Crito
by
Plato
Crito
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[2] PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Crito.
[3]
[4] SCENE: The Prison of Socrates.
[5]
[6]
[7] SOCRATES: Why have you come at this hour, Crito? it must be quite early.
[8]
[9] CRITO: Yes, certainly.
[10]
[11] SOCRATES: What is the exact time?
[12]
[13] CRITO: The dawn is breaking.
[14]
[15] SOCRATES: I wonder that the keeper of the prison would let you in.
[16]
[17] CRITO: He knows me because I often come, Socrates; moreover. I have done
[18] him a kindness.
[19]
[20] SOCRATES: And are you only just arrived?
[21]
[22] CRITO: No, I came some time ago.
[23]
[24] SOCRATES: Then why did you sit and say nothing, instead of at once
[25] awakening me?
[26]
[27] CRITO: I should not have liked myself, Socrates, to be in such great
[28] trouble and unrest as you are--indeed I should not: I have been watching
[29] with amazement your peaceful slumbers; and for that reason I did not awake
[30] you, because I wished to minimize the pain. I have always thought you to
[31] be of a happy disposition; but never did I see anything like the easy,
[32] tranquil manner in which you bear this calamity.
[33]
[34] SOCRATES: Why, Crito, when a man has reached my age he ought not to be
[35] repining at the approach of death.
[36]
[37] CRITO: And yet other old men find themselves in similar misfortunes, and
[38] age does not prevent them from repining.
[39]
[40] SOCRATES: That is true. But you have not told me why you come at this
[41] early hour.
[42]
[43] CRITO: I come to bring you a message which is sad and painful; not, as I
[44] believe, to yourself, but to all of us who are your friends, and saddest of
[45] all to me.
[46]
[47] SOCRATES: What? Has the ship come from Delos, on the arrival of which I
[48] am to die?
[49]
[50] CRITO: No, the ship has not actually arrived, but she will probably be
[51] here to-day, as persons who have come from Sunium tell me that they have
[52] left her there; and therefore to-morrow, Socrates, will be the last day of
[53] your life.
[54]
[55] SOCRATES: Very well, Crito; if such is the will of God, I am willing; but
[56] my belief is that there will be a delay of a day.
[57]
[58] CRITO: Why do you think so?
[59]
[60] SOCRATES: I will tell you. I am to die on the day after the arrival of
[61] the ship?
[62]
[63] CRITO: Yes; that is what the authorities say.
[64]
[65] SOCRATES: But I do not think that the ship will be here until to-morrow;
[66] this I infer from a vision which I had last night, or rather only just now,
[67] when you fortunately allowed me to sleep.
[68]
[69] CRITO: And what was the nature of the vision?
[70]
[71] SOCRATES: There appeared to me the likeness of a woman, fair and comely,
[72] clothed in bright raiment, who called to me and said: O Socrates,
[73]
[74] 'The third day hence to fertile Phthia shalt thou go.' (Homer, Il.)
[75]
[76] CRITO: What a singular dream, Socrates!
[77]
[78] SOCRATES: There can be no doubt about the meaning, Crito, I think.
[79]
[80] CRITO: Yes; the meaning is only too clear. But, oh! my beloved Socrates,
[81] let me entreat you once more to take my advice and escape. For if you die
[82] I shall not only lose a friend who can never be replaced, but there is
[83] another evil: people who do not know you and me will believe that I might
[84] have saved you if I had been willing to give money, but that I did not
[85] care. Now, can there be a worse disgrace than this--that I should be
[86] thought to value money more than the life of a friend? For the many will
[87] not be persuaded that I wanted you to escape, and that you refused.
[88]
[89] SOCRATES: But why, my dear Crito, should we care about the opinion of the
[90] many? Good men, and they are the only persons who are worth considering,
[91] will think of these things truly as they occurred.
[92]
[93] CRITO: But you see, Socrates, that the opinion of the many must be
[94] regarded, for what is now happening shows that they can do the greatest
[95] evil to any one who has lost their good opinion.
[96]
[97] SOCRATES: I only wish it were so, Crito; and that the many could do the
[98] greatest evil; for then they would also be able to do the greatest good--
[99] and what a fine thing this would be! But in reality they can do neither;
[100] for they cannot make a man either wise or foolish; and whatever they do is
[101] the result of chance.
[102]
[103] CRITO: Well, I will not dispute with you; but please to tell me, Socrates,
[104] whether you are not acting out of regard to me and your other friends: are
[105] you not afraid that if you escape from prison we may get into trouble with
[106] the informers for having stolen you away, and lose either the whole or a
[107] great part of our property; or that even a worse evil may happen to us?
[108] Now, if you fear on our account, be at ease; for in order to save you, we
[109] ought surely to run this, or even a greater risk; be persuaded, then, and
[110] do as I say.
[111]
[112] SOCRATES: Yes, Crito, that is one fear which you mention, but by no means
[113] the only one.
[114]
[115] CRITO: Fear not--there are persons who are willing to get you out of
[116] prison at no great cost; and as for the informers they are far from being
[117] exorbitant in their demands--a little money will satisfy them. My means,
[118] which are certainly ample, are at your service, and if you have a scruple
[119] about spending all mine, here are strangers who will give you the use of
[120] theirs; and one of them, Simmias the Theban, has brought a large sum of
[121] money for this very purpose; and Cebes and many others are prepared to
[122] spend their money in helping you to escape. I say, therefore, do not
[123] hesitate on our account, and do not say, as you did in the court (compare
[124] Apol.), that you will have a difficulty in knowing what to do with yourself
[125] anywhere else. For men will love you in other places to which you may go,
[126] and not in Athens only; there are friends of mine in Thessaly, if you like
[127] to go to them, who will value and protect you, and no Thessalian will give
[128] you any trouble. Nor can I think that you are at all justified, Socrates,
[129] in betraying your own life when you might be saved; in acting thus you are
[130] playing into the hands of your enemies, who are hurrying on your
[131] destruction. And further I should say that you are deserting your own
[132] children; for you might bring them up and educate them; instead of which
[133] you go away and leave them, and they will have to take their chance; and if
[134] they do not meet with the usual fate of orphans, there will be small thanks
[135] to you. No man should bring children into the world who is unwilling to
[136] persevere to the end in their nurture and education. But you appear to be
[137] choosing the easier part, not the better and manlier, which would have been
[138] more becoming in one who professes to care for virtue in all his actions,
[139] like yourself. And indeed, I am ashamed not only of you, but of us who are
[140] your friends, when I reflect that the whole business will be attributed
[141] entirely to our want of courage. The trial need never have come on, or
[142] might have been managed differently; and this last act, or crowning folly,
[143] will seem to have occurred through our negligence and cowardice, who might
[144] have saved you, if we had been good for anything; and you might have saved
[145] yourself, for there was no difficulty at all. See now, Socrates, how sad
[146] and discreditable are the consequences, both to us and you. Make up your
[147] mind then, or rather have your mind already made up, for the time of
[148] deliberation is over, and there is only one thing to be done, which must be
[149] done this very night, and if we delay at all will be no longer practicable
[150] or possible; I beseech you therefore, Socrates, be persuaded by me, and do
[151] as I say.
[152]
[153] SOCRATES: Dear Crito, your zeal is invaluable, if a right one; but if
[154] wrong, the greater the zeal the greater the danger; and therefore we ought
[155] to consider whether I shall or shall not do as you say. For I am and
[156] always have been one of those natures who must be guided by reason,
[157] whatever the reason may be which upon reflection appears to me to be the
[158] best; and now that this chance has befallen me, I cannot repudiate my own
[159] words: the principles which I have hitherto honoured and revered I still
[160] honour, and unless we can at once find other and better principles, I am
[161] certain not to agree with you; no, not even if the power of the multitude
[162] could inflict many more imprisonments, confiscations, deaths, frightening
[163] us like children with hobgoblin terrors (compare Apol.). What will be the
[164] fairest way of considering the question? Shall I return to your old
[165] argument about the opinions of men?--we were saying that some of them are
[166] to be regarded, and others not. Now were we right in maintaining this
[167] before I was condemned? And has the argument which was once good now
[168] proved to be talk for the sake of talking--mere childish nonsense? That is
[169] what I want to consider with your help, Crito:--whether, under my present
[170] circumstances, the argument appears to be in any way different or not; and
[171] is to be allowed by me or disallowed. That argument, which, as I believe,
[172] is maintained by many persons of authority, was to the effect, as I was
[173] saying, that the opinions of some men are to be regarded, and of other men
[174] not to be regarded. Now you, Crito, are not going to die to-morrow--at
[175] least, there is no human probability of this, and therefore you are
[176] disinterested and not liable to be deceived by the circumstances in which
[177] you are placed. Tell me then, whether I am right in saying that some
[178] opinions, and the opinions of some men only, are to be valued, and that
[179] other opinions, and the opinions of other men, are not to be valued. I ask
[180] you whether I was right in maintaining this?
[181]
[182] CRITO: Certainly.
[183]
[184] SOCRATES: The good are to be regarded, and not the bad?
[185]
[186] CRITO: Yes.
[187]
[188] SOCRATES: And the opinions of the wise are good, and the opinions of the
[189] unwise are evil?
[190]
[191] CRITO: Certainly.
[192]
[193] SOCRATES: And what was said about another matter? Is the pupil who
[194] devotes himself to the practice of gymnastics supposed to attend to the
[195] praise and blame and opinion of every man, or of one man only--his
[196] physician or trainer, whoever he may be?
[197]
[198] CRITO: Of one man only.
[199]
[200] SOCRATES: And he ought to fear the censure and welcome the praise of that
[201] one only, and not of the many?
[202]
[203] CRITO: Clearly so.
[204]
[205] SOCRATES: And he ought to act and train, and eat and drink in the way
[206] which seems good to his single master who has understanding, rather than
[207] according to the opinion of all other men put together?
[208]
[209] CRITO: True.
[210]
[211] SOCRATES: And if he disobeys and disregards the opinion and approval of
[212] the one, and regards the opinion of the many who have no understanding,
[213] will he not suffer evil?
[214]
[215] CRITO: Certainly he will.
[216]
[217] SOCRATES: And what will the evil be, whither tending and what affecting,
[218] in the disobedient person?
[219]
[220] CRITO: Clearly, affecting the body; that is what is destroyed by the evil.
[221]
[222] SOCRATES: Very good; and is not this true, Crito, of other things which we
[223] need not separately enumerate? In questions of just and unjust, fair and
[224] foul, good and evil, which are the subjects of our present consultation,
[225] ought we to follow the opinion of the many and to fear them; or the opinion
[226] of the one man who has understanding? ought we not to fear and reverence
[227] him more than all the rest of the world: and if we desert him shall we not
[228] destroy and injure that principle in us which may be assumed to be improved
[229] by justice and deteriorated by injustice;--there is such a principle?
[230]
[231] CRITO: Certainly there is, Socrates.
[232]
[233] SOCRATES: Take a parallel instance:--if, acting under the advice of those
[234] who have no understanding, we destroy that which is improved by health and
[235] is deteriorated by disease, would life be worth having? And that which has
[236] been destroyed is--the body?
[237]
[238] CRITO: Yes.
[239]
[240] SOCRATES: Could we live, having an evil and corrupted body?
[241]
[242] CRITO: Certainly not.
[243]
[244] SOCRATES: And will life be worth having, if that higher part of man be
[245] destroyed, which is improved by justice and depraved by injustice? Do we
[246] suppose that principle, whatever it may be in man, which has to do with
[247] justice and injustice, to be inferior to the body?
[248]
[249] CRITO: Certainly not.
[250]
[251] SOCRATES: More honourable than the body?
[252]
[253] CRITO: Far more.
[254]
[255] SOCRATES: Then, my friend, we must not regard what the many say of us:
[256] but what he, the one man who has understanding of just and unjust, will
[257] say, and what the truth will say. And therefore you begin in error when
[258] you advise that we should regard the opinion of the many about just and
[259] unjust, good and evil, honorable and dishonorable.--'Well,' some one will
[260] say, 'but the many can kill us.'
[261]
[262] CRITO: Yes, Socrates; that will clearly be the answer.
[263]
[264] SOCRATES: And it is true; but still I find with surprise that the old
[265] argument is unshaken as ever. And I should like to know whether I may say
[266] the same of another proposition--that not life, but a good life, is to be
[267] chiefly valued?
[268]
[269] CRITO: Yes, that also remains unshaken.
[270]
[271] SOCRATES: And a good life is equivalent to a just and honorable one--that
[272] holds also?
[273]
[274] CRITO: Yes, it does.
[275]
[276] SOCRATES: From these premisses I proceed to argue the question whether I
[277] ought or ought not to try and escape without the consent of the Athenians:
[278] and if I am clearly right in escaping, then I will make the attempt; but if
[279] not, I will abstain. The other considerations which you mention, of money
[280] and loss of character and the duty of educating one's children, are, I
[281] fear, only the doctrines of the multitude, who would be as ready to restore
[282] people to life, if they were able, as they are to put them to death--and
[283] with as little reason. But now, since the argument has thus far prevailed,
[284] the only question which remains to be considered is, whether we shall do
[285] rightly either in escaping or in suffering others to aid in our escape and
[286] paying them in money and thanks, or whether in reality we shall not do
[287] rightly; and if the latter, then death or any other calamity which may
[288] ensue on my remaining here must not be allowed to enter into the
[289] calculation.
[290]
[291] CRITO: I think that you are right, Socrates; how then shall we proceed?
[292]
[293] SOCRATES: Let us consider the matter together, and do you either refute me
[294] if you can, and I will be convinced; or else cease, my dear friend, from
[295] repeating to me that I ought to escape against the wishes of the Athenians:
[296] for I highly value your attempts to persuade me to do so, but I may not be
[297] persuaded against my own better judgment. And now please to consider my
[298] first position, and try how you can best answer me.
[299]
[300] CRITO: I will.
[301]
[302] SOCRATES: Are we to say that we are never intentionally to do wrong, or
[303] that in one way we ought and in another way we ought not to do wrong, or is
[304] doing wrong always evil and dishonorable, as I was just now saying, and as
[305] has been already acknowledged by us? Are all our former admissions which
[306] were made within a few days to be thrown away? And have we, at our age,
[307] been earnestly discoursing with one another all our life long only to
[308] discover that we are no better than children? Or, in spite of the opinion
[309] of the many, and in spite of consequences whether better or worse, shall we
[310] insist on the truth of what was then said, that injustice is always an evil
[311] and dishonour to him who acts unjustly? Shall we say so or not?
[312]
[313] CRITO: Yes.
[314]
[315] SOCRATES: Then we must do no wrong?
[316]
[317] CRITO: Certainly not.
[318]
[319] SOCRATES: Nor when injured injure in return, as the many imagine; for we
[320] must injure no one at all? (E.g. compare Rep.)
[321]
[322] CRITO: Clearly not.
[323]
[324] SOCRATES: Again, Crito, may we do evil?
[325]
[326] CRITO: Surely not, Socrates.
[327]
[328] SOCRATES: And what of doing evil in return for evil, which is the morality
[329] of the many--is that just or not?
[330]
[331] CRITO: Not just.
[332]
[333] SOCRATES: For doing evil to another is the same as injuring him?
[334]
[335] CRITO: Very true.
[336]
[337] SOCRATES: Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to any
[338] one, whatever evil we may have suffered from him. But I would have you
[339] consider, Crito, whether you really mean what you are saying. For this
[340] opinion has never been held, and never will be held, by any considerable
[341] number of persons; and those who are agreed and those who are not agreed
[342] upon this point have no common ground, and can only despise one another
[343] when they see how widely they differ. Tell me, then, whether you agree
[344] with and assent to my first principle, that neither injury nor retaliation
[345] nor warding off evil by evil is ever right. And shall that be the premiss
[346] of our argument? Or do you decline and dissent from this? For so I have
[347] ever thought, and continue to think; but, if you are of another opinion,
[348] let me hear what you have to say. If, however, you remain of the same mind
[349] as formerly, I will proceed to the next step.
[350]
[351] CRITO: You may proceed, for I have not changed my mind.
[352]
[353] SOCRATES: Then I will go on to the next point, which may be put in the
[354] form of a question:--Ought a man to do what he admits to be right, or ought
[355] he to betray the right?
[356]
[357] CRITO: He ought to do what he thinks right.
[358]
[359] SOCRATES: But if this is true, what is the application? In leaving the
[360] prison against the will of the Athenians, do I wrong any? or rather do I
[361] not wrong those whom I ought least to wrong? Do I not desert the
[362] principles which were acknowledged by us to be just--what do you say?
[363]
[364] CRITO: I cannot tell, Socrates, for I do not know.
[365]
[366] SOCRATES: Then consider the matter in this way:--Imagine that I am about
[367] to play truant (you may call the proceeding by any name which you like),
[368] and the laws and the government come and interrogate me: 'Tell us,
[369] Socrates,' they say; 'what are you about? are you not going by an act of
[370] yours to overturn us--the laws, and the whole state, as far as in you lies?
[371] Do you imagine that a state can subsist and not be overthrown, in which the
[372] decisions of law have no power, but are set aside and trampled upon by
[373] individuals?' What will be our answer, Crito, to these and the like words?
[374] Any one, and especially a rhetorician, will have a good deal to say on
[375] behalf of the law which requires a sentence to be carried out. He will
[376] argue that this law should not be set aside; and shall we reply, 'Yes; but
[377] the state has injured us and given an unjust sentence.' Suppose I say
[378] that?
[379]
[380] CRITO: Very good, Socrates.
[381]
[382] SOCRATES: 'And was that our agreement with you?' the law would answer; 'or
[383] were you to abide by the sentence of the state?' And if I were to express
[384] my astonishment at their words, the law would probably add: 'Answer,
[385] Socrates, instead of opening your eyes--you are in the habit of asking and
[386] answering questions. Tell us,--What complaint have you to make against us
[387] which justifies you in attempting to destroy us and the state? In the
[388] first place did we not bring you into existence? Your father married your
[389] mother by our aid and begat you. Say whether you have any objection to
[390] urge against those of us who regulate marriage?' None, I should reply.
[391] 'Or against those of us who after birth regulate the nurture and education
[392] of children, in which you also were trained? Were not the laws, which have
[393] the charge of education, right in commanding your father to train you in
[394] music and gymnastic?' Right, I should reply. 'Well then, since you were
[395] brought into the world and nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in the
[396] first place that you are our child and slave, as your fathers were before
[397] you? And if this is true you are not on equal terms with us; nor can you
[398] think that you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you. Would
[399] you have any right to strike or revile or do any other evil to your father
[400] or your master, if you had one, because you have been struck or reviled by
[401] him, or received some other evil at his hands?--you would not say this?
[402] And because we think right to destroy you, do you think that you have any
[403] right to destroy us in return, and your country as far as in you lies?
[404] Will you, O professor of true virtue, pretend that you are justified in
[405] this? Has a philosopher like you failed to discover that our country is
[406] more to be valued and higher and holier far than mother or father or any
[407] ancestor, and more to be regarded in the eyes of the gods and of men of
[408] understanding? also to be soothed, and gently and reverently entreated when
[409] angry, even more than a father, and either to be persuaded, or if not
[410] persuaded, to be obeyed? And when we are punished by her, whether with
[411] imprisonment or stripes, the punishment is to be endured in silence; and if
[412] she lead us to wounds or death in battle, thither we follow as is right;
[413] neither may any one yield or retreat or leave his rank, but whether in
[414] battle or in a court of law, or in any other place, he must do what his
[415] city and his country order him; or he must change their view of what is
[416] just: and if he may do no violence to his father or mother, much less may
[417] he do violence to his country.' What answer shall we make to this, Crito?
[418] Do the laws speak truly, or do they not?
[419]
[420] CRITO: I think that they do.
[421]
[422] SOCRATES: Then the laws will say: 'Consider, Socrates, if we are speaking
[423] truly that in your present attempt you are going to do us an injury. For,
[424] having brought you into the world, and nurtured and educated you, and given
[425] you and every other citizen a share in every good which we had to give, we
[426] further proclaim to any Athenian by the liberty which we allow him, that if
[427] he does not like us when he has become of age and has seen the ways of the
[428] city, and made our acquaintance, he may go where he pleases and take his
[429] goods with him. None of us laws will forbid him or interfere with him.
[430] Any one who does not like us and the city, and who wants to emigrate to a
[431] colony or to any other city, may go where he likes, retaining his property.
[432] But he who has experience of the manner in which we order justice and
[433] administer the state, and still remains, has entered into an implied
[434] contract that he will do as we command him. And he who disobeys us is, as
[435] we maintain, thrice wrong: first, because in disobeying us he is
[436] disobeying his parents; secondly, because we are the authors of his
[437] education; thirdly, because he has made an agreement with us that he will
[438] duly obey our commands; and he neither obeys them nor convinces us that our
[439] commands are unjust; and we do not rudely impose them, but give him the
[440] alternative of obeying or convincing us;--that is what we offer, and he
[441] does neither.
[442]
[443] 'These are the sort of accusations to which, as we were saying, you,
[444] Socrates, will be exposed if you accomplish your intentions; you, above all
[445] other Athenians.' Suppose now I ask, why I rather than anybody else? they
[446] will justly retort upon me that I above all other men have acknowledged the
[447] agreement. 'There is clear proof,' they will say, 'Socrates, that we and
[448] the city were not displeasing to you. Of all Athenians you have been the
[449] most constant resident in the city, which, as you never leave, you may be
[450] supposed to love (compare Phaedr.). For you never went out of the city
[451] either to see the games, except once when you went to the Isthmus, or to
[452] any other place unless when you were on military service; nor did you
[453] travel as other men do. Nor had you any curiosity to know other states or
[454] their laws: your affections did not go beyond us and our state; we were
[455] your especial favourites, and you acquiesced in our government of you; and
[456] here in this city you begat your children, which is a proof of your
[457] satisfaction. Moreover, you might in the course of the trial, if you had
[458] liked, have fixed the penalty at banishment; the state which refuses to let
[459] you go now would have let you go then. But you pretended that you
[460] preferred death to exile (compare Apol.), and that you were not unwilling
[461] to die. And now you have forgotten these fine sentiments, and pay no
[462] respect to us the laws, of whom you are the destroyer; and are doing what
[463] only a miserable slave would do, running away and turning your back upon
[464] the compacts and agreements which you made as a citizen. And first of all
[465] answer this very question: Are we right in saying that you agreed to be
[466] governed according to us in deed, and not in word only? Is that true or
[467] not?' How shall we answer, Crito? Must we not assent?
[468]
[469] CRITO: We cannot help it, Socrates.
[470]
[471] SOCRATES: Then will they not say: 'You, Socrates, are breaking the
[472] covenants and agreements which you made with us at your leisure, not in any
[473] haste or under any compulsion or deception, but after you have had seventy
[474] years to think of them, during which time you were at liberty to leave the
[475] city, if we were not to your mind, or if our covenants appeared to you to
[476] be unfair. You had your choice, and might have gone either to Lacedaemon
[477] or Crete, both which states are often praised by you for their good
[478] government, or to some other Hellenic or foreign state. Whereas you, above
[479] all other Athenians, seemed to be so fond of the state, or, in other words,
[480] of us her laws (and who would care about a state which has no laws?), that
[481] you never stirred out of her; the halt, the blind, the maimed, were not
[482] more stationary in her than you were. And now you run away and forsake
[483] your agreements. Not so, Socrates, if you will take our advice; do not
[484] make yourself ridiculous by escaping out of the city.
[485]
[486] 'For just consider, if you transgress and err in this sort of way, what
[487] good will you do either to yourself or to your friends? That your friends
[488] will be driven into exile and deprived of citizenship, or will lose their
[489] property, is tolerably certain; and you yourself, if you fly to one of the
[490] neighbouring cities, as, for example, Thebes or Megara, both of which are
[491] well governed, will come to them as an enemy, Socrates, and their
[492] government will be against you, and all patriotic citizens will cast an
[493] evil eye upon you as a subverter of the laws, and you will confirm in the
[494] minds of the judges the justice of their own condemnation of you. For he
[495] who is a corrupter of the laws is more than likely to be a corrupter of the
[496] young and foolish portion of mankind. Will you then flee from well-ordered
[497] cities and virtuous men? and is existence worth having on these terms? Or
[498] will you go to them without shame, and talk to them, Socrates? And what
[499] will you say to them? What you say here about virtue and justice and
[500] institutions and laws being the best things among men? Would that be
[501] decent of you? Surely not. But if you go away from well-governed states
[502] to Crito's friends in Thessaly, where there is great disorder and licence,
[503] they will be charmed to hear the tale of your escape from prison, set off
[504] with ludicrous particulars of the manner in which you were wrapped in a
[505] goatskin or some other disguise, and metamorphosed as the manner is of
[506] runaways; but will there be no one to remind you that in your old age you
[507] were not ashamed to violate the most sacred laws from a miserable desire of
[508] a little more life? Perhaps not, if you keep them in a good temper; but if
[509] they are out of temper you will hear many degrading things; you will live,
[510] but how?--as the flatterer of all men, and the servant of all men; and
[511] doing what?--eating and drinking in Thessaly, having gone abroad in order
[512] that you may get a dinner. And where will be your fine sentiments about
[513] justice and virtue? Say that you wish to live for the sake of your
[514] children--you want to bring them up and educate them--will you take them
[515] into Thessaly and deprive them of Athenian citizenship? Is this the
[516] benefit which you will confer upon them? Or are you under the impression
[517] that they will be better cared for and educated here if you are still
[518] alive, although absent from them; for your friends will take care of them?
[519] Do you fancy that if you are an inhabitant of Thessaly they will take care
[520] of them, and if you are an inhabitant of the other world that they will not
[521] take care of them? Nay; but if they who call themselves friends are good
[522] for anything, they will--to be sure they will.
[523]
[524] 'Listen, then, Socrates, to us who have brought you up. Think not of life
[525] and children first, and of justice afterwards, but of justice first, that
[526] you may be justified before the princes of the world below. For neither
[527] will you nor any that belong to you be happier or holier or juster in this
[528] life, or happier in another, if you do as Crito bids. Now you depart in
[529] innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil; a victim, not of the laws,
[530] but of men. But if you go forth, returning evil for evil, and injury for
[531] injury, breaking the covenants and agreements which you have made with us,
[532] and wronging those whom you ought least of all to wrong, that is to say,
[533] yourself, your friends, your country, and us, we shall be angry with you
[534] while you live, and our brethren, the laws in the world below, will receive
[535] you as an enemy; for they will know that you have done your best to destroy
[536] us. Listen, then, to us and not to Crito.'
[537]
[538] This, dear Crito, is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring in my ears,
[539] like the sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic; that voice, I say,
[540] is humming in my ears, and prevents me from hearing any other. And I know
[541] that anything more which you may say will be vain. Yet speak, if you have
[542] anything to say.
[543]
[544] CRITO: I have nothing to say, Socrates.
[545]
[546] SOCRATES: Leave me then, Crito, to fulfil the will of God, and to follow
[547] whither he leads.