Gorgias by Plato
Gorgias

Plato Gorgias

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[1]        
[2]        PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Callicles, Socrates, Chaerephon, Gorgias, Polus.
[3]        
[4]        SCENE: The house of Callicles.
[5]        
[6]        
[7]        CALLICLES: The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a fray, but not
[8]        for a feast.
[9]        
[10]       SOCRATES: And are we late for a feast?
[11]       
[12]       CALLICLES: Yes, and a delightful feast; for Gorgias has just been
[13]       exhibiting to us many fine things.
[14]       
[15]       SOCRATES: It is not my fault, Callicles; our friend Chaerephon is to
[16]       blame; for he would keep us loitering in the Agora.
[17]       
[18]       CHAEREPHON: Never mind, Socrates; the misfortune of which I have been the
[19]       cause I will also repair; for Gorgias is a friend of mine, and I will make
[20]       him give the exhibition again either now, or, if you prefer, at some other
[21]       time.
[22]       
[23]       CALLICLES: What is the matter, Chaerephon--does Socrates want to hear
[24]       Gorgias?
[25]       
[26]       CHAEREPHON: Yes, that was our intention in coming.
[27]       
[28]       CALLICLES: Come into my house, then; for Gorgias is staying with me, and
[29]       he shall exhibit to you.
[30]       
[31]       SOCRATES: Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? for I
[32]       want to hear from him what is the nature of his art, and what it is which
[33]       he professes and teaches; he may, as you (Chaerephon) suggest, defer the
[34]       exhibition to some other time.
[35]       
[36]       CALLICLES: There is nothing like asking him, Socrates; and indeed to
[37]       answer questions is a part of his exhibition, for he was saying only just
[38]       now, that any one in my house might put any question to him, and that he
[39]       would answer.
[40]       
[41]       SOCRATES: How fortunate! will you ask him, Chaerephon--?
[42]       
[43]       CHAEREPHON: What shall I ask him?
[44]       
[45]       SOCRATES: Ask him who he is.
[46]       
[47]       CHAEREPHON: What do you mean?
[48]       
[49]       SOCRATES: I mean such a question as would elicit from him, if he had been
[50]       a maker of shoes, the answer that he is a cobbler. Do you understand?
[51]       
[52]       CHAEREPHON: I understand, and will ask him: Tell me, Gorgias, is our
[53]       friend Callicles right in saying that you undertake to answer any questions
[54]       which you are asked?
[55]       
[56]       GORGIAS: Quite right, Chaerephon: I was saying as much only just now; and
[57]       I may add, that many years have elapsed since any one has asked me a new
[58]       one.
[59]       
[60]       CHAEREPHON: Then you must be very ready, Gorgias.
[61]       
[62]       GORGIAS: Of that, Chaerephon, you can make trial.
[63]       
[64]       POLUS: Yes, indeed, and if you like, Chaerephon, you may make trial of me
[65]       too, for I think that Gorgias, who has been talking a long time, is tired.
[66]       
[67]       CHAEREPHON: And do you, Polus, think that you can answer better than
[68]       Gorgias?
[69]       
[70]       POLUS: What does that matter if I answer well enough for you?
[71]       
[72]       CHAEREPHON: Not at all:--and you shall answer if you like.
[73]       
[74]       POLUS: Ask:--
[75]       
[76]       CHAEREPHON: My question is this: If Gorgias had the skill of his brother
[77]       Herodicus, what ought we to call him? Ought he not to have the name which
[78]       is given to his brother?
[79]       
[80]       POLUS: Certainly.
[81]       
[82]       CHAEREPHON: Then we should be right in calling him a physician?
[83]       
[84]       POLUS: Yes.
[85]       
[86]       CHAEREPHON: And if he had the skill of Aristophon the son of Aglaophon, or
[87]       of his brother Polygnotus, what ought we to call him?
[88]       
[89]       POLUS: Clearly, a painter.
[90]       
[91]       CHAEREPHON: But now what shall we call him--what is the art in which he is
[92]       skilled.
[93]       
[94]       POLUS: O Chaerephon, there are many arts among mankind which are
[95]       experimental, and have their origin in experience, for experience makes the
[96]       days of men to proceed according to art, and inexperience according to
[97]       chance, and different persons in different ways are proficient in different
[98]       arts, and the best persons in the best arts. And our friend Gorgias is one
[99]       of the best, and the art in which he is a proficient is the noblest.
[100]      
[101]      SOCRATES: Polus has been taught how to make a capital speech, Gorgias; but
[102]      he is not fulfilling the promise which he made to Chaerephon.
[103]      
[104]      GORGIAS: What do you mean, Socrates?
[105]      
[106]      SOCRATES: I mean that he has not exactly answered the question which he
[107]      was asked.
[108]      
[109]      GORGIAS: Then why not ask him yourself?
[110]      
[111]      SOCRATES: But I would much rather ask you, if you are disposed to answer:
[112]      for I see, from the few words which Polus has uttered, that he has attended
[113]      more to the art which is called rhetoric than to dialectic.
[114]      
[115]      POLUS: What makes you say so, Socrates?
[116]      
[117]      SOCRATES: Because, Polus, when Chaerephon asked you what was the art which
[118]      Gorgias knows, you praised it as if you were answering some one who found
[119]      fault with it, but you never said what the art was.
[120]      
[121]      POLUS: Why, did I not say that it was the noblest of arts?
[122]      
[123]      SOCRATES: Yes, indeed, but that was no answer to the question: nobody
[124]      asked what was the quality, but what was the nature, of the art, and by
[125]      what name we were to describe Gorgias. And I would still beg you briefly
[126]      and clearly, as you answered Chaerephon when he asked you at first, to say
[127]      what this art is, and what we ought to call Gorgias: Or rather, Gorgias,
[128]      let me turn to you, and ask the same question,--what are we to call you,
[129]      and what is the art which you profess?
[130]      
[131]      GORGIAS: Rhetoric, Socrates, is my art.
[132]      
[133]      SOCRATES: Then I am to call you a rhetorician?
[134]      
[135]      GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if you would call me that
[136]      which, in Homeric language, 'I boast myself to be.'
[137]      
[138]      SOCRATES: I should wish to do so.
[139]      
[140]      GORGIAS: Then pray do.
[141]      
[142]      SOCRATES: And are we to say that you are able to make other men
[143]      rhetoricians?
[144]      
[145]      GORGIAS: Yes, that is exactly what I profess to make them, not only at
[146]      Athens, but in all places.
[147]      
[148]      SOCRATES: And will you continue to ask and answer questions, Gorgias, as
[149]      we are at present doing, and reserve for another occasion the longer mode
[150]      of speech which Polus was attempting? Will you keep your promise, and
[151]      answer shortly the questions which are asked of you?
[152]      
[153]      GORGIAS: Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will do my
[154]      best to make them as short as possible; for a part of my profession is that
[155]      I can be as short as any one.
[156]      
[157]      SOCRATES: That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit the shorter method now,
[158]      and the longer one at some other time.
[159]      
[160]      GORGIAS: Well, I will; and you will certainly say, that you never heard a
[161]      man use fewer words.
[162]      
[163]      SOCRATES: Very good then; as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a maker
[164]      of rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned: I might
[165]      ask with what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would you not?),
[166]      with the making of garments?
[167]      
[168]      GORGIAS: Yes.
[169]      
[170]      SOCRATES: And music is concerned with the composition of melodies?
[171]      
[172]      GORGIAS: It is.
[173]      
[174]      SOCRATES: By Here, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your
[175]      answers.
[176]      
[177]      GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, I do think myself good at that.
[178]      
[179]      SOCRATES: I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about rhetoric:
[180]      with what is rhetoric concerned?
[181]      
[182]      GORGIAS: With discourse.
[183]      
[184]      SOCRATES: What sort of discourse, Gorgias?--such discourse as would teach
[185]      the sick under what treatment they might get well?
[186]      
[187]      GORGIAS: No.
[188]      
[189]      SOCRATES: Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse?
[190]      
[191]      GORGIAS: Certainly not.
[192]      
[193]      SOCRATES: And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak?
[194]      
[195]      GORGIAS: Yes.
[196]      
[197]      SOCRATES: And to understand that about which they speak?
[198]      
[199]      GORGIAS: Of course.
[200]      
[201]      SOCRATES: But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now
[202]      mentioning, also make men able to understand and speak about the sick?
[203]      
[204]      GORGIAS: Certainly.
[205]      
[206]      SOCRATES: Then medicine also treats of discourse?
[207]      
[208]      GORGIAS: Yes.
[209]      
[210]      SOCRATES: Of discourse concerning diseases?
[211]      
[212]      GORGIAS: Just so.
[213]      
[214]      SOCRATES: And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the
[215]      good or evil condition of the body?
[216]      
[217]      GORGIAS: Very true.
[218]      
[219]      SOCRATES: And the same, Gorgias, is true of the other arts:--all of them
[220]      treat of discourse concerning the subjects with which they severally have
[221]      to do.
[222]      
[223]      GORGIAS: Clearly.
[224]      
[225]      SOCRATES: Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of
[226]      discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call them
[227]      arts of rhetoric?
[228]      
[229]      GORGIAS: Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only to do
[230]      with some sort of external action, as of the hand; but there is no such
[231]      action of the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect only through
[232]      the medium of discourse. And therefore I am justified in saying that
[233]      rhetoric treats of discourse.
[234]      
[235]      SOCRATES: I am not sure whether I entirely understand you, but I dare say
[236]      I shall soon know better; please to answer me a question:--you would allow
[237]      that there are arts?
[238]      
[239]      GORGIAS: Yes.
[240]      
[241]      SOCRATES: As to the arts generally, they are for the most part concerned
[242]      with doing, and require little or no speaking; in painting, and statuary,
[243]      and many other arts, the work may proceed in silence; and of such arts I
[244]      suppose you would say that they do not come within the province of
[245]      rhetoric.
[246]      
[247]      GORGIAS: You perfectly conceive my meaning, Socrates.
[248]      
[249]      SOCRATES: But there are other arts which work wholly through the medium of
[250]      language, and require either no action or very little, as, for example, the
[251]      arts of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of playing draughts;
[252]      in some of these speech is pretty nearly co-extensive with action, but in
[253]      most of them the verbal element is greater--they depend wholly on words for
[254]      their efficacy and power: and I take your meaning to be that rhetoric is
[255]      an art of this latter sort?
[256]      
[257]      GORGIAS: Exactly.
[258]      
[259]      SOCRATES: And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of
[260]      these arts rhetoric; although the precise expression which you used was,
[261]      that rhetoric is an art which works and takes effect only through the
[262]      medium of discourse; and an adversary who wished to be captious might say,
[263]      'And so, Gorgias, you call arithmetic rhetoric.' But I do not think that
[264]      you really call arithmetic rhetoric any more than geometry would be so
[265]      called by you.
[266]      
[267]      GORGIAS: You are quite right, Socrates, in your apprehension of my
[268]      meaning.
[269]      
[270]      SOCRATES: Well, then, let me now have the rest of my answer:--seeing that
[271]      rhetoric is one of those arts which works mainly by the use of words, and
[272]      there are other arts which also use words, tell me what is that quality in
[273]      words with which rhetoric is concerned:--Suppose that a person asks me
[274]      about some of the arts which I was mentioning just now; he might say,
[275]      'Socrates, what is arithmetic?' and I should reply to him, as you replied
[276]      to me, that arithmetic is one of those arts which take effect through
[277]      words. And then he would proceed to ask: 'Words about what?' and I should
[278]      reply, Words about odd and even numbers, and how many there are of each.
[279]      And if he asked again: 'What is the art of calculation?' I should say,
[280]      That also is one of the arts which is concerned wholly with words. And if
[281]      he further said, 'Concerned with what?' I should say, like the clerks in
[282]      the assembly, 'as aforesaid' of arithmetic, but with a difference, the
[283]      difference being that the art of calculation considers not only the
[284]      quantities of odd and even numbers, but also their numerical relations to
[285]      themselves and to one another. And suppose, again, I were to say that
[286]      astronomy is only words--he would ask, 'Words about what, Socrates?' and I
[287]      should answer, that astronomy tells us about the motions of the stars and
[288]      sun and moon, and their relative swiftness.
[289]      
[290]      GORGIAS: You would be quite right, Socrates.
[291]      
[292]      SOCRATES: And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about rhetoric:
[293]      which you would admit (would you not?) to be one of those arts which act
[294]      always and fulfil all their ends through the medium of words?
[295]      
[296]      GORGIAS: True.
[297]      
[298]      SOCRATES: Words which do what? I should ask. To what class of things do
[299]      the words which rhetoric uses relate?
[300]      
[301]      GORGIAS: To the greatest, Socrates, and the best of human things.
[302]      
[303]      SOCRATES: That again, Gorgias is ambiguous; I am still in the dark: for
[304]      which are the greatest and best of human things? I dare say that you have
[305]      heard men singing at feasts the old drinking song, in which the singers
[306]      enumerate the goods of life, first health, beauty next, thirdly, as the
[307]      writer of the song says, wealth honestly obtained.
[308]      
[309]      GORGIAS: Yes, I know the song; but what is your drift?
[310]      
[311]      SOCRATES: I mean to say, that the producers of those things which the
[312]      author of the song praises, that is to say, the physician, the trainer, the
[313]      money-maker, will at once come to you, and first the physician will say:
[314]      'O Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving you, for my art is concerned with the
[315]      greatest good of men and not his.' And when I ask, Who are you? he will
[316]      reply, 'I am a physician.' What do you mean? I shall say. Do you mean
[317]      that your art produces the greatest good? 'Certainly,' he will answer,
[318]      'for is not health the greatest good? What greater good can men have,
[319]      Socrates?' And after him the trainer will come and say, 'I too, Socrates,
[320]      shall be greatly surprised if Gorgias can show more good of his art than I
[321]      can show of mine.' To him again I shall say, Who are you, honest friend,
[322]      and what is your business? 'I am a trainer,' he will reply, 'and my
[323]      business is to make men beautiful and strong in body.' When I have done
[324]      with the trainer, there arrives the money-maker, and he, as I expect, will
[325]      utterly despise them all. 'Consider Socrates,' he will say, 'whether
[326]      Gorgias or any one else can produce any greater good than wealth.' Well,
[327]      you and I say to him, and are you a creator of wealth? 'Yes,' he replies.
[328]      And who are you? 'A money-maker.' And do you consider wealth to be the
[329]      greatest good of man? 'Of course,' will be his reply. And we shall
[330]      rejoin: Yes; but our friend Gorgias contends that his art produces a
[331]      greater good than yours. And then he will be sure to go on and ask, 'What
[332]      good? Let Gorgias answer.' Now I want you, Gorgias, to imagine that this
[333]      question is asked of you by them and by me; What is that which, as you say,
[334]      is the greatest good of man, and of which you are the creator? Answer us.
[335]      
[336]      GORGIAS: That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being that
[337]      which gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to individuals the
[338]      power of ruling over others in their several states.
[339]      
[340]      SOCRATES: And what would you consider this to be?
[341]      
[342]      GORGIAS: What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges in
[343]      the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the
[344]      assembly, or at any other political meeting?--if you have the power of
[345]      uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer
[346]      your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather
[347]      treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak and to
[348]      persuade the multitude.
[349]      
[350]      SOCRATES: Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained
[351]      what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I am
[352]      not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, having this and
[353]      no other business, and that this is her crown and end. Do you know any
[354]      other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion?
[355]      
[356]      GORGIAS: No: the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates; for
[357]      persuasion is the chief end of rhetoric.
[358]      
[359]      SOCRATES: Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever
[360]      was a man who entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love of
[361]      knowing the truth, I am such a one, and I should say the same of you.
[362]      
[363]      GORGIAS: What is coming, Socrates?
[364]      
[365]      SOCRATES: I will tell you: I am very well aware that I do not know what,
[366]      according to you, is the exact nature, or what are the topics of that
[367]      persuasion of which you speak, and which is given by rhetoric; although I
[368]      have a suspicion about both the one and the other. And I am going to ask--
[369]      what is this power of persuasion which is given by rhetoric, and about
[370]      what? But why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask instead of telling you?
[371]      Not for your sake, but in order that the argument may proceed in such a
[372]      manner as is most likely to set forth the truth. And I would have you
[373]      observe, that I am right in asking this further question: If I asked,
[374]      'What sort of a painter is Zeuxis?' and you said, 'The painter of figures,'
[375]      should I not be right in asking, 'What kind of figures, and where do you
[376]      find them?'
[377]      
[378]      GORGIAS: Certainly.
[379]      
[380]      SOCRATES: And the reason for asking this second question would be, that
[381]      there are other painters besides, who paint many other figures?
[382]      
[383]      GORGIAS: True.
[384]      
[385]      SOCRATES: But if there had been no one but Zeuxis who painted them, then
[386]      you would have answered very well?
[387]      
[388]      GORGIAS: Quite so.
[389]      
[390]      SOCRATES: Now I want to know about rhetoric in the same way;--is rhetoric
[391]      the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have the same
[392]      effect? I mean to say--Does he who teaches anything persuade men of that
[393]      which he teaches or not?
[394]      
[395]      GORGIAS: He persuades, Socrates,--there can be no mistake about that.
[396]      
[397]      SOCRATES: Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now speaking:--
[398]      do not arithmetic and the arithmeticians teach us the properties of number?
[399]      
[400]      GORGIAS: Certainly.
[401]      
[402]      SOCRATES: And therefore persuade us of them?
[403]      
[404]      GORGIAS: Yes.
[405]      
[406]      SOCRATES: Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of
[407]      persuasion?
[408]      
[409]      GORGIAS: Clearly.
[410]      
[411]      SOCRATES: And if any one asks us what sort of persuasion, and about what,
[412]      --we shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantity of odd and even;
[413]      and we shall be able to show that all the other arts of which we were just
[414]      now speaking are artificers of persuasion, and of what sort, and about
[415]      what.
[416]      
[417]      GORGIAS: Very true.
[418]      
[419]      SOCRATES: Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion?
[420]      
[421]      GORGIAS: True.
[422]      
[423]      SOCRATES: Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric works by persuasion, but
[424]      that other arts do the same, as in the case of the painter, a question has
[425]      arisen which is a very fair one: Of what persuasion is rhetoric the
[426]      artificer, and about what?--is not that a fair way of putting the question?
[427]      
[428]      GORGIAS: I think so.
[429]      
[430]      SOCRATES: Then, if you approve the question, Gorgias, what is the answer?
[431]      
[432]      GORGIAS: I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in
[433]      courts of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about the
[434]      just and unjust.
[435]      
[436]      SOCRATES: And that, Gorgias, was what I was suspecting to be your notion;
[437]      yet I would not have you wonder if by-and-by I am found repeating a
[438]      seemingly plain question; for I ask not in order to confute you, but as I
[439]      was saying that the argument may proceed consecutively, and that we may not
[440]      get the habit of anticipating and suspecting the meaning of one another's
[441]      words; I would have you develope your own views in your own way, whatever
[442]      may be your hypothesis.
[443]      
[444]      GORGIAS: I think that you are quite right, Socrates.
[445]      
[446]      SOCRATES: Then let me raise another question; there is such a thing as
[447]      'having learned'?
[448]      
[449]      GORGIAS: Yes.
[450]      
[451]      SOCRATES: And there is also 'having believed'?
[452]      
[453]      GORGIAS: Yes.
[454]      
[455]      SOCRATES: And is the 'having learned' the same as 'having believed,' and
[456]      are learning and belief the same things?
[457]      
[458]      GORGIAS: In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same.
[459]      
[460]      SOCRATES: And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in this way:--
[461]      If a person were to say to you, 'Is there, Gorgias, a false belief as well
[462]      as a true?'--you would reply, if I am not mistaken, that there is.
[463]      
[464]      GORGIAS: Yes.
[465]      
[466]      SOCRATES: Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true?
[467]      
[468]      GORGIAS: No.
[469]      
[470]      SOCRATES: No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief
[471]      differ.
[472]      
[473]      GORGIAS: Very true.
[474]      
[475]      SOCRATES: And yet those who have learned as well as those who have
[476]      believed are persuaded?
[477]      
[478]      GORGIAS: Just so.
[479]      
[480]      SOCRATES: Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion,--one which is the
[481]      source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge?
[482]      
[483]      GORGIAS: By all means.
[484]      
[485]      SOCRATES: And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts of
[486]      law and other assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of persuasion
[487]      which gives belief without knowledge, or that which gives knowledge?
[488]      
[489]      GORGIAS: Clearly, Socrates, that which only gives belief.
[490]      
[491]      SOCRATES: Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a persuasion
[492]      which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no instruction
[493]      about them?
[494]      
[495]      GORGIAS: True.
[496]      
[497]      SOCRATES: And the rhetorician does not instruct the courts of law or other
[498]      assemblies about things just and unjust, but he creates belief about them;
[499]      for no one can be supposed to instruct such a vast multitude about such
[500]      high matters in a short time?
[501]      
[502]      GORGIAS: Certainly not.
[503]      
[504]      SOCRATES: Come, then, and let us see what we really mean about rhetoric;
[505]      for I do not know what my own meaning is as yet. When the assembly meets
[506]      to elect a physician or a shipwright or any other craftsman, will the
[507]      rhetorician be taken into counsel? Surely not. For at every election he
[508]      ought to be chosen who is most skilled; and, again, when walls have to be
[509]      built or harbours or docks to be constructed, not the rhetorician but the
[510]      master workman will advise; or when generals have to be chosen and an order
[511]      of battle arranged, or a position taken, then the military will advise and
[512]      not the rhetoricians: what do you say, Gorgias? Since you profess to be a
[513]      rhetorician and a maker of rhetoricians, I cannot do better than learn the
[514]      nature of your art from you. And here let me assure you that I have your
[515]      interest in view as well as my own. For likely enough some one or other of
[516]      the young men present might desire to become your pupil, and in fact I see
[517]      some, and a good many too, who have this wish, but they would be too modest
[518]      to question you. And therefore when you are interrogated by me, I would
[519]      have you imagine that you are interrogated by them. 'What is the use of
[520]      coming to you, Gorgias?' they will say--'about what will you teach us to
[521]      advise the state?--about the just and unjust only, or about those other
[522]      things also which Socrates has just mentioned?' How will you answer them?
[523]      
[524]      GORGIAS: I like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I will endeavour
[525]      to reveal to you the whole nature of rhetoric. You must have heard, I
[526]      think, that the docks and the walls of the Athenians and the plan of the
[527]      harbour were devised in accordance with the counsels, partly of
[528]      Themistocles, and partly of Pericles, and not at the suggestion of the
[529]      builders.
[530]      
[531]      SOCRATES: Such is the tradition, Gorgias, about Themistocles; and I myself
[532]      heard the speech of Pericles when he advised us about the middle wall.
[533]      
[534]      GORGIAS: And you will observe, Socrates, that when a decision has to be
[535]      given in such matters the rhetoricians are the advisers; they are the men
[536]      who win their point.
[537]      
[538]      SOCRATES: I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias, when I asked what is
[539]      the nature of rhetoric, which always appears to me, when I look at the
[540]      matter in this way, to be a marvel of greatness.
[541]      
[542]      GORGIAS: A marvel, indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how rhetoric
[543]      comprehends and holds under her sway all the inferior arts. Let me offer
[544]      you a striking example of this. On several occasions I have been with my
[545]      brother Herodicus or some other physician to see one of his patients, who
[546]      would not allow the physician to give him medicine, or apply the knife or
[547]      hot iron to him; and I have persuaded him to do for me what he would not do
[548]      for the physician just by the use of rhetoric. And I say that if a
[549]      rhetorician and a physician were to go to any city, and had there to argue
[550]      in the Ecclesia or any other assembly as to which of them should be elected
[551]      state-physician, the physician would have no chance; but he who could speak
[552]      would be chosen if he wished; and in a contest with a man of any other
[553]      profession the rhetorician more than any one would have the power of
[554]      getting himself chosen, for he can speak more persuasively to the multitude
[555]      than any of them, and on any subject. Such is the nature and power of the
[556]      art of rhetoric! And yet, Socrates, rhetoric should be used like any other
[557]      competitive art, not against everybody,--the rhetorician ought not to abuse
[558]      his strength any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master of
[559]      fence;--because he has powers which are more than a match either for friend
[560]      or enemy, he ought not therefore to strike, stab, or slay his friends.
[561]      Suppose a man to have been trained in the palestra and to be a skilful
[562]      boxer,--he in the fulness of his strength goes and strikes his father or
[563]      mother or one of his familiars or friends; but that is no reason why the
[564]      trainers or fencing-masters should be held in detestation or banished from
[565]      the city;--surely not. For they taught their art for a good purpose, to be
[566]      used against enemies and evil-doers, in self-defence not in aggression, and
[567]      others have perverted their instructions, and turned to a bad use their own
[568]      strength and skill. But not on this account are the teachers bad, neither
[569]      is the art in fault, or bad in itself; I should rather say that those who
[570]      make a bad use of the art are to blame. And the same argument holds good
[571]      of rhetoric; for the rhetorician can speak against all men and upon any
[572]      subject,--in short, he can persuade the multitude better than any other man
[573]      of anything which he pleases, but he should not therefore seek to defraud
[574]      the physician or any other artist of his reputation merely because he has
[575]      the power; he ought to use rhetoric fairly, as he would also use his
[576]      athletic powers. And if after having become a rhetorician he makes a bad
[577]      use of his strength and skill, his instructor surely ought not on that
[578]      account to be held in detestation or banished. For he was intended by his
[579]      teacher to make a good use of his instructions, but he abuses them. And
[580]      therefore he is the person who ought to be held in detestation, banished,
[581]      and put to death, and not his instructor.
[582]      
[583]      SOCRATES: You, Gorgias, like myself, have had great experience of
[584]      disputations, and you must have observed, I think, that they do not always
[585]      terminate in mutual edification, or in the definition by either party of
[586]      the subjects which they are discussing; but disagreements are apt to arise
[587]      --somebody says that another has not spoken truly or clearly; and then they
[588]      get into a passion and begin to quarrel, both parties conceiving that their
[589]      opponents are arguing from personal feeling only and jealousy of
[590]      themselves, not from any interest in the question at issue. And sometimes
[591]      they will go on abusing one another until the company at last are quite
[592]      vexed at themselves for ever listening to such fellows. Why do I say this?
[593]      Why, because I cannot help feeling that you are now saying what is not
[594]      quite consistent or accordant with what you were saying at first about
[595]      rhetoric. And I am afraid to point this out to you, lest you should think
[596]      that I have some animosity against you, and that I speak, not for the sake
[597]      of discovering the truth, but from jealousy of you. Now if you are one of
[598]      my sort, I should like to cross-examine you, but if not I will let you
[599]      alone. And what is my sort? you will ask. I am one of those who are very
[600]      willing to be refuted if I say anything which is not true, and very willing
[601]      to refute any one else who says what is not true, and quite as ready to be
[602]      refuted as to refute; for I hold that this is the greater gain of the two,
[603]      just as the gain is greater of being cured of a very great evil than of
[604]      curing another. For I imagine that there is no evil which a man can endure
[605]      so great as an erroneous opinion about the matters of which we are
[606]      speaking; and if you claim to be one of my sort, let us have the discussion
[607]      out, but if you would rather have done, no matter;--let us make an end of
[608]      it.
[609]      
[610]      GORGIAS: I should say, Socrates, that I am quite the man whom you
[611]      indicate; but, perhaps, we ought to consider the audience, for, before you
[612]      came, I had already given a long exhibition, and if we proceed the argument
[613]      may run on to a great length. And therefore I think that we should
[614]      consider whether we may not be detaining some part of the company when they
[615]      are wanting to do something else.
[616]      
[617]      CHAEREPHON: You hear the audience cheering, Gorgias and Socrates, which
[618]      shows their desire to listen to you; and for myself, Heaven forbid that I
[619]      should have any business on hand which would take me away from a discussion
[620]      so interesting and so ably maintained.
[621]      
[622]      CALLICLES: By the gods, Chaerephon, although I have been present at many
[623]      discussions, I doubt whether I was ever so much delighted before, and
[624]      therefore if you go on discoursing all day I shall be the better pleased.
[625]      
[626]      SOCRATES: I may truly say, Callicles, that I am willing, if Gorgias is.
[627]      
[628]      GORGIAS: After all this, Socrates, I should be disgraced if I refused,
[629]      especially as I have promised to answer all comers; in accordance with the
[630]      wishes of the company, then, do you begin. and ask of me any question
[631]      which you like.
[632]      
[633]      SOCRATES: Let me tell you then, Gorgias, what surprises me in your words;
[634]      though I dare say that you may be right, and I may have misunderstood your
[635]      meaning. You say that you can make any man, who will learn of you, a
[636]      rhetorician?
[637]      
[638]      GORGIAS: Yes.
[639]      
[640]      SOCRATES: Do you mean that you will teach him to gain the ears of the
[641]      multitude on any subject, and this not by instruction but by persuasion?
[642]      
[643]      GORGIAS: Quite so.
[644]      
[645]      SOCRATES: You were saying, in fact, that the rhetorician will have greater
[646]      powers of persuasion than the physician even in a matter of health?
[647]      
[648]      GORGIAS: Yes, with the multitude,--that is.
[649]      
[650]      SOCRATES: You mean to say, with the ignorant; for with those who know he
[651]      cannot be supposed to have greater powers of persuasion.
[652]      
[653]      GORGIAS: Very true.
[654]      
[655]      SOCRATES: But if he is to have more power of persuasion than the
[656]      physician, he will have greater power than he who knows?
[657]      
[658]      GORGIAS: Certainly.
[659]      
[660]      SOCRATES: Although he is not a physician:--is he?
[661]      
[662]      GORGIAS: No.
[663]      
[664]      SOCRATES: And he who is not a physician must, obviously, be ignorant of
[665]      what the physician knows.
[666]      
[667]      GORGIAS: Clearly.
[668]      
[669]      SOCRATES: Then, when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the
[670]      physician, the ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he who
[671]      has knowledge?--is not that the inference?
[672]      
[673]      GORGIAS: In the case supposed:--yes.
[674]      
[675]      SOCRATES: And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the other
[676]      arts; the rhetorician need not know the truth about things; he has only to
[677]      discover some way of persuading the ignorant that he has more knowledge
[678]      than those who know?
[679]      
[680]      GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, and is not this a great comfort?--not to have
[681]      learned the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only, and yet to be in no
[682]      way inferior to the professors of them?
[683]      
[684]      SOCRATES: Whether the rhetorician is or not inferior on this account is a
[685]      question which we will hereafter examine if the enquiry is likely to be of
[686]      any service to us; but I would rather begin by asking, whether he is or is
[687]      not as ignorant of the just and unjust, base and honourable, good and evil,
[688]      as he is of medicine and the other arts; I mean to say, does he really know
[689]      anything of what is good and evil, base or honourable, just or unjust in
[690]      them; or has he only a way with the ignorant of persuading them that he not
[691]      knowing is to be esteemed to know more about these things than some one
[692]      else who knows? Or must the pupil know these things and come to you
[693]      knowing them before he can acquire the art of rhetoric? If he is ignorant,
[694]      you who are the teacher of rhetoric will not teach him--it is not your
[695]      business; but you will make him seem to the multitude to know them, when he
[696]      does not know them; and seem to be a good man, when he is not. Or will you
[697]      be unable to teach him rhetoric at all, unless he knows the truth of these
[698]      things first? What is to be said about all this? By heavens, Gorgias, I
[699]      wish that you would reveal to me the power of rhetoric, as you were saying
[700]      that you would.
[701]      
[702]      GORGIAS: Well, Socrates, I suppose that if the pupil does chance not to
[703]      know them, he will have to learn of me these things as well.
[704]      
[705]      SOCRATES: Say no more, for there you are right; and so he whom you make a
[706]      rhetorician must either know the nature of the just and unjust already, or
[707]      he must be taught by you.
[708]      
[709]      GORGIAS: Certainly.
[710]      
[711]      SOCRATES: Well, and is not he who has learned carpentering a carpenter?
[712]      
[713]      GORGIAS: Yes.
[714]      
[715]      SOCRATES: And he who has learned music a musician?
[716]      
[717]      GORGIAS: Yes.
[718]      
[719]      SOCRATES: And he who has learned medicine is a physician, in like manner?
[720]      He who has learned anything whatever is that which his knowledge makes him.
[721]      
[722]      GORGIAS: Certainly.
[723]      
[724]      SOCRATES: And in the same way, he who has learned what is just is just?
[725]      
[726]      GORGIAS: To be sure.
[727]      
[728]      SOCRATES: And he who is just may be supposed to do what is just?
[729]      
[730]      GORGIAS: Yes.
[731]      
[732]      SOCRATES: And must not the just man always desire to do what is just?
[733]      
[734]      GORGIAS: That is clearly the inference.
[735]      
[736]      SOCRATES: Surely, then, the just man will never consent to do injustice?
[737]      
[738]      GORGIAS: Certainly not.
[739]      
[740]      SOCRATES: And according to the argument the rhetorician must be a just
[741]      man?
[742]      
[743]      GORGIAS: Yes.
[744]      
[745]      SOCRATES: And will therefore never be willing to do injustice?
[746]      
[747]      GORGIAS: Clearly not.
[748]      
[749]      SOCRATES: But do you remember saying just now that the trainer is not to
[750]      be accused or banished if the pugilist makes a wrong use of his pugilistic
[751]      art; and in like manner, if the rhetorician makes a bad and unjust use of
[752]      his rhetoric, that is not to be laid to the charge of his teacher, who is
[753]      not to be banished, but the wrong-doer himself who made a bad use of his
[754]      rhetoric--he is to be banished--was not that said?
[755]      
[756]      GORGIAS: Yes, it was.
[757]      
[758]      SOCRATES: But now we are affirming that the aforesaid rhetorician will
[759]      never have done injustice at all?
[760]      
[761]      GORGIAS: True.
[762]      
[763]      SOCRATES: And at the very outset, Gorgias, it was said that rhetoric
[764]      treated of discourse, not (like arithmetic) about odd and even, but about
[765]      just and unjust? Was not this said?
[766]      
[767]      GORGIAS: Yes.
[768]      
[769]      SOCRATES: I was thinking at the time, when I heard you saying so, that
[770]      rhetoric, which is always discoursing about justice, could not possibly be
[771]      an unjust thing. But when you added, shortly afterwards, that the
[772]      rhetorician might make a bad use of rhetoric I noted with surprise the
[773]      inconsistency into which you had fallen; and I said, that if you thought,
[774]      as I did, that there was a gain in being refuted, there would be an
[775]      advantage in going on with the question, but if not, I would leave off.
[776]      And in the course of our investigations, as you will see yourself, the
[777]      rhetorician has been acknowledged to be incapable of making an unjust use
[778]      of rhetoric, or of willingness to do injustice. By the dog, Gorgias, there
[779]      will be a great deal of discussion, before we get at the truth of all this.
[780]      
[781]      POLUS: And do even you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now
[782]      saying about rhetoric? What! because Gorgias was ashamed to deny that the
[783]      rhetorician knew the just and the honourable and the good, and admitted
[784]      that to any one who came to him ignorant of them he could teach them, and
[785]      then out of this admission there arose a contradiction--the thing which you
[786]      dearly love, and to which not he, but you, brought the argument by your
[787]      captious questions--(do you seriously believe that there is any truth in
[788]      all this?) For will any one ever acknowledge that he does not know, or
[789]      cannot teach, the nature of justice? The truth is, that there is great
[790]      want of manners in bringing the argument to such a pass.
[791]      
[792]      SOCRATES: Illustrious Polus, the reason why we provide ourselves with
[793]      friends and children is, that when we get old and stumble, a younger
[794]      generation may be at hand to set us on our legs again in our words and in
[795]      our actions: and now, if I and Gorgias are stumbling, here are you who
[796]      should raise us up; and I for my part engage to retract any error into
[797]      which you may think that I have fallen-upon one condition:
[798]      
[799]      POLUS: What condition?
[800]      
[801]      SOCRATES: That you contract, Polus, the prolixity of speech in which you
[802]      indulged at first.
[803]      
[804]      POLUS: What! do you mean that I may not use as many words as I please?
[805]      
[806]      SOCRATES: Only to think, my friend, that having come on a visit to Athens,
[807]      which is the most free-spoken state in Hellas, you when you got there, and
[808]      you alone, should be deprived of the power of speech--that would be hard
[809]      indeed. But then consider my case:--shall not I be very hardly used, if,
[810]      when you are making a long oration, and refusing to answer what you are
[811]      asked, I am compelled to stay and listen to you, and may not go away? I
[812]      say rather, if you have a real interest in the argument, or, to repeat my
[813]      former expression, have any desire to set it on its legs, take back any
[814]      statement which you please; and in your turn ask and answer, like myself
[815]      and Gorgias--refute and be refuted: for I suppose that you would claim to
[816]      know what Gorgias knows--would you not?
[817]      
[818]      POLUS: Yes.
[819]      
[820]      SOCRATES: And you, like him, invite any one to ask you about anything
[821]      which he pleases, and you will know how to answer him?
[822]      
[823]      POLUS: To be sure.
[824]      
[825]      SOCRATES: And now, which will you do, ask or answer?
[826]      
[827]      POLUS: I will ask; and do you answer me, Socrates, the same question which
[828]      Gorgias, as you suppose, is unable to answer: What is rhetoric?
[829]      
[830]      SOCRATES: Do you mean what sort of an art?
[831]      
[832]      POLUS: Yes.
[833]      
[834]      SOCRATES: To say the truth, Polus, it is not an art at all, in my opinion.
[835]      
[836]      POLUS: Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric?
[837]      
[838]      SOCRATES: A thing which, as I was lately reading in a book of yours, you
[839]      say that you have made an art.
[840]      
[841]      POLUS: What thing?
[842]      
[843]      SOCRATES: I should say a sort of experience.
[844]      
[845]      POLUS: Does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience?
[846]      
[847]      SOCRATES: That is my view, but you may be of another mind.
[848]      
[849]      POLUS: An experience in what?
[850]      
[851]      SOCRATES: An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification.
[852]      
[853]      POLUS: And if able to gratify others, must not rhetoric be a fine thing?
[854]      
[855]      SOCRATES: What are you saying, Polus? Why do you ask me whether rhetoric
[856]      is a fine thing or not, when I have not as yet told you what rhetoric is?
[857]      
[858]      POLUS: Did I not hear you say that rhetoric was a sort of experience?
[859]      
[860]      SOCRATES: Will you, who are so desirous to gratify others, afford a slight
[861]      gratification to me?
[862]      
[863]      POLUS: I will.
[864]      
[865]      SOCRATES: Will you ask me, what sort of an art is cookery?
[866]      
[867]      POLUS: What sort of an art is cookery?
[868]      
[869]      SOCRATES: Not an art at all, Polus.
[870]      
[871]      POLUS: What then?
[872]      
[873]      SOCRATES: I should say an experience.
[874]      
[875]      POLUS: In what? I wish that you would explain to me.
[876]      
[877]      SOCRATES: An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification,
[878]      Polus.
[879]      
[880]      POLUS: Then are cookery and rhetoric the same?
[881]      
[882]      SOCRATES: No, they are only different parts of the same profession.
[883]      
[884]      POLUS: Of what profession?
[885]      
[886]      SOCRATES: I am afraid that the truth may seem discourteous; and I hesitate
[887]      to answer, lest Gorgias should imagine that I am making fun of his own
[888]      profession. For whether or no this is that art of rhetoric which Gorgias
[889]      practises I really cannot tell:--from what he was just now saying, nothing
[890]      appeared of what he thought of his art, but the rhetoric which I mean is a
[891]      part of a not very creditable whole.
[892]      
[893]      GORGIAS: A part of what, Socrates? Say what you mean, and never mind me.
[894]      
[895]      SOCRATES: In my opinion then, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is a
[896]      part is not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready wit, which
[897]      knows how to manage mankind: this habit I sum up under the word
[898]      'flattery'; and it appears to me to have many other parts, one of which is
[899]      cookery, which may seem to be an art, but, as I maintain, is only an
[900]      experience or routine and not an art:--another part is rhetoric, and the
[901]      art of attiring and sophistry are two others: thus there are four
[902]      branches, and four different things answering to them. And Polus may ask,
[903]      if he likes, for he has not as yet been informed, what part of flattery is
[904]      rhetoric: he did not see that I had not yet answered him when he proceeded
[905]      to ask a further question: Whether I do not think rhetoric a fine thing?
[906]      But I shall not tell him whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, until I
[907]      have first answered, 'What is rhetoric?' For that would not be right,
[908]      Polus; but I shall be happy to answer, if you will ask me, What part of
[909]      flattery is rhetoric?
[910]      
[911]      POLUS: I will ask and do you answer? What part of flattery is rhetoric?
[912]      
[913]      SOCRATES: Will you understand my answer? Rhetoric, according to my view,
[914]      is the ghost or counterfeit of a part of politics.
[915]      
[916]      POLUS: And noble or ignoble?
[917]      
[918]      SOCRATES: Ignoble, I should say, if I am compelled to answer, for I call
[919]      what is bad ignoble: though I doubt whether you understand what I was
[920]      saying before.
[921]      
[922]      GORGIAS: Indeed, Socrates, I cannot say that I understand myself.
[923]      
[924]      SOCRATES: I do not wonder, Gorgias; for I have not as yet explained
[925]      myself, and our friend Polus, colt by name and colt by nature, is apt to
[926]      run away. (This is an untranslatable play on the name 'Polus,' which means
[927]      'a colt.')
[928]      
[929]      GORGIAS: Never mind him, but explain to me what you mean by saying that
[930]      rhetoric is the counterfeit of a part of politics.
[931]      
[932]      SOCRATES: I will try, then, to explain my notion of rhetoric, and if I am
[933]      mistaken, my friend Polus shall refute me. We may assume the existence of
[934]      bodies and of souls?
[935]      
[936]      GORGIAS: Of course.
[937]      
[938]      SOCRATES: You would further admit that there is a good condition of either
[939]      of them?
[940]      
[941]      GORGIAS: Yes.
[942]      
[943]      SOCRATES: Which condition may not be really good, but good only in
[944]      appearance? I mean to say, that there are many persons who appear to be in
[945]      good health, and whom only a physician or trainer will discern at first
[946]      sight not to be in good health.
[947]      
[948]      GORGIAS: True.
[949]      
[950]      SOCRATES: And this applies not only to the body, but also to the soul: in
[951]      either there may be that which gives the appearance of health and not the
[952]      reality?
[953]      
[954]      GORGIAS: Yes, certainly.
[955]      
[956]      SOCRATES: And now I will endeavour to explain to you more clearly what I
[957]      mean: The soul and body being two, have two arts corresponding to them:
[958]      there is the art of politics attending on the soul; and another art
[959]      attending on the body, of which I know no single name, but which may be
[960]      described as having two divisions, one of them gymnastic, and the other
[961]      medicine. And in politics there is a legislative part, which answers to
[962]      gymnastic, as justice does to medicine; and the two parts run into one
[963]      another, justice having to do with the same subject as legislation, and
[964]      medicine with the same subject as gymnastic, but with a difference. Now,
[965]      seeing that there are these four arts, two attending on the body and two on
[966]      the soul for their highest good; flattery knowing, or rather guessing their
[967]      natures, has distributed herself into four shams or simulations of them;
[968]      she puts on the likeness of some one or other of them, and pretends to be
[969]      that which she simulates, and having no regard for men's highest interests,
[970]      is ever making pleasure the bait of the unwary, and deceiving them into the
[971]      belief that she is of the highest value to them. Cookery simulates the
[972]      disguise of medicine, and pretends to know what food is the best for the
[973]      body; and if the physician and the cook had to enter into a competition in
[974]      which children were the judges, or men who had no more sense than children,
[975]      as to which of them best understands the goodness or badness of food, the
[976]      physician would be starved to death. A flattery I deem this to be and of
[977]      an ignoble sort, Polus, for to you I am now addressing myself, because it
[978]      aims at pleasure without any thought of the best. An art I do not call it,
[979]      but only an experience, because it is unable to explain or to give a reason
[980]      of the nature of its own applications. And I do not call any irrational
[981]      thing an art; but if you dispute my words, I am prepared to argue in
[982]      defence of them.
[983]      
[984]      Cookery, then, I maintain to be a flattery which takes the form of
[985]      medicine; and tiring, in like manner, is a flattery which takes the form of
[986]      gymnastic, and is knavish, false, ignoble, illiberal, working deceitfully
[987]      by the help of lines, and colours, and enamels, and garments, and making
[988]      men affect a spurious beauty to the neglect of the true beauty which is
[989]      given by gymnastic.
[990]      
[991]      I would rather not be tedious, and therefore I will only say, after the
[992]      manner of the geometricians (for I think that by this time you will be able
[993]      to follow)
[994]      
[995]      as tiring : gymnastic :: cookery : medicine;
[996]      
[997]      or rather,
[998]      
[999]      as tiring : gymnastic :: sophistry : legislation;
[1000]     
[1001]     and
[1002]     
[1003]     as cookery : medicine :: rhetoric : justice.
[1004]     
[1005]     And this, I say, is the natural difference between the rhetorician and the
[1006]     sophist, but by reason of their near connection, they are apt to be jumbled
[1007]     up together; neither do they know what to make of themselves, nor do other
[1008]     men know what to make of them. For if the body presided over itself, and
[1009]     were not under the guidance of the soul, and the soul did not discern and
[1010]     discriminate between cookery and medicine, but the body was made the judge
[1011]     of them, and the rule of judgment was the bodily delight which was given by
[1012]     them, then the word of Anaxagoras, that word with which you, friend Polus,
[1013]     are so well acquainted, would prevail far and wide: 'Chaos' would come
[1014]     again, and cookery, health, and medicine would mingle in an indiscriminate
[1015]     mass. And now I have told you my notion of rhetoric, which is, in relation
[1016]     to the soul, what cookery is to the body. I may have been inconsistent in
[1017]     making a long speech, when I would not allow you to discourse at length.
[1018]     But I think that I may be excused, because you did not understand me, and
[1019]     could make no use of my answer when I spoke shortly, and therefore I had to
[1020]     enter into an explanation. And if I show an equal inability to make use of
[1021]     yours, I hope that you will speak at equal length; but if I am able to
[1022]     understand you, let me have the benefit of your brevity, as is only fair:
[1023]     And now you may do what you please with my answer.
[1024]     
[1025]     POLUS: What do you mean? do you think that rhetoric is flattery?
[1026]     
[1027]     SOCRATES: Nay, I said a part of flattery; if at your age, Polus, you
[1028]     cannot remember, what will you do by-and-by, when you get older?
[1029]     
[1030]     POLUS: And are the good rhetoricians meanly regarded in states, under the
[1031]     idea that they are flatterers?
[1032]     
[1033]     SOCRATES: Is that a question or the beginning of a speech?
[1034]     
[1035]     POLUS: I am asking a question.
[1036]     
[1037]     SOCRATES: Then my answer is, that they are not regarded at all.
[1038]     
[1039]     POLUS: How not regarded? Have they not very great power in states?
[1040]     
[1041]     SOCRATES: Not if you mean to say that power is a good to the possessor.
[1042]     
[1043]     POLUS: And that is what I do mean to say.
[1044]     
[1045]     SOCRATES: Then, if so, I think that they have the least power of all the
[1046]     citizens.
[1047]     
[1048]     POLUS: What! are they not like tyrants? They kill and despoil and exile
[1049]     any one whom they please.
[1050]     
[1051]     SOCRATES: By the dog, Polus, I cannot make out at each deliverance of
[1052]     yours, whether you are giving an opinion of your own, or asking a question
[1053]     of me.
[1054]     
[1055]     POLUS: I am asking a question of you.
[1056]     
[1057]     SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, but you ask two questions at once.
[1058]     
[1059]     POLUS: How two questions?
[1060]     
[1061]     SOCRATES: Why, did you not say just now that the rhetoricians are like
[1062]     tyrants, and that they kill and despoil or exile any one whom they please?
[1063]     
[1064]     POLUS: I did.
[1065]     
[1066]     SOCRATES: Well then, I say to you that here are two questions in one, and
[1067]     I will answer both of them. And I tell you, Polus, that rhetoricians and
[1068]     tyrants have the least possible power in states, as I was just now saying;
[1069]     for they do literally nothing which they will, but only what they think
[1070]     best.
[1071]     
[1072]     POLUS: And is not that a great power?
[1073]     
[1074]     SOCRATES: Polus has already said the reverse.
[1075]     
[1076]     POLUS: Said the reverse! nay, that is what I assert.
[1077]     
[1078]     SOCRATES: No, by the great--what do you call him?--not you, for you say
[1079]     that power is a good to him who has the power.
[1080]     
[1081]     POLUS: I do.
[1082]     
[1083]     SOCRATES: And would you maintain that if a fool does what he thinks best,
[1084]     this is a good, and would you call this great power?
[1085]     
[1086]     POLUS: I should not.
[1087]     
[1088]     SOCRATES: Then you must prove that the rhetorician is not a fool, and that
[1089]     rhetoric is an art and not a flattery--and so you will have refuted me; but
[1090]     if you leave me unrefuted, why, the rhetoricians who do what they think
[1091]     best in states, and the tyrants, will have nothing upon which to
[1092]     congratulate themselves, if as you say, power be indeed a good, admitting
[1093]     at the same time that what is done without sense is an evil.
[1094]     
[1095]     POLUS: Yes; I admit that.
[1096]     
[1097]     SOCRATES: How then can the rhetoricians or the tyrants have great power in
[1098]     states, unless Polus can refute Socrates, and prove to him that they do as
[1099]     they will?
[1100]     
[1101]     POLUS: This fellow--
[1102]     
[1103]     SOCRATES: I say that they do not do as they will;--now refute me.
[1104]     
[1105]     POLUS: Why, have you not already said that they do as they think best?
[1106]     
[1107]     SOCRATES: And I say so still.
[1108]     
[1109]     POLUS: Then surely they do as they will?
[1110]     
[1111]     SOCRATES: I deny it.
[1112]     
[1113]     POLUS: But they do what they think best?
[1114]     
[1115]     SOCRATES: Aye.
[1116]     
[1117]     POLUS: That, Socrates, is monstrous and absurd.
[1118]     
[1119]     SOCRATES: Good words, good Polus, as I may say in your own peculiar style;
[1120]     but if you have any questions to ask of me, either prove that I am in error
[1121]     or give the answer yourself.
[1122]     
[1123]     POLUS: Very well, I am willing to answer that I may know what you mean.
[1124]     
[1125]     SOCRATES: Do men appear to you to will that which they do, or to will that
[1126]     further end for the sake of which they do a thing? when they take medicine,
[1127]     for example, at the bidding of a physician, do they will the drinking of
[1128]     the medicine which is painful, or the health for the sake of which they
[1129]     drink?
[1130]     
[1131]     POLUS: Clearly, the health.
[1132]     
[1133]     SOCRATES: And when men go on a voyage or engage in business, they do not
[1134]     will that which they are doing at the time; for who would desire to take
[1135]     the risk of a voyage or the trouble of business?--But they will, to have
[1136]     the wealth for the sake of which they go on a voyage.
[1137]     
[1138]     POLUS: Certainly.
[1139]     
[1140]     SOCRATES: And is not this universally true? If a man does something for
[1141]     the sake of something else, he wills not that which he does, but that for
[1142]     the sake of which he does it.
[1143]     
[1144]     POLUS: Yes.
[1145]     
[1146]     SOCRATES: And are not all things either good or evil, or intermediate and
[1147]     indifferent?
[1148]     
[1149]     POLUS: To be sure, Socrates.
[1150]     
[1151]     SOCRATES: Wisdom and health and wealth and the like you would call goods,
[1152]     and their opposites evils?
[1153]     
[1154]     POLUS: I should.
[1155]     
[1156]     SOCRATES: And the things which are neither good nor evil, and which
[1157]     partake sometimes of the nature of good and at other times of evil, or of
[1158]     neither, are such as sitting, walking, running, sailing; or, again, wood,
[1159]     stones, and the like:--these are the things which you call neither good nor
[1160]     evil?
[1161]     
[1162]     POLUS: Exactly so.
[1163]     
[1164]     SOCRATES: Are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good, or
[1165]     the good for the sake of the indifferent?
[1166]     
[1167]     POLUS: Clearly, the indifferent for the sake of the good.
[1168]     
[1169]     SOCRATES: When we walk we walk for the sake of the good, and under the
[1170]     idea that it is better to walk, and when we stand we stand equally for the
[1171]     sake of the good?
[1172]     
[1173]     POLUS: Yes.
[1174]     
[1175]     SOCRATES: And when we kill a man we kill him or exile him or despoil him
[1176]     of his goods, because, as we think, it will conduce to our good?
[1177]     
[1178]     POLUS: Certainly.
[1179]     
[1180]     SOCRATES: Men who do any of these things do them for the sake of the good?
[1181]     
[1182]     POLUS: Yes.
[1183]     
[1184]     SOCRATES: And did we not admit that in doing something for the sake of
[1185]     something else, we do not will those things which we do, but that other
[1186]     thing for the sake of which we do them?
[1187]     
[1188]     POLUS: Most true.
[1189]     
[1190]     SOCRATES: Then we do not will simply to kill a man or to exile him or to
[1191]     despoil him of his goods, but we will to do that which conduces to our
[1192]     good, and if the act is not conducive to our good we do not will it; for we
[1193]     will, as you say, that which is our good, but that which is neither good
[1194]     nor evil, or simply evil, we do not will. Why are you silent, Polus? Am I
[1195]     not right?
[1196]     
[1197]     POLUS: You are right.
[1198]     
[1199]     SOCRATES: Hence we may infer, that if any one, whether he be a tyrant or a
[1200]     rhetorician, kills another or exiles another or deprives him of his
[1201]     property, under the idea that the act is for his own interests when really
[1202]     not for his own interests, he may be said to do what seems best to him?
[1203]     
[1204]     POLUS: Yes.
[1205]     
[1206]     SOCRATES: But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil? Why do
[1207]     you not answer?
[1208]     
[1209]     POLUS: Well, I suppose not.
[1210]     
[1211]     SOCRATES: Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such a one have
[1212]     great power in a state?
[1213]     
[1214]     POLUS: He will not.
[1215]     
[1216]     SOCRATES: Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good to
[1217]     him in a state, and not have great power, and not do what he wills?
[1218]     
[1219]     POLUS: As though you, Socrates, would not like to have the power of doing
[1220]     what seemed good to you in the state, rather than not; you would not be
[1221]     jealous when you saw any one killing or despoiling or imprisoning whom he
[1222]     pleased, Oh, no!
[1223]     
[1224]     SOCRATES: Justly or unjustly, do you mean?
[1225]     
[1226]     POLUS: In either case is he not equally to be envied?
[1227]     
[1228]     SOCRATES: Forbear, Polus!
[1229]     
[1230]     POLUS: Why 'forbear'?
[1231]     
[1232]     SOCRATES: Because you ought not to envy wretches who are not to be envied,
[1233]     but only to pity them.
[1234]     
[1235]     POLUS: And are those of whom I spoke wretches?
[1236]     
[1237]     SOCRATES: Yes, certainly they are.
[1238]     
[1239]     POLUS: And so you think that he who slays any one whom he pleases, and
[1240]     justly slays him, is pitiable and wretched?
[1241]     
[1242]     SOCRATES: No, I do not say that of him: but neither do I think that he is
[1243]     to be envied.
[1244]     
[1245]     POLUS: Were you not saying just now that he is wretched?
[1246]     
[1247]     SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, if he killed another unjustly, in which case he
[1248]     is also to be pitied; and he is not to be envied if he killed him justly.
[1249]     
[1250]     POLUS: At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death is
[1251]     wretched, and to be pitied?
[1252]     
[1253]     SOCRATES: Not so much, Polus, as he who kills him, and not so much as he
[1254]     who is justly killed.
[1255]     
[1256]     POLUS: How can that be, Socrates?
[1257]     
[1258]     SOCRATES: That may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is the
[1259]     greatest of evils.
[1260]     
[1261]     POLUS: But is it the greatest? Is not suffering injustice a greater evil?
[1262]     
[1263]     SOCRATES: Certainly not.
[1264]     
[1265]     POLUS: Then would you rather suffer than do injustice?
[1266]     
[1267]     SOCRATES: I should not like either, but if I must choose between them, I
[1268]     would rather suffer than do.
[1269]     
[1270]     POLUS: Then you would not wish to be a tyrant?
[1271]     
[1272]     SOCRATES: Not if you mean by tyranny what I mean.
[1273]     
[1274]     POLUS: I mean, as I said before, the power of doing whatever seems good to
[1275]     you in a state, killing, banishing, doing in all things as you like.
[1276]     
[1277]     SOCRATES: Well then, illustrious friend, when I have said my say, do you
[1278]     reply to me. Suppose that I go into a crowded Agora, and take a dagger
[1279]     under my arm. Polus, I say to you, I have just acquired rare power, and
[1280]     become a tyrant; for if I think that any of these men whom you see ought to
[1281]     be put to death, the man whom I have a mind to kill is as good as dead; and
[1282]     if I am disposed to break his head or tear his garment, he will have his
[1283]     head broken or his garment torn in an instant. Such is my great power in
[1284]     this city. And if you do not believe me, and I show you the dagger, you
[1285]     would probably reply: Socrates, in that sort of way any one may have great
[1286]     power--he may burn any house which he pleases, and the docks and triremes
[1287]     of the Athenians, and all their other vessels, whether public or private--
[1288]     but can you believe that this mere doing as you think best is great power?
[1289]     
[1290]     POLUS: Certainly not such doing as this.
[1291]     
[1292]     SOCRATES: But can you tell me why you disapprove of such a power?
[1293]     
[1294]     POLUS: I can.
[1295]     
[1296]     SOCRATES: Why then?
[1297]     
[1298]     POLUS: Why, because he who did as you say would be certain to be punished.
[1299]     
[1300]     SOCRATES: And punishment is an evil?
[1301]     
[1302]     POLUS: Certainly.
[1303]     
[1304]     SOCRATES: And you would admit once more, my good sir, that great power is
[1305]     a benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage, and that this
[1306]     is the meaning of great power; and if not, then his power is an evil and is
[1307]     no power. But let us look at the matter in another way:--do we not
[1308]     acknowledge that the things of which we were speaking, the infliction of
[1309]     death, and exile, and the deprivation of property are sometimes a good and
[1310]     sometimes not a good?
[1311]     
[1312]     POLUS: Certainly.
[1313]     
[1314]     SOCRATES: About that you and I may be supposed to agree?
[1315]     
[1316]     POLUS: Yes.
[1317]     
[1318]     SOCRATES: Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good and when that
[1319]     they are evil--what principle do you lay down?
[1320]     
[1321]     POLUS: I would rather, Socrates, that you should answer as well as ask
[1322]     that question.
[1323]     
[1324]     SOCRATES: Well, Polus, since you would rather have the answer from me, I
[1325]     say that they are good when they are just, and evil when they are unjust.
[1326]     
[1327]     POLUS: You are hard of refutation, Socrates, but might not a child refute
[1328]     that statement?
[1329]     
[1330]     SOCRATES: Then I shall be very grateful to the child, and equally grateful
[1331]     to you if you will refute me and deliver me from my foolishness. And I
[1332]     hope that refute me you will, and not weary of doing good to a friend.
[1333]     
[1334]     POLUS: Yes, Socrates, and I need not go far or appeal to antiquity; events
[1335]     which happened only a few days ago are enough to refute you, and to prove
[1336]     that many men who do wrong are happy.
[1337]     
[1338]     SOCRATES: What events?
[1339]     
[1340]     POLUS: You see, I presume, that Archelaus the son of Perdiccas is now the
[1341]     ruler of Macedonia?
[1342]     
[1343]     SOCRATES: At any rate I hear that he is.
[1344]     
[1345]     POLUS: And do you think that he is happy or miserable?
[1346]     
[1347]     SOCRATES: I cannot say, Polus, for I have never had any acquaintance with
[1348]     him.
[1349]     
[1350]     POLUS: And cannot you tell at once, and without having an acquaintance
[1351]     with him, whether a man is happy?
[1352]     
[1353]     SOCRATES: Most certainly not.
[1354]     
[1355]     POLUS: Then clearly, Socrates, you would say that you did not even know
[1356]     whether the great king was a happy man?
[1357]     
[1358]     SOCRATES: And I should speak the truth; for I do not know how he stands in
[1359]     the matter of education and justice.
[1360]     
[1361]     POLUS: What! and does all happiness consist in this?
[1362]     
[1363]     SOCRATES: Yes, indeed, Polus, that is my doctrine; the men and women who
[1364]     are gentle and good are also happy, as I maintain, and the unjust and evil
[1365]     are miserable.
[1366]     
[1367]     POLUS: Then, according to your doctrine, the said Archelaus is miserable?
[1368]     
[1369]     SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, if he is wicked.
[1370]     
[1371]     POLUS: That he is wicked I cannot deny; for he had no title at all to the
[1372]     throne which he now occupies, he being only the son of a woman who was the
[1373]     slave of Alcetas the brother of Perdiccas; he himself therefore in strict
[1374]     right was the slave of Alcetas; and if he had meant to do rightly he would
[1375]     have remained his slave, and then, according to your doctrine, he would
[1376]     have been happy. But now he is unspeakably miserable, for he has been
[1377]     guilty of the greatest crimes: in the first place he invited his uncle and
[1378]     master, Alcetas, to come to him, under the pretence that he would restore
[1379]     to him the throne which Perdiccas has usurped, and after entertaining him
[1380]     and his son Alexander, who was his own cousin, and nearly of an age with
[1381]     him, and making them drunk, he threw them into a waggon and carried them
[1382]     off by night, and slew them, and got both of them out of the way; and when
[1383]     he had done all this wickedness he never discovered that he was the most
[1384]     miserable of all men, and was very far from repenting: shall I tell you
[1385]     how he showed his remorse? he had a younger brother, a child of seven years
[1386]     old, who was the legitimate son of Perdiccas, and to him of right the
[1387]     kingdom belonged; Archelaus, however, had no mind to bring him up as he
[1388]     ought and restore the kingdom to him; that was not his notion of happiness;
[1389]     but not long afterwards he threw him into a well and drowned him, and
[1390]     declared to his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in while running after
[1391]     a goose, and had been killed. And now as he is the greatest criminal of
[1392]     all the Macedonians, he may be supposed to be the most miserable and not
[1393]     the happiest of them, and I dare say that there are many Athenians, and you
[1394]     would be at the head of them, who would rather be any other Macedonian than
[1395]     Archelaus!
[1396]     
[1397]     SOCRATES: I praised you at first, Polus, for being a rhetorician rather
[1398]     than a reasoner. And this, as I suppose, is the sort of argument with
[1399]     which you fancy that a child might refute me, and by which I stand refuted
[1400]     when I say that the unjust man is not happy. But, my good friend, where is
[1401]     the refutation? I cannot admit a word which you have been saying.
[1402]     
[1403]     POLUS: That is because you will not; for you surely must think as I do.
[1404]     
[1405]     SOCRATES: Not so, my simple friend, but because you will refute me after
[1406]     the manner which rhetoricians practise in courts of law. For there the one
[1407]     party think that they refute the other when they bring forward a number of
[1408]     witnesses of good repute in proof of their allegations, and their adversary
[1409]     has only a single one or none at all. But this kind of proof is of no
[1410]     value where truth is the aim; a man may often be sworn down by a multitude
[1411]     of false witnesses who have a great air of respectability. And in this
[1412]     argument nearly every one, Athenian and stranger alike, would be on your
[1413]     side, if you should bring witnesses in disproof of my statement;--you may,
[1414]     if you will, summon Nicias the son of Niceratus, and let his brothers, who
[1415]     gave the row of tripods which stand in the precincts of Dionysus, come with
[1416]     him; or you may summon Aristocrates, the son of Scellius, who is the giver
[1417]     of that famous offering which is at Delphi; summon, if you will, the whole
[1418]     house of Pericles, or any other great Athenian family whom you choose;--
[1419]     they will all agree with you: I only am left alone and cannot agree, for
[1420]     you do not convince me; although you produce many false witnesses against
[1421]     me, in the hope of depriving me of my inheritance, which is the truth. But
[1422]     I consider that nothing worth speaking of will have been effected by me
[1423]     unless I make you the one witness of my words; nor by you, unless you make
[1424]     me the one witness of yours; no matter about the rest of the world. For
[1425]     there are two ways of refutation, one which is yours and that of the world
[1426]     in general; but mine is of another sort--let us compare them, and see in
[1427]     what they differ. For, indeed, we are at issue about matters which to know
[1428]     is honourable and not to know disgraceful; to know or not to know happiness
[1429]     and misery--that is the chief of them. And what knowledge can be nobler?
[1430]     or what ignorance more disgraceful than this? And therefore I will begin
[1431]     by asking you whether you do not think that a man who is unjust and doing
[1432]     injustice can be happy, seeing that you think Archelaus unjust, and yet
[1433]     happy? May I assume this to be your opinion?
[1434]     
[1435]     POLUS: Certainly.
[1436]     
[1437]     SOCRATES: But I say that this is an impossibility--here is one point about
[1438]     which we are at issue:--very good. And do you mean to say also that if he
[1439]     meets with retribution and punishment he will still be happy?
[1440]     
[1441]     POLUS: Certainly not; in that case he will be most miserable.
[1442]     
[1443]     SOCRATES: On the other hand, if the unjust be not punished, then,
[1444]     according to you, he will be happy?
[1445]     
[1446]     POLUS: Yes.
[1447]     
[1448]     SOCRATES: But in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doer of unjust actions
[1449]     is miserable in any case,--more miserable, however, if he be not punished
[1450]     and does not meet with retribution, and less miserable if he be punished
[1451]     and meets with retribution at the hands of gods and men.
[1452]     
[1453]     POLUS: You are maintaining a strange doctrine, Socrates.
[1454]     
[1455]     SOCRATES: I shall try to make you agree with me, O my friend, for as a
[1456]     friend I regard you. Then these are the points at issue between us--are
[1457]     they not? I was saying that to do is worse than to suffer injustice?
[1458]     
[1459]     POLUS: Exactly so.
[1460]     
[1461]     SOCRATES: And you said the opposite?
[1462]     
[1463]     POLUS: Yes.
[1464]     
[1465]     SOCRATES: I said also that the wicked are miserable, and you refuted me?
[1466]     
[1467]     POLUS: By Zeus, I did.
[1468]     
[1469]     SOCRATES: In your own opinion, Polus.
[1470]     
[1471]     POLUS: Yes, and I rather suspect that I was in the right.
[1472]     
[1473]     SOCRATES: You further said that the wrong-doer is happy if he be
[1474]     unpunished?
[1475]     
[1476]     POLUS: Certainly.
[1477]     
[1478]     SOCRATES: And I affirm that he is most miserable, and that those who are
[1479]     punished are less miserable--are you going to refute this proposition also?
[1480]     
[1481]     POLUS: A proposition which is harder of refutation than the other,
[1482]     Socrates.
[1483]     
[1484]     SOCRATES: Say rather, Polus, impossible; for who can refute the truth?
[1485]     
[1486]     POLUS: What do you mean? If a man is detected in an unjust attempt to
[1487]     make himself a tyrant, and when detected is racked, mutilated, has his eyes
[1488]     burned out, and after having had all sorts of great injuries inflicted on
[1489]     him, and having seen his wife and children suffer the like, is at last
[1490]     impaled or tarred and burned alive, will he be happier than if he escape
[1491]     and become a tyrant, and continue all through life doing what he likes and
[1492]     holding the reins of government, the envy and admiration both of citizens
[1493]     and strangers? Is that the paradox which, as you say, cannot be refuted?
[1494]     
[1495]     SOCRATES: There again, noble Polus, you are raising hobgoblins instead of
[1496]     refuting me; just now you were calling witnesses against me. But please to
[1497]     refresh my memory a little; did you say--'in an unjust attempt to make
[1498]     himself a tyrant'?
[1499]     
[1500]     POLUS: Yes, I did.
[1501]     
[1502]     SOCRATES: Then I say that neither of them will be happier than the other,
[1503]     --neither he who unjustly acquires a tyranny, nor he who suffers in the
[1504]     attempt, for of two miserables one cannot be the happier, but that he who
[1505]     escapes and becomes a tyrant is the more miserable of the two. Do you
[1506]     laugh, Polus? Well, this is a new kind of refutation,--when any one says
[1507]     anything, instead of refuting him to laugh at him.
[1508]     
[1509]     POLUS: But do you not think, Socrates, that you have been sufficiently
[1510]     refuted, when you say that which no human being will allow? Ask the
[1511]     company.
[1512]     
[1513]     SOCRATES: O Polus, I am not a public man, and only last year, when my
[1514]     tribe were serving as Prytanes, and it became my duty as their president to
[1515]     take the votes, there was a laugh at me, because I was unable to take them.
[1516]     And as I failed then, you must not ask me to count the suffrages of the
[1517]     company now; but if, as I was saying, you have no better argument than
[1518]     numbers, let me have a turn, and do you make trial of the sort of proof
[1519]     which, as I think, is required; for I shall produce one witness only of the
[1520]     truth of my words, and he is the person with whom I am arguing; his
[1521]     suffrage I know how to take; but with the many I have nothing to do, and do
[1522]     not even address myself to them. May I ask then whether you will answer in
[1523]     turn and have your words put to the proof? For I certainly think that I
[1524]     and you and every man do really believe, that to do is a greater evil than
[1525]     to suffer injustice: and not to be punished than to be punished.
[1526]     
[1527]     POLUS: And I should say neither I, nor any man: would you yourself, for
[1528]     example, suffer rather than do injustice?
[1529]     
[1530]     SOCRATES: Yes, and you, too; I or any man would.
[1531]     
[1532]     POLUS: Quite the reverse; neither you, nor I, nor any man.
[1533]     
[1534]     SOCRATES: But will you answer?
[1535]     
[1536]     POLUS: To be sure, I will; for I am curious to hear what you can have to
[1537]     say.
[1538]     
[1539]     SOCRATES: Tell me, then, and you will know, and let us suppose that I am
[1540]     beginning at the beginning: which of the two, Polus, in your opinion, is
[1541]     the worst?--to do injustice or to suffer?
[1542]     
[1543]     POLUS: I should say that suffering was worst.
[1544]     
[1545]     SOCRATES: And which is the greater disgrace?--Answer.
[1546]     
[1547]     POLUS: To do.
[1548]     
[1549]     SOCRATES: And the greater disgrace is the greater evil?
[1550]     
[1551]     POLUS: Certainly not.
[1552]     
[1553]     SOCRATES: I understand you to say, if I am not mistaken, that the
[1554]     honourable is not the same as the good, or the disgraceful as the evil?
[1555]     
[1556]     POLUS: Certainly not.
[1557]     
[1558]     SOCRATES: Let me ask a question of you: When you speak of beautiful
[1559]     things, such as bodies, colours, figures, sounds, institutions, do you not
[1560]     call them beautiful in reference to some standard: bodies, for example,
[1561]     are beautiful in proportion as they are useful, or as the sight of them
[1562]     gives pleasure to the spectators; can you give any other account of
[1563]     personal beauty?
[1564]     
[1565]     POLUS: I cannot.
[1566]     
[1567]     SOCRATES: And you would say of figures or colours generally that they were
[1568]     beautiful, either by reason of the pleasure which they give, or of their
[1569]     use, or of both?
[1570]     
[1571]     POLUS: Yes, I should.
[1572]     
[1573]     SOCRATES: And you would call sounds and music beautiful for the same
[1574]     reason?
[1575]     
[1576]     POLUS: I should.
[1577]     
[1578]     SOCRATES: Laws and institutions also have no beauty in them except in so
[1579]     far as they are useful or pleasant or both?
[1580]     
[1581]     POLUS: I think not.
[1582]     
[1583]     SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of the beauty of knowledge?
[1584]     
[1585]     POLUS: To be sure, Socrates; and I very much approve of your measuring
[1586]     beauty by the standard of pleasure and utility.
[1587]     
[1588]     SOCRATES: And deformity or disgrace may be equally measured by the
[1589]     opposite standard of pain and evil?
[1590]     
[1591]     POLUS: Certainly.
[1592]     
[1593]     SOCRATES: Then when of two beautiful things one exceeds in beauty, the
[1594]     measure of the excess is to be taken in one or both of these; that is to
[1595]     say, in pleasure or utility or both?
[1596]     
[1597]     POLUS: Very true.
[1598]     
[1599]     SOCRATES: And of two deformed things, that which exceeds in deformity or
[1600]     disgrace, exceeds either in pain or evil--must it not be so?
[1601]     
[1602]     POLUS: Yes.
[1603]     
[1604]     SOCRATES: But then again, what was the observation which you just now
[1605]     made, about doing and suffering wrong? Did you not say, that suffering
[1606]     wrong was more evil, and doing wrong more disgraceful?
[1607]     
[1608]     POLUS: I did.
[1609]     
[1610]     SOCRATES: Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering, the
[1611]     more disgraceful must be more painful and must exceed in pain or in evil or
[1612]     both: does not that also follow?
[1613]     
[1614]     POLUS: Of course.
[1615]     
[1616]     SOCRATES: First, then, let us consider whether the doing of injustice
[1617]     exceeds the suffering in the consequent pain: Do the injurers suffer more
[1618]     than the injured?
[1619]     
[1620]     POLUS: No, Socrates; certainly not.
[1621]     
[1622]     SOCRATES: Then they do not exceed in pain?
[1623]     
[1624]     POLUS: No.
[1625]     
[1626]     SOCRATES: But if not in pain, then not in both?
[1627]     
[1628]     POLUS: Certainly not.
[1629]     
[1630]     SOCRATES: Then they can only exceed in the other?
[1631]     
[1632]     POLUS: Yes.
[1633]     
[1634]     SOCRATES: That is to say, in evil?
[1635]     
[1636]     POLUS: True.
[1637]     
[1638]     SOCRATES: Then doing injustice will have an excess of evil, and will
[1639]     therefore be a greater evil than suffering injustice?
[1640]     
[1641]     POLUS: Clearly.
[1642]     
[1643]     SOCRATES: But have not you and the world already agreed that to do
[1644]     injustice is more disgraceful than to suffer?
[1645]     
[1646]     POLUS: Yes.
[1647]     
[1648]     SOCRATES: And that is now discovered to be more evil?
[1649]     
[1650]     POLUS: True.
[1651]     
[1652]     SOCRATES: And would you prefer a greater evil or a greater dishonour to a
[1653]     less one? Answer, Polus, and fear not; for you will come to no harm if you
[1654]     nobly resign yourself into the healing hand of the argument as to a
[1655]     physician without shrinking, and either say 'Yes' or 'No' to me.
[1656]     
[1657]     POLUS: I should say 'No.'
[1658]     
[1659]     SOCRATES: Would any other man prefer a greater to a less evil?
[1660]     
[1661]     POLUS: No, not according to this way of putting the case, Socrates.
[1662]     
[1663]     SOCRATES: Then I said truly, Polus, that neither you, nor I, nor any man,
[1664]     would rather do than suffer injustice; for to do injustice is the greater
[1665]     evil of the two.
[1666]     
[1667]     POLUS: That is the conclusion.
[1668]     
[1669]     SOCRATES: You see, Polus, when you compare the two kinds of refutations,
[1670]     how unlike they are. All men, with the exception of myself, are of your
[1671]     way of thinking; but your single assent and witness are enough for me,--I
[1672]     have no need of any other, I take your suffrage, and am regardless of the
[1673]     rest. Enough of this, and now let us proceed to the next question; which
[1674]     is, Whether the greatest of evils to a guilty man is to suffer punishment,
[1675]     as you supposed, or whether to escape punishment is not a greater evil, as
[1676]     I supposed. Consider:--You would say that to suffer punishment is another
[1677]     name for being justly corrected when you do wrong?
[1678]     
[1679]     POLUS: I should.
[1680]     
[1681]     SOCRATES: And would you not allow that all just things are honourable in
[1682]     so far as they are just? Please to reflect, and tell me your opinion.
[1683]     
[1684]     POLUS: Yes, Socrates, I think that they are.
[1685]     
[1686]     SOCRATES: Consider again:--Where there is an agent, must there not also be
[1687]     a patient?
[1688]     
[1689]     POLUS: I should say so.
[1690]     
[1691]     SOCRATES: And will not the patient suffer that which the agent does, and
[1692]     will not the suffering have the quality of the action? I mean, for
[1693]     example, that if a man strikes, there must be something which is stricken?
[1694]     
[1695]     POLUS: Yes.
[1696]     
[1697]     SOCRATES: And if the striker strikes violently or quickly, that which is
[1698]     struck will he struck violently or quickly?
[1699]     
[1700]     POLUS: True.
[1701]     
[1702]     SOCRATES: And the suffering to him who is stricken is of the same nature
[1703]     as the act of him who strikes?
[1704]     
[1705]     POLUS: Yes.
[1706]     
[1707]     SOCRATES: And if a man burns, there is something which is burned?
[1708]     
[1709]     POLUS: Certainly.
[1710]     
[1711]     SOCRATES: And if he burns in excess or so as to cause pain, the thing
[1712]     burned will be burned in the same way?
[1713]     
[1714]     POLUS: Truly.
[1715]     
[1716]     SOCRATES: And if he cuts, the same argument holds--there will be something
[1717]     cut?
[1718]     
[1719]     POLUS: Yes.
[1720]     
[1721]     SOCRATES: And if the cutting be great or deep or such as will cause pain,
[1722]     the cut will be of the same nature?
[1723]     
[1724]     POLUS: That is evident.
[1725]     
[1726]     SOCRATES: Then you would agree generally to the universal proposition
[1727]     which I was just now asserting: that the affection of the patient answers
[1728]     to the affection of the agent?
[1729]     
[1730]     POLUS: I agree.
[1731]     
[1732]     SOCRATES: Then, as this is admitted, let me ask whether being punished is
[1733]     suffering or acting?
[1734]     
[1735]     POLUS: Suffering, Socrates; there can be no doubt of that.
[1736]     
[1737]     SOCRATES: And suffering implies an agent?
[1738]     
[1739]     POLUS: Certainly, Socrates; and he is the punisher.
[1740]     
[1741]     SOCRATES: And he who punishes rightly, punishes justly?
[1742]     
[1743]     POLUS: Yes.
[1744]     
[1745]     SOCRATES: And therefore he acts justly?
[1746]     
[1747]     POLUS: Justly.
[1748]     
[1749]     SOCRATES: Then he who is punished and suffers retribution, suffers justly?
[1750]     
[1751]     POLUS: That is evident.
[1752]     
[1753]     SOCRATES: And that which is just has been admitted to be honourable?
[1754]     
[1755]     POLUS: Certainly.
[1756]     
[1757]     SOCRATES: Then the punisher does what is honourable, and the punished
[1758]     suffers what is honourable?
[1759]     
[1760]     POLUS: True.
[1761]     
[1762]     SOCRATES: And if what is honourable, then what is good, for the honourable
[1763]     is either pleasant or useful?
[1764]     
[1765]     POLUS: Certainly.
[1766]     
[1767]     SOCRATES: Then he who is punished suffers what is good?
[1768]     
[1769]     POLUS: That is true.
[1770]     
[1771]     SOCRATES: Then he is benefited?
[1772]     
[1773]     POLUS: Yes.
[1774]     
[1775]     SOCRATES: Do I understand you to mean what I mean by the term 'benefited'?
[1776]     I mean, that if he be justly punished his soul is improved.
[1777]     
[1778]     POLUS: Surely.
[1779]     
[1780]     SOCRATES: Then he who is punished is delivered from the evil of his soul?
[1781]     
[1782]     POLUS: Yes.
[1783]     
[1784]     SOCRATES: And is he not then delivered from the greatest evil? Look at
[1785]     the matter in this way:--In respect of a man's estate, do you see any
[1786]     greater evil than poverty?
[1787]     
[1788]     POLUS: There is no greater evil.
[1789]     
[1790]     SOCRATES: Again, in a man's bodily frame, you would say that the evil is
[1791]     weakness and disease and deformity?
[1792]     
[1793]     POLUS: I should.
[1794]     
[1795]     SOCRATES: And do you not imagine that the soul likewise has some evil of
[1796]     her own?
[1797]     
[1798]     POLUS: Of course.
[1799]     
[1800]     SOCRATES: And this you would call injustice and ignorance and cowardice,
[1801]     and the like?
[1802]     
[1803]     POLUS: Certainly.
[1804]     
[1805]     SOCRATES: So then, in mind, body, and estate, which are three, you have
[1806]     pointed out three corresponding evils--injustice, disease, poverty?
[1807]     
[1808]     POLUS: True.
[1809]     
[1810]     SOCRATES: And which of the evils is the most disgraceful?--Is not the most
[1811]     disgraceful of them injustice, and in general the evil of the soul?
[1812]     
[1813]     POLUS: By far the most.
[1814]     
[1815]     SOCRATES: And if the most disgraceful, then also the worst?
[1816]     
[1817]     POLUS: What do you mean, Socrates?
[1818]     
[1819]     SOCRATES: I mean to say, that is most disgraceful has been already
[1820]     admitted to be most painful or hurtful, or both.
[1821]     
[1822]     POLUS: Certainly.
[1823]     
[1824]     SOCRATES: And now injustice and all evil in the soul has been admitted by
[1825]     us to be most disgraceful?
[1826]     
[1827]     POLUS: It has been admitted.
[1828]     
[1829]     SOCRATES: And most disgraceful either because most painful and causing
[1830]     excessive pain, or most hurtful, or both?
[1831]     
[1832]     POLUS: Certainly.
[1833]     
[1834]     SOCRATES: And therefore to be unjust and intemperate, and cowardly and
[1835]     ignorant, is more painful than to be poor and sick?
[1836]     
[1837]     POLUS: Nay, Socrates; the painfulness does not appear to me to follow from
[1838]     your premises.
[1839]     
[1840]     SOCRATES: Then, if, as you would argue, not more painful, the evil of the
[1841]     soul is of all evils the most disgraceful; and the excess of disgrace must
[1842]     be caused by some preternatural greatness, or extraordinary hurtfulness of
[1843]     the evil.
[1844]     
[1845]     POLUS: Clearly.
[1846]     
[1847]     SOCRATES: And that which exceeds most in hurtfulness will be the greatest
[1848]     of evils?
[1849]     
[1850]     POLUS: Yes.
[1851]     
[1852]     SOCRATES: Then injustice and intemperance, and in general the depravity of
[1853]     the soul, are the greatest of evils?
[1854]     
[1855]     POLUS: That is evident.
[1856]     
[1857]     SOCRATES: Now, what art is there which delivers us from poverty? Does not
[1858]     the art of making money?
[1859]     
[1860]     POLUS: Yes.
[1861]     
[1862]     SOCRATES: And what art frees us from disease? Does not the art of
[1863]     medicine?
[1864]     
[1865]     POLUS: Very true.
[1866]     
[1867]     SOCRATES: And what from vice and injustice? If you are not able to answer
[1868]     at once, ask yourself whither we go with the sick, and to whom we take
[1869]     them.
[1870]     
[1871]     POLUS: To the physicians, Socrates.
[1872]     
[1873]     SOCRATES: And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate?
[1874]     
[1875]     POLUS: To the judges, you mean.
[1876]     
[1877]     SOCRATES: --Who are to punish them?
[1878]     
[1879]     POLUS: Yes.
[1880]     
[1881]     SOCRATES: And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in
[1882]     accordance with a certain rule of justice?
[1883]     
[1884]     POLUS: Clearly.
[1885]     
[1886]     SOCRATES: Then the art of money-making frees a man from poverty; medicine
[1887]     from disease; and justice from intemperance and injustice?
[1888]     
[1889]     POLUS: That is evident.
[1890]     
[1891]     SOCRATES: Which, then, is the best of these three?
[1892]     
[1893]     POLUS: Will you enumerate them?
[1894]     
[1895]     SOCRATES: Money-making, medicine, and justice.
[1896]     
[1897]     POLUS: Justice, Socrates, far excels the two others.
[1898]     
[1899]     SOCRATES: And justice, if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or
[1900]     advantage or both?
[1901]     
[1902]     POLUS: Yes.
[1903]     
[1904]     SOCRATES: But is the being healed a pleasant thing, and are those who are
[1905]     being healed pleased?
[1906]     
[1907]     POLUS: I think not.
[1908]     
[1909]     SOCRATES: A useful thing, then?
[1910]     
[1911]     POLUS: Yes.
[1912]     
[1913]     SOCRATES: Yes, because the patient is delivered from a great evil; and
[1914]     this is the advantage of enduring the pain--that you get well?
[1915]     
[1916]     POLUS: Certainly.
[1917]     
[1918]     SOCRATES: And would he be the happier man in his bodily condition, who is
[1919]     healed, or who never was out of health?
[1920]     
[1921]     POLUS: Clearly he who was never out of health.
[1922]     
[1923]     SOCRATES: Yes; for happiness surely does not consist in being delivered
[1924]     from evils, but in never having had them.
[1925]     
[1926]     POLUS: True.
[1927]     
[1928]     SOCRATES: And suppose the case of two persons who have some evil in their
[1929]     bodies, and that one of them is healed and delivered from evil, and another
[1930]     is not healed, but retains the evil--which of them is the most miserable?
[1931]     
[1932]     POLUS: Clearly he who is not healed.
[1933]     
[1934]     SOCRATES: And was not punishment said by us to be a deliverance from the
[1935]     greatest of evils, which is vice?
[1936]     
[1937]     POLUS: True.
[1938]     
[1939]     SOCRATES: And justice punishes us, and makes us more just, and is the
[1940]     medicine of our vice?
[1941]     
[1942]     POLUS: True.
[1943]     
[1944]     SOCRATES: He, then, has the first place in the scale of happiness who has
[1945]     never had vice in his soul; for this has been shown to be the greatest of
[1946]     evils.
[1947]     
[1948]     POLUS: Clearly.
[1949]     
[1950]     SOCRATES: And he has the second place, who is delivered from vice?
[1951]     
[1952]     POLUS: True.
[1953]     
[1954]     SOCRATES: That is to say, he who receives admonition and rebuke and
[1955]     punishment?
[1956]     
[1957]     POLUS: Yes.
[1958]     
[1959]     SOCRATES: Then he lives worst, who, having been unjust, has no deliverance
[1960]     from injustice?
[1961]     
[1962]     POLUS: Certainly.
[1963]     
[1964]     SOCRATES: That is, he lives worst who commits the greatest crimes, and
[1965]     who, being the most unjust of men, succeeds in escaping rebuke or
[1966]     correction or punishment; and this, as you say, has been accomplished by
[1967]     Archelaus and other tyrants and rhetoricians and potentates? (Compare
[1968]     Republic.)
[1969]     
[1970]     POLUS: True.
[1971]     
[1972]     SOCRATES: May not their way of proceeding, my friend, be compared to the
[1973]     conduct of a person who is afflicted with the worst of diseases and yet
[1974]     contrives not to pay the penalty to the physician for his sins against his
[1975]     constitution, and will not be cured, because, like a child, he is afraid of
[1976]     the pain of being burned or cut:--Is not that a parallel case?
[1977]     
[1978]     POLUS: Yes, truly.
[1979]     
[1980]     SOCRATES: He would seem as if he did not know the nature of health and
[1981]     bodily vigour; and if we are right, Polus, in our previous conclusions,
[1982]     they are in a like case who strive to evade justice, which they see to be
[1983]     painful, but are blind to the advantage which ensues from it, not knowing
[1984]     how far more miserable a companion a diseased soul is than a diseased body;
[1985]     a soul, I say, which is corrupt and unrighteous and unholy. And hence they
[1986]     do all that they can to avoid punishment and to avoid being released from
[1987]     the greatest of evils; they provide themselves with money and friends, and
[1988]     cultivate to the utmost their powers of persuasion. But if we, Polus, are
[1989]     right, do you see what follows, or shall we draw out the consequences in
[1990]     form?
[1991]     
[1992]     POLUS: If you please.
[1993]     
[1994]     SOCRATES: Is it not a fact that injustice, and the doing of injustice, is
[1995]     the greatest of evils?
[1996]     
[1997]     POLUS: That is quite clear.
[1998]     
[1999]     SOCRATES: And further, that to suffer punishment is the way to be released
[2000]     from this evil?
[2001]     
[2002]     POLUS: True.
[2003]     
[2004]     SOCRATES: And not to suffer, is to perpetuate the evil?
[2005]     
[2006]     POLUS: Yes.
[2007]     
[2008]     SOCRATES: To do wrong, then, is second only in the scale of evils; but to
[2009]     do wrong and not to be punished, is first and greatest of all?
[2010]     
[2011]     POLUS: That is true.
[2012]     
[2013]     SOCRATES: Well, and was not this the point in dispute, my friend? You
[2014]     deemed Archelaus happy, because he was a very great criminal and
[2015]     unpunished: I, on the other hand, maintained that he or any other who like
[2016]     him has done wrong and has not been punished, is, and ought to be, the most
[2017]     miserable of all men; and that the doer of injustice is more miserable than
[2018]     the sufferer; and he who escapes punishment, more miserable than he who
[2019]     suffers.--Was not that what I said?
[2020]     
[2021]     POLUS: Yes.
[2022]     
[2023]     SOCRATES: And it has been proved to be true?
[2024]     
[2025]     POLUS: Certainly.
[2026]     
[2027]     SOCRATES: Well, Polus, but if this is true, where is the great use of
[2028]     rhetoric? If we admit what has been just now said, every man ought in
[2029]     every way to guard himself against doing wrong, for he will thereby suffer
[2030]     great evil?
[2031]     
[2032]     POLUS: True.
[2033]     
[2034]     SOCRATES: And if he, or any one about whom he cares, does wrong, he ought
[2035]     of his own accord to go where he will be immediately punished; he will run
[2036]     to the judge, as he would to the physician, in order that the disease of
[2037]     injustice may not be rendered chronic and become the incurable cancer of
[2038]     the soul; must we not allow this consequence, Polus, if our former
[2039]     admissions are to stand:--is any other inference consistent with them?
[2040]     
[2041]     POLUS: To that, Socrates, there can be but one answer.
[2042]     
[2043]     SOCRATES: Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in helping a man to
[2044]     excuse his own injustice, that of his parents or friends, or children or
[2045]     country; but may be of use to any one who holds that instead of excusing he
[2046]     ought to accuse--himself above all, and in the next degree his family or
[2047]     any of his friends who may be doing wrong; he should bring to light the
[2048]     iniquity and not conceal it, that so the wrong-doer may suffer and be made
[2049]     whole; and he should even force himself and others not to shrink, but with
[2050]     closed eyes like brave men to let the physician operate with knife or
[2051]     searing iron, not regarding the pain, in the hope of attaining the good and
[2052]     the honourable; let him who has done things worthy of stripes, allow
[2053]     himself to be scourged, if of bonds, to be bound, if of a fine, to be
[2054]     fined, if of exile, to be exiled, if of death, to die, himself being the
[2055]     first to accuse himself and his own relations, and using rhetoric to this
[2056]     end, that his and their unjust actions may be made manifest, and that they
[2057]     themselves may be delivered from injustice, which is the greatest evil.
[2058]     Then, Polus, rhetoric would indeed be useful. Do you say 'Yes' or 'No' to
[2059]     that?
[2060]     
[2061]     POLUS: To me, Socrates, what you are saying appears very strange, though
[2062]     probably in agreement with your premises.
[2063]     
[2064]     SOCRATES: Is not this the conclusion, if the premises are not disproven?
[2065]     
[2066]     POLUS: Yes; it certainly is.
[2067]     
[2068]     SOCRATES: And from the opposite point of view, if indeed it be our duty to
[2069]     harm another, whether an enemy or not--I except the case of self-defence--
[2070]     then I have to be upon my guard--but if my enemy injures a third person,
[2071]     then in every sort of way, by word as well as deed, I should try to prevent
[2072]     his being punished, or appearing before the judge; and if he appears, I
[2073]     should contrive that he should escape, and not suffer punishment: if he
[2074]     has stolen a sum of money, let him keep what he has stolen and spend it on
[2075]     him and his, regardless of religion and justice; and if he have done things
[2076]     worthy of death, let him not die, but rather be immortal in his wickedness;
[2077]     or, if this is not possible, let him at any rate be allowed to live as long
[2078]     as he can. For such purposes, Polus, rhetoric may be useful, but is of
[2079]     small if of any use to him who is not intending to commit injustice; at
[2080]     least, there was no such use discovered by us in the previous discussion.
[2081]     
[2082]     CALLICLES: Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest, or is he joking?
[2083]     
[2084]     CHAEREPHON: I should say, Callicles, that he is in most profound earnest;
[2085]     but you may well ask him.
[2086]     
[2087]     CALLICLES: By the gods, and I will. Tell me, Socrates, are you in
[2088]     earnest, or only in jest? For if you are in earnest, and what you say is
[2089]     true, is not the whole of human life turned upside down; and are we not
[2090]     doing, as would appear, in everything the opposite of what we ought to be
[2091]     doing?
[2092]     
[2093]     SOCRATES: O Callicles, if there were not some community of feelings among
[2094]     mankind, however varying in different persons--I mean to say, if every
[2095]     man's feelings were peculiar to himself and were not shared by the rest of
[2096]     his species--I do not see how we could ever communicate our impressions to
[2097]     one another. I make this remark because I perceive that you and I have a
[2098]     common feeling. For we are lovers both, and both of us have two loves
[2099]     apiece:--I am the lover of Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, and of
[2100]     philosophy; and you of the Athenian Demus, and of Demus the son of
[2101]     Pyrilampes. Now, I observe that you, with all your cleverness, do not
[2102]     venture to contradict your favourite in any word or opinion of his; but as
[2103]     he changes you change, backwards and forwards. When the Athenian Demus
[2104]     denies anything that you are saying in the assembly, you go over to his
[2105]     opinion; and you do the same with Demus, the fair young son of Pyrilampes.
[2106]     For you have not the power to resist the words and ideas of your loves; and
[2107]     if a person were to express surprise at the strangeness of what you say
[2108]     from time to time when under their influence, you would probably reply to
[2109]     him, if you were honest, that you cannot help saying what your loves say
[2110]     unless they are prevented; and that you can only be silent when they are.
[2111]     Now you must understand that my words are an echo too, and therefore you
[2112]     need not wonder at me; but if you want to silence me, silence philosophy,
[2113]     who is my love, for she is always telling me what I am now telling you, my
[2114]     friend; neither is she capricious like my other love, for the son of
[2115]     Cleinias says one thing to-day and another thing to-morrow, but philosophy
[2116]     is always true. She is the teacher at whose words you are now wondering,
[2117]     and you have heard her yourself. Her you must refute, and either show, as
[2118]     I was saying, that to do injustice and to escape punishment is not the
[2119]     worst of all evils; or, if you leave her word unrefuted, by the dog the god
[2120]     of Egypt, I declare, O Callicles, that Callicles will never be at one with
[2121]     himself, but that his whole life will be a discord. And yet, my friend, I
[2122]     would rather that my lyre should be inharmonious, and that there should be
[2123]     no music in the chorus which I provided; aye, or that the whole world
[2124]     should be at odds with me, and oppose me, rather than that I myself should
[2125]     be at odds with myself, and contradict myself.
[2126]     
[2127]     CALLICLES: O Socrates, you are a regular declaimer, and seem to be running
[2128]     riot in the argument. And now you are declaiming in this way because Polus
[2129]     has fallen into the same error himself of which he accused Gorgias:--for he
[2130]     said that when Gorgias was asked by you, whether, if some one came to him
[2131]     who wanted to learn rhetoric, and did not know justice, he would teach him
[2132]     justice, Gorgias in his modesty replied that he would, because he thought
[2133]     that mankind in general would be displeased if he answered 'No'; and then
[2134]     in consequence of this admission, Gorgias was compelled to contradict
[2135]     himself, that being just the sort of thing in which you delight. Whereupon
[2136]     Polus laughed at you deservedly, as I think; but now he has himself fallen
[2137]     into the same trap. I cannot say very much for his wit when he conceded to
[2138]     you that to do is more dishonourable than to suffer injustice, for this was
[2139]     the admission which led to his being entangled by you; and because he was
[2140]     too modest to say what he thought, he had his mouth stopped. For the truth
[2141]     is, Socrates, that you, who pretend to be engaged in the pursuit of truth,
[2142]     are appealing now to the popular and vulgar notions of right, which are not
[2143]     natural, but only conventional. Convention and nature are generally at
[2144]     variance with one another: and hence, if a person is too modest to say
[2145]     what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict himself; and you, in your
[2146]     ingenuity perceiving the advantage to be thereby gained, slyly ask of him
[2147]     who is arguing conventionally a question which is to be determined by the
[2148]     rule of nature; and if he is talking of the rule of nature, you slip away
[2149]     to custom: as, for instance, you did in this very discussion about doing
[2150]     and suffering injustice. When Polus was speaking of the conventionally
[2151]     dishonourable, you assailed him from the point of view of nature; for by
[2152]     the rule of nature, to suffer injustice is the greater disgrace because the
[2153]     greater evil; but conventionally, to do evil is the more disgraceful. For
[2154]     the suffering of injustice is not the part of a man, but of a slave, who
[2155]     indeed had better die than live; since when he is wronged and trampled
[2156]     upon, he is unable to help himself, or any other about whom he cares. The
[2157]     reason, as I conceive, is that the makers of laws are the majority who are
[2158]     weak; and they make laws and distribute praises and censures with a view to
[2159]     themselves and to their own interests; and they terrify the stronger sort
[2160]     of men, and those who are able to get the better of them, in order that
[2161]     they may not get the better of them; and they say, that dishonesty is
[2162]     shameful and unjust; meaning, by the word injustice, the desire of a man to
[2163]     have more than his neighbours; for knowing their own inferiority, I suspect
[2164]     that they are too glad of equality. And therefore the endeavour to have
[2165]     more than the many, is conventionally said to be shameful and unjust, and
[2166]     is called injustice (compare Republic), whereas nature herself intimates
[2167]     that it is just for the better to have more than the worse, the more
[2168]     powerful than the weaker; and in many ways she shows, among men as well as
[2169]     among animals, and indeed among whole cities and races, that justice
[2170]     consists in the superior ruling over and having more than the inferior.
[2171]     For on what principle of justice did Xerxes invade Hellas, or his father
[2172]     the Scythians? (not to speak of numberless other examples). Nay, but these
[2173]     are the men who act according to nature; yes, by Heaven, and according to
[2174]     the law of nature: not, perhaps, according to that artificial law, which
[2175]     we invent and impose upon our fellows, of whom we take the best and
[2176]     strongest from their youth upwards, and tame them like young lions,--
[2177]     charming them with the sound of the voice, and saying to them, that with
[2178]     equality they must be content, and that the equal is the honourable and the
[2179]     just. But if there were a man who had sufficient force, he would shake off
[2180]     and break through, and escape from all this; he would trample under foot
[2181]     all our formulas and spells and charms, and all our laws which are against
[2182]     nature: the slave would rise in rebellion and be lord over us, and the
[2183]     light of natural justice would shine forth. And this I take to be the
[2184]     sentiment of Pindar, when he says in his poem, that
[2185]     
[2186]     'Law is the king of all, of mortals as well as of immortals;'
[2187]     
[2188]     this, as he says,
[2189]     
[2190]     'Makes might to be right, doing violence with highest hand; as I infer from
[2191]     the deeds of Heracles, for without buying them--' (Fragm. Incert. 151
[2192]     (Bockh).)
[2193]     
[2194]     --I do not remember the exact words, but the meaning is, that without
[2195]     buying them, and without their being given to him, he carried off the oxen
[2196]     of Geryon, according to the law of natural right, and that the oxen and
[2197]     other possessions of the weaker and inferior properly belong to the
[2198]     stronger and superior. And this is true, as you may ascertain, if you will
[2199]     leave philosophy and go on to higher things: for philosophy, Socrates, if
[2200]     pursued in moderation and at the proper age, is an elegant accomplishment,
[2201]     but too much philosophy is the ruin of human life. Even if a man has good
[2202]     parts, still, if he carries philosophy into later life, he is necessarily
[2203]     ignorant of all those things which a gentleman and a person of honour ought
[2204]     to know; he is inexperienced in the laws of the State, and in the language
[2205]     which ought to be used in the dealings of man with man, whether private or
[2206]     public, and utterly ignorant of the pleasures and desires of mankind and of
[2207]     human character in general. And people of this sort, when they betake
[2208]     themselves to politics or business, are as ridiculous as I imagine the
[2209]     politicians to be, when they make their appearance in the arena of
[2210]     philosophy. For, as Euripides says,
[2211]     
[2212]     'Every man shines in that and pursues that, and devotes the greatest
[2213]     portion of the day to that in which he most excels,' (Antiope, fragm. 20
[2214]     (Dindorf).)
[2215]     
[2216]     but anything in which he is inferior, he avoids and depreciates, and
[2217]     praises the opposite from partiality to himself, and because he thinks that
[2218]     he will thus praise himself. The true principle is to unite them.
[2219]     Philosophy, as a part of education, is an excellent thing, and there is no
[2220]     disgrace to a man while he is young in pursuing such a study; but when he
[2221]     is more advanced in years, the thing becomes ridiculous, and I feel towards
[2222]     philosophers as I do towards those who lisp and imitate children. For I
[2223]     love to see a little child, who is not of an age to speak plainly, lisping
[2224]     at his play; there is an appearance of grace and freedom in his utterance,
[2225]     which is natural to his childish years. But when I hear some small
[2226]     creature carefully articulating its words, I am offended; the sound is
[2227]     disagreeable, and has to my ears the twang of slavery. So when I hear a
[2228]     man lisping, or see him playing like a child, his behaviour appears to me
[2229]     ridiculous and unmanly and worthy of stripes. And I have the same feeling
[2230]     about students of philosophy; when I see a youth thus engaged,--the study
[2231]     appears to me to be in character, and becoming a man of liberal education,
[2232]     and him who neglects philosophy I regard as an inferior man, who will never
[2233]     aspire to anything great or noble. But if I see him continuing the study
[2234]     in later life, and not leaving off, I should like to beat him, Socrates;
[2235]     for, as I was saying, such a one, even though he have good natural parts,
[2236]     becomes effeminate. He flies from the busy centre and the market-place, in
[2237]     which, as the poet says, men become distinguished; he creeps into a corner
[2238]     for the rest of his life, and talks in a whisper with three or four
[2239]     admiring youths, but never speaks out like a freeman in a satisfactory
[2240]     manner. Now I, Socrates, am very well inclined towards you, and my feeling
[2241]     may be compared with that of Zethus towards Amphion, in the play of
[2242]     Euripides, whom I was mentioning just now: for I am disposed to say to you
[2243]     much what Zethus said to his brother, that you, Socrates, are careless
[2244]     about the things of which you ought to be careful; and that you
[2245]     
[2246]     'Who have a soul so noble, are remarkable for a puerile exterior;
[2247]     Neither in a court of justice could you state a case, or give any reason or
[2248]     proof,
[2249]     Or offer valiant counsel on another's behalf.'
[2250]     
[2251]     And you must not be offended, my dear Socrates, for I am speaking out of
[2252]     good-will towards you, if I ask whether you are not ashamed of being thus
[2253]     defenceless; which I affirm to be the condition not of you only but of all
[2254]     those who will carry the study of philosophy too far. For suppose that
[2255]     some one were to take you, or any one of your sort, off to prison,
[2256]     declaring that you had done wrong when you had done no wrong, you must
[2257]     allow that you would not know what to do:--there you would stand giddy and
[2258]     gaping, and not having a word to say; and when you went up before the
[2259]     Court, even if the accuser were a poor creature and not good for much, you
[2260]     would die if he were disposed to claim the penalty of death. And yet,
[2261]     Socrates, what is the value of
[2262]     
[2263]     'An art which converts a man of sense into a fool,'
[2264]     
[2265]     who is helpless, and has no power to save either himself or others, when he
[2266]     is in the greatest danger and is going to be despoiled by his enemies of
[2267]     all his goods, and has to live, simply deprived of his rights of
[2268]     citizenship?--he being a man who, if I may use the expression, may be boxed
[2269]     on the ears with impunity. Then, my good friend, take my advice, and
[2270]     refute no more:
[2271]     
[2272]     'Learn the philosophy of business, and acquire the reputation of wisdom.
[2273]     But leave to others these niceties,'
[2274]     
[2275]     whether they are to be described as follies or absurdities:
[2276]     
[2277]     'For they will only
[2278]     Give you poverty for the inmate of your dwelling.'
[2279]     
[2280]     Cease, then, emulating these paltry splitters of words, and emulate only
[2281]     the man of substance and honour, who is well to do.
[2282]     
[2283]     SOCRATES: If my soul, Callicles, were made of gold, should I not rejoice
[2284]     to discover one of those stones with which they test gold, and the very
[2285]     best possible one to which I might bring my soul; and if the stone and I
[2286]     agreed in approving of her training, then I should know that I was in a
[2287]     satisfactory state, and that no other test was needed by me.
[2288]     
[2289]     CALLICLES: What is your meaning, Socrates?
[2290]     
[2291]     SOCRATES: I will tell you; I think that I have found in you the desired
[2292]     touchstone.
[2293]     
[2294]     CALLICLES: Why?
[2295]     
[2296]     SOCRATES: Because I am sure that if you agree with me in any of the
[2297]     opinions which my soul forms, I have at last found the truth indeed. For I
[2298]     consider that if a man is to make a complete trial of the good or evil of
[2299]     the soul, he ought to have three qualities--knowledge, good-will,
[2300]     outspokenness, which are all possessed by you. Many whom I meet are unable
[2301]     to make trial of me, because they are not wise as you are; others are wise,
[2302]     but they will not tell me the truth, because they have not the same
[2303]     interest in me which you have; and these two strangers, Gorgias and Polus,
[2304]     are undoubtedly wise men and my very good friends, but they are not
[2305]     outspoken enough, and they are too modest. Why, their modesty is so great
[2306]     that they are driven to contradict themselves, first one and then the other
[2307]     of them, in the face of a large company, on matters of the highest moment.
[2308]     But you have all the qualities in which these others are deficient, having
[2309]     received an excellent education; to this many Athenians can testify. And
[2310]     you are my friend. Shall I tell you why I think so? I know that you,
[2311]     Callicles, and Tisander of Aphidnae, and Andron the son of Androtion, and
[2312]     Nausicydes of the deme of Cholarges, studied together: there were four of
[2313]     you, and I once heard you advising with one another as to the extent to
[2314]     which the pursuit of philosophy should be carried, and, as I know, you came
[2315]     to the conclusion that the study should not be pushed too much into detail.
[2316]     You were cautioning one another not to be overwise; you were afraid that
[2317]     too much wisdom might unconsciously to yourselves be the ruin of you. And
[2318]     now when I hear you giving the same advice to me which you then gave to
[2319]     your most intimate friends, I have a sufficient evidence of your real good-
[2320]     will to me. And of the frankness of your nature and freedom from modesty I
[2321]     am assured by yourself, and the assurance is confirmed by your last speech.
[2322]     Well then, the inference in the present case clearly is, that if you agree
[2323]     with me in an argument about any point, that point will have been
[2324]     sufficiently tested by us, and will not require to be submitted to any
[2325]     further test. For you could not have agreed with me, either from lack of
[2326]     knowledge or from superfluity of modesty, nor yet from a desire to deceive
[2327]     me, for you are my friend, as you tell me yourself. And therefore when you
[2328]     and I are agreed, the result will be the attainment of perfect truth. Now
[2329]     there is no nobler enquiry, Callicles, than that which you censure me for
[2330]     making,--What ought the character of a man to be, and what his pursuits,
[2331]     and how far is he to go, both in maturer years and in youth? For be
[2332]     assured that if I err in my own conduct I do not err intentionally, but
[2333]     from ignorance. Do not then desist from advising me, now that you have
[2334]     begun, until I have learned clearly what this is which I am to practise,
[2335]     and how I may acquire it. And if you find me assenting to your words, and
[2336]     hereafter not doing that to which I assented, call me 'dolt,' and deem me
[2337]     unworthy of receiving further instruction. Once more, then, tell me what
[2338]     you and Pindar mean by natural justice: Do you not mean that the superior
[2339]     should take the property of the inferior by force; that the better should
[2340]     rule the worse, the noble have more than the mean? Am I not right in my
[2341]     recollection?
[2342]     
[2343]     CALLICLES: Yes; that is what I was saying, and so I still aver.
[2344]     
[2345]     SOCRATES: And do you mean by the better the same as the superior? for I
[2346]     could not make out what you were saying at the time--whether you meant by
[2347]     the superior the stronger, and that the weaker must obey the stronger, as
[2348]     you seemed to imply when you said that great cities attack small ones in
[2349]     accordance with natural right, because they are superior and stronger, as
[2350]     though the superior and stronger and better were the same; or whether the
[2351]     better may be also the inferior and weaker, and the superior the worse, or
[2352]     whether better is to be defined in the same way as superior:--this is the
[2353]     point which I want to have cleared up. Are the superior and better and
[2354]     stronger the same or different?
[2355]     
[2356]     CALLICLES: I say unequivocally that they are the same.
[2357]     
[2358]     SOCRATES: Then the many are by nature superior to the one, against whom,
[2359]     as you were saying, they make the laws?
[2360]     
[2361]     CALLICLES: Certainly.
[2362]     
[2363]     SOCRATES: Then the laws of the many are the laws of the superior?
[2364]     
[2365]     CALLICLES: Very true.
[2366]     
[2367]     SOCRATES: Then they are the laws of the better; for the superior class are
[2368]     far better, as you were saying?
[2369]     
[2370]     CALLICLES: Yes.
[2371]     
[2372]     SOCRATES: And since they are superior, the laws which are made by them are
[2373]     by nature good?
[2374]     
[2375]     CALLICLES: Yes.
[2376]     
[2377]     SOCRATES: And are not the many of opinion, as you were lately saying, that
[2378]     justice is equality, and that to do is more disgraceful than to suffer
[2379]     injustice?--is that so or not? Answer, Callicles, and let no modesty be
[2380]     found to come in the way; do the many think, or do they not think thus?--I
[2381]     must beg of you to answer, in order that if you agree with me I may fortify
[2382]     myself by the assent of so competent an authority.
[2383]     
[2384]     CALLICLES: Yes; the opinion of the many is what you say.
[2385]     
[2386]     SOCRATES: Then not only custom but nature also affirms that to do is more
[2387]     disgraceful than to suffer injustice, and that justice is equality; so that
[2388]     you seem to have been wrong in your former assertion, when accusing me you
[2389]     said that nature and custom are opposed, and that I, knowing this, was
[2390]     dishonestly playing between them, appealing to custom when the argument is
[2391]     about nature, and to nature when the argument is about custom?
[2392]     
[2393]     CALLICLES: This man will never cease talking nonsense. At your age,
[2394]     Socrates, are you not ashamed to be catching at words and chuckling over
[2395]     some verbal slip? do you not see--have I not told you already, that by
[2396]     superior I mean better: do you imagine me to say, that if a rabble of
[2397]     slaves and nondescripts, who are of no use except perhaps for their
[2398]     physical strength, get together, their ipsissima verba are laws?
[2399]     
[2400]     SOCRATES: Ho! my philosopher, is that your line?
[2401]     
[2402]     CALLICLES: Certainly.
[2403]     
[2404]     SOCRATES: I was thinking, Callicles, that something of the kind must have
[2405]     been in your mind, and that is why I repeated the question,--What is the
[2406]     superior? I wanted to know clearly what you meant; for you surely do not
[2407]     think that two men are better than one, or that your slaves are better than
[2408]     you because they are stronger? Then please to begin again, and tell me who
[2409]     the better are, if they are not the stronger; and I will ask you, great
[2410]     Sir, to be a little milder in your instructions, or I shall have to run
[2411]     away from you.
[2412]     
[2413]     CALLICLES: You are ironical.
[2414]     
[2415]     SOCRATES: No, by the hero Zethus, Callicles, by whose aid you were just
[2416]     now saying many ironical things against me, I am not:--tell me, then, whom
[2417]     you mean, by the better?
[2418]     
[2419]     CALLICLES: I mean the more excellent.
[2420]     
[2421]     SOCRATES: Do you not see that you are yourself using words which have no
[2422]     meaning and that you are explaining nothing?--will you tell me whether you
[2423]     mean by the better and superior the wiser, or if not, whom?
[2424]     
[2425]     CALLICLES: Most assuredly, I do mean the wiser.
[2426]     
[2427]     SOCRATES: Then according to you, one wise man may often be superior to ten
[2428]     thousand fools, and he ought to rule them, and they ought to be his
[2429]     subjects, and he ought to have more than they should. This is what I
[2430]     believe that you mean (and you must not suppose that I am word-catching),
[2431]     if you allow that the one is superior to the ten thousand?
[2432]     
[2433]     CALLICLES: Yes; that is what I mean, and that is what I conceive to be
[2434]     natural justice--that the better and wiser should rule and have more than
[2435]     the inferior.
[2436]     
[2437]     SOCRATES: Stop there, and let me ask you what you would say in this case:
[2438]     Let us suppose that we are all together as we are now; there are several of
[2439]     us, and we have a large common store of meats and drinks, and there are all
[2440]     sorts of persons in our company having various degrees of strength and
[2441]     weakness, and one of us, being a physician, is wiser in the matter of food
[2442]     than all the rest, and he is probably stronger than some and not so strong
[2443]     as others of us--will he not, being wiser, be also better than we are, and
[2444]     our superior in this matter of food?
[2445]     
[2446]     CALLICLES: Certainly.
[2447]     
[2448]     SOCRATES: Either, then, he will have a larger share of the meats and
[2449]     drinks, because he is better, or he will have the distribution of all of
[2450]     them by reason of his authority, but he will not expend or make use of a
[2451]     larger share of them on his own person, or if he does, he will be punished;
[2452]     --his share will exceed that of some, and be less than that of others, and
[2453]     if he be the weakest of all, he being the best of all will have the
[2454]     smallest share of all, Callicles:--am I not right, my friend?
[2455]     
[2456]     CALLICLES: You talk about meats and drinks and physicians and other
[2457]     nonsense; I am not speaking of them.
[2458]     
[2459]     SOCRATES: Well, but do you admit that the wiser is the better? Answer
[2460]     'Yes' or 'No.'
[2461]     
[2462]     CALLICLES: Yes.
[2463]     
[2464]     SOCRATES: And ought not the better to have a larger share?
[2465]     
[2466]     CALLICLES: Not of meats and drinks.
[2467]     
[2468]     SOCRATES: I understand: then, perhaps, of coats--the skilfullest weaver
[2469]     ought to have the largest coat, and the greatest number of them, and go
[2470]     about clothed in the best and finest of them?
[2471]     
[2472]     CALLICLES: Fudge about coats!
[2473]     
[2474]     SOCRATES: Then the skilfullest and best in making shoes ought to have the
[2475]     advantage in shoes; the shoemaker, clearly, should walk about in the
[2476]     largest shoes, and have the greatest number of them?
[2477]     
[2478]     CALLICLES: Fudge about shoes! What nonsense are you talking?
[2479]     
[2480]     SOCRATES: Or, if this is not your meaning, perhaps you would say that the
[2481]     wise and good and true husbandman should actually have a larger share of
[2482]     seeds, and have as much seed as possible for his own land?
[2483]     
[2484]     CALLICLES: How you go on, always talking in the same way, Socrates!
[2485]     
[2486]     SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, and also about the same things.
[2487]     
[2488]     CALLICLES: Yes, by the Gods, you are literally always talking of cobblers
[2489]     and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do with our argument.
[2490]     
[2491]     SOCRATES: But why will you not tell me in what a man must be superior and
[2492]     wiser in order to claim a larger share; will you neither accept a
[2493]     suggestion, nor offer one?
[2494]     
[2495]     CALLICLES: I have already told you. In the first place, I mean by
[2496]     superiors not cobblers or cooks, but wise politicians who understand the
[2497]     administration of a state, and who are not only wise, but also valiant and
[2498]     able to carry out their designs, and not the men to faint from want of
[2499]     soul.
[2500]     
[2501]     SOCRATES: See now, most excellent Callicles, how different my charge
[2502]     against you is from that which you bring against me, for you reproach me
[2503]     with always saying the same; but I