Parmenides by Plato
Parmenides

Parmenides Parmenides

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[1]        
[2]        PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Cephalus, Adeimantus, Glaucon, Antiphon,
[3]        Pythodorus, Socrates, Zeno, Parmenides, Aristoteles.
[4]        
[5]        Cephalus rehearses a dialogue which is supposed to have been narrated in
[6]        his presence by Antiphon, the half-brother of Adeimantus and Glaucon, to
[7]        certain Clazomenians.
[8]        
[9]        
[10]       We had come from our home at Clazomenae to Athens, and met Adeimantus and
[11]       Glaucon in the Agora. Welcome, Cephalus, said Adeimantus, taking me by the
[12]       hand; is there anything which we can do for you in Athens?
[13]       
[14]       Yes; that is why I am here; I wish to ask a favour of you.
[15]       
[16]       What may that be? he said.
[17]       
[18]       I want you to tell me the name of your half brother, which I have
[19]       forgotten; he was a mere child when I last came hither from Clazomenae, but
[20]       that was a long time ago; his father's name, if I remember rightly, was
[21]       Pyrilampes?
[22]       
[23]       Yes, he said, and the name of our brother, Antiphon; but why do you ask?
[24]       
[25]       Let me introduce some countrymen of mine, I said; they are lovers of
[26]       philosophy, and have heard that Antiphon was intimate with a certain
[27]       Pythodorus, a friend of Zeno, and remembers a conversation which took place
[28]       between Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides many years ago, Pythodorus having
[29]       often recited it to him.
[30]       
[31]       Quite true.
[32]       
[33]       And could we hear it? I asked.
[34]       
[35]       Nothing easier, he replied; when he was a youth he made a careful study of
[36]       the piece; at present his thoughts run in another direction; like his
[37]       grandfather Antiphon he is devoted to horses. But, if that is what you
[38]       want, let us go and look for him; he dwells at Melita, which is quite near,
[39]       and he has only just left us to go home.
[40]       
[41]       Accordingly we went to look for him; he was at home, and in the act of
[42]       giving a bridle to a smith to be fitted. When he had done with the smith,
[43]       his brothers told him the purpose of our visit; and he saluted me as an
[44]       acquaintance whom he remembered from my former visit, and we asked him to
[45]       repeat the dialogue. At first he was not very willing, and complained of
[46]       the trouble, but at length he consented. He told us that Pythodorus had
[47]       described to him the appearance of Parmenides and Zeno; they came to
[48]       Athens, as he said, at the great Panathenaea; the former was, at the time
[49]       of his visit, about 65 years old, very white with age, but well favoured.
[50]       Zeno was nearly 40 years of age, tall and fair to look upon; in the days of
[51]       his youth he was reported to have been beloved by Parmenides. He said that
[52]       they lodged with Pythodorus in the Ceramicus, outside the wall, whither
[53]       Socrates, then a very young man, came to see them, and many others with
[54]       him; they wanted to hear the writings of Zeno, which had been brought to
[55]       Athens for the first time on the occasion of their visit. These Zeno
[56]       himself read to them in the absence of Parmenides, and had very nearly
[57]       finished when Pythodorus entered, and with him Parmenides and Aristoteles
[58]       who was afterwards one of the Thirty, and heard the little that remained of
[59]       the dialogue. Pythodorus had heard Zeno repeat them before.
[60]       
[61]       When the recitation was completed, Socrates requested that the first thesis
[62]       of the first argument might be read over again, and this having been done,
[63]       he said: What is your meaning, Zeno? Do you maintain that if being is
[64]       many, it must be both like and unlike, and that this is impossible, for
[65]       neither can the like be unlike, nor the unlike like--is that your position?
[66]       
[67]       Just so, said Zeno.
[68]       
[69]       And if the unlike cannot be like, or the like unlike, then according to
[70]       you, being could not be many; for this would involve an impossibility. In
[71]       all that you say have you any other purpose except to disprove the being of
[72]       the many? and is not each division of your treatise intended to furnish a
[73]       separate proof of this, there being in all as many proofs of the not-being
[74]       of the many as you have composed arguments? Is that your meaning, or have
[75]       I misunderstood you?
[76]       
[77]       No, said Zeno; you have correctly understood my general purpose.
[78]       
[79]       I see, Parmenides, said Socrates, that Zeno would like to be not only one
[80]       with you in friendship but your second self in his writings too; he puts
[81]       what you say in another way, and would fain make believe that he is telling
[82]       us something which is new. For you, in your poems, say The All is one, and
[83]       of this you adduce excellent proofs; and he on the other hand says There is
[84]       no many; and on behalf of this he offers overwhelming evidence. You affirm
[85]       unity, he denies plurality. And so you deceive the world into believing
[86]       that you are saying different things when really you are saying much the
[87]       same. This is a strain of art beyond the reach of most of us.
[88]       
[89]       Yes, Socrates, said Zeno. But although you are as keen as a Spartan hound
[90]       in pursuing the track, you do not fully apprehend the true motive of the
[91]       composition, which is not really such an artificial work as you imagine;
[92]       for what you speak of was an accident; there was no pretence of a great
[93]       purpose; nor any serious intention of deceiving the world. The truth is,
[94]       that these writings of mine were meant to protect the arguments of
[95]       Parmenides against those who make fun of him and seek to show the many
[96]       ridiculous and contradictory results which they suppose to follow from the
[97]       affirmation of the one. My answer is addressed to the partisans of the
[98]       many, whose attack I return with interest by retorting upon them that their
[99]       hypothesis of the being of many, if carried out, appears to be still more
[100]      ridiculous than the hypothesis of the being of one. Zeal for my master led
[101]      me to write the book in the days of my youth, but some one stole the copy;
[102]      and therefore I had no choice whether it should be published or not; the
[103]      motive, however, of writing, was not the ambition of an elder man, but the
[104]      pugnacity of a young one. This you do not seem to see, Socrates; though in
[105]      other respects, as I was saying, your notion is a very just one.
[106]      
[107]      I understand, said Socrates, and quite accept your account. But tell me,
[108]      Zeno, do you not further think that there is an idea of likeness in itself,
[109]      and another idea of unlikeness, which is the opposite of likeness, and that
[110]      in these two, you and I and all other things to which we apply the term
[111]      many, participate--things which participate in likeness become in that
[112]      degree and manner like; and so far as they participate in unlikeness become
[113]      in that degree unlike, or both like and unlike in the degree in which they
[114]      participate in both? And may not all things partake of both opposites, and
[115]      be both like and unlike, by reason of this participation?--Where is the
[116]      wonder? Now if a person could prove the absolute like to become unlike, or
[117]      the absolute unlike to become like, that, in my opinion, would indeed be a
[118]      wonder; but there is nothing extraordinary, Zeno, in showing that the
[119]      things which only partake of likeness and unlikeness experience both. Nor,
[120]      again, if a person were to show that all is one by partaking of one, and at
[121]      the same time many by partaking of many, would that be very astonishing.
[122]      But if he were to show me that the absolute one was many, or the absolute
[123]      many one, I should be truly amazed. And so of all the rest: I should be
[124]      surprised to hear that the natures or ideas themselves had these opposite
[125]      qualities; but not if a person wanted to prove of me that I was many and
[126]      also one. When he wanted to show that I was many he would say that I have
[127]      a right and a left side, and a front and a back, and an upper and a lower
[128]      half, for I cannot deny that I partake of multitude; when, on the other
[129]      hand, he wants to prove that I am one, he will say, that we who are here
[130]      assembled are seven, and that I am one and partake of the one. In both
[131]      instances he proves his case. So again, if a person shows that such things
[132]      as wood, stones, and the like, being many are also one, we admit that he
[133]      shows the coexistence of the one and many, but he does not show that the
[134]      many are one or the one many; he is uttering not a paradox but a truism.
[135]      If however, as I just now suggested, some one were to abstract simple
[136]      notions of like, unlike, one, many, rest, motion, and similar ideas, and
[137]      then to show that these admit of admixture and separation in themselves, I
[138]      should be very much astonished. This part of the argument appears to be
[139]      treated by you, Zeno, in a very spirited manner; but, as I was saying, I
[140]      should be far more amazed if any one found in the ideas themselves which
[141]      are apprehended by reason, the same puzzle and entanglement which you have
[142]      shown to exist in visible objects.
[143]      
[144]      While Socrates was speaking, Pythodorus thought that Parmenides and Zeno
[145]      were not altogether pleased at the successive steps of the argument; but
[146]      still they gave the closest attention, and often looked at one another, and
[147]      smiled as if in admiration of him. When he had finished, Parmenides
[148]      expressed their feelings in the following words:--
[149]      
[150]      Socrates, he said, I admire the bent of your mind towards philosophy; tell
[151]      me now, was this your own distinction between ideas in themselves and the
[152]      things which partake of them? and do you think that there is an idea of
[153]      likeness apart from the likeness which we possess, and of the one and many,
[154]      and of the other things which Zeno mentioned?
[155]      
[156]      I think that there are such ideas, said Socrates.
[157]      
[158]      Parmenides proceeded: And would you also make absolute ideas of the just
[159]      and the beautiful and the good, and of all that class?
[160]      
[161]      Yes, he said, I should.
[162]      
[163]      And would you make an idea of man apart from us and from all other human
[164]      creatures, or of fire and water?
[165]      
[166]      I am often undecided, Parmenides, as to whether I ought to include them or
[167]      not.
[168]      
[169]      And would you feel equally undecided, Socrates, about things of which the
[170]      mention may provoke a smile?--I mean such things as hair, mud, dirt, or
[171]      anything else which is vile and paltry; would you suppose that each of
[172]      these has an idea distinct from the actual objects with which we come into
[173]      contact, or not?
[174]      
[175]      Certainly not, said Socrates; visible things like these are such as they
[176]      appear to us, and I am afraid that there would be an absurdity in assuming
[177]      any idea of them, although I sometimes get disturbed, and begin to think
[178]      that there is nothing without an idea; but then again, when I have taken up
[179]      this position, I run away, because I am afraid that I may fall into a
[180]      bottomless pit of nonsense, and perish; and so I return to the ideas of
[181]      which I was just now speaking, and occupy myself with them.
[182]      
[183]      Yes, Socrates, said Parmenides; that is because you are still young; the
[184]      time will come, if I am not mistaken, when philosophy will have a firmer
[185]      grasp of you, and then you will not despise even the meanest things; at
[186]      your age, you are too much disposed to regard the opinions of men. But I
[187]      should like to know whether you mean that there are certain ideas of which
[188]      all other things partake, and from which they derive their names; that
[189]      similars, for example, become similar, because they partake of similarity;
[190]      and great things become great, because they partake of greatness; and that
[191]      just and beautiful things become just and beautiful, because they partake
[192]      of justice and beauty?
[193]      
[194]      Yes, certainly, said Socrates that is my meaning.
[195]      
[196]      Then each individual partakes either of the whole of the idea or else of a
[197]      part of the idea? Can there be any other mode of participation?
[198]      
[199]      There cannot be, he said.
[200]      
[201]      Then do you think that the whole idea is one, and yet, being one, is in
[202]      each one of the many?
[203]      
[204]      Why not, Parmenides? said Socrates.
[205]      
[206]      Because one and the same thing will exist as a whole at the same time in
[207]      many separate individuals, and will therefore be in a state of separation
[208]      from itself.
[209]      
[210]      Nay, but the idea may be like the day which is one and the same in many
[211]      places at once, and yet continuous with itself; in this way each idea may
[212]      be one and the same in all at the same time.
[213]      
[214]      I like your way, Socrates, of making one in many places at once. You mean
[215]      to say, that if I were to spread out a sail and cover a number of men,
[216]      there would be one whole including many--is not that your meaning?
[217]      
[218]      I think so.
[219]      
[220]      And would you say that the whole sail includes each man, or a part of it
[221]      only, and different parts different men?
[222]      
[223]      The latter.
[224]      
[225]      Then, Socrates, the ideas themselves will be divisible, and things which
[226]      participate in them will have a part of them only and not the whole idea
[227]      existing in each of them?
[228]      
[229]      That seems to follow.
[230]      
[231]      Then would you like to say, Socrates, that the one idea is really divisible
[232]      and yet remains one?
[233]      
[234]      Certainly not, he said.
[235]      
[236]      Suppose that you divide absolute greatness, and that of the many great
[237]      things, each one is great in virtue of a portion of greatness less than
[238]      absolute greatness--is that conceivable?
[239]      
[240]      No.
[241]      
[242]      Or will each equal thing, if possessing some small portion of equality less
[243]      than absolute equality, be equal to some other thing by virtue of that
[244]      portion only?
[245]      
[246]      Impossible.
[247]      
[248]      Or suppose one of us to have a portion of smallness; this is but a part of
[249]      the small, and therefore the absolutely small is greater; if the absolutely
[250]      small be greater, that to which the part of the small is added will be
[251]      smaller and not greater than before.
[252]      
[253]      How absurd!
[254]      
[255]      Then in what way, Socrates, will all things participate in the ideas, if
[256]      they are unable to participate in them either as parts or wholes?
[257]      
[258]      Indeed, he said, you have asked a question which is not easily answered.
[259]      
[260]      Well, said Parmenides, and what do you say of another question?
[261]      
[262]      What question?
[263]      
[264]      I imagine that the way in which you are led to assume one idea of each kind
[265]      is as follows:--You see a number of great objects, and when you look at
[266]      them there seems to you to be one and the same idea (or nature) in them
[267]      all; hence you conceive of greatness as one.
[268]      
[269]      Very true, said Socrates.
[270]      
[271]      And if you go on and allow your mind in like manner to embrace in one view
[272]      the idea of greatness and of great things which are not the idea, and to
[273]      compare them, will not another greatness arise, which will appear to be the
[274]      source of all these?
[275]      
[276]      It would seem so.
[277]      
[278]      Then another idea of greatness now comes into view over and above absolute
[279]      greatness, and the individuals which partake of it; and then another, over
[280]      and above all these, by virtue of which they will all be great, and so each
[281]      idea instead of being one will be infinitely multiplied.
[282]      
[283]      But may not the ideas, asked Socrates, be thoughts only, and have no proper
[284]      existence except in our minds, Parmenides? For in that case each idea may
[285]      still be one, and not experience this infinite multiplication.
[286]      
[287]      And can there be individual thoughts which are thoughts of nothing?
[288]      
[289]      Impossible, he said.
[290]      
[291]      The thought must be of something?
[292]      
[293]      Yes.
[294]      
[295]      Of something which is or which is not?
[296]      
[297]      Of something which is.
[298]      
[299]      Must it not be of a single something, which the thought recognizes as
[300]      attaching to all, being a single form or nature?
[301]      
[302]      Yes.
[303]      
[304]      And will not the something which is apprehended as one and the same in all,
[305]      be an idea?
[306]      
[307]      From that, again, there is no escape.
[308]      
[309]      Then, said Parmenides, if you say that everything else participates in the
[310]      ideas, must you not say either that everything is made up of thoughts, and
[311]      that all things think; or that they are thoughts but have no thought?
[312]      
[313]      The latter view, Parmenides, is no more rational than the previous one. In
[314]      my opinion, the ideas are, as it were, patterns fixed in nature, and other
[315]      things are like them, and resemblances of them--what is meant by the
[316]      participation of other things in the ideas, is really assimilation to them.
[317]      
[318]      But if, said he, the individual is like the idea, must not the idea also be
[319]      like the individual, in so far as the individual is a resemblance of the
[320]      idea? That which is like, cannot be conceived of as other than the like of
[321]      like.
[322]      
[323]      Impossible.
[324]      
[325]      And when two things are alike, must they not partake of the same idea?
[326]      
[327]      They must.
[328]      
[329]      And will not that of which the two partake, and which makes them alike, be
[330]      the idea itself?
[331]      
[332]      Certainly.
[333]      
[334]      Then the idea cannot be like the individual, or the individual like the
[335]      idea; for if they are alike, some further idea of likeness will always be
[336]      coming to light, and if that be like anything else, another; and new ideas
[337]      will be always arising, if the idea resembles that which partakes of it?
[338]      
[339]      Quite true.
[340]      
[341]      The theory, then, that other things participate in the ideas by
[342]      resemblance, has to be given up, and some other mode of participation
[343]      devised?
[344]      
[345]      It would seem so.
[346]      
[347]      Do you see then, Socrates, how great is the difficulty of affirming the
[348]      ideas to be absolute?
[349]      
[350]      Yes, indeed.
[351]      
[352]      And, further, let me say that as yet you only understand a small part of
[353]      the difficulty which is involved if you make of each thing a single idea,
[354]      parting it off from other things.
[355]      
[356]      What difficulty? he said.
[357]      
[358]      There are many, but the greatest of all is this:--If an opponent argues
[359]      that these ideas, being such as we say they ought to be, must remain
[360]      unknown, no one can prove to him that he is wrong, unless he who denies
[361]      their existence be a man of great ability and knowledge, and is willing to
[362]      follow a long and laborious demonstration; he will remain unconvinced, and
[363]      still insist that they cannot be known.
[364]      
[365]      What do you mean, Parmenides? said Socrates.
[366]      
[367]      In the first place, I think, Socrates, that you, or any one who maintains
[368]      the existence of absolute essences, will admit that they cannot exist in
[369]      us.
[370]      
[371]      No, said Socrates; for then they would be no longer absolute.
[372]      
[373]      True, he said; and therefore when ideas are what they are in relation to
[374]      one another, their essence is determined by a relation among themselves,
[375]      and has nothing to do with the resemblances, or whatever they are to be
[376]      termed, which are in our sphere, and from which we receive this or that
[377]      name when we partake of them. And the things which are within our sphere
[378]      and have the same names with them, are likewise only relative to one
[379]      another, and not to the ideas which have the same names with them, but
[380]      belong to themselves and not to them.
[381]      
[382]      What do you mean? said Socrates.
[383]      
[384]      I may illustrate my meaning in this way, said Parmenides:--A master has a
[385]      slave; now there is nothing absolute in the relation between them, which is
[386]      simply a relation of one man to another. But there is also an idea of
[387]      mastership in the abstract, which is relative to the idea of slavery in the
[388]      abstract. These natures have nothing to do with us, nor we with them; they
[389]      are concerned with themselves only, and we with ourselves. Do you see my
[390]      meaning?
[391]      
[392]      Yes, said Socrates, I quite see your meaning.
[393]      
[394]      And will not knowledge--I mean absolute knowledge--answer to absolute
[395]      truth?
[396]      
[397]      Certainly.
[398]      
[399]      And each kind of absolute knowledge will answer to each kind of absolute
[400]      being?
[401]      
[402]      Yes.
[403]      
[404]      But the knowledge which we have, will answer to the truth which we have;
[405]      and again, each kind of knowledge which we have, will be a knowledge of
[406]      each kind of being which we have?
[407]      
[408]      Certainly.
[409]      
[410]      But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and cannot have?
[411]      
[412]      No, we cannot.
[413]      
[414]      And the absolute natures or kinds are known severally by the absolute idea
[415]      of knowledge?
[416]      
[417]      Yes.
[418]      
[419]      And we have not got the idea of knowledge?
[420]      
[421]      No.
[422]      
[423]      Then none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share in
[424]      absolute knowledge?
[425]      
[426]      I suppose not.
[427]      
[428]      Then the nature of the beautiful in itself, and of the good in itself, and
[429]      all other ideas which we suppose to exist absolutely, are unknown to us?
[430]      
[431]      It would seem so.
[432]      
[433]      I think that there is a stranger consequence still.
[434]      
[435]      What is it?
[436]      
[437]      Would you, or would you not say, that absolute knowledge, if there is such
[438]      a thing, must be a far more exact knowledge than our knowledge; and the
[439]      same of beauty and of the rest?
[440]      
[441]      Yes.
[442]      
[443]      And if there be such a thing as participation in absolute knowledge, no one
[444]      is more likely than God to have this most exact knowledge?
[445]      
[446]      Certainly.
[447]      
[448]      But then, will God, having absolute knowledge, have a knowledge of human
[449]      things?
[450]      
[451]      Why not?
[452]      
[453]      Because, Socrates, said Parmenides, we have admitted that the ideas are not
[454]      valid in relation to human things; nor human things in relation to them;
[455]      the relations of either are limited to their respective spheres.
[456]      
[457]      Yes, that has been admitted.
[458]      
[459]      And if God has this perfect authority, and perfect knowledge, his authority
[460]      cannot rule us, nor his knowledge know us, or any human thing; just as our
[461]      authority does not extend to the gods, nor our knowledge know anything
[462]      which is divine, so by parity of reason they, being gods, are not our
[463]      masters, neither do they know the things of men.
[464]      
[465]      Yet, surely, said Socrates, to deprive God of knowledge is monstrous.
[466]      
[467]      These, Socrates, said Parmenides, are a few, and only a few of the
[468]      difficulties in which we are involved if ideas really are and we determine
[469]      each one of them to be an absolute unity. He who hears what may be said
[470]      against them will deny the very existence of them--and even if they do
[471]      exist, he will say that they must of necessity be unknown to man; and he
[472]      will seem to have reason on his side, and as we were remarking just now,
[473]      will be very difficult to convince; a man must be gifted with very
[474]      considerable ability before he can learn that everything has a class and an
[475]      absolute essence; and still more remarkable will he be who discovers all
[476]      these things for himself, and having thoroughly investigated them is able
[477]      to teach them to others.
[478]      
[479]      I agree with you, Parmenides, said Socrates; and what you say is very much
[480]      to my mind.
[481]      
[482]      And yet, Socrates, said Parmenides, if a man, fixing his attention on these
[483]      and the like difficulties, does away with ideas of things and will not
[484]      admit that every individual thing has its own determinate idea which is
[485]      always one and the same, he will have nothing on which his mind can rest;
[486]      and so he will utterly destroy the power of reasoning, as you seem to me to
[487]      have particularly noted.
[488]      
[489]      Very true, he said.
[490]      
[491]      But, then, what is to become of philosophy? Whither shall we turn, if the
[492]      ideas are unknown?
[493]      
[494]      I certainly do not see my way at present.
[495]      
[496]      Yes, said Parmenides; and I think that this arises, Socrates, out of your
[497]      attempting to define the beautiful, the just, the good, and the ideas
[498]      generally, without sufficient previous training. I noticed your
[499]      deficiency, when I heard you talking here with your friend Aristoteles, the
[500]      day before yesterday. The impulse that carries you towards philosophy is
[501]      assuredly noble and divine; but there is an art which is called by the
[502]      vulgar idle talking, and which is often imagined to be useless; in that you
[503]      must train and exercise yourself, now that you are young, or truth will
[504]      elude your grasp.
[505]      
[506]      And what is the nature of this exercise, Parmenides, which you would
[507]      recommend?
[508]      
[509]      That which you heard Zeno practising; at the same time, I give you credit
[510]      for saying to him that you did not care to examine the perplexity in
[511]      reference to visible things, or to consider the question that way; but only
[512]      in reference to objects of thought, and to what may be called ideas.
[513]      
[514]      Why, yes, he said, there appears to me to be no difficulty in showing by
[515]      this method that visible things are like and unlike and may experience
[516]      anything.
[517]      
[518]      Quite true, said Parmenides; but I think that you should go a step further,
[519]      and consider not only the consequences which flow from a given hypothesis,
[520]      but also the consequences which flow from denying the hypothesis; and that
[521]      will be still better training for you.
[522]      
[523]      What do you mean? he said.
[524]      
[525]      I mean, for example, that in the case of this very hypothesis of Zeno's
[526]      about the many, you should inquire not only what will be the consequences
[527]      to the many in relation to themselves and to the one, and to the one in
[528]      relation to itself and the many, on the hypothesis of the being of the
[529]      many, but also what will be the consequences to the one and the many in
[530]      their relation to themselves and to each other, on the opposite hypothesis.
[531]      Or, again, if likeness is or is not, what will be the consequences in
[532]      either of these cases to the subjects of the hypothesis, and to other
[533]      things, in relation both to themselves and to one another, and so of
[534]      unlikeness; and the same holds good of motion and rest, of generation and
[535]      destruction, and even of being and not-being. In a word, when you suppose
[536]      anything to be or not to be, or to be in any way affected, you must look at
[537]      the consequences in relation to the thing itself, and to any other things
[538]      which you choose,--to each of them singly, to more than one, and to all;
[539]      and so of other things, you must look at them in relation to themselves and
[540]      to anything else which you suppose either to be or not to be, if you would
[541]      train yourself perfectly and see the real truth.
[542]      
[543]      That, Parmenides, is a tremendous business of which you speak, and I do not
[544]      quite understand you; will you take some hypothesis and go through the
[545]      steps?--then I shall apprehend you better.
[546]      
[547]      That, Socrates, is a serious task to impose on a man of my years.
[548]      
[549]      Then will you, Zeno? said Socrates.
[550]      
[551]      Zeno answered with a smile:--Let us make our petition to Parmenides
[552]      himself, who is quite right in saying that you are hardly aware of the
[553]      extent of the task which you are imposing on him; and if there were more of
[554]      us I should not ask him, for these are not subjects which any one,
[555]      especially at his age, can well speak of before a large audience; most
[556]      people are not aware that this roundabout progress through all things is
[557]      the only way in which the mind can attain truth and wisdom. And therefore,
[558]      Parmenides, I join in the request of Socrates, that I may hear the process
[559]      again which I have not heard for a long time.
[560]      
[561]      When Zeno had thus spoken, Pythodorus, according to Antiphon's report of
[562]      him, said, that he himself and Aristoteles and the whole company entreated
[563]      Parmenides to give an example of the process. I cannot refuse, said
[564]      Parmenides; and yet I feel rather like Ibycus, who, when in his old age,
[565]      against his will, he fell in love, compared himself to an old racehorse,
[566]      who was about to run in a chariot race, shaking with fear at the course he
[567]      knew so well--this was his simile of himself. And I also experience a
[568]      trembling when I remember through what an ocean of words I have to wade at
[569]      my time of life. But I must indulge you, as Zeno says that I ought, and we
[570]      are alone. Where shall I begin? And what shall be our first hypothesis,
[571]      if I am to attempt this laborious pastime? Shall I begin with myself, and
[572]      take my own hypothesis the one? and consider the consequences which follow
[573]      on the supposition either of the being or of the not-being of one?
[574]      
[575]      By all means, said Zeno.
[576]      
[577]      And who will answer me? he said. Shall I propose the youngest? He will
[578]      not make difficulties and will be the most likely to say what he thinks;
[579]      and his answers will give me time to breathe.
[580]      
[581]      I am the one whom you mean, Parmenides, said Aristoteles; for I am the
[582]      youngest and at your service. Ask, and I will answer.
[583]      
[584]      Parmenides proceeded: 1.a. If one is, he said, the one cannot be many?
[585]      
[586]      Impossible.
[587]      
[588]      Then the one cannot have parts, and cannot be a whole?
[589]      
[590]      Why not?
[591]      
[592]      Because every part is part of a whole; is it not?
[593]      
[594]      Yes.
[595]      
[596]      And what is a whole? would not that of which no part is wanting be a whole?
[597]      
[598]      Certainly.
[599]      
[600]      Then, in either case, the one would be made up of parts; both as being a
[601]      whole, and also as having parts?
[602]      
[603]      To be sure.
[604]      
[605]      And in either case, the one would be many, and not one?
[606]      
[607]      True.
[608]      
[609]      But, surely, it ought to be one and not many?
[610]      
[611]      It ought.
[612]      
[613]      Then, if the one is to remain one, it will not be a whole, and will not
[614]      have parts?
[615]      
[616]      No.
[617]      
[618]      But if it has no parts, it will have neither beginning, middle, nor end;
[619]      for these would of course be parts of it.
[620]      
[621]      Right.
[622]      
[623]      But then, again, a beginning and an end are the limits of everything?
[624]      
[625]      Certainly.
[626]      
[627]      Then the one, having neither beginning nor end, is unlimited?
[628]      
[629]      Yes, unlimited.
[630]      
[631]      And therefore formless; for it cannot partake either of round or straight.
[632]      
[633]      But why?
[634]      
[635]      Why, because the round is that of which all the extreme points are
[636]      equidistant from the centre?
[637]      
[638]      Yes.
[639]      
[640]      And the straight is that of which the centre intercepts the view of the
[641]      extremes?
[642]      
[643]      True.
[644]      
[645]      Then the one would have parts and would be many, if it partook either of a
[646]      straight or of a circular form?
[647]      
[648]      Assuredly.
[649]      
[650]      But having no parts, it will be neither straight nor round?
[651]      
[652]      Right.
[653]      
[654]      And, being of such a nature, it cannot be in any place, for it cannot be
[655]      either in another or in itself.
[656]      
[657]      How so?
[658]      
[659]      Because if it were in another, it would be encircled by that in which it
[660]      was, and would touch it at many places and with many parts; but that which
[661]      is one and indivisible, and does not partake of a circular nature, cannot
[662]      be touched all round in many places.
[663]      
[664]      Certainly not.
[665]      
[666]      But if, on the other hand, one were in itself, it would also be contained
[667]      by nothing else but itself; that is to say, if it were really in itself;
[668]      for nothing can be in anything which does not contain it.
[669]      
[670]      Impossible.
[671]      
[672]      But then, that which contains must be other than that which is contained?
[673]      for the same whole cannot do and suffer both at once; and if so, one will
[674]      be no longer one, but two?
[675]      
[676]      True.
[677]      
[678]      Then one cannot be anywhere, either in itself or in another?
[679]      
[680]      No.
[681]      
[682]      Further consider, whether that which is of such a nature can have either
[683]      rest or motion.
[684]      
[685]      Why not?
[686]      
[687]      Why, because the one, if it were moved, would be either moved in place or
[688]      changed in nature; for these are the only kinds of motion.
[689]      
[690]      Yes.
[691]      
[692]      And the one, when it changes and ceases to be itself, cannot be any longer
[693]      one.
[694]      
[695]      It cannot.
[696]      
[697]      It cannot therefore experience the sort of motion which is change of
[698]      nature?
[699]      
[700]      Clearly not.
[701]      
[702]      Then can the motion of the one be in place?
[703]      
[704]      Perhaps.
[705]      
[706]      But if the one moved in place, must it not either move round and round in
[707]      the same place, or from one place to another?
[708]      
[709]      It must.
[710]      
[711]      And that which moves in a circle must rest upon a centre; and that which
[712]      goes round upon a centre must have parts which are different from the
[713]      centre; but that which has no centre and no parts cannot possibly be
[714]      carried round upon a centre?
[715]      
[716]      Impossible.
[717]      
[718]      But perhaps the motion of the one consists in change of place?
[719]      
[720]      Perhaps so, if it moves at all.
[721]      
[722]      And have we not already shown that it cannot be in anything?
[723]      
[724]      Yes.
[725]      
[726]      Then its coming into being in anything is still more impossible; is it not?
[727]      
[728]      I do not see why.
[729]      
[730]      Why, because anything which comes into being in anything, can neither as
[731]      yet be in that other thing while still coming into being, nor be altogether
[732]      out of it, if already coming into being in it.
[733]      
[734]      Certainly not.
[735]      
[736]      And therefore whatever comes into being in another must have parts, and
[737]      then one part may be in, and another part out of that other; but that which
[738]      has no parts can never be at one and the same time neither wholly within
[739]      nor wholly without anything.
[740]      
[741]      True.
[742]      
[743]      And is there not a still greater impossibility in that which has no parts,
[744]      and is not a whole, coming into being anywhere, since it cannot come into
[745]      being either as a part or as a whole?
[746]      
[747]      Clearly.
[748]      
[749]      Then it does not change place by revolving in the same spot, nor by going
[750]      somewhere and coming into being in something; nor again, by change in
[751]      itself?
[752]      
[753]      Very true.
[754]      
[755]      Then in respect of any kind of motion the one is immoveable?
[756]      
[757]      Immoveable.
[758]      
[759]      But neither can the one be in anything, as we affirm?
[760]      
[761]      Yes, we said so.
[762]      
[763]      Then it is never in the same?
[764]      
[765]      Why not?
[766]      
[767]      Because if it were in the same it would be in something.
[768]      
[769]      Certainly.
[770]      
[771]      And we said that it could not be in itself, and could not be in other?
[772]      
[773]      True.
[774]      
[775]      Then one is never in the same place?
[776]      
[777]      It would seem not.
[778]      
[779]      But that which is never in the same place is never quiet or at rest?
[780]      
[781]      Never.
[782]      
[783]      One then, as would seem, is neither at rest nor in motion?
[784]      
[785]      It certainly appears so.
[786]      
[787]      Neither will it be the same with itself or other; nor again, other than
[788]      itself or other.
[789]      
[790]      How is that?
[791]      
[792]      If other than itself it would be other than one, and would not be one.
[793]      
[794]      True.
[795]      
[796]      And if the same with other, it would be that other, and not itself; so that
[797]      upon this supposition too, it would not have the nature of one, but would
[798]      be other than one?
[799]      
[800]      It would.
[801]      
[802]      Then it will not be the same with other, or other than itself?
[803]      
[804]      It will not.
[805]      
[806]      Neither will it be other than other, while it remains one; for not one, but
[807]      only other, can be other than other, and nothing else.
[808]      
[809]      True.
[810]      
[811]      Then not by virtue of being one will it be other?
[812]      
[813]      Certainly not.
[814]      
[815]      But if not by virtue of being one, not by virtue of itself; and if not by
[816]      virtue of itself, not itself, and itself not being other at all, will not
[817]      be other than anything?
[818]      
[819]      Right.
[820]      
[821]      Neither will one be the same with itself.
[822]      
[823]      How not?
[824]      
[825]      Surely the nature of the one is not the nature of the same.
[826]      
[827]      Why not?
[828]      
[829]      It is not when anything becomes the same with anything that it becomes one.
[830]      
[831]      What of that?
[832]      
[833]      Anything which becomes the same with the many, necessarily becomes many and
[834]      not one.
[835]      
[836]      True.
[837]      
[838]      But, if there were no difference between the one and the same, when a thing
[839]      became the same, it would always become one; and when it became one, the
[840]      same?
[841]      
[842]      Certainly.
[843]      
[844]      And, therefore, if one be the same with itself, it is not one with itself,
[845]      and will therefore be one and also not one.
[846]      
[847]      Surely that is impossible.
[848]      
[849]      And therefore the one can neither be other than other, nor the same with
[850]      itself.
[851]      
[852]      Impossible.
[853]      
[854]      And thus the one can neither be the same, nor other, either in relation to
[855]      itself or other?
[856]      
[857]      No.
[858]      
[859]      Neither will the one be like anything or unlike itself or other.
[860]      
[861]      Why not?
[862]      
[863]      Because likeness is sameness of affections.
[864]      
[865]      Yes.
[866]      
[867]      And sameness has been shown to be of a nature distinct from oneness?
[868]      
[869]      That has been shown.
[870]      
[871]      But if the one had any other affection than that of being one, it would be
[872]      affected in such a way as to be more than one; which is impossible.
[873]      
[874]      True.
[875]      
[876]      Then the one can never be so affected as to be the same either with another
[877]      or with itself?
[878]      
[879]      Clearly not.
[880]      
[881]      Then it cannot be like another, or like itself?
[882]      
[883]      No.
[884]      
[885]      Nor can it be affected so as to be other, for then it would be affected in
[886]      such a way as to be more than one.
[887]      
[888]      It would.
[889]      
[890]      That which is affected otherwise than itself or another, will be unlike
[891]      itself or another, for sameness of affections is likeness.
[892]      
[893]      True.
[894]      
[895]      But the one, as appears, never being affected otherwise, is never unlike
[896]      itself or other?
[897]      
[898]      Never.
[899]      
[900]      Then the one will never be either like or unlike itself or other?
[901]      
[902]      Plainly not.
[903]      
[904]      Again, being of this nature, it can neither be equal nor unequal either to
[905]      itself or to other.
[906]      
[907]      How is that?
[908]      
[909]      Why, because the one if equal must be of the same measures as that to which
[910]      it is equal.
[911]      
[912]      True.
[913]      
[914]      And if greater or less than things which are commensurable with it, the one
[915]      will have more measures than that which is less, and fewer than that which
[916]      is greater?
[917]      
[918]      Yes.
[919]      
[920]      And so of things which are not commensurate with it, the one will have
[921]      greater measures than that which is less and smaller than that which is
[922]      greater.
[923]      
[924]      Certainly.
[925]      
[926]      But how can that which does not partake of sameness, have either the same
[927]      measures or have anything else the same?
[928]      
[929]      Impossible.
[930]      
[931]      And not having the same measures, the one cannot be equal either with
[932]      itself or with another?
[933]      
[934]      It appears so.
[935]      
[936]      But again, whether it have fewer or more measures, it will have as many
[937]      parts as it has measures; and thus again the one will be no longer one but
[938]      will have as many parts as measures.
[939]      
[940]      Right.
[941]      
[942]      And if it were of one measure, it would be equal to that measure; yet it
[943]      has been shown to be incapable of equality.
[944]      
[945]      It has.
[946]      
[947]      Then it will neither partake of one measure, nor of many, nor of few, nor
[948]      of the same at all, nor be equal to itself or another; nor be greater or
[949]      less than itself, or other?
[950]      
[951]      Certainly.
[952]      
[953]      Well, and do we suppose that one can be older, or younger than anything, or
[954]      of the same age with it?
[955]      
[956]      Why not?
[957]      
[958]      Why, because that which is of the same age with itself or other, must
[959]      partake of equality or likeness of time; and we said that the one did not
[960]      partake either of equality or of likeness?
[961]      
[962]      We did say so.
[963]      
[964]      And we also said, that it did not partake of inequality or unlikeness.
[965]      
[966]      Very true.
[967]      
[968]      How then can one, being of this nature, be either older or younger than
[969]      anything, or have the same age with it?
[970]      
[971]      In no way.
[972]      
[973]      Then one cannot be older or younger, or of the same age, either with itself
[974]      or with another?
[975]      
[976]      Clearly not.
[977]      
[978]      Then the one, being of this nature, cannot be in time at all; for must not
[979]      that which is in time, be always growing older than itself?
[980]      
[981]      Certainly.
[982]      
[983]      And that which is older, must always be older than something which is
[984]      younger?
[985]      
[986]      True.
[987]      
[988]      Then, that which becomes older than itself, also becomes at the same time
[989]      younger than itself, if it is to have something to become older than.
[990]      
[991]      What do you mean?
[992]      
[993]      I mean this:--A thing does not need to become different from another thing
[994]      which is already different; it IS different, and if its different has
[995]      become, it has become different; if its different will be, it will be
[996]      different; but of that which is becoming different, there cannot have been,
[997]      or be about to be, or yet be, a different--the only different possible is
[998]      one which is becoming.
[999]      
[1000]     That is inevitable.
[1001]     
[1002]     But, surely, the elder is a difference relative to the younger, and to
[1003]     nothing else.
[1004]     
[1005]     True.
[1006]     
[1007]     Then that which becomes older than itself must also, at the same time,
[1008]     become younger than itself?
[1009]     
[1010]     Yes.
[1011]     
[1012]     But again, it is true that it cannot become for a longer or for a shorter
[1013]     time than itself, but it must become, and be, and have become, and be about
[1014]     to be, for the same time with itself?
[1015]     
[1016]     That again is inevitable.
[1017]     
[1018]     Then things which are in time, and partake of time, must in every case, I
[1019]     suppose, be of the same age with themselves; and must also become at once
[1020]     older and younger than themselves?
[1021]     
[1022]     Yes.
[1023]     
[1024]     But the one did not partake of those affections?
[1025]     
[1026]     Not at all.
[1027]     
[1028]     Then it does not partake of time, and is not in any time?
[1029]     
[1030]     So the argument shows.
[1031]     
[1032]     Well, but do not the expressions 'was,' and 'has become,' and 'was
[1033]     becoming,' signify a participation of past time?
[1034]     
[1035]     Certainly.
[1036]     
[1037]     And do not 'will be,' 'will become,' 'will have become,' signify a
[1038]     participation of future time?
[1039]     
[1040]     Yes.
[1041]     
[1042]     And 'is,' or 'becomes,' signifies a participation of present time?
[1043]     
[1044]     Certainly.
[1045]     
[1046]     And if the one is absolutely without participation in time, it never had
[1047]     become, or was becoming, or was at any time, or is now become or is
[1048]     becoming, or is, or will become, or will have become, or will be,
[1049]     hereafter.
[1050]     
[1051]     Most true.
[1052]     
[1053]     But are there any modes of partaking of being other than these?
[1054]     
[1055]     There are none.
[1056]     
[1057]     Then the one cannot possibly partake of being?
[1058]     
[1059]     That is the inference.
[1060]     
[1061]     Then the one is not at all?
[1062]     
[1063]     Clearly not.
[1064]     
[1065]     Then the one does not exist in such way as to be one; for if it were and
[1066]     partook of being, it would already be; but if the argument is to be
[1067]     trusted, the one neither is nor is one?
[1068]     
[1069]     True.
[1070]     
[1071]     But that which is not admits of no attribute or relation?
[1072]     
[1073]     Of course not.
[1074]     
[1075]     Then there is no name, nor expression, nor perception, nor opinion, nor
[1076]     knowledge of it?
[1077]     
[1078]     Clearly not.
[1079]     
[1080]     Then it is neither named, nor expressed, nor opined, nor known, nor does
[1081]     anything that is perceive it.
[1082]     
[1083]     So we must infer.
[1084]     
[1085]     But can all this be true about the one?
[1086]     
[1087]     I think not.
[1088]     
[1089]     1.b. Suppose, now, that we return once more to the original hypothesis;
[1090]     let us see whether, on a further review, any new aspect of the question
[1091]     appears.
[1092]     
[1093]     I shall be very happy to do so.
[1094]     
[1095]     We say that we have to work out together all the consequences, whatever
[1096]     they may be, which follow, if the one is?
[1097]     
[1098]     Yes.
[1099]     
[1100]     Then we will begin at the beginning:--If one is, can one be, and not
[1101]     partake of being?
[1102]     
[1103]     Impossible.
[1104]     
[1105]     Then the one will have being, but its being will not be the same with the
[1106]     one; for if the same, it would not be the being of the one; nor would the
[1107]     one have participated in being, for the proposition that one is would have
[1108]     been identical with the proposition that one is one; but our hypothesis is
[1109]     not if one is one, what will follow, but if one is:--am I not right?
[1110]     
[1111]     Quite right.
[1112]     
[1113]     We mean to say, that being has not the same significance as one?
[1114]     
[1115]     Of course.
[1116]     
[1117]     And when we put them together shortly, and say 'One is,' that is equivalent
[1118]     to saying, 'partakes of being'?
[1119]     
[1120]     Quite true.
[1121]     
[1122]     Once more then let us ask, if one is what will follow. Does not this
[1123]     hypothesis necessarily imply that one is of such a nature as to have parts?
[1124]     
[1125]     How so?
[1126]     
[1127]     In this way:--If being is predicated of the one, if the one is, and one of
[1128]     being, if being is one; and if being and one are not the same; and since
[1129]     the one, which we have assumed, is, must not the whole, if it is one,
[1130]     itself be, and have for its parts, one and being?
[1131]     
[1132]     Certainly.
[1133]     
[1134]     And is each of these parts--one and being--to be simply called a part, or
[1135]     must the word 'part' be relative to the word 'whole'?
[1136]     
[1137]     The latter.
[1138]     
[1139]     Then that which is one is both a whole and has a part?
[1140]     
[1141]     Certainly.
[1142]     
[1143]     Again, of the parts of the one, if it is--I mean being and one--does either
[1144]     fail to imply the other? is the one wanting to being, or being to the one?
[1145]     
[1146]     Impossible.
[1147]     
[1148]     Thus, each of the parts also has in turn both one and being, and is at the
[1149]     least made up of two parts; and the same principle goes on for ever, and
[1150]     every part whatever has always these two parts; for being always involves
[1151]     one, and one being; so that one is always disappearing, and becoming two.
[1152]     
[1153]     Certainly.
[1154]     
[1155]     And so the one, if it is, must be infinite in multiplicity?
[1156]     
[1157]     Clearly.
[1158]     
[1159]     Let us take another direction.
[1160]     
[1161]     What direction?
[1162]     
[1163]     We say that the one partakes of being and therefore it is?
[1164]     
[1165]     Yes.
[1166]     
[1167]     And in this way, the one, if it has being, has turned out to be many?
[1168]     
[1169]     True.
[1170]     
[1171]     But now, let us abstract the one which, as we say, partakes of being, and
[1172]     try to imagine it apart from that of which, as we say, it partakes--will
[1173]     this abstract one be one only or many?
[1174]     
[1175]     One, I think.
[1176]     
[1177]     Let us see:--Must not the being of one be other than one? for the one is
[1178]     not being, but, considered as one, only partook of being?
[1179]     
[1180]     Certainly.
[1181]     
[1182]     If being and the one be two different things, it is not because the one is
[1183]     one that it is other than being; nor because being is being that it is
[1184]     other than the one; but they differ from one another in virtue of otherness
[1185]     and difference.
[1186]     
[1187]     Certainly.
[1188]     
[1189]     So that the other is not the same--either with the one or with being?
[1190]     
[1191]     Certainly not.
[1192]     
[1193]     And therefore whether we take being and the other, or being and the one, or
[1194]     the one and the other, in every such case we take two things, which may be
[1195]     rightly called both.
[1196]     
[1197]     How so.
[1198]     
[1199]     In this way--you may speak of being?
[1200]     
[1201]     Yes.
[1202]     
[1203]     And also of one?
[1204]     
[1205]     Yes.
[1206]     
[1207]     Then now we have spoken of either of them?
[1208]     
[1209]     Yes.
[1210]     
[1211]     Well, and when I speak of being and one, I speak of them both?
[1212]     
[1213]     Certainly.
[1214]     
[1215]     And if I speak of being and the other, or of the one and the other,--in any
[1216]     such case do I not speak of both?
[1217]     
[1218]     Yes.
[1219]     
[1220]     And must not that which is correctly called both, be also two?
[1221]     
[1222]     Undoubtedly.
[1223]     
[1224]     And of two things how can either by any possibility not be one?
[1225]     
[1226]     It cannot.
[1227]     
[1228]     Then, if the individuals of the pair are together two, they must be
[1229]     severally one?
[1230]     
[1231]     Clearly.
[1232]     
[1233]     And if each of them is one, then by the addition of any one to any pair,
[1234]     the whole becomes three?
[1235]     
[1236]     Yes.
[1237]     
[1238]     And three are odd, and two are even?
[1239]     
[1240]     Of course.
[1241]     
[1242]     And if there are two there must also be twice, and if there are three there
[1243]     must be thrice; that is, if twice one makes two, and thrice one three?
[1244]     
[1245]     Certainly.
[1246]     
[1247]     There are two, and twice, and therefore there must be twice two; and there
[1248]     are three, and there is thrice, and therefore there must be thrice three?
[1249]     
[1250]     Of course.
[1251]     
[1252]     If there are three and twice, there is twice three; and if there are
[1253]     two and thrice, there is thrice two?
[1254]     
[1255]     Undoubtedly.
[1256]     
[1257]     Here, then, we have even taken even times, and odd taken odd times, and
[1258]     even taken odd times, and odd taken even times.
[1259]     
[1260]     True.
[1261]     
[1262]     And if this is so, does any number remain which has no necessity to be?
[1263]     
[1264]     None whatever.
[1265]     
[1266]     Then if one is, number must also be?
[1267]     
[1268]     It must.
[1269]     
[1270]     But if there is number, there must also be many, and infinite multiplicity
[1271]     of being; for number is infinite in multiplicity, and partakes also of
[1272]     being: am I not right?
[1273]     
[1274]     Certainly.
[1275]     
[1276]     And if all number participates in being, every part of number will also
[1277]     participate?
[1278]     
[1279]     Yes.
[1280]     
[1281]     Then being is distributed over the whole multitude of things, and nothing
[1282]     that is, however small or however great, is devoid of it? And, indeed, the
[1283]     very supposition of this is absurd, for how can that which is, be devoid of
[1284]     being?
[1285]     
[1286]     In no way.
[1287]     
[1288]     And it is divided into the greatest and into the smallest, and into being
[1289]     of all sizes, and is broken up more than all things; the divisions of it
[1290]     have no limit.
[1291]     
[1292]     True.
[1293]     
[1294]     Then it has the greatest number of parts?
[1295]     
[1296]     Yes, the greatest number.
[1297]     
[1298]     Is there any of these which is a part of being, and yet no part?
[1299]     
[1300]     Impossible.
[1301]     
[1302]     But if it is at all and so long as it is, it must be one, and cannot be
[1303]     none?
[1304]     
[1305]     Certainly.
[1306]     
[1307]     Then the one attaches to every single part of being, and does not fail in
[1308]     any part, whether great or small, or whatever may be the size of it?
[1309]     
[1310]     True.
[1311]     
[1312]     But reflect:--Can one, in its entirety, be in many places at the same time?
[1313]     
[1314]     No; I see the impossibility of that.
[1315]     
[1316]     And if not in its entirety, then it is divided; for it cannot be present
[1317]     with all the parts of being, unless divided.
[1318]     
[1319]     True.
[1320]     
[1321]     And that which has parts will be as many as the parts are?
[1322]     
[1323]     Certainly.
[1324]     
[1325]     Then we were wrong in saying just now, that being was distributed into the
[1326]     greatest number of parts. For it is not distributed into parts more than
[1327]     the one, into parts equal to the one; the one is never wanting to being, or
[1328]     being to the one, but being two they are co-equal and co-extensive.
[1329]     
[1330]     Certainly that is true.
[1331]     
[1332]     The one itself, then, having been broken up into parts by being, is many
[1333]     and infinite?
[1334]     
[1335]     True.
[1336]     
[1337]     Then not only the one which has being is many, but the one itself
[1338]     distributed by being, must also be many?
[1339]     
[1340]     Certainly.
[1341]     
[1342]     Further, inasmuch as the parts are parts of a whole, the one, as a whole,
[1343]     will be limited; for are not the parts contained by the whole?
[1344]     
[1345]     Certainly.
[1346]     
[1347]     And that which contains, is a limit?
[1348]     
[1349]     Of course.
[1350]     
[1351]     Then the one if it has being is one and many, whole and parts, having
[1352]     limits and yet unlimited in number?
[1353]     
[1354]     Clearly.
[1355]     
[1356]     And because having limits, also having extremes?
[1357]     
[1358]     Certainly.
[1359]     
[1360]     And if a whole, having beginning and middle and end. For can anything be a
[1361]     whole without these three? And if any one of them is wanting to anything,
[1362]     will that any longer be a whole?
[1363]     
[1364]     No.
[1365]     
[1366]     Then the one, as appears, will have beginning, middle, and end.
[1367]     
[1368]     It will.
[1369]     
[1370]     But, again, the middle will be equidistant from the extremes; or it would
[1371]     not be in the middle?
[1372]     
[1373]     Yes.
[1374]     
[1375]     Then the one will partake of figure, either rectilinear or round, or a
[1376]     union of the two?
[1377]     
[1378]     True.
[1379]     
[1380]     And if this is the case, it will be both in itself and in another too.
[1381]     
[1382]     How?
[1383]     
[1384]     Every part is in the whole, and none is outside the whole.
[1385]     
[1386]     True.
[1387]     
[1388]     And all the parts are contained by the whole?
[1389]     
[1390]     Yes.
[1391]     
[1392]     And the one is all its parts, and neither more nor less than all?
[1393]     
[1394]     No.
[1395]     
[1396]     And the one is the whole?
[1397]     
[1398]     Of course.
[1399]     
[1400]     But if all the parts are in the whole, and the one is all of them and the
[1401]     whole, and they are all contained by the whole, the one will be contained
[1402]     by the one; and thus the one will be in itself.
[1403]     
[1404]     That is true.
[1405]     
[1406]     But then, again, the whole is not in the parts--neither in all the parts,
[1407]     nor in some one of them. For if it is in all, it must be in one; for if
[1408]     there were any one in which it was not, it could not be in all the parts;
[1409]     for the part in which it is wanting is one of all, and if the whole is not
[1410]     in this, how can it be in them all?
[1411]     
[1412]     It cannot.
[1413]     
[1414]     Nor can the whole be in some of the parts; for if the whole were in some of
[1415]     the parts, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible.
[1416]     
[1417]     Yes, impossible.
[1418]     
[1419]     But if the whole is neither in one, nor in more than one, nor in all of the
[1420]     parts, it must be in something else, or cease to be anywhere at all?
[1421]     
[1422]     Certainly.
[1423]     
[1424]     If it were nowhere, it would be nothing; but being a whole, and not being
[1425]     in itself, it must be in another.
[1426]     
[1427]     Very true.
[1428]     
[1429]     The one then, regarded as a whole, is in another, but regarded as being all
[1430]     its parts, is in itself; and therefore the one must be itself in itself and
[1431]     also in another.
[1432]     
[1433]     Certainly.
[1434]     
[1435]     The one then, being of this nature, is of necessity both at rest and in
[1436]     motion?
[1437]     
[1438]     How?
[1439]     
[1440]     The one is at rest since it is in itself, for being in one, and not passing
[1441]     out of this, it is in the same, which is itself.
[1442]     
[1443]     True.
[1444]     
[1445]     And that which is ever in the same, must be ever at rest?
[1446]     
[1447]     Certainly.
[1448]     
[1449]     Well, and must not that, on the contrary, which is ever in other, never be
[1450]     in the same; and if never in the same, never at rest, and if not at rest,
[1451]     in motion?
[1452]     
[1453]     True.
[1454]     
[1455]     Then the one being always itself in itself and other, must always be both
[1456]     at rest and in motion?
[1457]     
[1458]     Clearly.
[1459]     
[1460]     And must be the same with itself, and other than itself; and also the same
[1461]     with the others, and other than the others; this follows from its previous
[1462]     affections.
[1463]     
[1464]     How so?
[1465]     
[1466]     Everything in relation to every other thing, is either the same or other;
[1467]     or if neither the same nor other, then in the relation of a part to a
[1468]     whole, or of a whole to a part.
[1469]     
[1470]     Clearly.
[1471]     
[1472]     And is the one a part of itself?
[1473]     
[1474]     Certainly not.
[1475]     
[1476]     Since it is not a part in relation to itself it cannot be related to itself
[1477]     as whole to part?
[1478]     
[1479]     It cannot.
[1480]     
[1481]     But is the one other than one?
[1482]     
[1483]     No.
[1484]     
[1485]     And therefore not other than itself?
[1486]     
[1487]     Certainly not.
[1488]     
[1489]     If then it be neither other, nor a whole, nor a part in relation to itself,
[1490]     must it not be the same with itself?
[1491]     
[1492]     Certainly.
[1493]     
[1494]     But then, again, a thing which is in another place from 'itself,' if this
[1495]     'itself' remains in the same place with itself, must be other than
[1496]     'itself,' for it will be in another place?
[1497]     
[1498]     True.
[1499]     
[1500]     Then the one has been shown to be at once in itself and in another?
[1501]     
[1502]     Yes.
[1503]     
[1504]     Thus, then, as appears, the one will be other than itself?
[1505]     
[1506]     True.
[1507]     
[1508]     Well, then, if anything be other than anything, will it not be other than
[1509]     that which is other?
[1510]     
[1511]     Certainly.
[1512]     
[1513]     And will not all things that are not one, be other than the one, and the
[1514]     one other than the not-one?
[1515]     
[1516]     Of course.
[1517]     
[1518]     Then the one will be other than the others?
[1519]     
[1520]     True.
[1521]     
[1522]     But, consider:--Are not the absolute same, and the absolute other,
[1523]     opposites to one another?
[1524]     
[1525]     Of course.
[1526]     
[1527]     Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same?
[1528]     
[1529]     They will not.
[1530]     
[1531]     If then the other is never in the same, there is nothing in which the other
[1532]     is during any space of time; for during that space of time, however small,
[1533]     the other would be in the same. Is not that true?
[1534]     
[1535]     Yes.
[1536]     
[1537]     And since the other is never in the same, it can never be in anything that
[1538]     is.
[1539]     
[1540]     True.
[1541]     
[1542]     Then the other will never be either in the not-one, or in the one?
[1543]     
[1544]     Certainly not.
[1545]     
[1546]     Then not by reason of otherness is the one other than the not-one, or the
[1547]     not-one other than the one.
[1548]     
[1549]     No.
[1550]     
[1551]     Nor by reason of themselves will they be other than one another, if not
[1552]     partaking of the other.
[1553]     
[1554]     How can they be?
[1555]     
[1556]     But if they are not other, either by reason of themselves or of the other,
[1557]     will they not altogether escape being other than one another?
[1558]     
[1559]     They will.
[1560]     
[1561]     Again, the not-one cannot partake of the one; otherwise it would not have
[1562]     been not-one, but would have been in some way one.
[1563]     
[1564]     True.
[1565]     
[1566]     Nor can the not-one be number; for having number, it would not have been
[1567]     not-one at all.
[1568]     
[1569]     It would not.
[1570]     
[1571]     Again, is the not-one part of the one; or rather, would it not in that case
[1572]     partake of the one?
[1573]     
[1574]     It would.
[1575]     
[1576]     If then, in every point of view, the one and the not-one are distinct, then
[1577]     neither is the one part or whole of the not-one, nor is the not-one part or
[1578]     whole of the one?
[1579]     
[1580]     No.
[1581]     
[1582]     But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another,
[1583]     nor other than one another, will be the same with one another:--so we said?
[1584]     
[1585]     Yes.
[1586]     
[1587]     Then shall we say that the one, being in this relation to the not-one, is
[1588]     the same with it?
[1589]     
[1590]     Let us say so.
[1591]     
[1592]     Then it is the same with itself and the others, and also other than itself
[1593]     and the others.
[1594]     
[1595]     That appears to be the inference.
[1596]     
[1597]     And it will also be like and unlike itself and the others?
[1598]     
[1599]     Perhaps.
[1600]     
[1601]     Since the one was shown to be other than the others, the others will also
[1602]     be other than the one.
[1603]     
[1604]     Yes.
[1605]     
[1606]     And the one is other than the others in the same degree that the others are
[1607]     other than it, and neither more nor less?
[1608]     
[1609]     True.
[1610]     
[1611]     And if neither more nor less, then in a like degree?
[1612]     
[1613]     Yes.
[1614]     
[1615]     In virtue of the affection by which the one is other than others and others
[1616]     in like manner other than it, the one will be affected like the others and
[1617]     the others like the one.
[1618]     
[1619]     How do you mean?
[1620]     
[1621]     I may take as an illustration the case of names: You give a name to a
[1622]     thing?
[1623]     
[1624]     Yes.
[1625]     
[1626]     And you may say the name once or oftener?
[1627]     
[1628]     Yes.
[1629]     
[1630]     And when you say it once, you mention that of which it is the name? and
[1631]     when more than once, is it something else which you mention? or must it
[1632]     always be the same thing of which you speak, whether you utter the name
[1633]     once or more than once?
[1634]     
[1635]     Of course it is the same.
[1636]     
[1637]     And is not 'other' a name given to a thing?
[1638]     
[1639]     Certainly.
[1640]     
[1641]     Whenever, then, you use the word 'other,' whether once or oftener, you name
[1642]     that of which it is the name, and to no other do you give the name?
[1643]     
[1644]     True.
[1645]     
[1646]     Then when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one other
[1647]     than the others, in repeating the word 'other' we speak of that nature to
[1648]     which the name is applied, and of no other?
[1649]     
[1650]     Quite true.
[1651]     
[1652]     Then the one which is other than others, and the other which is other than
[1653]     the one, in that the word 'other' is applied to both, will be in the same
[1654]     condition; and that which is in the same condition is like?
[1655]     
[1656]     Yes.
[1657]     
[1658]     Then in virtue of the affection by which the one is other than the others,
[1659]     every thing will be like every thing, for every thing is other than every
[1660]     thing.
[1661]     
[1662]     True.
[1663]     
[1664]     Again, the like is opposed to the unlike?
[1665]     
[1666]     Yes.
[1667]     
[1668]     And the other to the same?
[1669]     
[1670]     True again.
[1671]     
[1672]     And the one was also shown to be the same with the others?
[1673]     
[1674]     Yes.
[1675]     
[1676]     And to be the same with the others is the opposite of being other than the
[1677]     others?
[1678]     
[1679]     Certainly.
[1680]     
[1681]     And in that it was other it was shown to be like?
[1682]     
[1683]     Yes.
[1684]     
[1685]     But in that it was the same it will be unlike by virtue of the opposite
[1686]     affection to that which made it like; and this was the affection of
[1687]     otherness.
[1688]     
[1689]     Yes.
[1690]     
[1691]     The same then will make it unlike; otherwise it will not be the opposite of
[1692]     the other.
[1693]     
[1694]     True.
[1695]     
[1696]     Then the one will be both like and unlike the others; like in so far as it
[1697]     is other, and unlike in so far as it is the same.
[1698]     
[1699]     Yes, that argument may be used.
[1700]     
[1701]     And there is another argument.
[1702]     
[1703]     What?
[1704]     
[1705]     In so far as it is affected in the same way it is not affected otherwise,
[1706]     and not being affected otherwise is not unlike, and not being unlike, is
[1707]     like; but in so far as it is affected by other it is otherwise, and being
[1708]     otherwise affected is unlike.
[1709]     
[1710]     True.
[1711]     
[1712]     Then because the one is the same with the others and other than the others,
[1713]     on either of these two grounds, or on both of them, it will be both like
[1714]     and unlike the others?
[1715]     
[1716]     Certainly.
[1717]     
[1718]     And in the same way as being other than itself and the same with itself, on
[1719]     either of these two grounds and on both of them, it will be like and unlike
[1720]     itself?
[1721]     
[1722]     Of course.
[1723]     
[1724]     Again, how far can the one touch or not touch itself and others?--consider.
[1725]     
[1726]     I am considering.
[1727]     
[1728]     The one was shown to be in itself which was a whole?
[1729]     
[1730]     True.
[1731]     
[1732]     And also in other things?
[1733]     
[1734]     Yes.
[1735]     
[1736]     In so far as it is in other things it would touch other things, but in so
[1737]     far as it is in itself it would be debarred from touching them, and would
[1738]     touch itself only.
[1739]     
[1740]     Clearly.
[1741]     
[1742]     Then the inference is that it would touch both?
[1743]     
[1744]     It would.
[1745]     
[1746]     But what do you say to a new point of view? Must not that which is to
[1747]     touch another be next to that which it is to touch, and occupy the place
[1748]     nearest to that in which what it touches is situated?
[1749]     
[1750]     True.
[1751]     
[1752]     Then the one, if it is to touch itself, ought to be situated next to
[1753]     itself, and occupy the place next to that in which itself is?
[1754]     
[1755]     It ought.
[1756]     
[1757]     And that would require that the one should be two, and be in two places at
[1758]     once, and this, while it is one, will never happen.
[1759]     
[1760]     No.
[1761]     
[1762]     Then the one cannot touch itself any more than it can be two?
[1763]     
[1764]     It cannot.
[1765]     
[1766]     Neither can it touch others.
[1767]     
[1768]     Why not?
[1769]     
[1770]     The reason is, that whatever is to touch another must be in separation
[1771]     from, and next to, that which it is to touch, and no third thing can be
[1772]     between them.
[1773]     
[1774]     True.
[1775]     
[1776]     Two things, then, at the least are necessary to make contact possible?
[1777]     
[1778]     They are.
[1779]     
[1780]     And if to the two a third be added in due order, the number of terms will
[1781]     be three, and the contacts two?
[1782]     
[1783]     Yes.
[1784]     
[1785]     And every additional term makes one additional contact, whence it follows
[1786]     that the contacts are one less in number than the terms; the first two
[1787]     terms exceeded the number of contacts by one, and the whole number of terms
[1788]     exceeds the whole number of contacts by one in like manner; and for every
[1789]     one which is afterwards added to the number of terms, one contact is added
[1790]     to the contacts.
[1791]     
[1792]     True.
[1793]     
[1794]     Whatever is the whole number of things, the contacts will be always one
[1795]     less.
[1796]     
[1797]     True.
[1798]     
[1799]     But if there be only one, and not two, there will be no contact?
[1800]     
[1801]     How can there be?
[1802]     
[1803]     And do we not say that the others being other than the one are not one and
[1804]     have no part in the one?
[1805]     
[1806]     True.
[1807]     
[1808]     Then they have no number, if they have no one in them?
[1809]     
[1810]     Of course not.
[1811]     
[1812]     Then the others are neither one nor two, nor are they called by the name of
[1813]     any number?
[1814]     
[1815]     No.
[1816]     
[1817]     One, then, alone is one, and two do not exist?
[1818]     
[1819]     Clearly not.
[1820]     
[1821]     And if there are not two, there is no contact?
[1822]     
[1823]     There is not.
[1824]     
[1825]     Then neither does the one touch the others, nor the others the one, if
[1826]     there is no contact?
[1827]     
[1828]     Certainly not.
[1829]     
[1830]     For all which reasons the one touches and does not touch itself and the
[1831]     others?
[1832]     
[1833]     True.
[1834]     
[1835]     Further--is the one equal and unequal to itself and others?
[1836]     
[1837]     How do you mean?
[1838]     
[1839]     If the one were greater or less than the others, or the others greater or
[1840]     less than the one, they would not be greater or less than each other in
[1841]     virtue of their being the one and the others; but, if in addition to their
[1842]     being what they are they had equality, they would be equal to one another,
[1843]     or if the one had smallness and the others greatness, or the one had
[1844]     greatness and the others smallness--whichever kind had greatness would be
[1845]     greater, and whichever had smallness would be smaller?
[1846]     
[1847]     Certainly.
[1848]     
[1849]     Then there are two such ideas as greatness and smallness; for if they were
[1850]     not they could not be opposed to each other and be present in that which
[1851]     is.
[1852]     
[1853]     How could they?
[1854]     
[1855]     If, then, smallness is present in the one it will be present either in the
[1856]     whole or in a part of the whole?
[1857]     
[1858]     Certainly.
[1859]     
[1860]     Suppose the first; it will be either co-equal and co-extensive with the
[1861]     whole one, or will contain the one?
[1862]     
[1863]     Clearly.
[1864]     
[1865]     If it be co-extensive with the one it will be co-equal with the one, or if
[1866]     containing the one it will be greater than the one?
[1867]     
[1868]     Of course.
[1869]     
[1870]     But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, and have
[1871]     the functions of greatness and equality and not its own functions?
[1872]     
[1873]     Impossible.
[1874]     
[1875]     Then smallness cannot be in the whole of one, but, if at all, in a part
[1876]     only?
[1877]     
[1878]     Yes.
[1879]     
[1880]     And surely not in all of a part, for then the difficulty of the whole will
[1881]     recur; it will be equal to or greater than any part in which it is.
[1882]     
[1883]     Certainly.
[1884]     
[1885]     Then smallness will not be in anything, whether in a whole or in a part;
[1886]     nor will there be anything small but actual smallness.
[1887]     
[1888]     True.
[1889]     
[1890]     Neither will greatness be in the one, for if greatness be in anything there
[1891]     will be something greater other and besides greatness itself, namely, that
[1892]     in which greatness is; and this too when the small itself is not there,
[1893]     which the one, if it is great, must exceed; this, however, is impossible,
[1894]     seeing that smallness is wholly absent.
[1895]     
[1896]     True.
[1897]     
[1898]     But absolute greatness is only greater than absolute smallness, and
[1899]     smallness is only smaller than absolute greatness.
[1900]     
[1901]     Very true.
[1902]     
[1903]     Then other things not greater or less than the one, if they have neither
[1904]     greatness nor smallness; nor have greatness or smallness any power of
[1905]     exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but only in relation to
[1906]     one another; nor will the one be greater or less than them or others, if it
[1907]     has neither greatness nor smallness.
[1908]     
[1909]     Clearly not.
[1910]     
[1911]     Then if the one is neither greater nor less than the others, it cannot
[1912]     either exceed or be exceeded by them?
[1913]     
[1914]     Certainly not.
[1915]     
[1916]     And that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded, must be on an equality; and
[1917]     being on an equality, must be equal.
[1918]     
[1919]     Of course.
[1920]     
[1921]     And this will be true also of the relation of the one to itself; having
[1922]     neither greatness nor smallness in itself, it will neither exceed nor be
[1923]     exceeded by itself, but will be on an equality with and equal to itself.
[1924]     
[1925]     Certainly.
[1926]     
[1927]     Then the one will be equal both to itself and the others?
[1928]     
[1929]     Clearly so.
[1930]     
[1931]     And yet the one, being itself in itself, will also surround and be without
[1932]     itself; and, as containing itself, will be greater than itself; and, as
[1933]     contained in itself, will be less; and will thus be greater and less than
[1934]     itself.
[1935]     
[1936]     It will.
[1937]     
[1938]     Now there cannot possibly be anything which is not included in the one and
[1939]     the others?
[1940]     
[1941]     Of course not.
[1942]     
[1943]     But, surely, that which is must always be somewhere?
[1944]     
[1945]     Yes.
[1946]     
[1947]     But that which is in anything will be less, and that in which it is will be
[1948]     greater; in no other way can one thing be in another.
[1949]     
[1950]     True.
[1951]     
[1952]     And since there is nothing other or besides the one and the others, and
[1953]     they must be in something, must they not be in one another, the one in the
[1954]     others and the others in the one, if they are to be anywhere?
[1955]     
[1956]     That is clear.
[1957]     
[1958]     But inasmuch as the one is in the others, the others will be greater than
[1959]     the one, because they contain the one, which will be less than the others,
[1960]     because it is contained in them; and inasmuch as the others are in the one,
[1961]     the one on the same principle will be greater than the others, and the
[1962]     others less than the one.
[1963]     
[1964]     True.
[1965]     
[1966]     The one, then, will be equal to and greater and less than itself and the
[1967]     others?
[1968]     
[1969]     Clearly.
[1970]     
[1971]     And if it be greater and less and equal, it will be of equal and more and
[1972]     less measures or divisions than itself and the others, and if of measures,
[1973]     also of parts?
[1974]     
[1975]     Of course.
[1976]     
[1977]     And if of equal and more and less measures or divisions, it will be in
[1978]     number more or less than itself and the others, and likewise equal in
[1979]     number to itself and to the others?
[1980]     
[1981]     How is that?
[1982]     
[1983]     It will be of more measures than those things which it exceeds, and of as
[1984]     many parts as measures; and so with that to which it is equal, and that
[1985]     than which it is less.
[1986]     
[1987]     True.
[1988]     
[1989]     And being greater and less than itself, and equal to itself, it will be of
[1990]     equal measures with itself and of more and fewer measures than itself; and
[1991]     if of measures then also of parts?
[1992]     
[1993]     It will.
[1994]     
[1995]     And being of equal parts with itself, it will be numerically equal to
[1996]     itself; and being of more parts, more, and being of less, less than itself?
[1997]     
[1998]     Certainly.
[1999]     
[2000]     And the same will hold of its relation to other things; inasmuch as it is
[2001]     greater than them, it will be more in number than them; and inasmuch as it
[2002]     is smaller, it will be less in number; and inasmuch as it is equal in size
[2003]     to other things, it will be equal to them in number.
[2004]     
[2005]     Certainly.
[2006]     
[2007]     Once more, then, as would appear, the one will be in number both equal to
[2008]     and more and less than both itself and all other things.
[2009]     
[2010]     It will.
[2011]     
[2012]     Does the one also partake of time? And is it and does it become older and
[2013]     younger than itself and others, and again, neither younger nor older than
[2014]     itself and others, by virtue of participation in time?
[2015]     
[2016]     How do you mean?
[2017]     
[2018]     If one is, being must be predicated of it?
[2019]     
[2020]     Yes.
[2021]     
[2022]     But to be (einai) is only participation of being in present time, and to
[2023]     have been is the participation of being at a past time, and to be about to
[2024]     be is the participation of being at a future time?
[2025]     
[2026]     Very true.
[2027]     
[2028]     Then the one, since it partakes of being, partakes of time?
[2029]     
[2030]     Certainly.
[2031]     
[2032]     And is not time always moving forward?
[2033]     
[2034]     Yes.
[2035]     
[2036]     Then the one is always becoming older than itself, since it moves forward
[2037]     in time?
[2038]     
[2039]     Certainly.
[2040]     
[2041]     And do you remember that the older becomes older than that which becomes
[2042]     younger?
[2043]     
[2044]     I remember.
[2045]     
[2046]     Then since the one becomes older than itself, it becomes younger at the
[2047]     same time?
[2048]     
[2049]     Certainly.
[2050]     
[2051]     Thus, then, the one becomes older as well as younger than itself?
[2052]     
[2053]     Yes.
[2054]     
[2055]     And it is older (is it not?) when in becoming, it gets to the point of time
[2056]     between 'was' and 'will be,' which is 'now': for surely in going from the
[2057]     past to the future, it cannot skip the present?
[2058]     
[2059]     No.
[2060]     
[2061]     And when it arrives at the present it stops from becoming older, and no
[2062]     longer becomes, but is older, for if it went on it would never be reached
[2063]     by the present, for it is the nature of that which goes on, to touch both
[2064]     the present and the future, letting go the present and seizing the future,
[2065]     while in process of becoming between them.
[2066]     
[2067]     True.
[2068]     
[2069]     But that which is becoming cannot skip the present; when it reaches the
[2070]     present it ceases to become, and is then whatever it may happen to be
[2071]     becoming.
[2072]     
[2073]     Clearly.
[2074]     
[2075]     And so the one, when in becoming older it reaches the present, ceases to
[2076]     become, and is then older.
[2077]     
[2078]     Certainly.
[2079]     
[2080]     And it is older than that than which it was becoming older, and it was
[2081]     becoming older than itself.
[2082]     
[2083]     Yes.
[2084]     
[2085]     And that which is older is older than that which is younger?
[2086]     
[2087]     True.
[2088]     
[2089]     Then the one is younger than itself, when in becoming older it reaches the
[2090]     present?
[2091]     
[2092]     Certainly.
[2093]     
[2094]     But the present is always present with the one during all its being; for
[2095]     whenever it is it is always now.
[2096]     
[2097]     Certainly.
[2098]     
[2099]     Then the one always both is and becomes older and younger than itself?
[2100]     
[2101]     Truly.
[2102]     
[2103]     And is it or does it become a longer time than itself or an equal time with
[2104]     itself?
[2105]     
[2106]     An equal time.
[2107]     
[2108]     But if it becomes or is for an equal time with itself, it is of the same
[2109]     age with itself?
[2110]     
[2111]     Of course.
[2112]     
[2113]     And that which is of the same age, is neither older nor younger?
[2114]     
[2115]     No.
[2116]     
[2117]     The one, then, becoming and being the same time with itself, neither is nor
[2118]     becomes older or younger than itself?
[2119]     
[2120]     I should say not.
[2121]     
[2122]     And what are its relations to other things? Is it or does it become older
[2123]     or younger than they?
[2124]     
[2125]     I cannot tell you.
[2126]     
[2127]     You can at least tell me that others than the one are more than the one--
[2128]     other would have been one, but the others have multitude, and are more than
[2129]     one?
[2130]     
[2131]     They will have multitude.
[2132]     
[2133]     And a multitude implies a number larger than one?
[2134]     
[2135]     Of course.
[2136]     
[2137]     And shall we say that the lesser or the greater is the first to come or to
[2138]     have come into existence?
[2139]     
[2140]     The lesser.
[2141]     
[2142]     Then the least is the first? And that is the one?
[2143]     
[2144]     Yes.
[2145]     
[2146]     Then the one of all things that have number is the first to come into
[2147]     being; but all other things have also number, being plural and not
[2148]     singular.
[2149]     
[2150]     They have.
[2151]     
[2152]     And since it came into being first it must be supposed to have come into
[2153]     being prior to the others, and the others later; and the things which came
[2154]     into being later, are younger than that which preceded them? And so the
[2155]     other things will be younger than the one, and the one older than other
[2156]     things?
[2157]     
[2158]     True.
[2159]     
[2160]     What would you say of another question? Can the one have come into being
[2161]     contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?
[2162]     
[2163]     Impossible.
[2164]     
[2165]     And yet, surely, the one was shown to have parts; and if parts, then a
[2166]     beginning, middle and end?
[2167]     
[2168]     Yes.
[2169]     
[2170]     And a beginning, both of the one itself and of all other things, comes into
[2171]     being first of all; and after the beginning, the others follow, until you
[2172]     reach the end?
[2173]     
[2174]     Certainly.
[2175]     
[2176]     And all these others we shall affirm to be parts of the whole and of the
[2177]     one, which, as soon as the end is reached, has become whole and one?
[2178]     
[2179]     Yes; that is what we shall say.
[2180]     
[2181]     But the end comes last, and the one is of such a nature as to come into
[2182]     being with the last; and, since the one cannot come into being except in
[2183]     accordance with its own nature, its nature will require that it should come
[2184]     into being after the others, simultaneously with the end.
[2185]     
[2186]     Clearly.
[2187]     
[2188]     Then the one is younger than the others and the others older than the one.
[2189]     
[2190]     That also is clear in my judgment.
[2191]     
[2192]     Well, and must not a beginning or any other part of the one or of anything,
[2193]     if it be a part and not parts, being a part, be also of necessity one?
[2194]     
[2195]     Certainly.
[2196]     
[2197]     And will not the one come into being together with each part--together with
[2198]     the first part when that comes into being, and together with the second
[2199]     part and with all the rest, and will not be wanting to any part, which is
[2200]     added to any other part until it has reached the last and become one whole;
[2201]     it will be wanting neither to the middle, nor to the first, nor to the
[2202]     last, nor to any of them, while the process of becoming is going on?
[2203]     
[2204]     True.
[2205]     
[2206]     Then the one is of the same age with all the others, so that if the one
[2207]     itself does not contradict its own nature, it will be neither prior nor
[2208]     posterior to the others, but simultaneous; and according to this argument
[2209]     the one will be neither older nor younger than the others, nor the others
[2210]     than the one, but according to the previous argument the one will be older
[2211]     and younger than the others and the others than the one.
[2212]     
[2213]     Certainly.
[2214]     
[2215]     After this manner then the one is and has become. But as to its becoming
[2216]     older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and neither
[2217]     older nor younger, what shall we say? Shall we say as of being so also of
[2218]     becoming, or otherwise?
[2219]     
[2220]     I cannot answer.
[2221]     
[2222]     But I can venture to say, that even if one thing were older or younger than
[2223]     another, it could not become older or younger in a greater degree than it
[2224]     was at first; for equals added to unequals, whether to periods of time or
[2225]     to anything else, leave the difference between them the same as at first.
[2226]     
[2227]     Of course.
[2228]     
[2229]     Then that which is, cannot become older or younger than that which is,
[2230]     since the difference of age is always the same; the one is and has become
[2231]     older and the other younger; but they are no longer becoming so.
[2232]     
[2233]     True.
[2234]     
[2235]     And the one which is does not therefore become either older or younger than
[2236]     the others which are.
[2237]     
[2238]     No.
[2239]     
[2240]     But consider whether they may not become older and younger in another way.
[2241]     
[2242]     In what way?
[2243]     
[2244]     Just as the one was proven to be older than the others and the others than
[2245]     the one.
[2246]     
[2247]     And what of that?
[2248]     
[2249]     If the one is older than the others, has come into being a longer time than
[2250]     the others.
[2251]     
[2252]     Yes.
[2253]     
[2254]     But consider again; if we add equal time to a greater and a less time, will
[2255]     the greater differ from the less time by an equal or by a smaller portion
[2256]     than before?
[2257]     
[2258]     By a smaller portion.
[2259]     
[2260]     Then the difference between the age of the one and the age of the others
[2261]     will not be afterwards so great as at first, but if an equal time be added
[2262]     to both of them they will differ less and less in age?
[2263]     
[2264]     Yes.
[2265]     
[2266]     And that which differs in age from some other less than formerly, from
[2267]     being older will become younger in relation to that other than which it was
[2268]     older?
[2269]     
[2270]     Yes, younger.
[2271]     
[2272]     And if the one becomes younger the others aforesaid will become older than
[2273]     they were before, in relation to the one.
[2274]     
[2275]     Certainly.
[2276]     
[2277]     Then that which had become younger becomes older relatively to that which
[2278]     previously had become and was older; it never really is older, but is
[2279]     always becoming, for the one is always growing on the side of youth and the
[2280]     other on the side of age. And in like manner the older is always in
[2281]     process of becoming younger than the younger; for as they are always going
[2282]     in opposite directions they become in ways the opposite to one another, the
[2283]     younger older than the older, and the older younger than the younger. They
[2284]     cannot, however, have become; for if they had already become they would be
[2285]     and not merely become. But that is impossible; for they are always
[2286]     becoming both older and younger than one another: the one becomes younger
[2287]     than the others because it was seen to be older and prior, and the others
[2288]     become older than the one because they came into being later; and in the
[2289]     same way the others are in the same relation to the one, because they were
[2290]     seen to be older, and prior to the one.
[2291]     
[2292]     That is clear.
[2293]     
[2294]     Inasmuch then, one thing does not become older or younger than another, in
[2295]     that they always differ from each other by an equal number, the one cannot
[2296]     become older or younger than the others, nor the others than the one; but
[2297]     inasmuch as that which came into being earlier and that which came into
[2298]     being later must continually differ from each other by a different portion
[2299]     --in this point of view the others must become older and younger than the
[2300]     one, and the one than the others.
[2301]     
[2302]     Certainly.
[2303]     
[2304]     For all these reasons, then, the one is and becomes older and younger than
[2305]     itself and the others, and neither is nor becomes older or younger than
[2306]     itself or the others.
[2307]     
[2308]     Certainly.
[2309]     
[2310]     But since the one partakes of time, and partakes of becoming older and
[2311]     younger, must it not also partake of the past, the present, and the future?
[2312]     
[2313]     Of course it must.
[2314]     
[2315]     Then the one was and is and will be, and was becoming and is becoming and
[2316]     will become?
[2317]     
[2318]     Certainly.
[2319]     
[2320]     And there is and was and will be something which is in relation to it and
[2321]     belongs to it?
[2322]     
[2323]     True.
[2324]     
[2325]     And since we have at this moment opinion and knowledge and perception of
[2326]     the one, there is opinion and knowledge and perception of it?
[2327]     
[2328]     Quite right.
[2329]     
[2330]     Then there is name and expression for it, and it is named and expressed,
[2331]     and everything of this kind which appertains to other things appertains to
[2332]     the one.
[2333]     
[2334]     Certainly, that is true.
[2335]     
[2336]     Yet once more and for the third time, let us consider: If the one is both
[2337]     one and many, as we have described, and is neither one nor many, and
[2338]     participates in time, must it not, in as far as it is one, at times partake
[2339]     of being, and in as far as it is not one, at times not partake of being?
[2340]     
[2341]     Certainly.
[2342]     
[2343]     But can it partake of being when not partaking of being, or not partake of
[2344]     being when partaking of being?
[2345]     
[2346]     Impossible.
[2347]     
[2348]     Then the one partakes and does not partake of being at different times, for
[2349]     that is the only way in which it can partake and not partake of the same.
[2350]     
[2351]     True.
[2352]     
[2353]     And is there not also a time at which it assumes being and relinquishes
[2354]     being--for how can it have and not have the same thing unless it receives
[2355]     and also gives it up at some time?
[2356]     
[2357]     Impossible.
[2358]     
[2359]     And the assuming of being is what you would call becoming?
[2360]     
[2361]     I should.
[2362]     
[2363]     And the relinquishing of being you would call destruction?
[2364]     
[2365]     I should.
[2366]     
[2367]     The one then, as would appear, becomes and is destroyed by taking and
[2368]     giving up being.
[2369]     
[2370]     Certainly.
[2371]     
[2372]     And being one and many and in process of becoming and being destroyed, when
[2373]     it becomes one it ceases to be many, and when many, it ceases to be one?
[2374]     
[2375]     Certainly.
[2376]     
[2377]     And as it becomes one and many, must it not inevitably experience
[2378]     separation and aggregation?
[2379]     
[2380]     Inevitably.
[2381]     
[2382]     And whenever it becomes like and unlike it must be assimilated and
[2383]     dissimilated?
[2384]     
[2385]     Yes.
[2386]     
[2387]     And when it becomes greater or less or equal it must grow or diminish or be
[2388]     equalized?
[2389]     
[2390]     True.
[2391]     
[2392]     And when being in motion it rests, and when being at rest it changes to
[2393]     motion, it can surely be in no time at all?
[2394]     
[2395]     How can it?
[2396]     
[2397]     But that a thing which is previously at rest should be afterwards in
[2398]     motion, or previously in motion and afterwards at rest, without
[2399]     experiencing change, is impossible.
[2400]     
[2401]     Impossible.
[2402]     
[2403]     And surely there cannot be a time in which a thing can be at once neither
[2404]     in motion nor at rest?
[2405]     
[2406]     There cannot.
[2407]     
[2408]     But neither can it change without changing.
[2409]     
[2410]     True.
[2411]     
[2412]     When then does it change; for it cannot change either when at rest, or when
[2413]     in motion, or when in time?
[2414]     
[2415]     It cannot.
[2416]     
[2417]     And does this strange thing in which it is at the time of changing really
[2418]     exist?
[2419]     
[2420]     What thing?
[2421]     
[2422]     The moment. For the moment seems to imply a something out of which change
[2423]     takes place into either of two states; for the change is not from the state
[2424]     of rest as such, nor from the state of motion as such; but there is this
[2425]     curious nature which we call the moment lying between rest and motion, not
[2426]     being in any time; and into this and out of this what is in motion changes
[2427]     into rest, and what is at rest into motion.
[2428]     
[2429]     So it appears.
[2430]     
[2431]     And the one then, since it is at rest and also in motion, will change to
[2432]     either, for only in this way can it be in both. And in changing it changes
[2433]     in a moment, and when it is changing it will be in no time, and will not
[2434]     then be either in motion or at rest.
[2435]     
[2436]     It will not.
[2437]     
[2438]     And it will be in the same case in relation to the other changes, when it
[2439]     passes from being into cessation of being, or from not-being into becoming
[2440]     --then it passes between certain states of motion and rest, and neither is
[2441]     nor is not, nor becomes nor is destroyed.
[2442]     
[2443]     Very true.
[2444]     
[2445]     And on the same principle, in the passage from one to many and from many to
[2446]     one, the one is neither one nor many, neither separated nor aggregated; and
[2447]     in the passage from like to unlike, and from unlike to like, it is neither
[2448]     like nor unlike, neither in a state of assimilation nor of dissimilation;
[2449]     and in the passage from small to great and equal and back again, it will be
[2450]     neither small nor great, nor equal, nor in a state of increase, or
[2451]     diminution, or equalization.
[2452]     
[2453]     True.
[2454]     
[2455]     All these, then, are the affections of the one, if the one has being.
[2456]     
[2457]     Of course.
[2458]     
[2459]     1.aa. But if one is, what will happen to the others--is not that also to
[2460]     be considered?
[2461]     
[2462]     Yes.
[2463]     
[2464]     Let us show then, if one is, what will be the affections of the others than
[2465]     the one.
[2466]     
[2467]     Let us do so.
[2468]     
[2469]     Inasmuch as there are things other than the one, the others are not the
[2470]     one; for if they were they could not be other than the one.
[2471]     
[2472]     Very true.
[2473]     
[2474]     Nor are the others altogether without the one, but in a certain way they
[2475]     participate in the one.
[2476]     
[2477]     In what way?
[2478]     
[2479]     Because the others are other than the one inasmuch as they have parts; for
[2480]     if they had no parts they would be simply one.
[2481]     
[2482]     Right.
[2483]     
[2484]     And parts, as we affirm, have relation to a whole?
[2485]     
[2486]     So we say.
[2487]     
[2488]     And a whole must necessarily be one made up of many; and the parts will be
[2489]     parts of the one, for each of the parts is not a part of many, but of a
[2490]     whole.
[2491]     
[2492]     How do you mean?
[2493]     
[2494]     If anything were a part of many, being itself one of them, it will surely
[2495]     be a part of itself, which is impossible, and it will be a part of each one
[2496]     of the other parts, if of all; for if not a part of some one, it will be a
[2497]     part of all the others but this one, and thus will not be a part of each
[2498]     one; and if not a part of each, one it will not be a part of any one of the
[2499]     many; and not being a part of any one, it cannot be a part or anything else
[2500]     of all those things of none of which it is anything.
[2501]     
[2502]     Clearly not.
[2503]     
[2504]     Then the part is not a part of the many, nor of all, but is of a certain
[2505]     single form, which we call a whole, being one perfect unity framed out of
[2506]     all--of this the part will be a part.
[2507]     
[2508]     Certainly.
[2509]     
[2510]     If, then, the others have parts, they will participate in the whole and in
[2511]     the one.
[2512]     
[2513]     True.
[2514]     
[2515]     Then the others than the one must be one perfect whole, having parts.
[2516]     
[2517]     Certainly.
[2518]     
[2519]     And the same argument holds of each part, for the part must participate in
[2520]     the one; for if each of the parts is a part, this means, I suppose, that it
[2521]     is one separate from the rest and self-related; otherwise it is not each.
[2522]     
[2523]     True.
[2524]     
[2525]     But when we speak of the part participating in the one, it must clearly be
[2526]     other than one; for if not, it would not merely have participated, but
[2527]     would have been one; whereas only the itself can be one.
[2528]     
[2529]     Very true.
[2530]     
[2531]     Both the whole and the part must participate in the one; for the whole will
[2532]     be one whole, of which the parts will be parts; and each part will be one
[2533]     part of the whole which is the whole of the part.
[2534]     
[2535]     True.
[2536]     
[2537]     And will not the things which participate in the one, be other than it?
[2538]     
[2539]     Of course.
[2540]     
[2541]     And the things which are other than the one will be many; for if the things
[2542]     which are other than the one were neither one nor more than one, they would
[2543]     be nothing.
[2544]     
[2545]     True.
[2546]     
[2547]     But, seeing that the things which participate in the one as a part, and in
[2548]     the one as a whole, are more than one, must not those very things which
[2549]     participate in the one be infinite in number?
[2550]     
[2551]     How so?
[2552]     
[2553]     Let us look at the matter thus:--Is it not a fact that in partaking of the
[2554]     one they are not one, and do not partake of the one at the very time when
[2555]     they are partaking of it?
[2556]     
[2557]     Clearly.
[2558]     
[2559]     They do so then as multitudes in which the one is not present?
[2560]     
[2561]     Very true.
[2562]     
[2563]     And if we were to abstract from them in idea the very smallest fraction,
[2564]     must not that least fraction, if it does not partake of the one, be a
[2565]     multitude and not one?
[2566]     
[2567]     It must.
[2568]     
[2569]     And if we continue to look at the other side of their nature, regarded
[2570]     simply, and in itself, will not they, as far as we see them, be unlimited
[2571]     in number?
[2572]     
[2573]     Certainly.
[2574]     
[2575]     And yet, when each several part becomes a part, then the parts have a limit
[2576]     in relation to the whole and to each other, and the whole in relation to
[2577]     the parts.
[2578]     
[2579]     Just so.
[2580]     
[2581]     The result to the others than the one is that the union of themselves and
[2582]     the one appears to create a new element in them which gives to them
[2583]     limitation in relation to one another; whereas in their own nature they
[2584]     have no limit.
[2585]     
[2586]     That is clear.
[2587]     
[2588]     Then the others than the one, both as whole and parts, are infinite, and
[2589]     also partake of limit.
[2590]     
[2591]     Certainly.
[2592]     
[2593]     Then they are both like and unlike one another and themselves.
[2594]     
[2595]     How is that?
[2596]     
[2597]     Inasmuch as they are unlimited in their own nature, they are all affected
[2598]     in the same way.
[2599]     
[2600]     True.
[2601]     
[2602]     And inasmuch as they all partake of limit, they are all affected in the
[2603]     same way.
[2604]     
[2605]     Of course.
[2606]     
[2607]     But inasmuch as their state is both limited and unlimited, they are
[2608]     affected in opposite ways.
[2609]     
[2610]     Yes.
[2611]     
[2612]     And opposites are the most unlike of things.
[2613]     
[2614]     Certainly.
[2615]     
[2616]     Considered, then, in regard to either one of their affections, they will be
[2617]     like themselves and one another; considered in reference to both of them
[2618]     together, most opposed and most unlike.
[2619]     
[2620]     That appears to be true.
[2621]     
[2622]     Then the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another?
[2623]     
[2624]     True.
[2625]     
[2626]     And they are the same and also different from one another, and in motion
[2627]     and at rest, and experience every sort of opposite affection, as may be
[2628]     proved without difficulty of them, since they have been shown to have
[2629]     experienced the affections aforesaid?
[2630]     
[2631]     True.
[2632]     
[2633]     1.bb. Suppose, now, that we leave the further discussion of these matters
[2634]     as evident, and consider again upon the hypothesis that the one is, whether
[2635]     opposite of all this is or is not equally true of the others.
[2636]     
[2637]     By all means.
[2638]     
[2639]     Then let us begin again, and ask, If one is, what must be the affections of
[2640]     the others?
[2641]     
[2642]     Let us ask that question.
[2643]     
[2644]     Must not the one be distinct from the others, and the others from the one?
[2645]     
[2646]     Why so?
[2647]     
[2648]     Why, because there is nothing else beside them which is distinct from both
[2649]     of them; for the expression 'one and the others' includes all things.
[2650]     
[2651]     Yes, all things.
[2652]     
[2653]     Then we cannot suppose that there is anything different from them in which
[2654]     both the one and the others might exist?
[2655]     
[2656]     There is nothing.
[2657]     
[2658]     Then the one and the others are never in the same?
[2659]     
[2660]     True.
[2661]     
[2662]     Then they are separated from each other?
[2663]     
[2664]     Yes.
[2665]     
[2666]     And we surely cannot say that what is truly one has parts?
[2667]     
[2668]     Impossible.
[2669]     
[2670]     Then the one will not be in the others as a whole, nor as part, if it be
[2671]     separated from the others, and has no parts?
[2672]     
[2673]     Impossible.
[2674]     
[2675]     Then there is no way in which the others can partake of the one, if they do
[2676]     not partake either in whole or in part?
[2677]     
[2678]     It would seem not.
[2679]     
[2680]     Then there is no way in which the others are one, or have in themselves any
[2681]     unity?
[2682]     
[2683]     There is not.
[2684]     
[2685]     Nor are the others many; for if they were many, each part of them would be
[2686]     a part of the whole; but now the others, not partaking in any way of the
[2687]     one, are neither one nor many, nor whole, nor part.
[2688]     
[2689]     True.
[2690]     
[2691]     Then the others neither are nor contain two or three, if entirely deprived
[2692]     of the one?
[2693]     
[2694]     True.
[2695]     
[2696]     Then the others are neither like nor unlike the one, nor is likeness and
[2697]     unlikeness in them; for if they were like and unlike, or had in them
[2698]     likeness and unlikeness, they would have two natures in them opposite to
[2699]     one another.
[2700]     
[2701]     That is clear.
[2702]     
[2703]     But for that which partakes of nothing to partake of two things was held by
[2704]     us to be impossible?
[2705]     
[2706]     Impossible.
[2707]     
[2708]     Then the others are neither like nor unlike nor both, for if they were like
[2709]     or unlike they would partake of one of those two natures, which would be
[2710]     one thing, and if they were both they would partake of opposites which
[2711]     would be two things, and this has been shown to be impossible.
[2712]     
[2713]     True.
[2714]     
[2715]     Therefore they are neither the same, nor other, nor in motion, nor at rest,
[2716]     nor in a state of becoming, nor of being destroyed, nor greater, nor less,
[2717]     nor equal, nor have they experienced anything else of the sort; for, if
[2718]     they are capable of experiencing any such affection, they will participate
[2719]     in one and two and three, and odd and even, and in these, as has been
[2720]     proved, they do not participate, seeing that they are altogether and in
[2721]     every way devoid of the one.
[2722]     
[2723]     Very true.
[2724]     
[2725]     Therefore if one is, the one is all things, and also nothing, both in
[2726]     relation to itself and to other things.
[2727]     
[2728]     Certainly.
[2729]     
[2730]     2.a. Well, and ought we not to consider next what will be the consequence
[2731]     if the one is not?
[2732]     
[2733]     Yes; we ought.
[2734]     
[2735]     What is the meaning of the hypothesis--If the one is not; is there any
[2736]     difference between this and the hypothesis--If the not one is not?
[2737]     
[2738]     There is a difference, certainly.
[2739]     
[2740]     Is there a difference only, or rather are not the two expressions--if the
[2741]     one is not, and if the not one is not, entirely opposed?
[2742]     
[2743]     They are entirely opposed.
[2744]     
[2745]     And suppose a person to say:--If greatness is not, if smallness is not, or
[2746]     anything of that sort, does he not mean, whenever he uses such an
[2747]     expression, that 'what is not' is other than other things?
[2748]     
[2749]     To be sure.
[2750]     
[2751]     And so when he says 'If one is not' he clearly means, that what 'is not' is
[2752]     other than all others; we know what he means--do we not?
[2753]     
[2754]     Yes, we do.
[2755]     
[2756]     When he says 'one,' he says something which is known; and secondly
[2757]     something which is other than all other things; it makes no difference
[2758]     whether he predicate of one being or not-being, for that which is said 'not
[2759]     to be' is known to be something all the same, and is distinguished from
[2760]     other things.
[2761]     
[2762]     Certainly.
[2763]     
[2764]     Then I will begin again, and ask: If one is not, what are the
[2765]     consequences? In the first place, as would appear, there is a knowledge of
[2766]     it, or the very meaning of the words, 'if one is not,' would not be known.
[2767]     
[2768]     True.
[2769]     
[2770]     Secondly, the others differ from it, or it could not be described as
[2771]     different from the others?
[2772]     
[2773]     Certainly.
[2774]     
[2775]     Difference, then, belongs to it as well as knowledge; for in speaking of
[2776]     the one as different from the others, we do not speak of a difference in
[2777]     the others, but in the one.
[2778]     
[2779]     Clearly so.
[2780]     
[2781]     Moreover, the one that is not is something and partakes of relation to
[2782]     'that,' and 'this,' and 'these,' and the like, and is an attribute of
[2783]     'this'; for the one, or the others than the one, could not have been spoken
[2784]     of, nor could any attribute or relative of the one that is not have been or
[2785]     been spoken of, nor could it have been said to be anything, if it did not
[2786]     partake of 'some,' or of the other relations just now mentioned.
[2787]     
[2788]     True.
[2789]     
[2790]     Being, then, cannot be ascribed to the one, since it is not; but the one
[2791]     that is not may or rather must participate in many things, if it and
[2792]     nothing else is not; if, however, neither the one nor the one that is not
[2793]     is supposed not to be, and we are speaking of something of a different
[2794]     nature, we can predicate nothing of it. But supposing that the one that is
[2795]     not and nothing else is not, then it must participate in the predicate
[2796]     'that,' and in many others.
[2797]     
[2798]     Certainly.
[2799]     
[2800]     And it will have unlikeness in relation to the others, for the others being
[2801]     different from the one will be of a different kind.
[2802]     
[2803]     Certainly.
[2804]     
[2805]     And are not things of a different kind also other in kind?
[2806]     
[2807]     Of course.
[2808]     
[2809]     And are not things other in kind unlike?
[2810]     
[2811]     They are unlike.
[2812]     
[2813]     And if they are unlike the one, that which they are unlike will clearly be
[2814]     unlike them?
[2815]     
[2816]     Clearly so.
[2817]     
[2818]     Then the one will have unlikeness in respect of which the others are unlike
[2819]     it?
[2820]     
[2821]     That would seem to be true.
[2822]     
[2823]     And if unlikeness to other things is attributed to it, it must have
[2824]     likeness to itself.
[2825]     
[2826]     How so?
[2827]     
[2828]     If the one have unlikeness to one, something else must be meant; nor will
[2829]     the hypothesis relate to one; but it will relate to something other than
[2830]     one?
[2831]     
[2832]     Quite so.
[2833]     
[2834]     But that cannot be.
[2835]     
[2836]     No.
[2837]     
[2838]     Then the one must have likeness to itself?
[2839]     
[2840]     It must.
[2841]     
[2842]     Again, it is not equal to the others; for if it were equal, then it would
[2843]     at once be and be like them in virtue of the equality; but if one has no
[2844]     being, then it can neither be nor be like?
[2845]     
[2846]     It cannot.
[2847]     
[2848]     But since it is not equal to the others, neither can the others be equal to
[2849]     it?
[2850]     
[2851]     Certainly not.
[2852]     
[2853]     And things that are not equal are unequal?
[2854]     
[2855]     True.
[2856]     
[2857]     And they are unequal to an unequal?
[2858]     
[2859]     Of course.
[2860]     
[2861]     Then the one partakes of inequality, and in respect of this the others are
[2862]     unequal to it?
[2863]     
[2864]     Very true.
[2865]     
[2866]     And inequality implies greatness and smallness?
[2867]     
[2868]     Yes.
[2869]     
[2870]     Then the one, if of such a nature, has greatness and smallness?
[2871]     
[2872]     That appears to be true.
[2873]     
[2874]     And greatness and smallness always stand apart?
[2875]     
[2876]     True.
[2877]     
[2878]     Then there is always something between them?
[2879]     
[2880]     There is.
[2881]     
[2882]     And can you think of anything else which is between them other than
[2883]     equality?
[2884]     
[2885]     No, it is equality which lies between them.
[2886]     
[2887]     Then that which has greatness and smallness also has equality, which lies
[2888]     between them?
[2889]     
[2890]     That is clear.
[2891]     
[2892]     Then the one, which is not, partakes, as would appear, of greatness and
[2893]     smallness and equality?
[2894]     
[2895]     Clearly.
[2896]     
[2897]     Further, it must surely in a sort partake of being?
[2898]     
[2899]     How so?
[2900]     
[2901]     It must be so, for if not, then we should not speak the truth in saying
[2902]     that the one is not. But if we speak the truth, clearly we must say what
[2903]     is. Am I not right?
[2904]     
[2905]     Yes.
[2906]     
[2907]     And since we affirm that we speak truly, we must also affirm that we say
[2908]     what is?
[2909]     
[2910]     Certainly.
[2911]     
[2912]     Then, as would appear, the one, when it is not, is; for if it were not to
[2913]     be when it is not, but (Or, 'to remit something of existence in relation to
[2914]     not-being.') were to relinquish something of being, so as to become not-
[2915]     being, it would at once be.
[2916]     
[2917]     Quite true.
[2918]     
[2919]     Then the one which is not, if it is to maintain itself, must have the being
[2920]     of not-being as the bond of not-being, just as being must have as a bond
[2921]     the not-being of not-being in order to perfect its own being; for the
[2922]     truest assertion of the being of being and of the not-being of not-being is
[2923]     when being partakes of the being of being, and not of the being of not-
[2924]     being--that is, the perfection of being; and when not-being does not
[2925]     partake of the not-being of not-being but of the being of not-being--that
[2926]     is the perfection of not-being.
[2927]     
[2928]     Most true.
[2929]     
[2930]     Since then what is partakes of not-being, and what is not of being, must
[2931]     not the one also partake of being in order not to be?
[2932]     
[2933]     Certainly.
[2934]     
[2935]     Then the one, if it is not, clearly has being?
[2936]     
[2937]     Clearly.
[2938]     
[2939]     And has not-being also, if it is not?
[2940]     
[2941]     Of course.
[2942]     
[2943]     But can anything which is in a certain state not be in that state without
[2944]     changing?
[2945]     
[2946]     Impossible.
[2947]     
[2948]     Then everything which is and is not in a certain state, implies change?
[2949]     
[2950]     Certainly.
[2951]     
[2952]     And change is motion--we may say that?
[2953]     
[2954]     Yes, motion.
[2955]     
[2956]     And the one has been proved both to be and not to be?
[2957]     
[2958]     Yes.
[2959]     
[2960]     And therefore is and is not in the same state?
[2961]     
[2962]     Yes.
[2963]     
[2964]     Thus the one that is not has been shown to have motion also, because it
[2965]     changes from being to not-being?
[2966]     
[2967]     That appears to be true.
[2968]     
[2969]     But surely if it is nowhere among what is, as is the fact, since it is not,
[2970]     it cannot change from one place to another?
[2971]     
[2972]     Impossible.
[2973]     
[2974]     Then it cannot move by changing place?
[2975]     
[2976]     No.
[2977]     
[2978]     Nor can it turn on the same spot, for it nowhere touches the same, for the
[2979]     same is, and that which is not cannot be reckoned among things that are?
[2980]     
[2981]     It cannot.
[2982]     
[2983]     Then the one, if it is not, cannot turn in that in which it is not?
[2984]     
[2985]     No.
[2986]     
[2987]     Neither can the one, whether it is or is not, be altered into other than
[2988]     itself, for if it altered and became different from itself, then we could
[2989]     not be still speaking of the one, but of something else?
[2990]     
[2991]     True.
[2992]     
[2993]     But if the one neither suffers alteration, nor turns round in the same
[2994]     place, nor changes place, can it still be capable of motion?
[2995]     
[2996]     Impossible.
[2997]     
[2998]     Now that which is unmoved must surely be at rest, and that which is at rest
[2999]     must stand still?
[3000]     
[3001]     Certainly.
[3002]     
[3003]     Then the one that is not, stands still, and is also in motion?
[3004]     
[3005]     That seems to be true.
[3006]     
[3007]     But if it be in motion it must necessarily undergo alteration, for anything
[3008]     which is moved, in so far as it is moved, is no longer in the same state,
[3009]     but in another?
[3010]     
[3011]     Yes.
[3012]     
[3013]     Then the one, being moved, is altered?
[3014]     
[3015]     Yes.
[3016]     
[3017]     And, further, if not moved in any way, it will not be altered in any way?
[3018]     
[3019]     No.
[3020]     
[3021]     Then, in so far as the one that is not is moved, it is altered, but in so
[3022]     far as it is not moved, it is not altered?
[3023]     
[3024]     Right.
[3025]     
[3026]     Then the one that is not is altered and is not altered?
[3027]     
[3028]     That is clear.
[3029]     
[3030]     And must not that which is altered become other than it previously was, and
[3031]     lose its former state and be destroyed; but that which is not altered can
[3032]     neither come into being nor be destroyed?
[3033]     
[3034]     Very true.
[3035]     
[3036]     And the one that is not, being altered, becomes and is destroyed; and not
[3037]     being altered, neither becomes nor is destroyed; and so the one that is not
[3038]     becomes and is destroyed, and neither becomes nor is destroyed?
[3039]     
[3040]     True.
[3041]     
[3042]     2.b. And now, let us go back once more to the beginning, and see whether
[3043]     these or some other consequences will follow.
[3044]     
[3045]     Let us do as you say.
[3046]     
[3047]     If one is not, we ask what will happen in respect of one? That is the
[3048]     question.
[3049]     
[3050]     Yes.
[3051]     
[3052]     Do not the words 'is not' signify absence of being in that to which we
[3053]     apply them?
[3054]     
[3055]     Just so.
[3056]     
[3057]     And when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it is not in one way
[3058]     but is in another? or do we mean, absolutely, that what is not has in no
[3059]     sort or way or kind participation of being?
[3060]     
[3061]     Quite absolutely.
[3062]     
[3063]     Then, that which is not cannot be, or in any way participate in being?
[3064]     
[3065]     It cannot.
[3066]     
[3067]     And did we not mean by becoming, and being destroyed, the assumption of
[3068]     being and the loss of being?
[3069]     
[3070]     Nothing else.
[3071]     
[3072]     And can that which has no participation in being, either assume or lose
[3073]     being?
[3074]     
[3075]     Impossible.
[3076]     
[3077]     The one then, since it in no way is, cannot have or lose or assume being in
[3078]     any way?
[3079]     
[3080]     True.
[3081]     
[3082]     Then the one that is not, since it in no way partakes of being, neither
[3083]     perishes nor becomes?
[3084]     
[3085]     No.
[3086]     
[3087]     Then it is not altered at all; for if it were it would become and be
[3088]     destroyed?
[3089]     
[3090]     True.
[3091]     
[3092]     But if it be not altered it cannot be moved?
[3093]     
[3094]     Certainly not.
[3095]     
[3096]     Nor can we say that it stands, if it is nowhere; for that which stands must
[3097]     always be in one and the same spot?
[3098]     
[3099]     Of course.
[3100]     
[3101]     Then we must say that the one which is not never stands still and never
[3102]     moves?
[3103]     
[3104]     Neither.
[3105]     
[3106]     Nor is there any existing thing which can be attributed to it; for if there
[3107]     had been, it would partake of being?
[3108]     
[3109]     That is clear.
[3110]     
[3111]     And therefore neither smallness, nor greatness, nor equality, can be
[3112]     attributed to it?
[3113]     
[3114]     No.
[3115]     
[3116]     Nor yet likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself or to others?
[3117]     
[3118]     Clearly not.
[3119]     
[3120]     Well, and if nothing should be attributed to it, can other things be
[3121]     attributed to it?
[3122]     
[3123]     Certainly not.
[3124]     
[3125]     And therefore other things can neither be like or unlike, the same, or
[3126]     different in relation to it?
[3127]     
[3128]     They cannot.
[3129]     
[3130]     Nor can what is not, be anything, or be this thing, or be related to or the
[3131]     attribute of this or that or other, or be past, present, or future. Nor
[3132]     can knowledge, or opinion, or perception, or expression, or name,