Meno
by
Plato
Meno
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[2] MENO
[3]
[4] by
[5]
[6] Plato
[7]
[8] Translated by Benjamin Jowett
[9]
[10]
[11] PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Meno, Socrates, A Slave of Meno (Boy), Anytus.
[12]
[13]
[14] MENO: Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching or
[15] by practice; or if neither by teaching nor by practice, then whether it
[16] comes to man by nature, or in what other way?
[17]
[18] SOCRATES: O Meno, there was a time when the Thessalians were famous among
[19] the other Hellenes only for their riches and their riding; but now, if I am
[20] not mistaken, they are equally famous for their wisdom, especially at
[21] Larisa, which is the native city of your friend Aristippus. And this is
[22] Gorgias' doing; for when he came there, the flower of the Aleuadae, among
[23] them your admirer Aristippus, and the other chiefs of the Thessalians, fell
[24] in love with his wisdom. And he has taught you the habit of answering
[25] questions in a grand and bold style, which becomes those who know, and is
[26] the style in which he himself answers all comers; and any Hellene who likes
[27] may ask him anything. How different is our lot! my dear Meno. Here at
[28] Athens there is a dearth of the commodity, and all wisdom seems to have
[29] emigrated from us to you. I am certain that if you were to ask any
[30] Athenian whether virtue was natural or acquired, he would laugh in your
[31] face, and say: 'Stranger, you have far too good an opinion of me, if you
[32] think that I can answer your question. For I literally do not know what
[33] virtue is, and much less whether it is acquired by teaching or not.' And I
[34] myself, Meno, living as I do in this region of poverty, am as poor as the
[35] rest of the world; and I confess with shame that I know literally nothing
[36] about virtue; and when I do not know the 'quid' of anything how can I know
[37] the 'quale'? How, if I knew nothing at all of Meno, could I tell if he was
[38] fair, or the opposite of fair; rich and noble, or the reverse of rich and
[39] noble? Do you think that I could?
[40]
[41] MENO: No, indeed. But are you in earnest, Socrates, in saying that you do
[42] not know what virtue is? And am I to carry back this report of you to
[43] Thessaly?
[44]
[45] SOCRATES: Not only that, my dear boy, but you may say further that I have
[46] never known of any one else who did, in my judgment.
[47]
[48] MENO: Then you have never met Gorgias when he was at Athens?
[49]
[50] SOCRATES: Yes, I have.
[51]
[52] MENO: And did you not think that he knew?
[53]
[54] SOCRATES: I have not a good memory, Meno, and therefore I cannot now tell
[55] what I thought of him at the time. And I dare say that he did know, and
[56] that you know what he said: please, therefore, to remind me of what he
[57] said; or, if you would rather, tell me your own view; for I suspect that
[58] you and he think much alike.
[59]
[60] MENO: Very true.
[61]
[62] SOCRATES: Then as he is not here, never mind him, and do you tell me: By
[63] the gods, Meno, be generous, and tell me what you say that virtue is; for I
[64] shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken, and that you
[65] and Gorgias do really have this knowledge; although I have been just saying
[66] that I have never found anybody who had.
[67]
[68] MENO: There will be no difficulty, Socrates, in answering your question.
[69] Let us take first the virtue of a man--he should know how to administer the
[70] state, and in the administration of it to benefit his friends and harm his
[71] enemies; and he must also be careful not to suffer harm himself. A woman's
[72] virtue, if you wish to know about that, may also be easily described: her
[73] duty is to order her house, and keep what is indoors, and obey her husband.
[74] Every age, every condition of life, young or old, male or female, bond or
[75] free, has a different virtue: there are virtues numberless, and no lack of
[76] definitions of them; for virtue is relative to the actions and ages of each
[77] of us in all that we do. And the same may be said of vice, Socrates
[78] (Compare Arist. Pol.).
[79]
[80] SOCRATES: How fortunate I am, Meno! When I ask you for one virtue, you
[81] present me with a swarm of them (Compare Theaet.), which are in your
[82] keeping. Suppose that I carry on the figure of the swarm, and ask of you,
[83] What is the nature of the bee? and you answer that there are many kinds of
[84] bees, and I reply: But do bees differ as bees, because there are many and
[85] different kinds of them; or are they not rather to be distinguished by some
[86] other quality, as for example beauty, size, or shape? How would you answer
[87] me?
[88]
[89] MENO: I should answer that bees do not differ from one another, as bees.
[90]
[91] SOCRATES: And if I went on to say: That is what I desire to know, Meno;
[92] tell me what is the quality in which they do not differ, but are all
[93] alike;--would you be able to answer?
[94]
[95] MENO: I should.
[96]
[97] SOCRATES: And so of the virtues, however many and different they may be,
[98] they have all a common nature which makes them virtues; and on this he who
[99] would answer the question, 'What is virtue?' would do well to have his eye
[100] fixed: Do you understand?
[101]
[102] MENO: I am beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold of the
[103] question as I could wish.
[104]
[105] SOCRATES: When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man, another
[106] of a woman, another of a child, and so on, does this apply only to virtue,
[107] or would you say the same of health, and size, and strength? Or is the
[108] nature of health always the same, whether in man or woman?
[109]
[110] MENO: I should say that health is the same, both in man and woman.
[111]
[112] SOCRATES: And is not this true of size and strength? If a woman is
[113] strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and of the same
[114] strength subsisting in her which there is in the man. I mean to say that
[115] strength, as strength, whether of man or woman, is the same. Is there any
[116] difference?
[117]
[118] MENO: I think not.
[119]
[120] SOCRATES: And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether in a child
[121] or in a grown-up person, in a woman or in a man?
[122]
[123] MENO: I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that this case is different from
[124] the others.
[125]
[126] SOCRATES: But why? Were you not saying that the virtue of a man was to
[127] order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house?
[128]
[129] MENO: I did say so.
[130]
[131] SOCRATES: And can either house or state or anything be well ordered
[132] without temperance and without justice?
[133]
[134] MENO: Certainly not.
[135]
[136] SOCRATES: Then they who order a state or a house temperately or justly
[137] order them with temperance and justice?
[138]
[139] MENO: Certainly.
[140]
[141] SOCRATES: Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and women,
[142] must have the same virtues of temperance and justice?
[143]
[144] MENO: True.
[145]
[146] SOCRATES: And can either a young man or an elder one be good, if they are
[147] intemperate and unjust?
[148]
[149] MENO: They cannot.
[150]
[151] SOCRATES: They must be temperate and just?
[152]
[153] MENO: Yes.
[154]
[155] SOCRATES: Then all men are good in the same way, and by participation in
[156] the same virtues?
[157]
[158] MENO: Such is the inference.
[159]
[160] SOCRATES: And they surely would not have been good in the same way, unless
[161] their virtue had been the same?
[162]
[163] MENO: They would not.
[164]
[165] SOCRATES: Then now that the sameness of all virtue has been proven, try
[166] and remember what you and Gorgias say that virtue is.
[167]
[168] MENO: Will you have one definition of them all?
[169]
[170] SOCRATES: That is what I am seeking.
[171]
[172] MENO: If you want to have one definition of them all, I know not what to
[173] say, but that virtue is the power of governing mankind.
[174]
[175] SOCRATES: And does this definition of virtue include all virtue? Is
[176] virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Can the child govern his
[177] father, or the slave his master; and would he who governed be any longer a
[178] slave?
[179]
[180] MENO: I think not, Socrates.
[181]
[182] SOCRATES: No, indeed; there would be small reason in that. Yet once more,
[183] fair friend; according to you, virtue is 'the power of governing;' but do
[184] you not add 'justly and not unjustly'?
[185]
[186] MENO: Yes, Socrates; I agree there; for justice is virtue.
[187]
[188] SOCRATES: Would you say 'virtue,' Meno, or 'a virtue'?
[189]
[190] MENO: What do you mean?
[191]
[192] SOCRATES: I mean as I might say about anything; that a round, for example,
[193] is 'a figure' and not simply 'figure,' and I should adopt this mode of
[194] speaking, because there are other figures.
[195]
[196] MENO: Quite right; and that is just what I am saying about virtue--that
[197] there are other virtues as well as justice.
[198]
[199] SOCRATES: What are they? tell me the names of them, as I would tell you
[200] the names of the other figures if you asked me.
[201]
[202] MENO: Courage and temperance and wisdom and magnanimity are virtues; and
[203] there are many others.
[204]
[205] SOCRATES: Yes, Meno; and again we are in the same case: in searching
[206] after one virtue we have found many, though not in the same way as before;
[207] but we have been unable to find the common virtue which runs through them
[208] all.
[209]
[210] MENO: Why, Socrates, even now I am not able to follow you in the attempt
[211] to get at one common notion of virtue as of other things.
[212]
[213] SOCRATES: No wonder; but I will try to get nearer if I can, for you know
[214] that all things have a common notion. Suppose now that some one asked you
[215] the question which I asked before: Meno, he would say, what is figure?
[216] And if you answered 'roundness,' he would reply to you, in my way of
[217] speaking, by asking whether you would say that roundness is 'figure' or 'a
[218] figure;' and you would answer 'a figure.'
[219]
[220] MENO: Certainly.
[221]
[222] SOCRATES: And for this reason--that there are other figures?
[223]
[224] MENO: Yes.
[225]
[226] SOCRATES: And if he proceeded to ask, What other figures are there? you
[227] would have told him.
[228]
[229] MENO: I should.
[230]
[231] SOCRATES: And if he similarly asked what colour is, and you answered
[232] whiteness, and the questioner rejoined, Would you say that whiteness is
[233] colour or a colour? you would reply, A colour, because there are other
[234] colours as well.
[235]
[236] MENO: I should.
[237]
[238] SOCRATES: And if he had said, Tell me what they are?--you would have told
[239] him of other colours which are colours just as much as whiteness.
[240]
[241] MENO: Yes.
[242]
[243] SOCRATES: And suppose that he were to pursue the matter in my way, he
[244] would say: Ever and anon we are landed in particulars, but this is not
[245] what I want; tell me then, since you call them by a common name, and say
[246] that they are all figures, even when opposed to one another, what is that
[247] common nature which you designate as figure--which contains straight as
[248] well as round, and is no more one than the other--that would be your mode
[249] of speaking?
[250]
[251] MENO: Yes.
[252]
[253] SOCRATES: And in speaking thus, you do not mean to say that the round is
[254] round any more than straight, or the straight any more straight than round?
[255]
[256] MENO: Certainly not.
[257]
[258] SOCRATES: You only assert that the round figure is not more a figure than
[259] the straight, or the straight than the round?
[260]
[261] MENO: Very true.
[262]
[263] SOCRATES: To what then do we give the name of figure? Try and answer.
[264] Suppose that when a person asked you this question either about figure or
[265] colour, you were to reply, Man, I do not understand what you want, or know
[266] what you are saying; he would look rather astonished and say: Do you not
[267] understand that I am looking for the 'simile in multis'? And then he might
[268] put the question in another form: Meno, he might say, what is that 'simile
[269] in multis' which you call figure, and which includes not only round and
[270] straight figures, but all? Could you not answer that question, Meno? I
[271] wish that you would try; the attempt will be good practice with a view to
[272] the answer about virtue.
[273]
[274] MENO: I would rather that you should answer, Socrates.
[275]
[276] SOCRATES: Shall I indulge you?
[277]
[278] MENO: By all means.
[279]
[280] SOCRATES: And then you will tell me about virtue?
[281]
[282] MENO: I will.
[283]
[284] SOCRATES: Then I must do my best, for there is a prize to be won.
[285]
[286] MENO: Certainly.
[287]
[288] SOCRATES: Well, I will try and explain to you what figure is. What do you
[289] say to this answer?--Figure is the only thing which always follows colour.
[290] Will you be satisfied with it, as I am sure that I should be, if you would
[291] let me have a similar definition of virtue?
[292]
[293] MENO: But, Socrates, it is such a simple answer.
[294]
[295] SOCRATES: Why simple?
[296]
[297] MENO: Because, according to you, figure is that which always follows
[298] colour.
[299]
[300] (SOCRATES: Granted.)
[301]
[302] MENO: But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour is,
[303] any more than what figure is--what sort of answer would you have given him?
[304]
[305] SOCRATES: I should have told him the truth. And if he were a philosopher
[306] of the eristic and antagonistic sort, I should say to him: You have my
[307] answer, and if I am wrong, your business is to take up the argument and
[308] refute me. But if we were friends, and were talking as you and I are now,
[309] I should reply in a milder strain and more in the dialectician's vein; that
[310] is to say, I should not only speak the truth, but I should make use of
[311] premisses which the person interrogated would be willing to admit. And
[312] this is the way in which I shall endeavour to approach you. You will
[313] acknowledge, will you not, that there is such a thing as an end, or
[314] termination, or extremity?--all which words I use in the same sense,
[315] although I am aware that Prodicus might draw distinctions about them: but
[316] still you, I am sure, would speak of a thing as ended or terminated--that
[317] is all which I am saying--not anything very difficult.
[318]
[319] MENO: Yes, I should; and I believe that I understand your meaning.
[320]
[321] SOCRATES: And you would speak of a surface and also of a solid, as for
[322] example in geometry.
[323]
[324] MENO: Yes.
[325]
[326] SOCRATES: Well then, you are now in a condition to understand my
[327] definition of figure. I define figure to be that in which the solid ends;
[328] or, more concisely, the limit of solid.
[329]
[330] MENO: And now, Socrates, what is colour?
[331]
[332] SOCRATES: You are outrageous, Meno, in thus plaguing a poor old man to
[333] give you an answer, when you will not take the trouble of remembering what
[334] is Gorgias' definition of virtue.
[335]
[336] MENO: When you have told me what I ask, I will tell you, Socrates.
[337]
[338] SOCRATES: A man who was blindfolded has only to hear you talking, and he
[339] would know that you are a fair creature and have still many lovers.
[340]
[341] MENO: Why do you think so?
[342]
[343] SOCRATES: Why, because you always speak in imperatives: like all beauties
[344] when they are in their prime, you are tyrannical; and also, as I suspect,
[345] you have found out that I have weakness for the fair, and therefore to
[346] humour you I must answer.
[347]
[348] MENO: Please do.
[349]
[350] SOCRATES: Would you like me to answer you after the manner of Gorgias,
[351] which is familiar to you?
[352]
[353] MENO: I should like nothing better.
[354]
[355] SOCRATES: Do not he and you and Empedocles say that there are certain
[356] effluences of existence?
[357]
[358] MENO: Certainly.
[359]
[360] SOCRATES: And passages into which and through which the effluences pass?
[361]
[362] MENO: Exactly.
[363]
[364] SOCRATES: And some of the effluences fit into the passages, and some of
[365] them are too small or too large?
[366]
[367] MENO: True.
[368]
[369] SOCRATES: And there is such a thing as sight?
[370]
[371] MENO: Yes.
[372]
[373] SOCRATES: And now, as Pindar says, 'read my meaning:'--colour is an
[374] effluence of form, commensurate with sight, and palpable to sense.
[375]
[376] MENO: That, Socrates, appears to me to be an admirable answer.
[377]
[378] SOCRATES: Why, yes, because it happens to be one which you have been in
[379] the habit of hearing: and your wit will have discovered, I suspect, that
[380] you may explain in the same way the nature of sound and smell, and of many
[381] other similar phenomena.
[382]
[383] MENO: Quite true.
[384]
[385] SOCRATES: The answer, Meno, was in the orthodox solemn vein, and therefore
[386] was more acceptable to you than the other answer about figure.
[387]
[388] MENO: Yes.
[389]
[390] SOCRATES: And yet, O son of Alexidemus, I cannot help thinking that the
[391] other was the better; and I am sure that you would be of the same opinion,
[392] if you would only stay and be initiated, and were not compelled, as you
[393] said yesterday, to go away before the mysteries.
[394]
[395] MENO: But I will stay, Socrates, if you will give me many such answers.
[396]
[397] SOCRATES: Well then, for my own sake as well as for yours, I will do my
[398] very best; but I am afraid that I shall not be able to give you very many
[399] as good: and now, in your turn, you are to fulfil your promise, and tell
[400] me what virtue is in the universal; and do not make a singular into a
[401] plural, as the facetious say of those who break a thing, but deliver virtue
[402] to me whole and sound, and not broken into a number of pieces: I have
[403] given you the pattern.
[404]
[405] MENO: Well then, Socrates, virtue, as I take it, is when he, who desires
[406] the honourable, is able to provide it for himself; so the poet says, and I
[407] say too--
[408]
[409] 'Virtue is the desire of things honourable and the power of attaining
[410] them.'
[411]
[412] SOCRATES: And does he who desires the honourable also desire the good?
[413]
[414] MENO: Certainly.
[415]
[416] SOCRATES: Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire
[417] the good? Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good?
[418]
[419] MENO: I think not.
[420]
[421] SOCRATES: There are some who desire evil?
[422]
[423] MENO: Yes.
[424]
[425] SOCRATES: Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire, to be
[426] good; or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them?
[427]
[428] MENO: Both, I think.
[429]
[430] SOCRATES: And do you really imagine, Meno, that a man knows evils to be
[431] evils and desires them notwithstanding?
[432]
[433] MENO: Certainly I do.
[434]
[435] SOCRATES: And desire is of possession?
[436]
[437] MENO: Yes, of possession.
[438]
[439] SOCRATES: And does he think that the evils will do good to him who
[440] possesses them, or does he know that they will do him harm?
[441]
[442] MENO: There are some who think that the evils will do them good, and
[443] others who know that they will do them harm.
[444]
[445] SOCRATES: And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do them
[446] good know that they are evils?
[447]
[448] MENO: Certainly not.
[449]
[450] SOCRATES: Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature do
[451] not desire them; but they desire what they suppose to be goods although
[452] they are really evils; and if they are mistaken and suppose the evils to be
[453] goods they really desire goods?
[454]
[455] MENO: Yes, in that case.
[456]
[457] SOCRATES: Well, and do those who, as you say, desire evils, and think that
[458] evils are hurtful to the possessor of them, know that they will be hurt by
[459] them?
[460]
[461] MENO: They must know it.
[462]
[463] SOCRATES: And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are miserable
[464] in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them?
[465]
[466] MENO: How can it be otherwise?
[467]
[468] SOCRATES: But are not the miserable ill-fated?
[469]
[470] MENO: Yes, indeed.
[471]
[472] SOCRATES: And does any one desire to be miserable and ill-fated?
[473]
[474] MENO: I should say not, Socrates.
[475]
[476] SOCRATES: But if there is no one who desires to be miserable, there is no
[477] one, Meno, who desires evil; for what is misery but the desire and
[478] possession of evil?
[479]
[480] MENO: That appears to be the truth, Socrates, and I admit that nobody
[481] desires evil.
[482]
[483] SOCRATES: And yet, were you not saying just now that virtue is the desire
[484] and power of attaining good?
[485]
[486] MENO: Yes, I did say so.
[487]
[488] SOCRATES: But if this be affirmed, then the desire of good is common to
[489] all, and one man is no better than another in that respect?
[490]
[491] MENO: True.
[492]
[493] SOCRATES: And if one man is not better than another in desiring good, he
[494] must be better in the power of attaining it?
[495]
[496] MENO: Exactly.
[497]
[498] SOCRATES: Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to be
[499] the power of attaining good?
[500]
[501] MENO: I entirely approve, Socrates, of the manner in which you now view
[502] this matter.
[503]
[504] SOCRATES: Then let us see whether what you say is true from another point
[505] of view; for very likely you may be right:--You affirm virtue to be the
[506] power of attaining goods?
[507]
[508] MENO: Yes.
[509]
[510] SOCRATES: And the goods which you mean are such as health and wealth and
[511] the possession of gold and silver, and having office and honour in the
[512] state--those are what you would call goods?
[513]
[514] MENO: Yes, I should include all those.
[515]
[516] SOCRATES: Then, according to Meno, who is the hereditary friend of the
[517] great king, virtue is the power of getting silver and gold; and would you
[518] add that they must be gained piously, justly, or do you deem this to be of
[519] no consequence? And is any mode of acquisition, even if unjust and
[520] dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue?
[521]
[522] MENO: Not virtue, Socrates, but vice.
[523]
[524] SOCRATES: Then justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part of
[525] virtue, as would appear, must accompany the acquisition, and without them
[526] the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue.
[527]
[528] MENO: Why, how can there be virtue without these?
[529]
[530] SOCRATES: And the non-acquisition of gold and silver in a dishonest manner
[531] for oneself or another, or in other words the want of them, may be equally
[532] virtue?
[533]
[534] MENO: True.
[535]
[536] SOCRATES: Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the
[537] non-acquisition and want of them, but whatever is accompanied by justice or
[538] honesty is virtue, and whatever is devoid of justice is vice.
[539]
[540] MENO: It cannot be otherwise, in my judgment.
[541]
[542] SOCRATES: And were we not saying just now that justice, temperance, and
[543] the like, were each of them a part of virtue?
[544]
[545] MENO: Yes.
[546]
[547] SOCRATES: And so, Meno, this is the way in which you mock me.
[548]
[549] MENO: Why do you say that, Socrates?
[550]
[551] SOCRATES: Why, because I asked you to deliver virtue into my hands whole
[552] and unbroken, and I gave you a pattern according to which you were to frame
[553] your answer; and you have forgotten already, and tell me that virtue is the
[554] power of attaining good justly, or with justice; and justice you
[555] acknowledge to be a part of virtue.
[556]
[557] MENO: Yes.
[558]
[559] SOCRATES: Then it follows from your own admissions, that virtue is doing
[560] what you do with a part of virtue; for justice and the like are said by you
[561] to be parts of virtue.
[562]
[563] MENO: What of that?
[564]
[565] SOCRATES: What of that! Why, did not I ask you to tell me the nature of
[566] virtue as a whole? And you are very far from telling me this; but declare
[567] every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue; as though
[568] you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue, and this too
[569] when frittered away into little pieces. And, therefore, my dear Meno, I
[570] fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question: What is virtue?
[571] for otherwise, I can only say, that every action done with a part of virtue
[572] is virtue; what else is the meaning of saying that every action done with
[573] justice is virtue? Ought I not to ask the question over again; for can any
[574] one who does not know virtue know a part of virtue?
[575]
[576] MENO: No; I do not say that he can.
[577]
[578] SOCRATES: Do you remember how, in the example of figure, we rejected any
[579] answer given in terms which were as yet unexplained or unadmitted?
[580]
[581] MENO: Yes, Socrates; and we were quite right in doing so.
[582]
[583] SOCRATES: But then, my friend, do not suppose that we can explain to any
[584] one the nature of virtue as a whole through some unexplained portion of
[585] virtue, or anything at all in that fashion; we should only have to ask over
[586] again the old question, What is virtue? Am I not right?
[587]
[588] MENO: I believe that you are.
[589]
[590] SOCRATES: Then begin again, and answer me, What, according to you and your
[591] friend Gorgias, is the definition of virtue?
[592]
[593] MENO: O Socrates, I used to be told, before I knew you, that you were
[594] always doubting yourself and making others doubt; and now you are casting
[595] your spells over me, and I am simply getting bewitched and enchanted, and
[596] am at my wits' end. And if I may venture to make a jest upon you, you seem
[597] to me both in your appearance and in your power over others to be very like
[598] the flat torpedo fish, who torpifies those who come near him and touch him,
[599] as you have now torpified me, I think. For my soul and my tongue are
[600] really torpid, and I do not know how to answer you; and though I have been
[601] delivered of an infinite variety of speeches about virtue before now, and
[602] to many persons--and very good ones they were, as I thought--at this moment
[603] I cannot even say what virtue is. And I think that you are very wise in
[604] not voyaging and going away from home, for if you did in other places as
[605] you do in Athens, you would be cast into prison as a magician.
[606]
[607] SOCRATES: You are a rogue, Meno, and had all but caught me.
[608]
[609] MENO: What do you mean, Socrates?
[610]
[611] SOCRATES: I can tell why you made a simile about me.
[612]
[613] MENO: Why?
[614]
[615] SOCRATES: In order that I might make another simile about you. For I know
[616] that all pretty young gentlemen like to have pretty similes made about
[617] them--as well they may--but I shall not return the compliment. As to my
[618] being a torpedo, if the torpedo is torpid as well as the cause of torpidity
[619] in others, then indeed I am a torpedo, but not otherwise; for I perplex
[620] others, not because I am clear, but because I am utterly perplexed myself.
[621] And now I know not what virtue is, and you seem to be in the same case,
[622] although you did once perhaps know before you touched me. However, I have
[623] no objection to join with you in the enquiry.
[624]
[625] MENO: And how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which you do not know?
[626] What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry? And if you find what
[627] you want, how will you ever know that this is the thing which you did not
[628] know?
[629]
[630] SOCRATES: I know, Meno, what you mean; but just see what a tiresome
[631] dispute you are introducing. You argue that a man cannot enquire either
[632] about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for if he
[633] knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not
[634] know the very subject about which he is to enquire (Compare Aristot. Post.
[635] Anal.).
[636]
[637] MENO: Well, Socrates, and is not the argument sound?
[638]
[639] SOCRATES: I think not.
[640]
[641] MENO: Why not?
[642]
[643] SOCRATES: I will tell you why: I have heard from certain wise men and
[644] women who spoke of things divine that--
[645]
[646] MENO: What did they say?
[647]
[648] SOCRATES: They spoke of a glorious truth, as I conceive.
[649]
[650] MENO: What was it? and who were they?
[651]
[652] SOCRATES: Some of them were priests and priestesses, who had studied how
[653] they might be able to give a reason of their profession: there have been
[654] poets also, who spoke of these things by inspiration, like Pindar, and many
[655] others who were inspired. And they say--mark, now, and see whether their
[656] words are true--they say that the soul of man is immortal, and at one time
[657] has an end, which is termed dying, and at another time is born again, but
[658] is never destroyed. And the moral is, that a man ought to live always in
[659] perfect holiness. 'For in the ninth year Persephone sends the souls of
[660] those from whom she has received the penalty of ancient crime back again
[661] from beneath into the light of the sun above, and these are they who become
[662] noble kings and mighty men and great in wisdom and are called saintly
[663] heroes in after ages.' The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been
[664] born again many times, and having seen all things that exist, whether in
[665] this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no
[666] wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever
[667] knew about virtue, and about everything; for as all nature is akin, and the
[668] soul has learned all things; there is no difficulty in her eliciting or as
[669] men say learning, out of a single recollection all the rest, if a man is
[670] strenuous and does not faint; for all enquiry and all learning is but
[671] recollection. And therefore we ought not to listen to this sophistical
[672] argument about the impossibility of enquiry: for it will make us idle; and
[673] is sweet only to the sluggard; but the other saying will make us active and
[674] inquisitive. In that confiding, I will gladly enquire with you into the
[675] nature of virtue.
[676]
[677] MENO: Yes, Socrates; but what do you mean by saying that we do not learn,
[678] and that what we call learning is only a process of recollection? Can you
[679] teach me how this is?
[680]
[681] SOCRATES: I told you, Meno, just now that you were a rogue, and now you
[682] ask whether I can teach you, when I am saying that there is no teaching,
[683] but only recollection; and thus you imagine that you will involve me in a
[684] contradiction.
[685]
[686] MENO: Indeed, Socrates, I protest that I had no such intention. I only
[687] asked the question from habit; but if you can prove to me that what you say
[688] is true, I wish that you would.
[689]
[690] SOCRATES: It will be no easy matter, but I will try to please you to the
[691] utmost of my power. Suppose that you call one of your numerous attendants,
[692] that I may demonstrate on him.
[693]
[694] MENO: Certainly. Come hither, boy.
[695]
[696] SOCRATES: He is Greek, and speaks Greek, does he not?
[697]
[698] MENO: Yes, indeed; he was born in the house.
[699]
[700] SOCRATES: Attend now to the questions which I ask him, and observe whether
[701] he learns of me or only remembers.
[702]
[703] MENO: I will.
[704]
[705] SOCRATES: Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is a square?
[706]
[707] BOY: I do.
[708]
[709] SOCRATES: And you know that a square figure has these four lines equal?
[710]
[711] BOY: Certainly.
[712]
[713] SOCRATES: And these lines which I have drawn through the middle of the
[714] square are also equal?
[715]
[716] BOY: Yes.
[717]
[718] SOCRATES: A square may be of any size?
[719]
[720] BOY: Certainly.
[721]
[722] SOCRATES: And if one side of the figure be of two feet, and the other side
[723] be of two feet, how much will the whole be? Let me explain: if in one
[724] direction the space was of two feet, and in the other direction of one
[725] foot, the whole would be of two feet taken once?
[726]
[727] BOY: Yes.
[728]
[729] SOCRATES: But since this side is also of two feet, there are twice two
[730] feet?
[731]
[732] BOY: There are.
[733]
[734] SOCRATES: Then the square is of twice two feet?
[735]
[736] BOY: Yes.
[737]
[738] SOCRATES: And how many are twice two feet? count and tell me.
[739]
[740] BOY: Four, Socrates.
[741]
[742] SOCRATES: And might there not be another square twice as large as this,
[743] and having like this the lines equal?
[744]
[745] BOY: Yes.
[746]
[747] SOCRATES: And of how many feet will that be?
[748]
[749] BOY: Of eight feet.
[750]
[751] SOCRATES: And now try and tell me the length of the line which forms the
[752] side of that double square: this is two feet--what will that be?
[753]
[754] BOY: Clearly, Socrates, it will be double.
[755]
[756] SOCRATES: Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy anything,
[757] but only asking him questions; and now he fancies that he knows how long a
[758] line is necessary in order to produce a figure of eight square feet; does
[759] he not?
[760]
[761] MENO: Yes.
[762]
[763] SOCRATES: And does he really know?
[764]
[765] MENO: Certainly not.
[766]
[767] SOCRATES: He only guesses that because the square is double, the line is
[768] double.
[769]
[770] MENO: True.
[771]
[772] SOCRATES: Observe him while he recalls the steps in regular order. (To
[773] the Boy:) Tell me, boy, do you assert that a double space comes from a
[774] double line? Remember that I am not speaking of an oblong, but of a figure
[775] equal every way, and twice the size of this--that is to say of eight feet;
[776] and I want to know whether you still say that a double square comes from
[777] double line?
[778]
[779] BOY: Yes.
[780]
[781] SOCRATES: But does not this line become doubled if we add another such
[782] line here?
[783]
[784] BOY: Certainly.
[785]
[786] SOCRATES: And four such lines will make a space containing eight feet?
[787]
[788] BOY: Yes.
[789]
[790] SOCRATES: Let us describe such a figure: Would you not say that this is
[791] the figure of eight feet?
[792]
[793] BOY: Yes.
[794]
[795] SOCRATES: And are there not these four divisions in the figure, each of
[796] which is equal to the figure of four feet?
[797]
[798] BOY: True.
[799]
[800] SOCRATES: And is not that four times four?
[801]
[802] BOY: Certainly.
[803]
[804] SOCRATES: And four times is not double?
[805]
[806] BOY: No, indeed.
[807]
[808] SOCRATES: But how much?
[809]
[810] BOY: Four times as much.
[811]
[812] SOCRATES: Therefore the double line, boy, has given a space, not twice,
[813] but four times as much.
[814]
[815] BOY: True.
[816]
[817] SOCRATES: Four times four are sixteen--are they not?
[818]
[819] BOY: Yes.
[820]
[821] SOCRATES: What line would give you a space of eight feet, as this gives
[822] one of sixteen feet;--do you see?
[823]
[824] BOY: Yes.
[825]
[826] SOCRATES: And the space of four feet is made from this half line?
[827]
[828] BOY: Yes.
[829]
[830] SOCRATES: Good; and is not a space of eight feet twice the size of this,
[831] and half the size of the other?
[832]
[833] BOY: Certainly.
[834]
[835] SOCRATES: Such a space, then, will be made out of a line greater than this
[836] one, and less than that one?
[837]
[838] BOY: Yes; I think so.
[839]
[840] SOCRATES: Very good; I like to hear you say what you think. And now tell
[841] me, is not this a line of two feet and that of four?
[842]
[843] BOY: Yes.
[844]
[845] SOCRATES: Then the line which forms the side of eight feet ought to be
[846] more than this line of two feet, and less than the other of four feet?
[847]
[848] BOY: It ought.
[849]
[850] SOCRATES: Try and see if you can tell me how much it will be.
[851]
[852] BOY: Three feet.
[853]
[854] SOCRATES: Then if we add a half to this line of two, that will be the line
[855] of three. Here are two and there is one; and on the other side, here are
[856] two also and there is one: and that makes the figure of which you speak?
[857]
[858] BOY: Yes.
[859]
[860] SOCRATES: But if there are three feet this way and three feet that way,
[861] the whole space will be three times three feet?
[862]
[863] BOY: That is evident.
[864]
[865] SOCRATES: And how much are three times three feet?
[866]
[867] BOY: Nine.
[868]
[869] SOCRATES: And how much is the double of four?
[870]
[871] BOY: Eight.
[872]
[873] SOCRATES: Then the figure of eight is not made out of a line of three?
[874]
[875] BOY: No.
[876]
[877] SOCRATES: But from what line?--tell me exactly; and if you would rather
[878] not reckon, try and show me the line.
[879]
[880] BOY: Indeed, Socrates, I do not know.
[881]
[882] SOCRATES: Do you see, Meno, what advances he has made in his power of
[883] recollection? He did not know at first, and he does not know now, what is
[884] the side of a figure of eight feet: but then he thought that he knew, and
[885] answered confidently as if he knew, and had no difficulty; now he has a
[886] difficulty, and neither knows nor fancies that he knows.
[887]
[888] MENO: True.
[889]
[890] SOCRATES: Is he not better off in knowing his ignorance?
[891]
[892] MENO: I think that he is.
[893]
[894] SOCRATES: If we have made him doubt, and given him the 'torpedo's shock,'
[895] have we done him any harm?
[896]
[897] MENO: I think not.
[898]
[899] SOCRATES: We have certainly, as would seem, assisted him in some degree to
[900] the discovery of the truth; and now he will wish to remedy his ignorance,
[901] but then he would have been ready to tell all the world again and again
[902] that the double space should have a double side.
[903]
[904] MENO: True.
[905]
[906] SOCRATES: But do you suppose that he would ever have enquired into or
[907] learned what he fancied that he knew, though he was really ignorant of it,
[908] until he had fallen into perplexity under the idea that he did not know,
[909] and had desired to know?
[910]
[911] MENO: I think not, Socrates.
[912]
[913] SOCRATES: Then he was the better for the torpedo's touch?
[914]
[915] MENO: I think so.
[916]
[917] SOCRATES: Mark now the farther development. I shall only ask him, and not
[918] teach him, and he shall share the enquiry with me: and do you watch and
[919] see if you find me telling or explaining anything to him, instead of
[920] eliciting his opinion. Tell me, boy, is not this a square of four feet
[921] which I have drawn?
[922]
[923] BOY: Yes.
[924]
[925] SOCRATES: And now I add another square equal to the former one?
[926]
[927] BOY: Yes.
[928]
[929] SOCRATES: And a third, which is equal to either of them?
[930]
[931] BOY: Yes.
[932]
[933] SOCRATES: Suppose that we fill up the vacant corner?
[934]
[935] BOY: Very good.
[936]
[937] SOCRATES: Here, then, there are four equal spaces?
[938]
[939] BOY: Yes.
[940]
[941] SOCRATES: And how many times larger is this space than this other?
[942]
[943] BOY: Four times.
[944]
[945] SOCRATES: But it ought to have been twice only, as you will remember.
[946]
[947] BOY: True.
[948]
[949] SOCRATES: And does not this line, reaching from corner to corner, bisect
[950] each of these spaces?
[951]
[952] BOY: Yes.
[953]
[954] SOCRATES: And are there not here four equal lines which contain this
[955] space?
[956]
[957] BOY: There are.
[958]
[959] SOCRATES: Look and see how much this space is.
[960]
[961] BOY: I do not understand.
[962]
[963] SOCRATES: Has not each interior line cut off half of the four spaces?
[964]
[965] BOY: Yes.
[966]
[967] SOCRATES: And how many spaces are there in this section?
[968]
[969] BOY: Four.
[970]
[971] SOCRATES: And how many in this?
[972]
[973] BOY: Two.
[974]
[975] SOCRATES: And four is how many times two?
[976]
[977] BOY: Twice.
[978]
[979] SOCRATES: And this space is of how many feet?
[980]
[981] BOY: Of eight feet.
[982]
[983] SOCRATES: And from what line do you get this figure?
[984]
[985] BOY: From this.
[986]
[987] SOCRATES: That is, from the line which extends from corner to corner of
[988] the figure of four feet?
[989]
[990] BOY: Yes.
[991]
[992] SOCRATES: And that is the line which the learned call the diagonal. And
[993] if this is the proper name, then you, Meno's slave, are prepared to affirm
[994] that the double space is the square of the diagonal?
[995]
[996] BOY: Certainly, Socrates.
[997]
[998] SOCRATES: What do you say of him, Meno? Were not all these answers given
[999] out of his own head?
[1000]
[1001] MENO: Yes, they were all his own.
[1002]
[1003] SOCRATES: And yet, as we were just now saying, he did not know?
[1004]
[1005] MENO: True.
[1006]
[1007] SOCRATES: But still he had in him those notions of his--had he not?
[1008]
[1009] MENO: Yes.
[1010]
[1011] SOCRATES: Then he who does not know may still have true notions of that
[1012] which he does not know?
[1013]
[1014] MENO: He has.
[1015]
[1016] SOCRATES: And at present these notions have just been stirred up in him,
[1017] as in a dream; but if he were frequently asked the same questions, in
[1018] different forms, he would know as well as any one at last?
[1019]
[1020] MENO: I dare say.
[1021]
[1022] SOCRATES: Without any one teaching him he will recover his knowledge for
[1023] himself, if he is only asked questions?
[1024]
[1025] MENO: Yes.
[1026]
[1027] SOCRATES: And this spontaneous recovery of knowledge in him is
[1028] recollection?
[1029]
[1030] MENO: True.
[1031]
[1032] SOCRATES: And this knowledge which he now has must he not either have
[1033] acquired or always possessed?
[1034]
[1035] MENO: Yes.
[1036]
[1037] SOCRATES: But if he always possessed this knowledge he would always have
[1038] known; or if he has acquired the knowledge he could not have acquired it in
[1039] this life, unless he has been taught geometry; for he may be made to do the
[1040] same with all geometry and every other branch of knowledge. Now, has any
[1041] one ever taught him all this? You must know about him, if, as you say, he
[1042] was born and bred in your house.
[1043]
[1044] MENO: And I am certain that no one ever did teach him.
[1045]
[1046] SOCRATES: And yet he has the knowledge?
[1047]
[1048] MENO: The fact, Socrates, is undeniable.
[1049]
[1050] SOCRATES: But if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life, then he
[1051] must have had and learned it at some other time?
[1052]
[1053] MENO: Clearly he must.
[1054]
[1055] SOCRATES: Which must have been the time when he was not a man?
[1056]
[1057] MENO: Yes.
[1058]
[1059] SOCRATES: And if there have been always true thoughts in him, both at the
[1060] time when he was and was not a man, which only need to be awakened into
[1061] knowledge by putting questions to him, his soul must have always possessed
[1062] this knowledge, for he always either was or was not a man?
[1063]
[1064] MENO: Obviously.
[1065]
[1066] SOCRATES: And if the truth of all things always existed in the soul, then
[1067] the soul is immortal. Wherefore be of good cheer, and try to recollect
[1068] what you do not know, or rather what you do not remember.
[1069]
[1070] MENO: I feel, somehow, that I like what you are saying.
[1071]
[1072] SOCRATES: And I, Meno, like what I am saying. Some things I have said of
[1073] which I am not altogether confident. But that we shall be better and
[1074] braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than we
[1075] should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no knowing
[1076] and no use in seeking to know what we do not know;--that is a theme upon
[1077] which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my power.
[1078]
[1079] MENO: There again, Socrates, your words seem to me excellent.
[1080]
[1081] SOCRATES: Then, as we are agreed that a man should enquire about that
[1082] which he does not know, shall you and I make an effort to enquire together
[1083] into the nature of virtue?
[1084]
[1085] MENO: By all means, Socrates. And yet I would much rather return to my
[1086] original question, Whether in seeking to acquire virtue we should regard it
[1087] as a thing to be taught, or as a gift of nature, or as coming to men in
[1088] some other way?
[1089]
[1090] SOCRATES: Had I the command of you as well as of myself, Meno, I would not
[1091] have enquired whether virtue is given by instruction or not, until we had
[1092] first ascertained 'what it is.' But as you think only of controlling me
[1093] who am your slave, and never of controlling yourself,--such being your
[1094] notion of freedom, I must yield to you, for you are irresistible. And
[1095] therefore I have now to enquire into the qualities of a thing of which I do
[1096] not as yet know the nature. At any rate, will you condescend a little, and
[1097] allow the question 'Whether virtue is given by instruction, or in any other
[1098] way,' to be argued upon hypothesis? As the geometrician, when he is asked
[1099] whether a certain triangle is capable being inscribed in a certain circle
[1100] (Or, whether a certain area is capable of being inscribed as a triangle in
[1101] a certain circle.), will reply: 'I cannot tell you as yet; but I will
[1102] offer a hypothesis which may assist us in forming a conclusion: If the
[1103] figure be such that when you have produced a given side of it (Or, when you
[1104] apply it to the given line, i.e. the diameter of the circle (autou).), the
[1105] given area of the triangle falls short by an area corresponding to the part
[1106] produced (Or, similar to the area so applied.), then one consequence
[1107] follows, and if this is impossible then some other; and therefore I wish to
[1108] assume a hypothesis before I tell you whether this triangle is capable of
[1109] being inscribed in the circle':--that is a geometrical hypothesis. And we
[1110] too, as we know not the nature and qualities of virtue, must ask, whether
[1111] virtue is or is not taught, under a hypothesis: as thus, if virtue is of
[1112] such a class of mental goods, will it be taught or not? Let the first
[1113] hypothesis be that virtue is or is not knowledge,--in that case will it be
[1114] taught or not? or, as we were just now saying, 'remembered'? For there is
[1115] no use in disputing about the name. But is virtue taught or not? or
[1116] rather, does not every one see that knowledge alone is taught?
[1117]
[1118] MENO: I agree.
[1119]
[1120] SOCRATES: Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught?
[1121]
[1122] MENO: Certainly.
[1123]
[1124] SOCRATES: Then now we have made a quick end of this question: if virtue
[1125] is of such a nature, it will be taught; and if not, not?
[1126]
[1127] MENO: Certainly.
[1128]
[1129] SOCRATES: The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of another
[1130] species?
[1131]
[1132] MENO: Yes, that appears to be the question which comes next in order.
[1133]
[1134] SOCRATES: Do we not say that virtue is a good?--This is a hypothesis which
[1135] is not set aside.
[1136]
[1137] MENO: Certainly.
[1138]
[1139] SOCRATES: Now, if there be any sort of good which is distinct from
[1140] knowledge, virtue may be that good; but if knowledge embraces all good,
[1141] then we shall be right in thinking that virtue is knowledge?
[1142]
[1143] MENO: True.
[1144]
[1145] SOCRATES: And virtue makes us good?
[1146]
[1147] MENO: Yes.
[1148]
[1149] SOCRATES: And if we are good, then we are profitable; for all good things
[1150] are profitable?
[1151]
[1152] MENO: Yes.
[1153]
[1154] SOCRATES: Then virtue is profitable?
[1155]
[1156] MENO: That is the only inference.
[1157]
[1158] SOCRATES: Then now let us see what are the things which severally profit
[1159] us. Health and strength, and beauty and wealth--these, and the like of
[1160] these, we call profitable?
[1161]
[1162] MENO: True.
[1163]
[1164] SOCRATES: And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm: would you
[1165] not think so?
[1166]
[1167] MENO: Yes.
[1168]
[1169] SOCRATES: And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable or
[1170] the reverse? Are they not profitable when they are rightly used, and
[1171] hurtful when they are not rightly used?
[1172]
[1173] MENO: Certainly.
[1174]
[1175] SOCRATES: Next, let us consider the goods of the soul: they are
[1176] temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory,
[1177] magnanimity, and the like?
[1178]
[1179] MENO: Surely.
[1180]
[1181] SOCRATES: And such of these as are not knowledge, but of another sort, are
[1182] sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful; as, for example, courage
[1183] wanting prudence, which is only a sort of confidence? When a man has no
[1184] sense he is harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited?
[1185]
[1186] MENO: True.
[1187]
[1188] SOCRATES: And the same may be said of temperance and quickness of
[1189] apprehension; whatever things are learned or done with sense are
[1190] profitable, but when done without sense they are hurtful?
[1191]
[1192] MENO: Very true.
[1193]
[1194] SOCRATES: And in general, all that the soul attempts or endures, when
[1195] under the guidance of wisdom, ends in happiness; but when she is under the
[1196] guidance of folly, in the opposite?
[1197]
[1198] MENO: That appears to be true.
[1199]
[1200] SOCRATES: If then virtue is a quality of the soul, and is admitted to be
[1201] profitable, it must be wisdom or prudence, since none of the things of the
[1202] soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves, but they are all made
[1203] profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly; and therefore
[1204] if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom or prudence?
[1205]
[1206] MENO: I quite agree.
[1207]
[1208] SOCRATES: And the other goods, such as wealth and the like, of which we
[1209] were just now saying that they are sometimes good and sometimes evil, do
[1210] not they also become profitable or hurtful, accordingly as the soul guides
[1211] and uses them rightly or wrongly; just as the things of the soul herself
[1212] are benefited when under the guidance of wisdom and harmed by folly?
[1213]
[1214] MENO: True.
[1215]
[1216] SOCRATES: And the wise soul guides them rightly, and the foolish soul
[1217] wrongly.
[1218]
[1219] MENO: Yes.
[1220]
[1221] SOCRATES: And is not this universally true of human nature? All other
[1222] things hang upon the soul, and the things of the soul herself hang upon
[1223] wisdom, if they are to be good; and so wisdom is inferred to be that which
[1224] profits--and virtue, as we say, is profitable?
[1225]
[1226] MENO: Certainly.
[1227]
[1228] SOCRATES: And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either
[1229] wholly or partly wisdom?
[1230]
[1231] MENO: I think that what you are saying, Socrates, is very true.
[1232]
[1233] SOCRATES: But if this is true, then the good are not by nature good?
[1234]
[1235] MENO: I think not.
[1236]
[1237] SOCRATES: If they had been, there would assuredly have been discerners of
[1238] characters among us who would have known our future great men; and on their
[1239] showing we should have adopted them, and when we had got them, we should
[1240] have kept them in the citadel out of the way of harm, and set a stamp upon
[1241] them far rather than upon a piece of gold, in order that no one might
[1242] tamper with them; and when they grew up they would have been useful to the
[1243] state?
[1244]
[1245] MENO: Yes, Socrates, that would have been the right way.
[1246]
[1247] SOCRATES: But if the good are not by nature good, are they made good by
[1248] instruction?
[1249]
[1250] MENO: There appears to be no other alternative, Socrates. On the
[1251] supposition that virtue is knowledge, there can be no doubt that virtue is
[1252] taught.
[1253]
[1254] SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; but what if the supposition is erroneous?
[1255]
[1256] MENO: I certainly thought just now that we were right.
[1257]
[1258] SOCRATES: Yes, Meno; but a principle which has any soundness should stand
[1259] firm not only just now, but always.
[1260]
[1261] MENO: Well; and why are you so slow of heart to believe that knowledge is
[1262] virtue?
[1263]
[1264] SOCRATES: I will try and tell you why, Meno. I do not retract the
[1265] assertion that if virtue is knowledge it may be taught; but I fear that I
[1266] have some reason in doubting whether virtue is knowledge: for consider now
[1267] and say whether virtue, and not only virtue but anything that is taught,
[1268] must not have teachers and disciples?
[1269]
[1270] MENO: Surely.
[1271]
[1272] SOCRATES: And conversely, may not the art of which neither teachers nor
[1273] disciples exist be assumed to be incapable of being taught?
[1274]
[1275] MENO: True; but do you think that there are no teachers of virtue?
[1276]
[1277] SOCRATES: I have certainly often enquired whether there were any, and
[1278] taken great pains to find them, and have never succeeded; and many have
[1279] assisted me in the search, and they were the persons whom I thought the
[1280] most likely to know. Here at the moment when he is wanted we fortunately
[1281] have sitting by us Anytus, the very person of whom we should make enquiry;
[1282] to him then let us repair. In the first place, he is the son of a wealthy
[1283] and wise father, Anthemion, who acquired his wealth, not by accident or
[1284] gift, like Ismenias the Theban (who has recently made himself as rich as
[1285] Polycrates), but by his own skill and industry, and who is a well-
[1286] conditioned, modest man, not insolent, or overbearing, or annoying;
[1287] moreover, this son of his has received a good education, as the Athenian
[1288] people certainly appear to think, for they choose him to fill the highest
[1289] offices. And these are the sort of men from whom you are likely to learn
[1290] whether there are any teachers of virtue, and who they are. Please,
[1291] Anytus, to help me and your friend Meno in answering our question, Who are
[1292] the teachers? Consider the matter thus: If we wanted Meno to be a good
[1293] physician, to whom should we send him? Should we not send him to the
[1294] physicians?
[1295]
[1296] ANYTUS: Certainly.
[1297]
[1298] SOCRATES: Or if we wanted him to be a good cobbler, should we not send him
[1299] to the cobblers?
[1300]
[1301] ANYTUS: Yes.
[1302]
[1303] SOCRATES: And so forth?
[1304]
[1305] ANYTUS: Yes.
[1306]
[1307] SOCRATES: Let me trouble you with one more question. When we say that we
[1308] should be right in sending him to the physicians if we wanted him to be a
[1309] physician, do we mean that we should be right in sending him to those who
[1310] profess the art, rather than to those who do not, and to those who demand
[1311] payment for teaching the art, and profess to teach it to any one who will
[1312] come and learn? And if these were our reasons, should we not be right in
[1313] sending him?
[1314]
[1315] ANYTUS: Yes.
[1316]
[1317] SOCRATES: And might not the same be said of flute-playing, and of the
[1318] other arts? Would a man who wanted to make another a flute-player refuse
[1319] to send him to those who profess to teach the art for money, and be
[1320] plaguing other persons to give him instruction, who are not professed
[1321] teachers and who never had a single disciple in that branch of knowledge
[1322] which he wishes him to acquire--would not such conduct be the height of
[1323] folly?
[1324]
[1325] ANYTUS: Yes, by Zeus, and of ignorance too.
[1326]
[1327] SOCRATES: Very good. And now you are in a position to advise with me
[1328] about my friend Meno. He has been telling me, Anytus, that he desires to
[1329] attain that kind of wisdom and virtue by which men order the state or the
[1330] house, and honour their parents, and know when to receive and when to send
[1331] away citizens and strangers, as a good man should. Now, to whom should he
[1332] go in order that he may learn this virtue? Does not the previous argument
[1333] imply clearly that we should send him to those who profess and avouch that
[1334] they are the common teachers of all Hellas, and are ready to impart
[1335] instruction to any one who likes, at a fixed price?
[1336]
[1337] ANYTUS: Whom do you mean, Socrates?
[1338]
[1339] SOCRATES: You surely know, do you not, Anytus, that these are the people
[1340] whom mankind call Sophists?
[1341]
[1342] ANYTUS: By Heracles, Socrates, forbear! I only hope that no friend or
[1343] kinsman or acquaintance of mine, whether citizen or stranger, will ever be
[1344] so mad as to allow himself to be corrupted by them; for they are a manifest
[1345] pest and corrupting influence to those who have to do with them.
[1346]
[1347] SOCRATES: What, Anytus? Of all the people who profess that they know how
[1348] to do men good, do you mean to say that these are the only ones who not
[1349] only do them no good, but positively corrupt those who are entrusted to
[1350] them, and in return for this disservice have the face to demand money?
[1351] Indeed, I cannot believe you; for I know of a single man, Protagoras, who
[1352] made more out of his craft than the illustrious Pheidias, who created such
[1353] noble works, or any ten other statuaries. How could that be? A mender of
[1354] old shoes, or patcher up of clothes, who made the shoes or clothes worse
[1355] than he received them, could not have remained thirty days undetected, and
[1356] would very soon have starved; whereas during more than forty years,
[1357] Protagoras was corrupting all Hellas, and sending his disciples from him
[1358] worse than he received them, and he was never found out. For, if I am not
[1359] mistaken, he was about seventy years old at his death, forty of which were
[1360] spent in the practice of his profession; and during all that time he had a
[1361] good reputation, which to this day he retains: and not only Protagoras,
[1362] but many others are well spoken of; some who lived before him, and others
[1363] who are still living. Now, when you say that they deceived and corrupted
[1364] the youth, are they to be supposed to have corrupted them consciously or
[1365] unconsciously? Can those who were deemed by many to be the wisest men of
[1366] Hellas have been out of their minds?
[1367]
[1368] ANYTUS: Out of their minds! No, Socrates; the young men who gave their
[1369] money to them were out of their minds, and their relations and guardians
[1370] who entrusted their youth to the care of these men were still more out of
[1371] their minds, and most of all, the cities who allowed them to come in, and
[1372] did not drive them out, citizen and stranger alike.
[1373]
[1374] SOCRATES: Has any of the Sophists wronged you, Anytus? What makes you so
[1375] angry with them?
[1376]
[1377] ANYTUS: No, indeed, neither I nor any of my belongings has ever had, nor
[1378] would I suffer them to have, anything to do with them.
[1379]
[1380] SOCRATES: Then you are entirely unacquainted with them?
[1381]
[1382] ANYTUS: And I have no wish to be acquainted.
[1383]
[1384] SOCRATES: Then, my dear friend, how can you know whether a thing is good
[1385] or bad of which you are wholly ignorant?
[1386]
[1387] ANYTUS: Quite well; I am sure that I know what manner of men these are,
[1388] whether I am acquainted with them or not.
[1389]
[1390] SOCRATES: You must be a diviner, Anytus, for I really cannot make out,
[1391] judging from your own words, how, if you are not acquainted with them, you
[1392] know about them. But I am not enquiring of you who are the teachers who
[1393] will corrupt Meno (let them be, if you please, the Sophists); I only ask
[1394] you to tell him who there is in this great city who will teach him how to
[1395] become eminent in the virtues which I was just now describing. He is the
[1396] friend of your family, and you will oblige him.
[1397]
[1398] ANYTUS: Why do you not tell him yourself?
[1399]
[1400] SOCRATES: I have told him whom I supposed to be the teachers of these
[1401] things; but I learn from you that I am utterly at fault, and I dare say
[1402] that you are right. And now I wish that you, on your part, would tell me
[1403] to whom among the Athenians he should go. Whom would you name?
[1404]
[1405] ANYTUS: Why single out individuals? Any Athenian gentleman, taken at
[1406] random, if he will mind him, will do far more good to him than the
[1407] Sophists.
[1408]
[1409] SOCRATES: And did those gentlemen grow of themselves; and without having
[1410] been taught by any one, were they nevertheless able to teach others that
[1411] which they had never learned themselves?
[1412]
[1413] ANYTUS: I imagine that they learned of the previous generation of
[1414] gentlemen. Have there not been many good men in this city?
[1415]
[1416] SOCRATES: Yes, certainly, Anytus; and many good statesmen also there
[1417] always have been and there are still, in the city of Athens. But the
[1418] question is whether they were also good teachers of their own virtue;--not
[1419] whether there are, or have been, good men in this part of the world, but
[1420] whether virtue can be taught, is the question which we have been
[1421] discussing. Now, do we mean to say that the good men of our own and of
[1422] other times knew how to impart to others that virtue which they had
[1423] themselves; or is virtue a thing incapable of being communicated or
[1424] imparted by one man to another? That is the question which I and Meno have
[1425] been arguing. Look at the matter in your own way: Would you not admit
[1426] that Themistocles was a good man?
[1427]
[1428] ANYTUS: Certainly; no man better.
[1429]
[1430] SOCRATES: And must not he then have been a good teacher, if any man ever
[1431] was a good teacher, of his own virtue?
[1432]
[1433] ANYTUS: Yes certainly,--if he wanted to be so.
[1434]
[1435] SOCRATES: But would he not have wanted? He would, at any rate, have
[1436] desired to make his own son a good man and a gentleman; he could not have
[1437] been jealous of him, or have intentionally abstained from imparting to him
[1438] his own virtue. Did you never hear that he made his son Cleophantus a
[1439] famous horseman; and had him taught to stand upright on horseback and hurl
[1440] a javelin, and to do many other marvellous things; and in anything which
[1441] could be learned from a master he was well trained? Have you not heard
[1442] from our elders of him?
[1443]
[1444] ANYTUS: I have.
[1445]
[1446] SOCRATES: Then no one could say that his son showed any want of capacity?
[1447]
[1448] ANYTUS: Very likely not.
[1449]
[1450] SOCRATES: But did any one, old or young, ever say in your hearing that
[1451] Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, was a wise or good man, as his father
[1452] was?
[1453]
[1454] ANYTUS: I have certainly never heard any one say so.
[1455]
[1456] SOCRATES: And if virtue could have been taught, would his father
[1457] Themistocles have sought to train him in these minor accomplishments, and
[1458] allowed him who, as you must remember, was his own son, to be no better
[1459] than his neighbours in those qualities in which he himself excelled?
[1460]
[1461] ANYTUS: Indeed, indeed, I think not.
[1462]
[1463] SOCRATES: Here was a teacher of virtue whom you admit to be among the best
[1464] men of the past. Let us take another,--Aristides, the son of Lysimachus:
[1465] would you not acknowledge that he was a good man?
[1466]
[1467] ANYTUS: To be sure I should.
[1468]
[1469] SOCRATES: And did not he train his son Lysimachus better than any other
[1470] Athenian in all that could be done for him by the help of masters? But
[1471] what has been the result? Is he a bit better than any other mortal? He is
[1472] an acquaintance of yours, and you see what he is like. There is Pericles,
[1473] again, magnificent in his wisdom; and he, as you are aware, had two sons,
[1474] Paralus and Xanthippus.
[1475]
[1476] ANYTUS: I know.
[1477]
[1478] SOCRATES: And you know, also, that he taught them to be unrivalled
[1479] horsemen, and had them trained in music and gymnastics and all sorts of
[1480] arts--in these respects they were on a level with the best--and had he no
[1481] wish to make good men of them? Nay, he must have wished it. But virtue,
[1482] as I suspect, could not be taught. And that you may not suppose the
[1483] incompetent teachers to be only the meaner sort of Athenians and few in
[1484] number, remember again that Thucydides had two sons, Melesias and
[1485] Stephanus, whom, besides giving them a good education in other things, he
[1486] trained in wrestling, and they were the best wrestlers in Athens: one of
[1487] them he committed to the care of Xanthias, and the other of Eudorus, who
[1488] had the reputation of being the most celebrated wrestlers of that day. Do
[1489] you remember them?
[1490]
[1491] ANYTUS: I have heard of them.
[1492]
[1493] SOCRATES: Now, can there be a doubt that Thucydides, whose children were
[1494] taught things for which he had to spend money, would have taught them to be
[1495] good men, which would have cost him nothing, if virtue could have been
[1496] taught? Will you reply that he was a mean man, and had not many friends
[1497] among the Athenians and allies? Nay, but he was of a great family, and a
[1498] man of influence at Athens and in all Hellas, and, if virtue could have
[1499] been taught, he would have found out some Athenian or foreigner who would
[1500] have made good men of his sons, if he could not himself spare the time from
[1501] cares of state. Once more, I suspect, friend Anytus, that virtue is not a
[1502] thing which can be taught?
[1503]
[1504] ANYTUS: Socrates, I think that you are too ready to speak evil of men:
[1505] and, if you will take my advice, I would recommend you to be careful.
[1506] Perhaps there is no city in which it is not easier to do men harm than to
[1507] do them good, and this is certainly the case at Athens, as I believe that
[1508] you know.
[1509]
[1510] SOCRATES: O Meno, think that Anytus is in a rage. And he may well be in a
[1511] rage, for he thinks, in the first place, that I am defaming these
[1512] gentlemen; and in the second place, he is of opinion that he is one of them
[1513] himself. But some day he will know what is the meaning of defamation, and
[1514] if he ever does, he will forgive me. Meanwhile I will return to you, Meno;
[1515] for I suppose that there are gentlemen in your region too?
[1516]
[1517] MENO: Certainly there are.
[1518]
[1519] SOCRATES: And are they willing to teach the young? and do they profess to
[1520] be teachers? and do they agree that virtue is taught?
[1521]
[1522] MENO: No indeed, Socrates, they are anything but agreed; you may hear them
[1523] saying at one time that virtue can be taught, and then again the reverse.
[1524]
[1525] SOCRATES: Can we call those teachers who do not acknowledge the
[1526] possibility of their own vocation?
[1527]
[1528] MENO: I think not, Socrates.
[1529]
[1530] SOCRATES: And what do you think of these Sophists, who are the only
[1531] professors? Do they seem to you to be teachers of virtue?
[1532]
[1533] MENO: I often wonder, Socrates, that Gorgias is never heard promising to
[1534] teach virtue: and when he hears others promising he only laughs at them;
[1535] but he thinks that men should be taught to speak.
[1536]
[1537] SOCRATES: Then do you not think that the Sophists are teachers?
[1538]
[1539] MENO: I cannot tell you, Socrates; like the rest of the world, I am in
[1540] doubt, and sometimes I think that they are teachers and sometimes not.
[1541]
[1542] SOCRATES: And are you aware that not you only and other politicians have
[1543] doubts whether virtue can be taught or not, but that Theognis the poet says
[1544] the very same thing?
[1545]
[1546] MENO: Where does he say so?
[1547]
[1548] SOCRATES: In these elegiac verses (Theog.):
[1549]
[1550] 'Eat and drink and sit with the mighty, and make yourself agreeable to
[1551] them; for from the good you will learn what is good, but if you mix with
[1552] the bad you will lose the intelligence which you already have.'
[1553]
[1554] Do you observe that here he seems to imply that virtue can be taught?
[1555]
[1556] MENO: Clearly.
[1557]
[1558] SOCRATES: But in some other verses he shifts about and says (Theog.):
[1559]
[1560] 'If understanding could be created and put into a man, then they' (who were
[1561] able to perform this feat) 'would have obtained great rewards.'
[1562]
[1563] And again:--
[1564]
[1565] 'Never would a bad son have sprung from a good sire, for he would have
[1566] heard the voice of instruction; but not by teaching will you ever make a
[1567] bad man into a good one.'
[1568]
[1569] And this, as you may remark, is a contradiction of the other.
[1570]
[1571] MENO: Clearly.
[1572]
[1573] SOCRATES: And is there anything else of which the professors are affirmed
[1574] not only not to be teachers of others, but to be ignorant themselves, and
[1575] bad at the knowledge of that which they are professing to teach? or is
[1576] there anything about which even the acknowledged 'gentlemen' are sometimes
[1577] saying that 'this thing can be taught,' and sometimes the opposite? Can
[1578] you say that they are teachers in any true sense whose ideas are in such
[1579] confusion?
[1580]
[1581] MENO: I should say, certainly not.
[1582]
[1583] SOCRATES: But if neither the Sophists nor the gentlemen are teachers,
[1584] clearly there can be no other teachers?
[1585]
[1586] MENO: No.
[1587]
[1588] SOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, neither are there disciples?
[1589]
[1590] MENO: Agreed.
[1591]
[1592] SOCRATES: And we have admitted that a thing cannot be taught of which
[1593] there are neither teachers nor disciples?
[1594]
[1595] MENO: We have.
[1596]
[1597] SOCRATES: And there are no teachers of virtue to be found anywhere?
[1598]
[1599] MENO: There are not.
[1600]
[1601] SOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, neither are there scholars?
[1602]
[1603] MENO: That, I think, is true.
[1604]
[1605] SOCRATES: Then virtue cannot be taught?
[1606]
[1607] MENO: Not if we are right in our view. But I cannot believe, Socrates,
[1608] that there are no good men: And if there are, how did they come into
[1609] existence?
[1610]
[1611] SOCRATES: I am afraid, Meno, that you and I are not good for much, and
[1612] that Gorgias has been as poor an educator of you as Prodicus has been of
[1613] me. Certainly we shall have to look to ourselves, and try to find some one
[1614] who will help in some way or other to improve us. This I say, because I
[1615] observe that in the previous discussion none of us remarked that right and
[1616] good action is possible to man under other guidance than that of knowledge
[1617] (episteme);--and indeed if this be denied, there is no seeing how there can
[1618] be any good men at all.
[1619]
[1620] MENO: How do you mean, Socrates?
[1621]
[1622] SOCRATES: I mean that good men are necessarily useful or profitable. Were
[1623] we not right in admitting this? It must be so.
[1624]
[1625] MENO: Yes.
[1626]
[1627] SOCRATES: And in supposing that they will be useful only if they are true
[1628] guides to us of action--there we were also right?
[1629]
[1630] MENO: Yes.
[1631]
[1632] SOCRATES: But when we said that a man cannot be a good guide unless he
[1633] have knowledge (phrhonesis), this we were wrong.
[1634]
[1635] MENO: What do you mean by the word 'right'?
[1636]
[1637] SOCRATES: I will explain. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or anywhere
[1638] else, and went to the place and led others thither, would he not be a right
[1639] and good guide?
[1640]
[1641] MENO: Certainly.
[1642]
[1643] SOCRATES: And a person who had a right opinion about the way, but had
[1644] never been and did not know, might be a good guide also, might he not?
[1645]
[1646] MENO: Certainly.
[1647]
[1648] SOCRATES: And while he has true opinion about that which the other knows,
[1649] he will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth, as he who knows the
[1650] truth?
[1651]
[1652] MENO: Exactly.
[1653]
[1654] SOCRATES: Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as
[1655] knowledge; and that was the point which we omitted in our speculation about
[1656] the nature of virtue, when we said that knowledge only is the guide of
[1657] right action; whereas there is also right opinion.
[1658]
[1659] MENO: True.
[1660]
[1661] SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge?
[1662]
[1663] MENO: The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has knowledge will
[1664] always be right; but he who has right opinion will sometimes be right, and
[1665] sometimes not.
[1666]
[1667] SOCRATES: What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has right opinion, so
[1668] long as he has right opinion?
[1669]
[1670] MENO: I admit the cogency of your argument, and therefore, Socrates, I
[1671] wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion--or why they
[1672] should ever differ.
[1673]
[1674] SOCRATES: And shall I explain this wonder to you?
[1675]
[1676] MENO: Do tell me.
[1677]
[1678] SOCRATES: You would not wonder if you had ever observed the images of
[1679] Daedalus (Compare Euthyphro); but perhaps you have not got them in your
[1680] country?
[1681]
[1682] MENO: What have they to do with the question?
[1683]
[1684] SOCRATES: Because they require to be fastened in order to keep them, and
[1685] if they are not fastened they will play truant and run away.
[1686]
[1687] MENO: Well, what of that?
[1688]
[1689] SOCRATES: I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if
[1690] they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but when
[1691] fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful works of
[1692] art. Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while
[1693] they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out
[1694] of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of
[1695] much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this
[1696] fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed
[1697] to call it. But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the
[1698] nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this
[1699] is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion,
[1700] because fastened by a chain.
[1701]
[1702] MENO: What you are saying, Socrates, seems to be very like the truth.
[1703]
[1704] SOCRATES: I too speak rather in ignorance; I only conjecture. And yet
[1705] that knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of conjecture with
[1706] me. There are not many things which I profess to know, but this is most
[1707] certainly one of them.
[1708]
[1709] MENO: Yes, Socrates; and you are quite right in saying so.
[1710]
[1711] SOCRATES: And am I not also right in saying that true opinion leading the
[1712] way perfects action quite as well as knowledge?
[1713]
[1714] MENO: There again, Socrates, I think you are right.
[1715]
[1716] SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge, or less
[1717] useful in action; nor is the man who has right opinion inferior to him who
[1718] has knowledge?
[1719]
[1720] MENO: True.
[1721]
[1722] SOCRATES: And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to be
[1723] useful?
[1724]
[1725] MENO: Yes.
[1726]
[1727] SOCRATES: Seeing then that men become good and useful to states, not only
[1728] because they have knowledge, but because they have right opinion, and that
[1729] neither knowledge nor right opinion is given to man by nature or acquired
[1730] by him--(do you imagine either of them to be given by nature?
[1731]
[1732] MENO: Not I.)
[1733]
[1734] SOCRATES: Then if they are not given by nature, neither are the good by
[1735] nature good?
[1736]
[1737] MENO: Certainly not.
[1738]
[1739] SOCRATES: And nature being excluded, then came the question whether virtue
[1740] is acquired by teaching?
[1741]
[1742] MENO: Yes.
[1743]
[1744] SOCRATES: If virtue was wisdom (or knowledge), then, as we thought, it was
[1745] taught?
[1746]
[1747] MENO: Yes.
[1748]
[1749] SOCRATES: And if it was taught it was wisdom?
[1750]
[1751] MENO: Certainly.
[1752]
[1753] SOCRATES: And if there were teachers, it might be taught; and if there
[1754] were no teachers, not?
[1755]
[1756] MENO: True.
[1757]
[1758] SOCRATES: But surely we acknowledged that there were no teachers of
[1759] virtue?
[1760]
[1761] MENO: Yes.
[1762]
[1763] SOCRATES: Then we acknowledged that it was not taught, and was not wisdom?
[1764]
[1765] MENO: Certainly.
[1766]
[1767] SOCRATES: And yet we admitted that it was a good?
[1768]
[1769] MENO: Yes.
[1770]
[1771] SOCRATES: And the right guide is useful and good?
[1772]
[1773] MENO: Certainly.
[1774]
[1775] SOCRATES: And the only right guides are knowledge and true opinion--these
[1776] are the guides of man; for things which happen by chance are not under the
[1777] guidance of man: but the guides of man are true opinion and knowledge.
[1778]
[1779] MENO: I think so too.
[1780]
[1781] SOCRATES: But if virtue is not taught, neither is virtue knowledge.
[1782]
[1783] MENO: Clearly not.
[1784]
[1785] SOCRATES: Then of two good and useful things, one, which is knowledge, has
[1786] been set aside, and cannot be supposed to be our guide in political life.
[1787]
[1788] MENO: I think not.
[1789]
[1790] SOCRATES: And therefore not by any wisdom, and not because they were wise,
[1791] did Themistocles and those others of whom Anytus spoke govern states. This
[1792] was the reason why they were unable to make others like themselves--because
[1793] their virtue was not grounded on knowledge.
[1794]
[1795] MENO: That is probably true, Socrates.
[1796]
[1797] SOCRATES: But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which remains is
[1798] that statesmen must have guided states by right opinion, which is in
[1799] politics what divination is in religion; for diviners and also prophets say
[1800] many things truly, but they know not what they say.
[1801]
[1802] MENO: So I believe.
[1803]
[1804] SOCRATES: And may we not, Meno, truly call those men 'divine' who, having
[1805] no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand deed and word?
[1806]
[1807] MENO: Certainly.
[1808]
[1809] SOCRATES: Then we shall also be right in calling divine those whom we were
[1810] just now speaking of as diviners and prophets, including the whole tribe of
[1811] poets. Yes, and statesmen above all may be said to be divine and
[1812] illumined, being inspired and possessed of God, in which condition they say
[1813] many grand things, not knowing what they say.
[1814]
[1815] MENO: Yes.
[1816]
[1817] SOCRATES: And the women too, Meno, call good men divine--do they not? and
[1818] the Spartans, when they praise a good man, say 'that he is a divine man.'
[1819]
[1820] MENO: And I think, Socrates, that they are right; although very likely our
[1821] friend Anytus may take offence at the word.
[1822]
[1823] SOCRATES: I do not care; as for Anytus, there will be another opportunity
[1824] of talking with him. To sum up our enquiry--the result seems to be, if we
[1825] are at all right in our view, that virtue is neither natural nor acquired,
[1826] but an instinct given by God to the virtuous. Nor is the instinct
[1827] accompanied by reason, unless there may be supposed to be among statesmen
[1828] some one who is capable of educating statesmen. And if there be such an
[1829] one, he may be said to be among the living what Homer says that Tiresias
[1830] was among the dead, 'he alone has understanding; but the rest are flitting
[1831] shades'; and he and his virtue in like manner will be a reality among
[1832] shadows.
[1833]
[1834] MENO: That is excellent, Socrates.
[1835]
[1836] SOCRATES: Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to the virtuous
[1837] by the gift of God. But we shall never know the certain truth until,
[1838] before asking how virtue is given, we enquire into the actual nature of
[1839] virtue. I fear that I must go away, but do you, now that you are persuaded
[1840] yourself, persuade our friend Anytus. And do not let him be so
[1841] exasperated; if you can conciliate him, you will have done good service to
[1842] the Athenian people.