Parmenides
by
Plato
Parmenides
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[2] PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Cephalus, Adeimantus, Glaucon, Antiphon,
[3] Pythodorus, Socrates, Zeno, Parmenides, Aristoteles.
[4]
[5] Cephalus rehearses a dialogue which is supposed to have been narrated in
[6] his presence by Antiphon, the half-brother of Adeimantus and Glaucon, to
[7] certain Clazomenians.
[8]
[9]
[10] We had come from our home at Clazomenae to Athens, and met Adeimantus and
[11] Glaucon in the Agora. Welcome, Cephalus, said Adeimantus, taking me by the
[12] hand; is there anything which we can do for you in Athens?
[13]
[14] Yes; that is why I am here; I wish to ask a favour of you.
[15]
[16] What may that be? he said.
[17]
[18] I want you to tell me the name of your half brother, which I have
[19] forgotten; he was a mere child when I last came hither from Clazomenae, but
[20] that was a long time ago; his father's name, if I remember rightly, was
[21] Pyrilampes?
[22]
[23] Yes, he said, and the name of our brother, Antiphon; but why do you ask?
[24]
[25] Let me introduce some countrymen of mine, I said; they are lovers of
[26] philosophy, and have heard that Antiphon was intimate with a certain
[27] Pythodorus, a friend of Zeno, and remembers a conversation which took place
[28] between Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides many years ago, Pythodorus having
[29] often recited it to him.
[30]
[31] Quite true.
[32]
[33] And could we hear it? I asked.
[34]
[35] Nothing easier, he replied; when he was a youth he made a careful study of
[36] the piece; at present his thoughts run in another direction; like his
[37] grandfather Antiphon he is devoted to horses. But, if that is what you
[38] want, let us go and look for him; he dwells at Melita, which is quite near,
[39] and he has only just left us to go home.
[40]
[41] Accordingly we went to look for him; he was at home, and in the act of
[42] giving a bridle to a smith to be fitted. When he had done with the smith,
[43] his brothers told him the purpose of our visit; and he saluted me as an
[44] acquaintance whom he remembered from my former visit, and we asked him to
[45] repeat the dialogue. At first he was not very willing, and complained of
[46] the trouble, but at length he consented. He told us that Pythodorus had
[47] described to him the appearance of Parmenides and Zeno; they came to
[48] Athens, as he said, at the great Panathenaea; the former was, at the time
[49] of his visit, about 65 years old, very white with age, but well favoured.
[50] Zeno was nearly 40 years of age, tall and fair to look upon; in the days of
[51] his youth he was reported to have been beloved by Parmenides. He said that
[52] they lodged with Pythodorus in the Ceramicus, outside the wall, whither
[53] Socrates, then a very young man, came to see them, and many others with
[54] him; they wanted to hear the writings of Zeno, which had been brought to
[55] Athens for the first time on the occasion of their visit. These Zeno
[56] himself read to them in the absence of Parmenides, and had very nearly
[57] finished when Pythodorus entered, and with him Parmenides and Aristoteles
[58] who was afterwards one of the Thirty, and heard the little that remained of
[59] the dialogue. Pythodorus had heard Zeno repeat them before.
[60]
[61] When the recitation was completed, Socrates requested that the first thesis
[62] of the first argument might be read over again, and this having been done,
[63] he said: What is your meaning, Zeno? Do you maintain that if being is
[64] many, it must be both like and unlike, and that this is impossible, for
[65] neither can the like be unlike, nor the unlike like--is that your position?
[66]
[67] Just so, said Zeno.
[68]
[69] And if the unlike cannot be like, or the like unlike, then according to
[70] you, being could not be many; for this would involve an impossibility. In
[71] all that you say have you any other purpose except to disprove the being of
[72] the many? and is not each division of your treatise intended to furnish a
[73] separate proof of this, there being in all as many proofs of the not-being
[74] of the many as you have composed arguments? Is that your meaning, or have
[75] I misunderstood you?
[76]
[77] No, said Zeno; you have correctly understood my general purpose.
[78]
[79] I see, Parmenides, said Socrates, that Zeno would like to be not only one
[80] with you in friendship but your second self in his writings too; he puts
[81] what you say in another way, and would fain make believe that he is telling
[82] us something which is new. For you, in your poems, say The All is one, and
[83] of this you adduce excellent proofs; and he on the other hand says There is
[84] no many; and on behalf of this he offers overwhelming evidence. You affirm
[85] unity, he denies plurality. And so you deceive the world into believing
[86] that you are saying different things when really you are saying much the
[87] same. This is a strain of art beyond the reach of most of us.
[88]
[89] Yes, Socrates, said Zeno. But although you are as keen as a Spartan hound
[90] in pursuing the track, you do not fully apprehend the true motive of the
[91] composition, which is not really such an artificial work as you imagine;
[92] for what you speak of was an accident; there was no pretence of a great
[93] purpose; nor any serious intention of deceiving the world. The truth is,
[94] that these writings of mine were meant to protect the arguments of
[95] Parmenides against those who make fun of him and seek to show the many
[96] ridiculous and contradictory results which they suppose to follow from the
[97] affirmation of the one. My answer is addressed to the partisans of the
[98] many, whose attack I return with interest by retorting upon them that their
[99] hypothesis of the being of many, if carried out, appears to be still more
[100] ridiculous than the hypothesis of the being of one. Zeal for my master led
[101] me to write the book in the days of my youth, but some one stole the copy;
[102] and therefore I had no choice whether it should be published or not; the
[103] motive, however, of writing, was not the ambition of an elder man, but the
[104] pugnacity of a young one. This you do not seem to see, Socrates; though in
[105] other respects, as I was saying, your notion is a very just one.
[106]
[107] I understand, said Socrates, and quite accept your account. But tell me,
[108] Zeno, do you not further think that there is an idea of likeness in itself,
[109] and another idea of unlikeness, which is the opposite of likeness, and that
[110] in these two, you and I and all other things to which we apply the term
[111] many, participate--things which participate in likeness become in that
[112] degree and manner like; and so far as they participate in unlikeness become
[113] in that degree unlike, or both like and unlike in the degree in which they
[114] participate in both? And may not all things partake of both opposites, and
[115] be both like and unlike, by reason of this participation?--Where is the
[116] wonder? Now if a person could prove the absolute like to become unlike, or
[117] the absolute unlike to become like, that, in my opinion, would indeed be a
[118] wonder; but there is nothing extraordinary, Zeno, in showing that the
[119] things which only partake of likeness and unlikeness experience both. Nor,
[120] again, if a person were to show that all is one by partaking of one, and at
[121] the same time many by partaking of many, would that be very astonishing.
[122] But if he were to show me that the absolute one was many, or the absolute
[123] many one, I should be truly amazed. And so of all the rest: I should be
[124] surprised to hear that the natures or ideas themselves had these opposite
[125] qualities; but not if a person wanted to prove of me that I was many and
[126] also one. When he wanted to show that I was many he would say that I have
[127] a right and a left side, and a front and a back, and an upper and a lower
[128] half, for I cannot deny that I partake of multitude; when, on the other
[129] hand, he wants to prove that I am one, he will say, that we who are here
[130] assembled are seven, and that I am one and partake of the one. In both
[131] instances he proves his case. So again, if a person shows that such things
[132] as wood, stones, and the like, being many are also one, we admit that he
[133] shows the coexistence of the one and many, but he does not show that the
[134] many are one or the one many; he is uttering not a paradox but a truism.
[135] If however, as I just now suggested, some one were to abstract simple
[136] notions of like, unlike, one, many, rest, motion, and similar ideas, and
[137] then to show that these admit of admixture and separation in themselves, I
[138] should be very much astonished. This part of the argument appears to be
[139] treated by you, Zeno, in a very spirited manner; but, as I was saying, I
[140] should be far more amazed if any one found in the ideas themselves which
[141] are apprehended by reason, the same puzzle and entanglement which you have
[142] shown to exist in visible objects.
[143]
[144] While Socrates was speaking, Pythodorus thought that Parmenides and Zeno
[145] were not altogether pleased at the successive steps of the argument; but
[146] still they gave the closest attention, and often looked at one another, and
[147] smiled as if in admiration of him. When he had finished, Parmenides
[148] expressed their feelings in the following words:--
[149]
[150] Socrates, he said, I admire the bent of your mind towards philosophy; tell
[151] me now, was this your own distinction between ideas in themselves and the
[152] things which partake of them? and do you think that there is an idea of
[153] likeness apart from the likeness which we possess, and of the one and many,
[154] and of the other things which Zeno mentioned?
[155]
[156] I think that there are such ideas, said Socrates.
[157]
[158] Parmenides proceeded: And would you also make absolute ideas of the just
[159] and the beautiful and the good, and of all that class?
[160]
[161] Yes, he said, I should.
[162]
[163] And would you make an idea of man apart from us and from all other human
[164] creatures, or of fire and water?
[165]
[166] I am often undecided, Parmenides, as to whether I ought to include them or
[167] not.
[168]
[169] And would you feel equally undecided, Socrates, about things of which the
[170] mention may provoke a smile?--I mean such things as hair, mud, dirt, or
[171] anything else which is vile and paltry; would you suppose that each of
[172] these has an idea distinct from the actual objects with which we come into
[173] contact, or not?
[174]
[175] Certainly not, said Socrates; visible things like these are such as they
[176] appear to us, and I am afraid that there would be an absurdity in assuming
[177] any idea of them, although I sometimes get disturbed, and begin to think
[178] that there is nothing without an idea; but then again, when I have taken up
[179] this position, I run away, because I am afraid that I may fall into a
[180] bottomless pit of nonsense, and perish; and so I return to the ideas of
[181] which I was just now speaking, and occupy myself with them.
[182]
[183] Yes, Socrates, said Parmenides; that is because you are still young; the
[184] time will come, if I am not mistaken, when philosophy will have a firmer
[185] grasp of you, and then you will not despise even the meanest things; at
[186] your age, you are too much disposed to regard the opinions of men. But I
[187] should like to know whether you mean that there are certain ideas of which
[188] all other things partake, and from which they derive their names; that
[189] similars, for example, become similar, because they partake of similarity;
[190] and great things become great, because they partake of greatness; and that
[191] just and beautiful things become just and beautiful, because they partake
[192] of justice and beauty?
[193]
[194] Yes, certainly, said Socrates that is my meaning.
[195]
[196] Then each individual partakes either of the whole of the idea or else of a
[197] part of the idea? Can there be any other mode of participation?
[198]
[199] There cannot be, he said.
[200]
[201] Then do you think that the whole idea is one, and yet, being one, is in
[202] each one of the many?
[203]
[204] Why not, Parmenides? said Socrates.
[205]
[206] Because one and the same thing will exist as a whole at the same time in
[207] many separate individuals, and will therefore be in a state of separation
[208] from itself.
[209]
[210] Nay, but the idea may be like the day which is one and the same in many
[211] places at once, and yet continuous with itself; in this way each idea may
[212] be one and the same in all at the same time.
[213]
[214] I like your way, Socrates, of making one in many places at once. You mean
[215] to say, that if I were to spread out a sail and cover a number of men,
[216] there would be one whole including many--is not that your meaning?
[217]
[218] I think so.
[219]
[220] And would you say that the whole sail includes each man, or a part of it
[221] only, and different parts different men?
[222]
[223] The latter.
[224]
[225] Then, Socrates, the ideas themselves will be divisible, and things which
[226] participate in them will have a part of them only and not the whole idea
[227] existing in each of them?
[228]
[229] That seems to follow.
[230]
[231] Then would you like to say, Socrates, that the one idea is really divisible
[232] and yet remains one?
[233]
[234] Certainly not, he said.
[235]
[236] Suppose that you divide absolute greatness, and that of the many great
[237] things, each one is great in virtue of a portion of greatness less than
[238] absolute greatness--is that conceivable?
[239]
[240] No.
[241]
[242] Or will each equal thing, if possessing some small portion of equality less
[243] than absolute equality, be equal to some other thing by virtue of that
[244] portion only?
[245]
[246] Impossible.
[247]
[248] Or suppose one of us to have a portion of smallness; this is but a part of
[249] the small, and therefore the absolutely small is greater; if the absolutely
[250] small be greater, that to which the part of the small is added will be
[251] smaller and not greater than before.
[252]
[253] How absurd!
[254]
[255] Then in what way, Socrates, will all things participate in the ideas, if
[256] they are unable to participate in them either as parts or wholes?
[257]
[258] Indeed, he said, you have asked a question which is not easily answered.
[259]
[260] Well, said Parmenides, and what do you say of another question?
[261]
[262] What question?
[263]
[264] I imagine that the way in which you are led to assume one idea of each kind
[265] is as follows:--You see a number of great objects, and when you look at
[266] them there seems to you to be one and the same idea (or nature) in them
[267] all; hence you conceive of greatness as one.
[268]
[269] Very true, said Socrates.
[270]
[271] And if you go on and allow your mind in like manner to embrace in one view
[272] the idea of greatness and of great things which are not the idea, and to
[273] compare them, will not another greatness arise, which will appear to be the
[274] source of all these?
[275]
[276] It would seem so.
[277]
[278] Then another idea of greatness now comes into view over and above absolute
[279] greatness, and the individuals which partake of it; and then another, over
[280] and above all these, by virtue of which they will all be great, and so each
[281] idea instead of being one will be infinitely multiplied.
[282]
[283] But may not the ideas, asked Socrates, be thoughts only, and have no proper
[284] existence except in our minds, Parmenides? For in that case each idea may
[285] still be one, and not experience this infinite multiplication.
[286]
[287] And can there be individual thoughts which are thoughts of nothing?
[288]
[289] Impossible, he said.
[290]
[291] The thought must be of something?
[292]
[293] Yes.
[294]
[295] Of something which is or which is not?
[296]
[297] Of something which is.
[298]
[299] Must it not be of a single something, which the thought recognizes as
[300] attaching to all, being a single form or nature?
[301]
[302] Yes.
[303]
[304] And will not the something which is apprehended as one and the same in all,
[305] be an idea?
[306]
[307] From that, again, there is no escape.
[308]
[309] Then, said Parmenides, if you say that everything else participates in the
[310] ideas, must you not say either that everything is made up of thoughts, and
[311] that all things think; or that they are thoughts but have no thought?
[312]
[313] The latter view, Parmenides, is no more rational than the previous one. In
[314] my opinion, the ideas are, as it were, patterns fixed in nature, and other
[315] things are like them, and resemblances of them--what is meant by the
[316] participation of other things in the ideas, is really assimilation to them.
[317]
[318] But if, said he, the individual is like the idea, must not the idea also be
[319] like the individual, in so far as the individual is a resemblance of the
[320] idea? That which is like, cannot be conceived of as other than the like of
[321] like.
[322]
[323] Impossible.
[324]
[325] And when two things are alike, must they not partake of the same idea?
[326]
[327] They must.
[328]
[329] And will not that of which the two partake, and which makes them alike, be
[330] the idea itself?
[331]
[332] Certainly.
[333]
[334] Then the idea cannot be like the individual, or the individual like the
[335] idea; for if they are alike, some further idea of likeness will always be
[336] coming to light, and if that be like anything else, another; and new ideas
[337] will be always arising, if the idea resembles that which partakes of it?
[338]
[339] Quite true.
[340]
[341] The theory, then, that other things participate in the ideas by
[342] resemblance, has to be given up, and some other mode of participation
[343] devised?
[344]
[345] It would seem so.
[346]
[347] Do you see then, Socrates, how great is the difficulty of affirming the
[348] ideas to be absolute?
[349]
[350] Yes, indeed.
[351]
[352] And, further, let me say that as yet you only understand a small part of
[353] the difficulty which is involved if you make of each thing a single idea,
[354] parting it off from other things.
[355]
[356] What difficulty? he said.
[357]
[358] There are many, but the greatest of all is this:--If an opponent argues
[359] that these ideas, being such as we say they ought to be, must remain
[360] unknown, no one can prove to him that he is wrong, unless he who denies
[361] their existence be a man of great ability and knowledge, and is willing to
[362] follow a long and laborious demonstration; he will remain unconvinced, and
[363] still insist that they cannot be known.
[364]
[365] What do you mean, Parmenides? said Socrates.
[366]
[367] In the first place, I think, Socrates, that you, or any one who maintains
[368] the existence of absolute essences, will admit that they cannot exist in
[369] us.
[370]
[371] No, said Socrates; for then they would be no longer absolute.
[372]
[373] True, he said; and therefore when ideas are what they are in relation to
[374] one another, their essence is determined by a relation among themselves,
[375] and has nothing to do with the resemblances, or whatever they are to be
[376] termed, which are in our sphere, and from which we receive this or that
[377] name when we partake of them. And the things which are within our sphere
[378] and have the same names with them, are likewise only relative to one
[379] another, and not to the ideas which have the same names with them, but
[380] belong to themselves and not to them.
[381]
[382] What do you mean? said Socrates.
[383]
[384] I may illustrate my meaning in this way, said Parmenides:--A master has a
[385] slave; now there is nothing absolute in the relation between them, which is
[386] simply a relation of one man to another. But there is also an idea of
[387] mastership in the abstract, which is relative to the idea of slavery in the
[388] abstract. These natures have nothing to do with us, nor we with them; they
[389] are concerned with themselves only, and we with ourselves. Do you see my
[390] meaning?
[391]
[392] Yes, said Socrates, I quite see your meaning.
[393]
[394] And will not knowledge--I mean absolute knowledge--answer to absolute
[395] truth?
[396]
[397] Certainly.
[398]
[399] And each kind of absolute knowledge will answer to each kind of absolute
[400] being?
[401]
[402] Yes.
[403]
[404] But the knowledge which we have, will answer to the truth which we have;
[405] and again, each kind of knowledge which we have, will be a knowledge of
[406] each kind of being which we have?
[407]
[408] Certainly.
[409]
[410] But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and cannot have?
[411]
[412] No, we cannot.
[413]
[414] And the absolute natures or kinds are known severally by the absolute idea
[415] of knowledge?
[416]
[417] Yes.
[418]
[419] And we have not got the idea of knowledge?
[420]
[421] No.
[422]
[423] Then none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share in
[424] absolute knowledge?
[425]
[426] I suppose not.
[427]
[428] Then the nature of the beautiful in itself, and of the good in itself, and
[429] all other ideas which we suppose to exist absolutely, are unknown to us?
[430]
[431] It would seem so.
[432]
[433] I think that there is a stranger consequence still.
[434]
[435] What is it?
[436]
[437] Would you, or would you not say, that absolute knowledge, if there is such
[438] a thing, must be a far more exact knowledge than our knowledge; and the
[439] same of beauty and of the rest?
[440]
[441] Yes.
[442]
[443] And if there be such a thing as participation in absolute knowledge, no one
[444] is more likely than God to have this most exact knowledge?
[445]
[446] Certainly.
[447]
[448] But then, will God, having absolute knowledge, have a knowledge of human
[449] things?
[450]
[451] Why not?
[452]
[453] Because, Socrates, said Parmenides, we have admitted that the ideas are not
[454] valid in relation to human things; nor human things in relation to them;
[455] the relations of either are limited to their respective spheres.
[456]
[457] Yes, that has been admitted.
[458]
[459] And if God has this perfect authority, and perfect knowledge, his authority
[460] cannot rule us, nor his knowledge know us, or any human thing; just as our
[461] authority does not extend to the gods, nor our knowledge know anything
[462] which is divine, so by parity of reason they, being gods, are not our
[463] masters, neither do they know the things of men.
[464]
[465] Yet, surely, said Socrates, to deprive God of knowledge is monstrous.
[466]
[467] These, Socrates, said Parmenides, are a few, and only a few of the
[468] difficulties in which we are involved if ideas really are and we determine
[469] each one of them to be an absolute unity. He who hears what may be said
[470] against them will deny the very existence of them--and even if they do
[471] exist, he will say that they must of necessity be unknown to man; and he
[472] will seem to have reason on his side, and as we were remarking just now,
[473] will be very difficult to convince; a man must be gifted with very
[474] considerable ability before he can learn that everything has a class and an
[475] absolute essence; and still more remarkable will he be who discovers all
[476] these things for himself, and having thoroughly investigated them is able
[477] to teach them to others.
[478]
[479] I agree with you, Parmenides, said Socrates; and what you say is very much
[480] to my mind.
[481]
[482] And yet, Socrates, said Parmenides, if a man, fixing his attention on these
[483] and the like difficulties, does away with ideas of things and will not
[484] admit that every individual thing has its own determinate idea which is
[485] always one and the same, he will have nothing on which his mind can rest;
[486] and so he will utterly destroy the power of reasoning, as you seem to me to
[487] have particularly noted.
[488]
[489] Very true, he said.
[490]
[491] But, then, what is to become of philosophy? Whither shall we turn, if the
[492] ideas are unknown?
[493]
[494] I certainly do not see my way at present.
[495]
[496] Yes, said Parmenides; and I think that this arises, Socrates, out of your
[497] attempting to define the beautiful, the just, the good, and the ideas
[498] generally, without sufficient previous training. I noticed your
[499] deficiency, when I heard you talking here with your friend Aristoteles, the
[500] day before yesterday. The impulse that carries you towards philosophy is
[501] assuredly noble and divine; but there is an art which is called by the
[502] vulgar idle talking, and which is often imagined to be useless; in that you
[503] must train and exercise yourself, now that you are young, or truth will
[504] elude your grasp.
[505]
[506] And what is the nature of this exercise, Parmenides, which you would
[507] recommend?
[508]
[509] That which you heard Zeno practising; at the same time, I give you credit
[510] for saying to him that you did not care to examine the perplexity in
[511] reference to visible things, or to consider the question that way; but only
[512] in reference to objects of thought, and to what may be called ideas.
[513]
[514] Why, yes, he said, there appears to me to be no difficulty in showing by
[515] this method that visible things are like and unlike and may experience
[516] anything.
[517]
[518] Quite true, said Parmenides; but I think that you should go a step further,
[519] and consider not only the consequences which flow from a given hypothesis,
[520] but also the consequences which flow from denying the hypothesis; and that
[521] will be still better training for you.
[522]
[523] What do you mean? he said.
[524]
[525] I mean, for example, that in the case of this very hypothesis of Zeno's
[526] about the many, you should inquire not only what will be the consequences
[527] to the many in relation to themselves and to the one, and to the one in
[528] relation to itself and the many, on the hypothesis of the being of the
[529] many, but also what will be the consequences to the one and the many in
[530] their relation to themselves and to each other, on the opposite hypothesis.
[531] Or, again, if likeness is or is not, what will be the consequences in
[532] either of these cases to the subjects of the hypothesis, and to other
[533] things, in relation both to themselves and to one another, and so of
[534] unlikeness; and the same holds good of motion and rest, of generation and
[535] destruction, and even of being and not-being. In a word, when you suppose
[536] anything to be or not to be, or to be in any way affected, you must look at
[537] the consequences in relation to the thing itself, and to any other things
[538] which you choose,--to each of them singly, to more than one, and to all;
[539] and so of other things, you must look at them in relation to themselves and
[540] to anything else which you suppose either to be or not to be, if you would
[541] train yourself perfectly and see the real truth.
[542]
[543] That, Parmenides, is a tremendous business of which you speak, and I do not
[544] quite understand you; will you take some hypothesis and go through the
[545] steps?--then I shall apprehend you better.
[546]
[547] That, Socrates, is a serious task to impose on a man of my years.
[548]
[549] Then will you, Zeno? said Socrates.
[550]
[551] Zeno answered with a smile:--Let us make our petition to Parmenides
[552] himself, who is quite right in saying that you are hardly aware of the
[553] extent of the task which