]     want to express.
[2110]     
[2111]     HERMOGENES: It must be so, I think.
[2112]     
[2113]     SOCRATES: Then a name is a vocal imitation of that which the vocal
[2114]     imitator names or imitates?
[2115]     
[2116]     HERMOGENES: I think so.
[2117]     
[2118]     SOCRATES: Nay, my friend, I am disposed to think that we have not reached
[2119]     the truth as yet.
[2120]     
[2121]     HERMOGENES: Why not?
[2122]     
[2123]     SOCRATES: Because if we have we shall be obliged to admit that the people
[2124]     who imitate sheep, or cocks, or other animals, name that which they
[2125]     imitate.
[2126]     
[2127]     HERMOGENES: Quite true.
[2128]     
[2129]     SOCRATES: Then could I have been right in what I was saying?
[2130]     
[2131]     HERMOGENES: In my opinion, no. But I wish that you would tell me,
[2132]     Socrates, what sort of an imitation is a name?
[2133]     
[2134]     SOCRATES: In the first place, I should reply, not a musical imitation,
[2135]     although that is also vocal; nor, again, an imitation of what music
[2136]     imitates; these, in my judgment, would not be naming. Let me put the
[2137]     matter as follows: All objects have sound and figure, and many have
[2138]     colour?
[2139]     
[2140]     HERMOGENES: Certainly.
[2141]     
[2142]     SOCRATES: But the art of naming appears not to be concerned with
[2143]     imitations of this kind; the arts which have to do with them are music and
[2144]     drawing?
[2145]     
[2146]     HERMOGENES: True.
[2147]     
[2148]     SOCRATES: Again, is there not an essence of each thing, just as there is a
[2149]     colour, or sound? And is there not an essence of colour and sound as well
[2150]     as of anything else which may be said to have an essence?
[2151]     
[2152]     HERMOGENES: I should think so.
[2153]     
[2154]     SOCRATES: Well, and if any one could express the essence of each thing in
[2155]     letters and syllables, would he not express the nature of each thing?
[2156]     
[2157]     HERMOGENES: Quite so.
[2158]     
[2159]     SOCRATES: The musician and the painter were the two names which you gave
[2160]     to the two other imitators. What will this imitator be called?
[2161]     
[2162]     HERMOGENES: I imagine, Socrates, that he must be the namer, or name-giver,
[2163]     of whom we are in search.
[2164]     
[2165]     SOCRATES: If this is true, then I think that we are in a condition to
[2166]     consider the names ron (stream), ienai (to go), schesis (retention), about
[2167]     which you were asking; and we may see whether the namer has grasped the
[2168]     nature of them in letters and syllables in such a manner as to imitate the
[2169]     essence or not.
[2170]     
[2171]     HERMOGENES: Very good.
[2172]     
[2173]     SOCRATES: But are these the only primary names, or are there others?
[2174]     
[2175]     HERMOGENES: There must be others.
[2176]     
[2177]     SOCRATES: So I should expect. But how shall we further analyse them, and
[2178]     where does the imitator begin? Imitation of the essence is made by
[2179]     syllables and letters; ought we not, therefore, first to separate the
[2180]     letters, just as those who are beginning rhythm first distinguish the
[2181]     powers of elementary, and then of compound sounds, and when they have done
[2182]     so, but not before, they proceed to the consideration of rhythms?
[2183]     
[2184]     HERMOGENES: Yes.
[2185]     
[2186]     SOCRATES: Must we not begin in the same way with letters; first separating
[2187]     the vowels, and then the consonants and mutes (letters which are neither
[2188]     vowels nor semivowels), into classes, according to the received
[2189]     distinctions of the learned; also the semivowels, which are neither vowels,
[2190]     nor yet mutes; and distinguishing into classes the vowels themselves? And
[2191]     when we have perfected the classification of things, we shall give them
[2192]     names, and see whether, as in the case of letters, there are any classes to
[2193]     which they may be all referred (cf. Phaedrus); and hence we shall see their
[2194]     natures, and see, too, whether they have in them classes as there are in
[2195]     the letters; and when we have well considered all this, we shall know how
[2196]     to apply them to what they resemble--whether one letter is used to denote
[2197]     one thing, or whether there is to be an admixture of several of them; just,
[2198]     as in painting, the painter who wants to depict anything sometimes uses
[2199]     purple only, or any other colour, and sometimes mixes up several colours,
[2200]     as his method is when he has to paint flesh colour or anything of that
[2201]     kind--he uses his colours as his figures appear to require them; and so,
[2202]     too, we shall apply letters to the expression of objects, either single
[2203]     letters when required, or several letters; and so we shall form syllables,
[2204]     as they are called, and from syllables make nouns and verbs; and thus, at
[2205]     last, from the combinations of nouns and verbs arrive at language, large
[2206]     and fair and whole; and as the painter made a figure, even so shall we make
[2207]     speech by the art of the namer or the rhetorician, or by some other art.
[2208]     Not that I am literally speaking of ourselves, but I was carried away--
[2209]     meaning to say that this was the way in which (not we but) the ancients
[2210]     formed language, and what they put together we must take to pieces in like
[2211]     manner, if we are to attain a scientific view of the whole subject, and we
[2212]     must see whether the primary, and also whether the secondary elements are
[2213]     rightly given or not, for if they are not, the composition of them, my dear
[2214]     Hermogenes, will be a sorry piece of work, and in the wrong direction.
[2215]     
[2216]     HERMOGENES: That, Socrates, I can quite believe.
[2217]     
[2218]     SOCRATES: Well, but do you suppose that you will be able to analyse them
[2219]     in this way? for I am certain that I should not.
[2220]     
[2221]     HERMOGENES: Much less am I likely to be able.
[2222]     
[2223]     SOCRATES: Shall we leave them, then? or shall we seek to discover, if we
[2224]     can, something about them, according to the measure of our ability, saying
[2225]     by way of preface, as I said before of the Gods, that of the truth about
[2226]     them we know nothing, and do but entertain human notions of them. And in
[2227]     this present enquiry, let us say to ourselves, before we proceed, that the
[2228]     higher method is the one which we or others who would analyse language to
[2229]     any good purpose must follow; but under the circumstances, as men say, we
[2230]     must do as well as we can. What do you think?
[2231]     
[2232]     HERMOGENES: I very much approve.
[2233]     
[2234]     SOCRATES: That objects should be imitated in letters and syllables, and so
[2235]     find expression, may appear ridiculous, Hermogenes, but it cannot be
[2236]     avoided--there is no better principle to which we can look for the truth of
[2237]     first names. Deprived of this, we must have recourse to divine help, like
[2238]     the tragic poets, who in any perplexity have their gods waiting in the air;
[2239]     and must get out of our difficulty in like fashion, by saying that 'the
[2240]     Gods gave the first names, and therefore they are right.' This will be the
[2241]     best contrivance, or perhaps that other notion may be even better still, of
[2242]     deriving them from some barbarous people, for the barbarians are older than
[2243]     we are; or we may say that antiquity has cast a veil over them, which is
[2244]     the same sort of excuse as the last; for all these are not reasons but only
[2245]     ingenious excuses for having no reasons concerning the truth of words. And
[2246]     yet any sort of ignorance of first or primitive names involves an ignorance
[2247]     of secondary words; for they can only be explained by the primary. Clearly
[2248]     then the professor of languages should be able to give a very lucid
[2249]     explanation of first names, or let him be assured he will only talk
[2250]     nonsense about the rest. Do you not suppose this to be true?
[2251]     
[2252]     HERMOGENES: Certainly, Socrates.
[2253]     
[2254]     SOCRATES: My first notions of original names are truly wild and
[2255]     ridiculous, though I have no objection to impart them to you if you desire,
[2256]     and I hope that you will communicate to me in return anything better which
[2257]     you may have.
[2258]     
[2259]     HERMOGENES: Fear not; I will do my best.
[2260]     
[2261]     SOCRATES: In the first place, the letter rho appears to me to be the
[2262]     general instrument expressing all motion (kinesis). But I have not yet
[2263]     explained the meaning of this latter word, which is just iesis (going); for
[2264]     the letter eta was not in use among the ancients, who only employed
[2265]     epsilon; and the root is kiein, which is a foreign form, the same as ienai.
[2266]     And the old word kinesis will be correctly given as iesis in corresponding
[2267]     modern letters. Assuming this foreign root kiein, and allowing for the
[2268]     change of the eta and the insertion of the nu, we have kinesis, which
[2269]     should have been kieinsis or eisis; and stasis is the negative of ienai (or
[2270]     eisis), and has been improved into stasis. Now the letter rho, as I was
[2271]     saying, appeared to the imposer of names an excellent instrument for the
[2272]     expression of motion; and he frequently uses the letter for this purpose:
[2273]     for example, in the actual words rein and roe he represents motion by rho;
[2274]     also in the words tromos (trembling), trachus (rugged); and again, in words
[2275]     such as krouein (strike), thrauein (crush), ereikein (bruise), thruptein
[2276]     (break), kermatixein (crumble), rumbein (whirl): of all these sorts of
[2277]     movements he generally finds an expression in the letter R, because, as I
[2278]     imagine, he had observed that the tongue was most agitated and least at
[2279]     rest in the pronunciation of this letter, which he therefore used in order
[2280]     to express motion, just as by the letter iota he expresses the subtle
[2281]     elements which pass through all things. This is why he uses the letter
[2282]     iota as imitative of motion, ienai, iesthai. And there is another class of
[2283]     letters, phi, psi, sigma, and xi, of which the pronunciation is accompanied
[2284]     by great expenditure of breath; these are used in the imitation of such
[2285]     notions as psuchron (shivering), xeon (seething), seiesthai, (to be
[2286]     shaken), seismos (shock), and are always introduced by the giver of names
[2287]     when he wants to imitate what is phusodes (windy). He seems to have
[2288]     thought that the closing and pressure of the tongue in the utterance of
[2289]     delta and tau was expressive of binding and rest in a place: he further
[2290]     observed the liquid movement of lambda, in the pronunciation of which the
[2291]     tongue slips, and in this he found the expression of smoothness, as in
[2292]     leios (level), and in the word oliothanein (to slip) itself, liparon
[2293]     (sleek), in the word kollodes (gluey), and the like: the heavier sound of
[2294]     gamma detained the slipping tongue, and the union of the two gave the
[2295]     notion of a glutinous clammy nature, as in glischros, glukus, gloiodes.
[2296]     The nu he observed to be sounded from within, and therefore to have a
[2297]     notion of inwardness; hence he introduced the sound in endos and entos:
[2298]     alpha he assigned to the expression of size, and nu of length, because they
[2299]     are great letters: omicron was the sign of roundness, and therefore there
[2300]     is plenty of omicron mixed up in the word goggulon (round). Thus did the
[2301]     legislator, reducing all things into letters and syllables, and impressing
[2302]     on them names and signs, and out of them by imitation compounding other
[2303]     signs. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the truth of names; but I should
[2304]     like to hear what Cratylus has more to say.
[2305]     
[2306]     HERMOGENES: But, Socrates, as I was telling you before, Cratylus mystifies
[2307]     me; he says that there is a fitness of names, but he never explains what is
[2308]     this fitness, so that I cannot tell whether his obscurity is intended or
[2309]     not. Tell me now, Cratylus, here in the presence of Socrates, do you agree
[2310]     in what Socrates has been saying about names, or have you something better
[2311]     of your own? and if you have, tell me what your view is, and then you will
[2312]     either learn of Socrates, or Socrates and I will learn of you.
[2313]     
[2314]     CRATYLUS: Well, but surely, Hermogenes, you do not suppose that you can
[2315]     learn, or I explain, any subject of importance all in a moment; at any
[2316]     rate, not such a subject as language, which is, perhaps, the very greatest
[2317]     of all.
[2318]     
[2319]     HERMOGENES: No, indeed; but, as Hesiod says, and I agree with him, 'to add
[2320]     little to little' is worth while. And, therefore, if you think that you
[2321]     can add anything at all, however small, to our knowledge, take a little
[2322]     trouble and oblige Socrates, and me too, who certainly have a claim upon
[2323]     you.
[2324]     
[2325]     SOCRATES: I am by no means positive, Cratylus, in the view which
[2326]     Hermogenes and myself have worked out; and therefore do not hesitate to say
[2327]     what you think, which if it be better than my own view I shall gladly
[2328]     accept. And I should not be at all surprized to find that you have found
[2329]     some better notion. For you have evidently reflected on these matters and
[2330]     have had teachers, and if you have really a better theory of the truth of
[2331]     names, you may count me in the number of your disciples.
[2332]     
[2333]     CRATYLUS: You are right, Socrates, in saying that I have made a study of
[2334]     these matters, and I might possibly convert you into a disciple. But I
[2335]     fear that the opposite is more probable, and I already find myself moved to
[2336]     say to you what Achilles in the 'Prayers' says to Ajax,--
[2337]     
[2338]     'Illustrious Ajax, son of Telamon, lord of the people,
[2339]     You appear to have spoken in all things much to my mind.'
[2340]     
[2341]     And you, Socrates, appear to me to be an oracle, and to give answers much
[2342]     to my mind, whether you are inspired by Euthyphro, or whether some Muse may
[2343]     have long been an inhabitant of your breast, unconsciously to yourself.
[2344]     
[2345]     SOCRATES: Excellent Cratylus, I have long been wondering at my own wisdom;
[2346]     I cannot trust myself. And I think that I ought to stop and ask myself
[2347]     What am I saying? for there is nothing worse than self-deception--when the
[2348]     deceiver is always at home and always with you--it is quite terrible, and
[2349]     therefore I ought often to retrace my steps and endeavour to 'look fore and
[2350]     aft,' in the words of the aforesaid Homer. And now let me see; where are
[2351]     we? Have we not been saying that the correct name indicates the nature of
[2352]     the thing:--has this proposition been sufficiently proven?
[2353]     
[2354]     CRATYLUS: Yes, Socrates, what you say, as I am disposed to think, is quite
[2355]     true.
[2356]     
[2357]     SOCRATES: Names, then, are given in order to instruct?
[2358]     
[2359]     CRATYLUS: Certainly.
[2360]     
[2361]     SOCRATES: And naming is an art, and has artificers?
[2362]     
[2363]     CRATYLUS: Yes.
[2364]     
[2365]     SOCRATES: And who are they?
[2366]     
[2367]     CRATYLUS: The legislators, of whom you spoke at first.
[2368]     
[2369]     SOCRATES: And does this art grow up among men like other arts? Let me
[2370]     explain what I mean: of painters, some are better and some worse?
[2371]     
[2372]     CRATYLUS: Yes.
[2373]     
[2374]     SOCRATES: The better painters execute their works, I mean their figures,
[2375]     better, and the worse execute them worse; and of builders also, the better
[2376]     sort build fairer houses, and the worse build them worse.
[2377]     
[2378]     CRATYLUS: True.
[2379]     
[2380]     SOCRATES: And among legislators, there are some who do their work better
[2381]     and some worse?
[2382]     
[2383]     CRATYLUS: No; there I do not agree with you.
[2384]     
[2385]     SOCRATES: Then you do not think that some laws are better and others
[2386]     worse?
[2387]     
[2388]     CRATYLUS: No, indeed.
[2389]     
[2390]     SOCRATES: Or that one name is better than another?
[2391]     
[2392]     CRATYLUS: Certainly not.
[2393]     
[2394]     SOCRATES: Then all names are rightly imposed?
[2395]     
[2396]     CRATYLUS: Yes, if they are names at all.
[2397]     
[2398]     SOCRATES: Well, what do you say to the name of our friend Hermogenes,
[2399]     which was mentioned before:--assuming that he has nothing of the nature of
[2400]     Hermes in him, shall we say that this is a wrong name, or not his name at
[2401]     all?
[2402]     
[2403]     CRATYLUS: I should reply that Hermogenes is not his name at all, but only
[2404]     appears to be his, and is really the name of somebody else, who has the
[2405]     nature which corresponds to it.
[2406]     
[2407]     SOCRATES: And if a man were to call him Hermogenes, would he not be even
[2408]     speaking falsely? For there may be a doubt whether you can call him
[2409]     Hermogenes, if he is not.
[2410]     
[2411]     CRATYLUS: What do you mean?
[2412]     
[2413]     SOCRATES: Are you maintaining that falsehood is impossible? For if this
[2414]     is your meaning I should answer, that there have been plenty of liars in
[2415]     all ages.
[2416]     
[2417]     CRATYLUS: Why, Socrates, how can a man say that which is not?--say
[2418]     something and yet say nothing? For is not falsehood saying the thing which
[2419]     is not?
[2420]     
[2421]     SOCRATES: Your argument, friend, is too subtle for a man of my age. But I
[2422]     should like