Gorgias
by
Plato
Gorgias
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[2] PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Callicles, Socrates, Chaerephon, Gorgias, Polus.
[3]
[4] SCENE: The house of Callicles.
[5]
[6]
[7] CALLICLES: The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a fray, but not
[8] for a feast.
[9]
[10] SOCRATES: And are we late for a feast?
[11]
[12] CALLICLES: Yes, and a delightful feast; for Gorgias has just been
[13] exhibiting to us many fine things.
[14]
[15] SOCRATES: It is not my fault, Callicles; our friend Chaerephon is to
[16] blame; for he would keep us loitering in the Agora.
[17]
[18] CHAEREPHON: Never mind, Socrates; the misfortune of which I have been the
[19] cause I will also repair; for Gorgias is a friend of mine, and I will make
[20] him give the exhibition again either now, or, if you prefer, at some other
[21] time.
[22]
[23] CALLICLES: What is the matter, Chaerephon--does Socrates want to hear
[24] Gorgias?
[25]
[26] CHAEREPHON: Yes, that was our intention in coming.
[27]
[28] CALLICLES: Come into my house, then; for Gorgias is staying with me, and
[29] he shall exhibit to you.
[30]
[31] SOCRATES: Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? for I
[32] want to hear from him what is the nature of his art, and what it is which
[33] he professes and teaches; he may, as you (Chaerephon) suggest, defer the
[34] exhibition to some other time.
[35]
[36] CALLICLES: There is nothing like asking him, Socrates; and indeed to
[37] answer questions is a part of his exhibition, for he was saying only just
[38] now, that any one in my house might put any question to him, and that he
[39] would answer.
[40]
[41] SOCRATES: How fortunate! will you ask him, Chaerephon--?
[42]
[43] CHAEREPHON: What shall I ask him?
[44]
[45] SOCRATES: Ask him who he is.
[46]
[47] CHAEREPHON: What do you mean?
[48]
[49] SOCRATES: I mean such a question as would elicit from him, if he had been
[50] a maker of shoes, the answer that he is a cobbler. Do you understand?
[51]
[52] CHAEREPHON: I understand, and will ask him: Tell me, Gorgias, is our
[53] friend Callicles right in saying that you undertake to answer any questions
[54] which you are asked?
[55]
[56] GORGIAS: Quite right, Chaerephon: I was saying as much only just now; and
[57] I may add, that many years have elapsed since any one has asked me a new
[58] one.
[59]
[60] CHAEREPHON: Then you must be very ready, Gorgias.
[61]
[62] GORGIAS: Of that, Chaerephon, you can make trial.
[63]
[64] POLUS: Yes, indeed, and if you like, Chaerephon, you may make trial of me
[65] too, for I think that Gorgias, who has been talking a long time, is tired.
[66]
[67] CHAEREPHON: And do you, Polus, think that you can answer better than
[68] Gorgias?
[69]
[70] POLUS: What does that matter if I answer well enough for you?
[71]
[72] CHAEREPHON: Not at all:--and you shall answer if you like.
[73]
[74] POLUS: Ask:--
[75]
[76] CHAEREPHON: My question is this: If Gorgias had the skill of his brother
[77] Herodicus, what ought we to call him? Ought he not to have the name which
[78] is given to his brother?
[79]
[80] POLUS: Certainly.
[81]
[82] CHAEREPHON: Then we should be right in calling him a physician?
[83]
[84] POLUS: Yes.
[85]
[86] CHAEREPHON: And if he had the skill of Aristophon the son of Aglaophon, or
[87] of his brother Polygnotus, what ought we to call him?
[88]
[89] POLUS: Clearly, a painter.
[90]
[91] CHAEREPHON: But now what shall we call him--what is the art in which he is
[92] skilled.
[93]
[94] POLUS: O Chaerephon, there are many arts among mankind which are
[95] experimental, and have their origin in experience, for experience makes the
[96] days of men to proceed according to art, and inexperience according to
[97] chance, and different persons in different ways are proficient in different
[98] arts, and the best persons in the best arts. And our friend Gorgias is one
[99] of the best, and the art in which he is a proficient is the noblest.
[100]
[101] SOCRATES: Polus has been taught how to make a capital speech, Gorgias; but
[102] he is not fulfilling the promise which he made to Chaerephon.
[103]
[104] GORGIAS: What do you mean, Socrates?
[105]
[106] SOCRATES: I mean that he has not exactly answered the question which he
[107] was asked.
[108]
[109] GORGIAS: Then why not ask him yourself?
[110]
[111] SOCRATES: But I would much rather ask you, if you are disposed to answer:
[112] for I see, from the few words which Polus has uttered, that he has attended
[113] more to the art which is called rhetoric than to dialectic.
[114]
[115] POLUS: What makes you say so, Socrates?
[116]
[117] SOCRATES: Because, Polus, when Chaerephon asked you what was the art which
[118] Gorgias knows, you praised it as if you were answering some one who found
[119] fault with it, but you never said what the art was.
[120]
[121] POLUS: Why, did I not say that it was the noblest of arts?
[122]
[123] SOCRATES: Yes, indeed, but that was no answer to the question: nobody
[124] asked what was the quality, but what was the nature, of the art, and by
[125] what name we were to describe Gorgias. And I would still beg you briefly
[126] and clearly, as you answered Chaerephon when he asked you at first, to say
[127] what this art is, and what we ought to call Gorgias: Or rather, Gorgias,
[128] let me turn to you, and ask the same question,--what are we to call you,
[129] and what is the art which you profess?
[130]
[131] GORGIAS: Rhetoric, Socrates, is my art.
[132]
[133] SOCRATES: Then I am to call you a rhetorician?
[134]
[135] GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if you would call me that
[136] which, in Homeric language, 'I boast myself to be.'
[137]
[138] SOCRATES: I should wish to do so.
[139]
[140] GORGIAS: Then pray do.
[141]
[142] SOCRATES: And are we to say that you are able to make other men
[143] rhetoricians?
[144]
[145] GORGIAS: Yes, that is exactly what I profess to make them, not only at
[146] Athens, but in all places.
[147]
[148] SOCRATES: And will you continue to ask and answer questions, Gorgias, as
[149] we are at present doing, and reserve for another occasion the longer mode
[150] of speech which Polus was attempting? Will you keep your promise, and
[151] answer shortly the questions which are asked of you?
[152]
[153] GORGIAS: Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will do my
[154] best to make them as short as possible; for a part of my profession is that
[155] I can be as short as any one.
[156]
[157] SOCRATES: That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit the shorter method now,
[158] and the longer one at some other time.
[159]
[160] GORGIAS: Well, I will; and you will certainly say, that you never heard a
[161] man use fewer words.
[162]
[163] SOCRATES: Very good then; as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a maker
[164] of rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned: I might
[165] ask with what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would you not?),
[166] with the making of garments?
[167]
[168] GORGIAS: Yes.
[169]
[170] SOCRATES: And music is concerned with the composition of melodies?
[171]
[172] GORGIAS: It is.
[173]
[174] SOCRATES: By Here, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your
[175] answers.
[176]
[177] GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, I do think myself good at that.
[178]
[179] SOCRATES: I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about rhetoric:
[180] with what is rhetoric concerned?
[181]
[182] GORGIAS: With discourse.
[183]
[184] SOCRATES: What sort of discourse, Gorgias?--such discourse as would teach
[185] the sick under what treatment they might get well?
[186]
[187] GORGIAS: No.
[188]
[189] SOCRATES: Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse?
[190]
[191] GORGIAS: Certainly not.
[192]
[193] SOCRATES: And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak?
[194]
[195] GORGIAS: Yes.
[196]
[197] SOCRATES: And to understand that about which they speak?
[198]
[199] GORGIAS: Of course.
[200]
[201] SOCRATES: But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now
[202] mentioning, also make men able to understand and speak about the sick?
[203]
[204] GORGIAS: Certainly.
[205]
[206] SOCRATES: Then medicine also treats of discourse?
[207]
[208] GORGIAS: Yes.
[209]
[210] SOCRATES: Of discourse concerning diseases?
[211]
[212] GORGIAS: Just so.
[213]
[214] SOCRATES: And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the
[215] good or evil condition of the body?
[216]
[217] GORGIAS: Very true.
[218]
[219] SOCRATES: And the same, Gorgias, is true of the other arts:--all of them
[220] treat of discourse concerning the subjects with which they severally have
[221] to do.
[222]
[223] GORGIAS: Clearly.
[224]
[225] SOCRATES: Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of
[226] discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call them
[227] arts of rhetoric?
[228]
[229] GORGIAS: Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only to do
[230] with some sort of external action, as of the hand; but there is no such
[231] action of the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect only through
[232] the medium of discourse. And therefore I am justified in saying that
[233] rhetoric treats of discourse.
[234]
[235] SOCRATES: I am not sure whether I entirely understand you, but I dare say
[236] I shall soon know better; please to answer me a question:--you would allow
[237] that there are arts?
[238]
[239] GORGIAS: Yes.
[240]
[241] SOCRATES: As to the arts generally, they are for the most part concerned
[242] with doing, and require little or no speaking; in painting, and statuary,
[243] and many other arts, the work may proceed in silence; and of such arts I
[244] suppose you would say that they do not come within the province of
[245] rhetoric.
[246]
[247] GORGIAS: You perfectly conceive my meaning, Socrates.
[248]
[249] SOCRATES: But there are other arts which work wholly through the medium of
[250] language, and require either no action or very little, as, for example, the
[251] arts of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of playing draughts;
[252] in some of these speech is pretty nearly co-extensive with action, but in
[253] most of them the verbal element is greater--they depend wholly on words for
[254] their efficacy and power: and I take your meaning to be that rhetoric is
[255] an art of this latter sort?
[256]
[257] GORGIAS: Exactly.
[258]
[259] SOCRATES: And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of
[260] these arts rhetoric; although the precise expression which you used was,
[261] that rhetoric is an art which works and takes effect only through the
[262] medium of discourse; and an adversary who wished to be captious might say,
[263] 'And so, Gorgias, you call arithmetic rhetoric.' But I do not think that
[264] you really call arithmetic rhetoric any more than geometry would be so
[265] called by you.
[266]
[267] GORGIAS: You are quite right, Socrates, in your apprehension of my
[268] meaning.
[269]
[270] SOCRATES: Well, then, let me now have the rest of my answer:--seeing that
[271] rhetoric is one of those arts which works mainly by the use of words, and
[272] there are other arts which also use words, tell me what is that quality in
[273] words with which rhetoric is concerned:--Suppose that a person asks me
[274] about some of the arts which I was mentioning just now; he might say,
[275] 'Socrates, what is arithmetic?' and I should reply to him, as you replied
[276] to me, that arithmetic is one of those arts which take effect through
[277] words. And then he would proceed to ask: 'Words about what?' and I should
[278] reply, Words about odd and even numbers, and how many there are of each.
[279] And if he asked again: 'What is the art of calculation?' I should say,
[280] That also is one of the arts which is concerned wholly with words. And if
[281] he further said, 'Concerned with what?' I should say, like the clerks in
[282] the assembly, 'as aforesaid' of arithmetic, but with a difference, the
[283] difference being that the art of calculation considers not only the
[284] quantities of odd and even numbers, but also their numerical relations to
[285] themselves and to one another. And suppose, again, I were to say that
[286] astronomy is only words--he would ask, 'Words about what, Socrates?' and I
[287] should answer, that astronomy tells us about the motions of the stars and
[288] sun and moon, and their relative swiftness.
[289]
[290] GORGIAS: You would be quite right, Socrates.
[291]
[292] SOCRATES: And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about rhetoric:
[293] which you would admit (would you not?) to be one of those arts which act
[294] always and fulfil all their ends through the medium of words?
[295]
[296] GORGIAS: True.
[297]
[298] SOCRATES: Words which do what? I should ask. To what class of things do
[299] the words which rhetoric uses relate?
[300]
[301] GORGIAS: To the greatest, Socrates, and the best of human things.
[302]
[303] SOCRATES: That again, Gorgias is ambiguous; I am still in the dark: for
[304] which are the greatest and best of human things? I dare say that you have
[305] heard men singing at feasts the old drinking song, in which the singers
[306] enumerate the goods of life, first health, beauty next, thirdly, as the
[307] writer of the song says, wealth honestly obtained.
[308]
[309] GORGIAS: Yes, I know the song; but what is your drift?
[310]
[311] SOCRATES: I mean to say, that the producers of those things which the
[312] author of the song praises, that is to say, the physician, the trainer, the
[313] money-maker, will at once come to you, and first the physician will say:
[314] 'O Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving you, for my art is concerned with the
[315] greatest good of men and not his.' And when I ask, Who are you? he will
[316] reply, 'I am a physician.' What do you mean? I shall say. Do you mean
[317] that your art produces the greatest good? 'Certainly,' he will answer,
[318] 'for is not health the greatest good? What greater good can men have,
[319] Socrates?' And after him the trainer will come and say, 'I too, Socrates,
[320] shall be greatly surprised if Gorgias can show more good of his art than I
[321] can show of mine.' To him again I shall say, Who are you, honest friend,
[322] and what is your business? 'I am a trainer,' he will reply, 'and my
[323] business is to make men beautiful and strong in body.' When I have done
[324] with the trainer, there arrives the money-maker, and he, as I expect, will
[325] utterly despise them all. 'Consider Socrates,' he will say, 'whether
[326] Gorgias or any one else can produce any greater good than wealth.' Well,
[327] you and I say to him, and are you a creator of wealth? 'Yes,' he replies.
[328] And who are you? 'A money-maker.' And do you consider wealth to be the
[329] greatest good of man? 'Of course,' will be his reply. And we shall
[330] rejoin: Yes; but our friend Gorgias contends that his art produces a
[331] greater good than yours. And then he will be sure to go on and ask, 'What
[332] good? Let Gorgias answer.' Now I want you, Gorgias, to imagine that this
[333] question is asked of you by them and by me; What is that which, as you say,
[334] is the greatest good of man, and of which you are the creator? Answer us.
[335]
[336] GORGIAS: That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being that
[337] which gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to individuals the
[338] power of ruling over others in their several states.
[339]
[340] SOCRATES: And what would you consider this to be?
[341]
[342] GORGIAS: What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges in
[343] the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the
[344] assembly, or at any other political meeting?--if you have the power of
[345] uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer
[346] your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather
[347] treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak and to
[348] persuade the multitude.
[349]
[350] SOCRATES: Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained
[351] what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I am
[352] not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, having this and
[353] no other business, and that this is her crown and end. Do you know any
[354] other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion?
[355]
[356] GORGIAS: No: the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates; for
[357] persuasion is the chief end of rhetoric.
[358]
[359] SOCRATES: Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever
[360] was a man who entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love of
[361] knowing the truth, I am such a one, and I should say the same of you.
[362]
[363] GORGIAS: What is coming, Socrates?
[364]
[365] SOCRATES: I will tell you: I am very well aware that I do not know what,
[366] according to you, is the exact nature, or what are the topics of that
[367] persuasion of which you speak, and which is given by rhetoric; although I
[368] have a suspicion about both the one and the other. And I am going to ask--
[369] what is this power of persuasion which is given by rhetoric, and about
[370] what? But why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask instead of telling you?
[371] Not for your sake, but in order that the argument may proceed in such a
[372] manner as is most likely to set forth the truth. And I would have you
[373] observe, that I am right in asking this further question: If I asked,
[374] 'What sort of a painter is Zeuxis?' and you said, 'The painter of figures,'
[375] should I not be right in asking, 'What kind of figures, and where do you
[376] find them?'
[377]
[378] GORGIAS: Certainly.
[379]
[380] SOCRATES: And the reason for asking this second question would be, that
[381] there are other painters besides, who paint many other figures?
[382]
[383] GORGIAS: True.
[384]
[385] SOCRATES: But if there had been no one but Zeuxis who painted them, then
[386] you would have answered very well?
[387]
[388] GORGIAS: Quite so.
[389]
[390] SOCRATES: Now I want to know about rhetoric in the same way;--is rhetoric
[391] the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have the same
[392] effect? I mean to say--Does he who teaches anything persuade men of that
[393] which he teaches or not?
[394]
[395] GORGIAS: He persuades, Socrates,--there can be no mistake about that.
[396]
[397] SOCRATES: Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now speaking:--
[398] do not arithmetic and the arithmeticians teach us the properties of number?
[399]
[400] GORGIAS: Certainly.
[401]
[402] SOCRATES: And therefore persuade us of them?
[403]
[404] GORGIAS: Yes.
[405]
[406] SOCRATES: Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of
[407] persuasion?
[408]
[409] GORGIAS: Clearly.
[410]
[411] SOCRATES: And if any one asks us what sort of persuasion, and about what,
[412] --we shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantity of odd and even;
[413] and we shall be able to show that all the other arts of which we were just
[414] now speaking are artificers of persuasion, and of what sort, and about
[415] what.
[416]
[417] GORGIAS: Very true.
[418]
[419] SOCRATES: Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion?
[420]
[421] GORGIAS: True.
[422]
[423] SOCRATES: Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric works by persuasion, but
[424] that other arts do the same, as in the case of the painter, a question has
[425] arisen which is a very fair one: Of what persuasion is rhetoric the
[426] artificer, and about what?--is not that a fair way of putting the question?
[427]
[428] GORGIAS: I think so.
[429]
[430] SOCRATES: Then, if you approve the question, Gorgias, what is the answer?
[431]
[432] GORGIAS: I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in
[433] courts of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about the
[434] just and unjust.
[435]
[436] SOCRATES: And that, Gorgias, was what I was suspecting to be your notion;
[437] yet I would not have you wonder if by-and-by I am found repeating a
[438] seemingly plain question; for I ask not in order to confute you, but as I
[439] was saying that the argument may proceed consecutively, and that we may not
[440] get the habit of anticipating and suspecting the meaning of one another's
[441] words; I would have you develope your own views in your own way, whatever
[442] may be your hypothesis.
[443]
[444] GORGIAS: I think that you are quite right, Socrates.
[445]
[446] SOCRATES: Then let me raise another question; there is such a thing as
[447] 'having learned'?
[448]
[449] GORGIAS: Yes.
[450]
[451] SOCRATES: And there is also 'having believed'?
[452]
[453] GORGIAS: Yes.
[454]
[455] SOCRATES: And is the 'having learned' the same as 'having believed,' and
[456] are learning and belief the same things?
[457]
[458] GORGIAS: In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same.
[459]
[460] SOCRATES: And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in this way:--
[461] If a person were to say to you, 'Is there, Gorgias, a false belief as well
[462] as a true?'--you would reply, if I am not mistaken, that there is.
[463]
[464] GORGIAS: Yes.
[465]
[466] SOCRATES: Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true?
[467]
[468] GORGIAS: No.
[469]
[470] SOCRATES: No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief
[471] differ.
[472]
[473] GORGIAS: Very true.
[474]
[475] SOCRATES: And yet those who have learned as well as those who have
[476] believed are persuaded?
[477]
[478] GORGIAS: Just so.
[479]
[480] SOCRATES: Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion,--one which is the
[481] source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge?
[482]
[483] GORGIAS: By all means.
[484]
[485] SOCRATES: And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts of
[486] law and other assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of persuasion
[487] which gives belief without knowledge, or that which gives knowledge?
[488]
[489] GORGIAS: Clearly, Socrates, that which only gives belief.
[490]
[491] SOCRATES: Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a persuasion
[492] which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no instruction
[493] about them?
[494]
[495] GORGIAS: True.
[496]
[497] SOCRATES: And the rhetorician does not instruct the courts of law or other
[498] assemblies about things just and unjust, but he creates belief about them;
[499] for no one can be supposed to instruct such a vast multitude about such
[500] high matters in a short time?
[501]
[502] GORGIAS: Certainly not.
[503]
[504] SOCRATES: Come, then, and let us see what we really mean about rhetoric;
[505] for I do not know what my own meaning is as yet. When the assembly meets
[506] to elect a physician or a shipwright or any other craftsman, will the
[507] rhetorician be taken into counsel? Surely not. For at every election he
[508] ought to be chosen who is most skilled; and, again, when walls have to be
[509] built or harbours or docks to be constructed, not the rhetorician but the
[510] master workman will advise; or when generals have to be chosen and an order
[511] of battle arranged, or a position taken, then the military will advise and
[512] not the rhetoricians: what do you say, Gorgias? Since you profess to be a
[513] rhetorician and a maker of rhetoricians, I cannot do better than learn the
[514] nature of your art from you. And here let me assure you that I have your
[515] interest in view as well as my own. For likely enough some one or other of
[516] the young men present might desire to become your pupil, and in fact I see
[517] some, and a good many too, who have this wish, but they would be too modest
[518] to question you. And therefore when you are interrogated by me, I would
[519] have you imagine that you are interrogated by them. 'What is the use of
[520] coming to you, Gorgias?' they will say--'about what will you teach us to
[521] advise the state?--about the just and unjust only, or about those other
[522] things also which Socrates has just mentioned?' How will you answer them?
[523]
[524] GORGIAS: I like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I will endeavour
[525] to reveal to you the whole nature of rhetoric. You must have heard, I
[526] think, that the docks and the walls of the Athenians and the plan of the
[527] harbour were devised in accordance with the counsels, partly of
[528] Themistocles, and partly of Pericles, and not at the suggestion of the
[529] builders.
[530]
[531] SOCRATES: Such is the tradition, Gorgias, about Themistocles; and I myself
[532] heard the speech of Pericles when he advised us about the middle wall.
[533]
[534] GORGIAS: And you will observe, Socrates, that when a decision has to be
[535] given in such matters the rhetoricians are the advisers; they are the men
[536] who win their point.
[537]
[538] SOCRATES: I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias, when I asked what is
[539] the nature of rhetoric, which always appears to me, when I look at the
[540] matter in this way, to be a marvel of greatness.
[541]
[542] GORGIAS: A marvel, indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how rhetoric
[543] comprehends and holds under her sway all the inferior arts. Let me offer
[544] you a striking example of this. On several occasions I have been with my
[545] brother Herodicus or some other physician to see one of his patients, who
[546] would not allow the physician to give him medicine, or apply the knife or
[547] hot iron to him; and I have persuaded him to do for me what he would not do
[548] for the physician just by the use of rhetoric. And I say that if a
[549] rhetorician and a physician were to go to any city, and had there to argue
[550] in the Ecclesia or any other assembly as to which of them should be elected
[551] state-physician, the physician would have no chance; but he who could speak
[552] would be chosen if he wished; and in a contest with a man of any other
[553] profession the rhetorician more than any one would have the power of
[554] getting himself chosen, for he can speak more persuasively to the multitude
[555] than any of them, and on any subject. Such is the nature and power of the
[556] art of rhetoric! And yet, Socrates, rhetoric should be used like any other
[557] competitive art, not against everybody,--the rhetorician ought not to abuse
[558] his strength any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master of
[559] fence;--because he has powers which are more than a match either for friend
[560] or enemy, he ought not therefore to strike, stab, or slay his friends.
[561] Suppose a man to have been trained in the palestra and to be a skilful
[562] boxer,--he in the fulness of his strength goes and strikes his father or
[563] mother or one of his familiars or friends; but that is no reason why the
[564] trainers or fencing-masters should be held in detestation or banished from
[565] the city;--surely not. For they taught their art for a good purpose, to be
[566] used against enemies and evil-doers, in self-defence not in aggression, and
[567] others have perverted their instructions, and turned to a bad use their own
[568] strength and skill. But not on this account are the teachers bad, neither
[569] is the art in fault, or bad in itself; I should rather say that those who
[570] make a bad use of the art are to blame. And the same argument holds good
[571] of rhetoric; for the rhetorician can speak against all men and upon any
[572] subject,--in short, he can persuade the multitude better than any other man
[573] of anything which he pleases, but he should not therefore seek to defraud
[574] the physician or any other artist of his reputation merely because he has
[575] the power; he ought to use rhetoric fairly, as he would also use his
[576] athletic powers. And if after having become a rhetorician he makes a bad
[577] use of his strength and skill, his instructor surely ought not on that
[578] account to be held in detestation or banished. For he was intended by his
[579] teacher to make a good use of his instructions, but he abuses them. And
[580] therefore he is the person who ought to be held in detestation, banished,
[581] and put to death, and not his instructor.
[582]
[583] SOCRATES: You, Gorgias, like myself, have had great experience of
[584] disputations, and you must have observed, I think, that they do not always
[585] terminate in mutual edification, or in the definition by either party of
[586] the subjects which they are discussing; but disagreements are apt to arise
[587] --somebody says that another has not spoken truly or clearly; and then they
[588] get into a passion and begin to quarrel, both parties conceiving that their
[589] opponents are arguing from personal feeling only and jealousy of
[590] themselves, not from any interest in the question at issue. And sometimes
[591] they will go on abusing one another until the company at last are quite
[592] vexed at themselves for ever listening to such fellows. Why do I say this?
[593] Why, because I cannot help feeling that you are now saying what is not
[594] quite consistent or accordant with what you were saying at first about
[595] rhetoric. And I am afraid to point this out to you, lest you should think
[596] that I have some animosity against you, and that I speak, not for the sake
[597] of discovering the truth, but from jealousy of you. Now if you are one of
[598] my sort, I should like to cross-examine you, but if not I will let you
[599] alone. And what is my sort? you will ask. I am one of those who are very
[600] willing to be refuted if I say anything which is not true, and very willing
[601] to refute any one else who says what is not true, and quite as ready to be
[602] refuted as to refute; for I hold that this is the