The Republic by Plato
is

Plato BOOK I
BOOK II
BOOK III
BOOK IV
BOOK V
BOOK VI
BOOK VII
BOOK VIII
BOOK IX
BOOK X

This is a hypertextual, self-referential edition of
The Republic by Plato.
The text was prepared using the Project Gutenberg edition.

Click on any word to see its occurrences in the text;
click on line numbers to go to that line;
click on chapter names to go to that chapter;
or search using the form below.
Search terms can contain spaces and punctuation.

The concordance for The Republic ordered alphanumerically,
and listed in order of word frequency. Click here for more texts.

There are 2515 occurrences of the word:   is

[BOOK I] [5] Socrates, who is the narrator.
[BOOK I] [21] The scene is laid in the house of Cephalus at the Piraeus; and the whole
[BOOK I] [22] dialogue is narrated by Socrates the day after it actually took place to
[BOOK I] [41] There he is, said the youth, coming after you, if you will only wait.
[BOOK I] [71] With horses! I replied: That is a novelty. Will horsemen carry torches
[BOOK I] [97] away, the greater to me is the pleasure and charm of conversation. Do not
[BOOK I] [101] I replied: There is nothing which for my part I like better, Cephalus,
[BOOK I] [104] whether the way is smooth and easy, or rugged and difficult. And this is a
[BOOK I] [106] which the poets call the 'threshold of old age'--Is life harder towards the
[BOOK I] [109] I will tell you, Socrates, he said, what my own feeling is. Men of my age
[BOOK I] [111] our meetings the tale of my acquaintance commonly is --I cannot eat, I
[BOOK I] [113] good time once, but now that is gone, and life is no longer life. Some
[BOOK I] [115] tell you sadly of how many evils their old age is the cause. But to me,
[BOOK I] [116] Socrates, these complainers seem to blame that which is not really in
[BOOK I] [118] man, would have felt as they do. But this is not my own experience, nor
[BOOK I] [127] grasp not of one mad master only, but of many. The truth is, Socrates,
[BOOK I] [129] attributed to the same cause, which is not old age, but men's characters
[BOOK I] [130] and tempers; for he who is of a calm and happy nature will hardly feel the
[BOOK I] [131] pressure of age, but to him who is of an opposite disposition youth and age
[BOOK I] [138] are rich, and wealth is well known to be a great comforter.
[BOOK I] [140] You are right, he replied; they are not convinced: and there is something
[BOOK I] [156] father Lysanias reduced the property below what it is at present: and I
[BOOK I] [161] are indifferent about money, which is a characteristic rather of those who
[BOOK I] [166] profit which is common to them and all men. And hence they are very bad
[BOOK I] [169] That is true, he said.
[BOOK I] [171] Yes, that is very true, but may I ask another question?--What do you
[BOOK I] [178] a world below and the punishment which is exacted there of deeds done here
[BOOK I] [179] were once a laughing matter to him, but now he is tormented with the
[BOOK I] [181] he is now drawing nearer to that other place, he has a clearer view of
[BOOK I] [184] finds that the sum of his transgressions is great he will many a time like
[BOOK I] [185] a child start up in his sleep for fear, and he is filled with dark
[BOOK I] [186] forebodings. But to him who is conscious of no sin, sweet hope, as Pindar
[BOOK I] [187] charmingly says, is the kind nurse of his age:
[BOOK I] [190] holiness, and is the nurse of his age and the companion of his journey;--
[BOOK I] [191] hope which is mightiest to sway the restless soul of man.'
[BOOK I] [194] say to every man, but to a good man, is, that he has had no occasion to
[BOOK I] [196] when he departs to the world below he is not in any apprehension about
[BOOK I] [200] wealth has to give, to a man of sense this is in my opinion the greatest.
[BOOK I] [202] Well said, Cephalus, I replied; but as concerning justice, what is it?--to
[BOOK I] [205] deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his right
[BOOK I] [208] ought always to speak the truth to one who is in his condition.
[BOOK I] [212] But then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct
[BOOK I] [215] Quite correct, Socrates, if Simonides is to be believed, said Polemarchus
[BOOK I] [221] Is not Polemarchus your heir? I said.
[BOOK I] [228] He said that the repayment of a debt is just, and in saying so he appears
[BOOK I] [232] his meaning, though probably clear to you, is the reverse of clear to me.
[BOOK I] [235] is not in his right senses; and yet a deposit cannot be denied to be a
[BOOK I] [240] Then when the person who asks me is not in his right mind I am by no means
[BOOK I] [251] You mean that the return of a deposit of gold which is to the injury of the
[BOOK I] [252] receiver, if the two parties are friends, is not the repayment of a debt,--
[BOOK I] [253] that is what you would imagine him to say?
[BOOK I] [260] I take it, owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to him--that is to
[BOOK I] [264] darkly of the nature of justice; for he really meant to say that justice is
[BOOK I] [265] the giving to each man what is proper to him, and this he termed a debt.
[BOOK I] [269] By heaven! I replied; and if we asked him what due or proper thing is given
[BOOK I] [276] And what due or proper thing is given by cookery, and to what?
[BOOK I] [280] And what is that which justice gives, and to whom?
[BOOK I] [283] instances, then justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to
[BOOK I] [286] That is his meaning then?
[BOOK I] [290] And who is best able to do good to his friends and evil to his enemies in
[BOOK I] [299] And in what sort of actions or with a view to what result is the just man
[BOOK I] [304] But when a man is well, my dear Polemarchus, there is no need of a
[BOOK I] [309] And he who is not on a voyage has no need of a pilot?
[BOOK I] [325] Or like shoemaking for the acquisition of shoes,--that is what you mean?
[BOOK I] [331] In contracts, Socrates, justice is of use.
[BOOK I] [337] But is the just man or the skilful player a more useful and better partner
[BOOK I] [342] And in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful or
[BOOK I] [347] Then in what sort of partnership is the just man a better partner than the
[BOOK I] [348] harp-player, as in playing the harp the harp-player is certainly a better
[BOOK I] [355] who is knowing about horses would be better for that, would he not?
[BOOK I] [364] Then what is that joint use of silver or gold in which the just man is to
[BOOK I] [369] You mean when money is not wanted, but allowed to lie?
[BOOK I] [373] That is to say, justice is useful when money is useless?
[BOOK I] [375] That is the inference.
[BOOK I] [377] And when you want to keep a pruning-hook safe, then justice is useful to
[BOOK I] [384] would say that justice is useful; but when you want to use them, then the
[BOOK I] [389] And so of all other things;--justice is useful when they are useless, and
[BOOK I] [392] That is the inference.
[BOOK I] [394] Then justice is not good for much. But let us consider this further point:
[BOOK I] [395] Is not he who can best strike a blow in a boxing match or in any kind of
[BOOK I] [400] And he who is most skilful in preventing or escaping from a disease is best
[BOOK I] [405] And he is the best guard of a camp who is best able to steal a march upon
[BOOK I] [410] Then he who is a good keeper of anything is also a good thief?
[BOOK I] [412] That, I suppose, is to be inferred.
[BOOK I] [414] Then if the just man is good at keeping money, he is good at stealing it.
[BOOK I] [416] That is implied in the argument.
[BOOK I] [418] Then after all the just man has turned out to be a thief. And this is a
[BOOK I] [420] of Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, who is a favourite of
[BOOK I] [425] And so, you and Homer and Simonides are agreed that justice is an art of
[BOOK I] [432] Well, there is another question: By friends and enemies do we mean those
[BOOK I] [441] That is true.
[BOOK I] [455] Then according to your argument it is just to injure those who do no wrong?
[BOOK I] [457] Nay, Socrates; the doctrine is immoral.
[BOOK I] [463] But see the consequence:--Many a man who is ignorant of human nature has
[BOOK I] [474] We assumed that he is a friend who seems to be or who is thought good.
[BOOK I] [476] And how is the error to be corrected?
[BOOK I] [478] We should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as seems, good;
[BOOK I] [479] and that he who seems only, and is not good, only seems to be and is not a
[BOOK I] [486] And instead of saying simply as we did at first, that it is just to do good
[BOOK I] [487] to our friends and harm to our enemies, we should further say: It is just
[BOOK I] [501] Deteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, not of dogs?
[BOOK I] [509] And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the
[BOOK I] [514] And that human virtue is justice?
[BOOK I] [520] That is the result.
[BOOK I] [547] And the just is the good?
[BOOK I] [551] Then to injure a friend or any one else is not the act of a just man, but
[BOOK I] [552] of the opposite, who is the unjust?
[BOOK I] [554] I think that what you say is quite true, Socrates.
[BOOK I] [557] that good is the debt which a just man owes to his friends, and evil the
[BOOK I] [558] debt which he owes to his enemies,--to say this is not wise; for it is not
[BOOK I] [576] was the first to say that justice is 'doing good to your friends and harm
[BOOK I] [593] another? I say that if you want really to know what justice is, you should
[BOOK I] [595] the refutation of an opponent, but have your own answer; for there is many
[BOOK I] [597] justice is duty or advantage or profit or gain or interest, for this sort
[BOOK I] [613] do so, but the fact is that we cannot. And if so, you people who know all
[BOOK I] [625] obviously, if that is your way of putting the question, no one can answer
[BOOK I] [628] question, am I falsely to say some other number which is not the right
[BOOK I] [629] one?--is that your meaning?'--How would you answer him?
[BOOK I] [634] appear to be so to the person who is asked, ought he not to say what he
[BOOK I] [645] Done to me!--as becomes the ignorant, I must learn from the wise--that is
[BOOK I] [660] his own, is told by a man of authority not to utter them? The natural
[BOOK I] [661] thing is, that the speaker should be some one like yourself who professes
[BOOK I] [672] That I learn of others, I replied, is quite true; but that I am ungrateful
[BOOK I] [673] I wholly deny. Money I have none, and therefore I pay in praise, which is
[BOOK I] [678] Listen, then, he said; I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the
[BOOK I] [682] Let me first understand you, I replied. Justice, as you say, is the
[BOOK I] [683] interest of the stronger. What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this? You
[BOOK I] [684] cannot mean to say that because Polydamas, the pancratiast, is stronger
[BOOK I] [686] that to eat beef is therefore equally for our good who are weaker than he
[BOOK I] [687] is, and right and just for us?
[BOOK I] [690] is most damaging to the argument.
[BOOK I] [700] And the government is the ruling power in each state?
[BOOK I] [708] punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean when I
[BOOK I] [709] say that in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the
[BOOK I] [711] power, the only reasonable conclusion is, that everywhere there is one
[BOOK I] [712] principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger.
[BOOK I] [716] used the word 'interest' which you forbade me to use. It is true, however,
[BOOK I] [722] you are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that justice is
[BOOK I] [728] I will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just for subjects to
[BOOK I] [748] And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects,--and that is
[BOOK I] [753] Then justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the
[BOOK I] [756] What is that you are saying? he asked.
[BOOK I] [760] interest in what they command, and also that to obey them is justice? Has
[BOOK I] [767] which are to their own injury. For if, as you say, justice is the
[BOOK I] [769] wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are
[BOOK I] [770] commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is for the injury
[BOOK I] [777] But there is no need of any witness, said Polemarchus, for Thrasymachus
[BOOK I] [778] himself acknowledges that rulers may sometimes command what is not for
[BOOK I] [779] their own interest, and that for subjects to obey them is justice.
[BOOK I] [782] commanded by their rulers is just.
[BOOK I] [784] Yes, Cleitophon, but he also said that justice is the interest of the
[BOOK I] [787] to do what is not for his own interest; whence follows that justice is the
[BOOK I] [800] Certainly not, he said. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the
[BOOK I] [801] stronger at the time when he is mistaken?
[BOOK I] [807] who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken? or
[BOOK I] [808] that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian
[BOOK I] [809] at the time when he is making the mistake, in respect of the mistake?
[BOOK I] [811] mistake, but this is only a way of speaking; for the fact is that neither
[BOOK I] [813] as he is what his name implies; they none of them err unless their skill
[BOOK I] [815] or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies; though he is
[BOOK I] [818] that the ruler, in so far as he is a ruler, is unerring, and, being
[BOOK I] [819] unerring, always commands that which is for his own interest; and the
[BOOK I] [820] subject is required to execute his commands; and therefore, as I said at
[BOOK I] [821] first and now repeat, justice is the interest of the stronger.
[BOOK I] [831] Nay, he replied, 'suppose' is not the word--I know it; but you will be
[BOOK I] [837] being the superior, it is just that the inferior should execute--is he a
[BOOK I] [850] you a question: Is the physician, taken in that strict sense of which you
[BOOK I] [856] And the pilot--that is to say, the true pilot--is he a captain of sailors
[BOOK I] [861] The circumstance that he sails in the ship is not to be taken into account;
[BOOK I] [862] neither is he to be called a sailor; the name pilot by which he is
[BOOK I] [863] distinguished has nothing to do with sailing, but is significant of his
[BOOK I] [874] Yes, that is the aim of art.
[BOOK I] [876] And the interest of any art is the perfection of it--this and nothing else?
[BOOK I] [881] Suppose you were to ask me whether the body is self-sufficing or has wants,
[BOOK I] [884] medicine ministers; and this is the origin and intention of medicine, as
[BOOK I] [889] But is the art of medicine or any other art faulty or deficient in any
[BOOK I] [900] faultless while remaining true--that is to say, while perfect and
[BOOK I] [914] is the subject of their art?
[BOOK I] [929] Then, I continued, no physician, in so far as he is a physician, considers
[BOOK I] [931] true physician is also a ruler having the human body as a subject, and is
[BOOK I] [936] And the pilot likewise, in the strict sense of the term, is a ruler of
[BOOK I] [942] the sailor who is under him, and not for his own or the ruler's interest?
[BOOK I] [946] Then, I said, Thrasymachus, there is no one in any rule who, in so far as
[BOOK I] [947] he is a ruler, considers or enjoins what is for his own interest, but
[BOOK I] [948] always what is for the interest of his subject or suitable to his art; to
[BOOK I] [970] justice and the just are in reality another's good; that is to say, the
[BOOK I] [972] servant; and injustice the opposite; for the unjust is lord over the truly
[BOOK I] [973] simple and just: he is the stronger, and his subjects do what is for his
[BOOK I] [974] interest, and minister to his happiness, which is very far from being their
[BOOK I] [975] own. Consider further, most foolish Socrates, that the just is always a
[BOOK I] [977] wherever the unjust is the partner of the just you will find that, when the
[BOOK I] [978] partnership is dissolved, the unjust man has always more and the just less.
[BOOK I] [979] Secondly, in their dealings with the State: when there is an income-tax,
[BOOK I] [981] income; and when there is anything to be received the one gains nothing and
[BOOK I] [983] is the just man neglecting his affairs and perhaps suffering other losses,
[BOOK I] [984] and getting nothing out of the public, because he is just; moreover he is
[BOOK I] [986] unlawful ways. But all this is reversed in the case of the unjust man. I
[BOOK I] [988] advantage of the unjust is most apparent; and my meaning will be most
[BOOK I] [990] criminal is the happiest of men, and the sufferers or those who refuse to
[BOOK I] [991] do injustice are the most miserable--that is to say tyranny, which by fraud
[BOOK I] [999] then, instead of these names of reproach, he is termed happy and blessed,
[BOOK I] [1005] said at first, justice is the interest of the stronger, whereas injustice
[BOOK I] [1006] is a man's own profit and interest.
[BOOK I] [1014] learned whether they are true or not? Is the attempt to determine the way
[BOOK I] [1022] you know, is to you a matter of indifference. Prithee, friend, do not keep
[BOOK I] [1027] For, granting that there may be an unjust man who is able to commit
[BOOK I] [1046] shepherd. Yet surely the art of the shepherd is concerned only with the
[BOOK I] [1048] perfection of the art is already ensured whenever all the requirements of
[BOOK I] [1052] subjects; whereas you seem to think that the rulers in states, that is to
[BOOK I] [1064] Yes, that is the difference, he replied.
[BOOK I] [1073] not confuse this with other arts, any more than the art of the pilot is to
[BOOK I] [1076] that navigation is the art of medicine, at least if we are to adopt your
[BOOK I] [1081] Or because a man is in good health when he receives pay you would not say
[BOOK I] [1082] that the art of payment is medicine?
[BOOK I] [1086] Nor would you say that medicine is the art of receiving pay because a man
[BOOK I] [1087] takes fees when he is engaged in healing?
[BOOK I] [1091] And we have admitted, I said, that the good of each art is specially
[BOOK I] [1096] Then, if there be any good which all artists have in common, that is to be
[BOOK I] [1101] And when the artist is benefited by receiving pay the advantage is gained
[BOOK I] [1102] by an additional use of the art of pay, which is not the art professed by
[BOOK I] [1107] Then the pay is not derived by the several artists from their respective
[BOOK I] [1108] arts. But the truth is, that while the art of medicine gives health, and
[BOOK I] [1109] the art of the builder builds a house, another art attends them which is
[BOOK I] [1120] Then now, Thrasymachus, there is no longer any doubt that neither arts nor
[BOOK I] [1124] of the superior. And this is the reason, my dear Thrasymachus, why, as I
[BOOK I] [1125] was just now saying, no one is willing to govern; because no one likes to
[BOOK I] [1134] are intelligible enough, but what the penalty is I do not understand, or
[BOOK I] [1138] best men is the great inducement to rule? Of course you know that ambition
[BOOK I] [1149] imagine, is the reason why the forwardness to take office, instead of
[BOOK I] [1151] of the punishment is that he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by
[BOOK I] [1152] one who is worse than himself. And the fear of this, as I conceive,
[BOOK I] [1156] commit the task of ruling to any one who is better than themselves, or
[BOOK I] [1157] indeed as good. For there is reason to think that if a city were composed
[BOOK I] [1159] contention as to obtain office is at present; then we should have plain
[BOOK I] [1160] proof that the true ruler is not meant by nature to regard his own
[BOOK I] [1164] is the interest of the stronger. This latter question need not be further
[BOOK I] [1166] unjust is more advantageous than that of the just, his new statement
[BOOK I] [1178] Then shall we try to find some way of convincing him, if we can, that he is
[BOOK I] [1179] saying what is not true?
[BOOK I] [1197] answer me. You say that perfect injustice is more gainful than perfect
[BOOK I] [1200] Yes, that is what I say, and I have given you my reasons.
[BOOK I] [1202] And what is your view about them? Would you call one of them virtue and
[BOOK I] [1253] I may be in earnest or not, but what is that to you?--to refute the
[BOOK I] [1254] argument is your business.
[BOOK I] [1256] Very true, I said; that is what I have to do: But will you be so good as
[BOOK I] [1261] he is.
[BOOK I] [1273] Whether he would or would not be able, I said, is not to the point. My
[BOOK I] [1274] question is only whether the just man, while refusing to have more than
[BOOK I] [1280] do more than is just?
[BOOK I] [1295] And the unjust is good and wise, and the just is neither?
[BOOK I] [1299] And is not the unjust like the wise and good and the just unlike them?
[BOOK I] [1301] Of course, he said, he who is of a certain nature, is like those who are of
[BOOK I] [1302] a certain nature; he who is not, not.
[BOOK I] [1304] Each of them, I said, is such as his like is?
[BOOK I] [1309] would admit that one man is a musician and another not a musician?
[BOOK I] [1313] And which is wise and which is foolish?
[BOOK I] [1315] Clearly the musician is wise, and he who is not a musician is foolish.
[BOOK I] [1317] And he is good in as far as he is wise, and bad in as far as he is foolish?
[BOOK I] [1357] And the knowing is wise?
[BOOK I] [1361] And the wise is good?
[BOOK I] [1383] Then the just is like the wise and good, and the unjust like the evil and
[BOOK I] [1386] That is the inference.
[BOOK I] [1388] And each of them is such as his like is?
[BOOK I] [1401] Well, I said, Thrasymachus, that matter is now settled; but were we not
[BOOK I] [1422] on regularly. A statement was made that injustice is stronger and more
[BOOK I] [1424] and virtue, is easily shown to be stronger than injustice, if injustice is
[BOOK I] [1435] consider is, whether this power which is possessed by the superior state
[BOOK I] [1438] If you are right in your view, and justice is wisdom, then only with
[BOOK I] [1444] That is out of civility to you, he replied.
[BOOK I] [1458] And this is because injustice creates divisions and hatreds and fighting,
[BOOK I] [1459] and justice imparts harmony and friendship; is not that true, Thrasymachus?
[BOOK I] [1480] Yet is not the power which injustice exercises of such a nature that
[BOOK I] [1482] family, or in any other body, that body is, to begin with, rendered
[BOOK I] [1485] with the just? Is not this the case?
[BOOK I] [1489] And is not injustice equally fatal when existing in a single person; in the
[BOOK I] [1490] first place rendering him incapable of action because he is not at unity
[BOOK I] [1492] the just? Is not that true, Thrasymachus?
[BOOK I] [1510] at any time vigorously together, is not strictly true, for if they had been
[BOOK I] [1511] perfectly evil, they would have laid hands upon one another; but it is
[BOOK I] [1516] would have been utterly incapable of action. That, as I believe, is the
[BOOK I] [1518] have a better and happier life than the unjust is a further question which
[BOOK I] [1521] light matter is at stake, nothing less than the rule of human life.
[BOOK I] [1556] May we not say that this is the end of a pruning-hook?
[BOOK I] [1566] And that to which an end is appointed has also an excellence? Need I ask
[BOOK I] [1579] And the same is true of all other things; they have each of them an end and
[BOOK I] [1582] That is so.
[BOOK I] [1589] You mean to say, if they have lost their proper excellence, which is sight;
[BOOK I] [1613] And is not life to be reckoned among the ends of the soul?
[BOOK I] [1631] And we have admitted that justice is the excellence of the soul, and
[BOOK I] [1639] That is what your argument proves.
[BOOK I] [1641] And he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who lives ill the
[BOOK I] [1646] Then the just is happy, and the unjust miserable?
[BOOK I] [1650] But happiness and not misery is profitable.
[BOOK I] [1662] snatches a taste of every dish which is successively brought to table, he
[BOOK I] [1666] consider whether justice is virtue and wisdom or evil and folly; and when
[BOOK I] [1670] not what justice is, and therefore I am not likely to know whether it is or
[BOOK I] [1671] is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy.
[BOOK II] [1677] but the end, in truth, proved to be only a beginning. For Glaucon, who is
[BOOK II] [1681] that to be just is always better than to be unjust?
[BOOK II] [1691] I agree in thinking that there is such a class, I replied.
[BOOK II] [1693] Is there not also a second class of goods, such as knowledge, sight,
[BOOK II] [1705] There is, I said, this third class also. But why do you ask?
[BOOK II] [1713] Then the many are of another mind; they think that justice is to be
[BOOK II] [1718] I know, I said, that this is their manner of thinking, and that this was
[BOOK II] [1732] there is reason in this view, for the life of the unjust is after all
[BOOK II] [1733] better far than the life of the just--if what they say is true, Socrates,
[BOOK II] [1751] They say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer injustice,
[BOOK II] [1752] evil; but that the evil is greater than the good. And so when men have
[BOOK II] [1756] covenants; and that which is ordained by law is termed by them lawful and
[BOOK II] [1757] just. This they affirm to be the origin and nature of justice;--it is a
[BOOK II] [1758] mean or compromise, between the best of all, which is to do injustice and
[BOOK II] [1759] not be punished, and the worst of all, which is to suffer injustice without
[BOOK II] [1761] two, is tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and honoured by
[BOOK II] [1762] reason of the inability of men to do injustice. For no man who is worthy
[BOOK II] [1764] to resist; he would be mad if he did. Such is the received account,
[BOOK II] [1775] them in the form of such a power as is said to have been possessed by
[BOOK II] [1804] that a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks that justice is any
[BOOK II] [1806] that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust. For all men believe in
[BOOK II] [1807] their hearts that injustice is far more profitable to the individual than
[BOOK II] [1817] we must isolate them; there is no other way; and how is the isolation to be
[BOOK II] [1819] man entirely just; nothing is to be taken away from either of them, and
[BOOK II] [1823] keeps within their limits, and who, if he fails at any point, is able to
[BOOK II] [1825] way, and lie hidden if he means to be great in his injustice: (he who is
[BOOK II] [1826] found out is nobody:) for the highest reach of injustice is, to be deemed
[BOOK II] [1828] must assume the most perfect injustice; there is to be no deduction, but we
[BOOK II] [1832] of his deeds come to light, and who can force his way where force is
[BOOK II] [1837] then we shall not know whether he is just for the sake of justice or for
[BOOK II] [1845] justice and the other of injustice, let judgment be given which of them is
[BOOK II] [1851] I do my best, he said. And now that we know what they are like there is no
[BOOK II] [1856] injustice: They will tell you that the just man who is thought unjust will
[BOOK II] [1861] unjust is pursuing a reality; he does not live with a view to appearances--
[BOOK II] [1867] In the first place, he is thought just, and therefore bears rule in the
[BOOK II] [1872] their expense, and is rich, and out of his gains he can benefit his
[BOOK II] [1876] just, and therefore he is likely to be dearer than they are to the gods.
[BOOK II] [1881] brother, interposed: Socrates, he said, you do not suppose that there is
[BOOK II] [1884] Why, what else is there? I answered.
[BOOK II] [1893] Nonsense, he replied. But let me add something more: There is another
[BOOK II] [1895] injustice, which is equally required in order to bring out what I believe
[BOOK II] [1899] him who is reputed just some of those offices, marriages, and the like
[BOOK II] [1901] from the reputation of justice. More, however, is made of appearances by
[BOOK II] [1912] has a very similar strain; for he speaks of one whose fame is--
[BOOK II] [1922] garlands; their idea seems to be that an immortality of drunkenness is the
[BOOK II] [1925] and fourth generation. This is the style in which they praise justice.
[BOOK II] [1926] But about the wicked there is another strain; they bury them in a slough in
[BOOK II] [1930] nothing else does their invention supply. Such is their manner of praising
[BOOK II] [1934] about justice and injustice, which is not confined to the poets, but is
[BOOK II] [1935] found in prose writers. The universal voice of mankind is always declaring
[BOOK II] [1938] censured by law and opinion. They say also that honesty is for the most
[BOOK II] [1943] than the others. But most extraordinary of all is their mode of speaking
[BOOK II] [1954] 'Vice may be had in abundance without trouble; the way is smooth and her
[BOOK II] [1955] dwelling-place is near. But before virtue the gods have set toil,'
[BOOK II] [1965] children of the Moon and the Muses--that is what they say--according to
[BOOK II] [1985] For what men say is that, if I am really just and am not also thought just
[BOOK II] [1986] profit there is none, but the pain and loss on the other hand are
[BOOK II] [1988] a heavenly life is promised to me. Since then, as philosophers prove,
[BOOK II] [1989] appearance tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness, to appearance I
[BOOK II] [1993] But I hear some one exclaiming that the concealment of wickedness is often
[BOOK II] [1994] difficult; to which I answer, Nothing great is easy. Nevertheless, the
[BOOK II] [2012] will be propitiated, and we shall not be punished. 'But there is a world
[BOOK II] [2015] and atoning deities, and these have great power. That is what mighty
[BOOK II] [2026] should be some one who is able to disprove the truth of my words, and who
[BOOK II] [2027] is satisfied that justice is best, still he is not angry with the unjust,
[BOOK II] [2028] but is very ready to forgive them, because he also knows that men are not
[BOOK II] [2033] power of being unjust. And this is proved by the fact that when he obtains
[BOOK II] [2045] man's soul which he has within him, justice is the greatest good, and
[BOOK II] [2062] and that you really agree with Thrasymachus in thinking that justice is
[BOOK II] [2063] another's good and the interest of the stronger, and that injustice is a
[BOOK II] [2065] have admitted that justice is one of that highest class of goods which are
[BOOK II] [2072] one and abusing the other; that is a manner of arguing which, coming from
[BOOK II] [2076] to us that justice is better than injustice, but show what they either of
[BOOK II] [2088] The epithet is very appropriate, for there is something truly divine in
[BOOK II] [2093] my confidence in you, the greater is my difficulty in knowing what to say.
[BOOK II] [2095] to the task; and my inability is brought home to me by the fact that you
[BOOK II] [2099] that there would be an impiety in being present when justice is evil spoken
[BOOK II] [2119] I will tell you, I replied; justice, which is the subject of our enquiry,
[BOOK II] [2120] is, as you know, sometimes spoken of as the virtue of an individual, and
[BOOK II] [2125] And is not a State larger than an individual?
[BOOK II] [2127] It is.
[BOOK II] [2129] Then in the larger the quantity of justice is likely to be larger and more
[BOOK II] [2135] That, he said, is an excellent proposal.
[BOOK II] [2142] When the State is completed there may be a hope that the object of our
[BOOK II] [2153] is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants. Can any other origin of
[BOOK II] [2161] inhabitants is termed a State.
[BOOK II] [2171] creator is necessity, who is the mother of our invention.
[BOOK II] [2175] Now the first and greatest of necessities is food, which is the condition
[BOOK II] [2180] The second is a dwelling, and the third clothing and the like.
[BOOK II] [2185] We may suppose that one man is a husbandman, another a builder, some one
[BOOK II] [2219] Further, there can be no doubt that a work is spoilt when not done at the
[BOOK II] [2224] For business is not disposed to wait until the doer of the business is at
[BOOK II] [2225] leisure; but the doer must follow up what he is doing, and make the
[BOOK II] [2231] easily and of a better quality when one man does one thing which is natural
[BOOK II] [2244] our little State, which is already beginning to grow?
[BOOK II] [2253] That is true; yet neither will it be a very small State which contains all
[BOOK II] [2256] Then, again, there is the situation of the city--to find a place where
[BOOK II] [2257] nothing need be imported is wellnigh impossible.
[BOOK II] [2269] That is certain.
[BOOK II] [2289] And if merchandise is to be carried over the sea, skilful sailors will also
[BOOK II] [2306] market, and he comes at a time when there is no one to exchange with him,--
[BOOK II] [2307] is he to leave his calling and sit idle in the market-place?
[BOOK II] [2312] purpose; their duty is to be in the market, and to give money in exchange
[BOOK II] [2316] This want, then, creates a class of retail-traders in our State. Is not
[BOOK II] [2317] 'retailer' the term which is applied to those who sit in the market-place
[BOOK II] [2323] And there is another class of servants, who are intellectually hardly on
[BOOK II] [2326] hirelings, hire being the name which is given to the price of their labour.
[BOOK II] [2334] And now, Adeimantus, is our State matured and perfected?
[BOOK II] [2338] Where, then, is justice, and where is injustice, and in what part of the
[BOOK II] [2381] consider is, not only how a State, but how a luxurious State is created;
[BOOK II] [2382] and possibly there is no harm in this, for in such a State we shall be more
[BOOK II] [2384] and healthy constitution of the State is the one which I have described.
[BOOK II] [2396] Then we must enlarge our borders; for the original healthy State is no
[BOOK II] [2453] But is not war an art?
[BOOK II] [2467] soldier should be well done. But is war an art so easily acquired that a
[BOOK II] [2468] man may be a warrior who is also a husbandman, or shoemaker, or other
[BOOK II] [2500] Is not the noble youth very like a well-bred dog in respect of guarding and
[BOOK II] [2511] Well, and your guardian must be brave if he is to fight well?
[BOOK II] [2515] And is he likely to be brave who has no spirit, whether horse or dog or any
[BOOK II] [2516] other animal? Have you never observed how invincible and unconquerable is
[BOOK II] [2527] And also of the mental ones; his soul is to be full of spirit?
[BOOK II] [2542] What is to be done then? I said; how shall we find a gentle nature which
[BOOK II] [2543] has also a great spirit, for the one is the contradiction of the other?
[BOOK II] [2547] He will not be a good guardian who is wanting in either of these two
[BOOK II] [2549] hence we must infer that to be a good guardian is impossible.
[BOOK II] [2551] I am afraid that what you say is true, he replied.
[BOOK II] [2564] Many animals, I replied, furnish examples of them; our friend the dog is a
[BOOK II] [2570] Then there is nothing impossible or out of the order of nature in our
[BOOK II] [2575] Would not he who is fitted to be a guardian, besides the spirited nature,
[BOOK II] [2581] and is remarkable in the animal.
[BOOK II] [2585] Why, a dog, whenever he sees a stranger, is angry; when an acquaintance, he
[BOOK II] [2592] And surely this instinct of the dog is very charming;--your dog is a true
[BOOK II] [2604] And is not the love of learning the love of wisdom, which is philosophy?
[BOOK II] [2608] And may we not say confidently of man also, that he who is likely to be
[BOOK II] [2614] Then he who is to be a really good and noble guardian of the State will
[BOOK II] [2621] how are they to be reared and educated? Is not this an enquiry which may
[BOOK II] [2622] be expected to throw light on the greater enquiry which is our final end--
[BOOK II] [2624] to omit what is to the point or to draw out the argument to an inconvenient
[BOOK II] [2671] You know also that the beginning is the most important part of any work,
[BOOK II] [2672] especially in the case of a young and tender thing; for that is the time at
[BOOK II] [2673] which the character is being formed and the desired impression is more
[BOOK II] [2686] fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good, and
[BOOK II] [2695] necessarily of the same type, and there is the same spirit in both of them.
[BOOK II] [2706] A fault which is most serious, I said; the fault of telling a lie, and,
[BOOK II] [2707] what is more, a bad lie.
[BOOK II] [2709] But when is this fault committed?
[BOOK II] [2711] Whenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods and
[BOOK II] [2715] Yes, he said, that sort of thing is certainly very blameable; but what are
[BOOK II] [2724] But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a chosen few might
[BOOK II] [2732] young man should not be told that in committing the worst of crimes he is
[BOOK II] [2747] them that quarrelling is unholy, and that never up to this time has there
[BOOK II] [2748] been any quarrel between citizens; this is what old men and old women
[BOOK II] [2755] For a young person cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal;
[BOOK II] [2756] anything that he receives into his mind at that age is likely to become
[BOOK II] [2757] indelible and unalterable; and therefore it is most important that the
[BOOK II] [2766] observed by them, but to make the tales is not their business.
[BOOK II] [2770] Something of this kind, I replied:--God is always to be represented as he
[BOOK II] [2771] truly is, whatever be the sort of poetry, epic, lyric or tragic, in which
[BOOK II] [2772] the representation is given.
[BOOK II] [2776] And is he not truly good? and must he not be represented as such?
[BOOK II] [2780] And no good thing is hurtful?
[BOOK II] [2784] And that which is not hurtful hurts not?
[BOOK II] [2796] And the good is advantageous?
[BOOK II] [2804] It follows therefore that the good is not the cause of all things, but of
[BOOK II] [2809] Then God, if he be good, is not the author of all things, as the many
[BOOK II] [2810] assert, but he is the cause of a few things only, and not of most things
[BOOK II] [2812] evils, and the good is to be attributed to God alone; of the evils the
[BOOK II] [2817] Then we must not listen to Homer or to any other poet who is guilty of the
[BOOK II] [2827] but that he to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill,
[BOOK II] [2833] 'Zeus, who is the dispenser of good and evil to us.'
[BOOK II] [2849] those who are punished are miserable, and that God is the author of their
[BOOK II] [2850] misery--the poet is not to be permitted to say; though he may say that the
[BOOK II] [2852] by receiving punishment from God; but that God being good is the author of
[BOOK II] [2853] evil to any one is to be strenuously denied, and not to be said or sung or
[BOOK II] [2855] commonwealth. Such a fiction is suicidal, ruinous, impious.
[BOOK II] [2860] which our poets and reciters will be expected to conform,--that God is not
[BOOK II] [2866] is a magician, and of a nature to appear insidiously now in one shape, and
[BOOK II] [2868] sometimes deceiving us with the semblance of such transformations; or is he
[BOOK II] [2879] discomposed; for example, when healthiest and strongest, the human frame is
[BOOK II] [2880] least liable to be affected by meats and drinks, and the plant which is in
[BOOK II] [2897] Then everything which is good, whether made by art or nature, or both, is
[BOOK II] [2912] Clearly, he said, that must be the case if he is changed at all.
[BOOK II] [2925] Then it is impossible that God should ever be willing to change; being, as
[BOOK II] [2926] is supposed, the fairest and best that is conceivable, every God remains
[BOOK II] [2962] allowed, is hated of gods and men?
[BOOK II] [2966] I mean that no one is willingly deceived in that which is the truest and
[BOOK II] [2968] above all, he is most afraid of a lie having possession of him.
[BOOK II] [2972] The reason is, I replied, that you attribute some profound meaning to my
[BOOK II] [2974] about the highest realities in the highest part of themselves, which is the
[BOOK II] [2975] soul, and in that part of them to have and to hold the lie, is what mankind
[BOOK II] [2976] least like;--that, I say, is what they utterly detest.
[BOOK II] [2978] There is nothing more hateful to them.
[BOOK II] [2980] And, as I was just now remarking, this ignorance in the soul of him who is
[BOOK II] [2981] deceived may be called the true lie; for the lie in words is only a kind of
[BOOK II] [2987] The true lie is hated not only by the gods, but also by men?
[BOOK II] [2991] Whereas the lie in words is in certain cases useful and not hateful; in
[BOOK II] [2994] harm, then it is useful and is a sort of medicine or preventive; also in
[BOOK II] [3001] But can any of these reasons apply to God? Can we suppose that he is
[BOOK II] [3010] Or perhaps he may tell a lie because he is afraid of enemies?
[BOOK II] [3012] That is inconceivable.
[BOOK II] [3022] Then the superhuman and divine is absolutely incapable of falsehood?
[BOOK II] [3026] Then is God perfectly simple and true both in word and deed; he changes
[BOOK II] [3031] You agree with me then, I said, that this is the second type or form in
[BOOK II] [3047] the banquet, and who said this--he it is who has slain my son.'
[BOOK III] [3100] 'O heavens! verily in the house of Hades there is soul and ghostly form but
[BOOK III] [3136] is a danger that the nerves of our guardians may be rendered too excitable
[BOOK III] [3139] There is a real danger, he said.
[BOOK III] [3153] But shall we be right in getting rid of them? Reflect: our principle is
[BOOK III] [3155] who is his comrade.
[BOOK III] [3157] Yes; that is our principle.
[BOOK III] [3164] Such an one, as we further maintain, is sufficient for himself and his own
[BOOK III] [3165] happiness, and therefore is least in need of other men.
[BOOK III] [3170] fortune, is to him of all men least terrible.
[BOOK III] [3187] Achilles, who is the son of a goddess, first lying on his side, then on his
[BOOK III] [3205] and round the city, and my heart is sorrowful.'
[BOOK III] [3209] Woe is me that I am fated to have Sarpedon, dearest of men to me, subdued
[BOOK III] [3220] Yes, he said, that is most true.
[BOOK III] [3222] Yes, I replied; but that surely is what ought not to be, as the argument
[BOOK III] [3223] has just proved to us; and by that proof we must abide until it is
[BOOK III] [3249] is certain.
[BOOK III] [3251] Again, truth should be highly valued; if, as we were saying, a lie is
[BOOK III] [3258] Then if any one at all is to have the privilege of lying, the rulers of the
[BOOK III] [3263] in return is to be deemed a more heinous fault than for the patient or the
[BOOK III] [3266] what is happening about the ship and the rest of the crew, and how things
[BOOK III] [3275] he will punish him for introducing a practice which is equally subversive
[BOOK III] [3278] Most certainly, he said, if our idea of the State is ever carried out.
[BOOK III] [3319] is more glorious than
[BOOK III] [3324] is it fit or conducive to temperance for a young man to hear such
[BOOK III] [3327] 'The saddest of fates is to die and meet destiny from hunger?'
[BOOK III] [3345] ought to see and hear; as, for example, what is said in the verses,
[BOOK III] [3361] Neither is Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, to be approved or deemed to have
[BOOK III] [3373] him, he is guilty of downright impiety. As little can I believe the
[BOOK III] [3379] or his insubordination to the river-god, on whose divinity he is ready to
[BOOK III] [3408] for everybody will begin to excuse his own vices when he is convinced that
[BOOK III] [3412] altar of Zeus, is aloft in air on the peak of Ida,'
[BOOK III] [3430] And what shall we say about men? That is clearly the remaining portion of
[BOOK III] [3443] injustice is profitable when undetected, but that justice is a man's own
[BOOK III] [3454] That such things are or are not to be said about men is a question which we
[BOOK III] [3455] cannot determine until we have discovered what justice is, and how
[BOOK III] [3468] and poetry is a narration of events, either past, present, or to come?
[BOOK III] [3489] the poet is speaking in his own person; he never leads us to suppose that
[BOOK III] [3490] he is any one else. But in what follows he takes the person of Chryses,
[BOOK III] [3491] and then he does all that he can to make us believe that the speaker is not
[BOOK III] [3504] assimilates his style to that of the person who, as he informs you, is
[BOOK III] [3510] gesture, is the imitation of the person whose character he assumes?
[BOOK III] [3520] the imitation is dropped, and his poetry becomes simple narration.
[BOOK III] [3552] failed to apprehend before is now made clear to you, that poetry and
[BOOK III] [3554] supplied by tragedy and comedy; there is likewise the opposite style, in
[BOOK III] [3555] which the poet is the only speaker--of this the dithyramb affords the best
[BOOK III] [3556] example; and the combination of both is found in epic, and in several other
[BOOK III] [3587] And this is equally true of imitation; no one man can imitate many things
[BOOK III] [3634] against the gods in conceit of her happiness, or when she is in affliction,
[BOOK III] [3635] or sorrow, or weeping; and certainly not one who is in sickness, love, or
[BOOK III] [3648] themselves and their neighbours in word or deed, as the manner of such is.
[BOOK III] [3650] women who are mad or bad; for madness, like vice, is to be known but not to
[BOOK III] [3668] You mean, I said, if I understand you aright, that there is one sort of
[BOOK III] [3679] is acting firmly and wisely; in a less degree when he is overtaken by
[BOOK III] [3681] comes to a character which is unworthy of him, he will not make a study of
[BOOK III] [3683] all, for a moment only when he is performing some good action; at other
[BOOK III] [3692] Homer, that is to say, his style will be both imitative and narrative; but
[BOOK III] [3696] Certainly, he said; that is the model which such a speaker must necessarily
[BOOK III] [3699] But there is another sort of character who will narrate anything, and, the
[BOOK III] [3700] worse he is, the more unscrupulous he will be; nothing will be too bad for
[BOOK III] [3715] And you would agree with me in saying that one of them is simple and has
[BOOK III] [3717] simplicity, the result is that the speaker, if he speaks correctly, is
[BOOK III] [3722] That is quite true, he said.
[BOOK III] [3728] That is also perfectly true, he replied.
[BOOK III] [3741] Yes, I said, Adeimantus, but the mixed style is also very charming: and
[BOOK III] [3742] indeed the pantomimic, which is the opposite of the one chosen by you, is
[BOOK III] [3748] But I suppose you would argue that such a style is unsuitable to our State,
[BOOK III] [3749] in which human nature is not twofold or manifold, for one man plays one
[BOOK III] [3754] And this is the reason why in our State, and in our State only, we shall
[BOOK III] [3782] That is obvious.
[BOOK III] [3837] of danger and stern resolve, or when his cause is failing, and he is going
[BOOK III] [3838] to wounds or death or is overtaken by some other evil, and at every such
[BOOK III] [3841] action, when there is no pressure of necessity, and he is seeking to
[BOOK III] [3843] other hand, when he is expressing his willingness to yield to persuasion or
[BOOK III] [3868] the flute is worse than all the stringed instruments put together; even the
[BOOK III] [3869] panharmonic music is only an imitation of the flute?
[BOOK III] [3876] That is surely the conclusion to be drawn from the argument.
[BOOK III] [3879] is not at all strange, I said.
[BOOK III] [3900] tetrachord.) out of which all the harmonies are composed; that is an
[BOOK III] [3926] But there is no difficulty in seeing that grace or the absence of grace is
[BOOK III] [3933] principle is that rhythm and harmony are regulated by the words, and not
[BOOK III] [3949] and character, not that other simplicity which is only an euphemism for
[BOOK III] [3961] manufacture; also nature, animal and vegetable,--in all of them there is
[BOOK III] [3966] That is quite true, he said.
[BOOK III] [3970] they do anything else, of expulsion from our State? Or is the same control
[BOOK III] [3973] indecency in sculpture and building and the other creative arts; and is he
[BOOK III] [3989] And therefore, I said, Glaucon, musical training is a more potent
[BOOK III] [3992] grace, and making the soul of him who is rightly educated graceful, or of
[BOOK III] [3993] him who is ill-educated ungraceful; and also because he who has received
[BOOK III] [3998] his youth, even before he is able to know the reason why; and when reason
[BOOK III] [4036] And the fairest is also the loveliest?
[BOOK III] [4041] loveliest; but he will not love him who is of an inharmonious soul?
[BOOK III] [4043] That is true, he replied, if the deficiency be in his soul; but if there be
[BOOK III] [4062] And is there any greater or keener pleasure than that of sensual love?
[BOOK III] [4066] Whereas true love is a love of beauty and order--temperate and harmonious?
[BOOK III] [4076] love is of the right sort?
[BOOK III] [4083] he must first have the other's consent; and this rule is to limit him in
[BOOK III] [4084] all his intercourse, and he is never to be seen going further, or, if he
[BOOK III] [4085] exceeds, he is to be deemed guilty of coarseness and bad taste.
[BOOK III] [4099] should be careful and should continue through life. Now my belief is,--and
[BOOK III] [4100] this is a matter upon which I should like to have your opinion in
[BOOK III] [4101] confirmation of my own, but my own belief is,--not that the good body by
[BOOK III] [4116] where in the world he is.
[BOOK III] [4119] of him is ridiculous indeed.
[BOOK III] [4130] I am afraid, I said, that a habit of body such as they have is but a sleepy
[BOOK III] [4144] That is my view.
[BOOK III] [4146] The really excellent gymnastic is twin sister of that simple music which we
[BOOK III] [4151] Why, I conceive that there is a gymnastic which, like our music, is simple
[BOOK III] [4159] allowed boiled meats but only roast, which is the food most convenient for
[BOOK III] [4166] mentioned in Homer. In proscribing them, however, he is not singular; all
[BOOK III] [4167] professional athletes are well aware that a man who is to be in good
[BOOK III] [4177] Nor, if a man is to be in condition, would you allow him to have a
[BOOK III] [4200] lawyer give themselves airs, finding how keen is the interest which not
[BOOK III] [4208] would profess to have had a liberal education? Is it not disgraceful, and
[BOOK III] [4216] Would you say 'most,' I replied, when you consider that there is a further
[BOOK III] [4217] stage of the evil in which a man is not only a life-long litigant, passing
[BOOK III] [4218] all his days in the courts, either as plaintiff or defendant, but is
[BOOK III] [4220] imagines that he is a master in dishonesty; able to take every crooked
[BOOK III] [4224] as to be able to do without a napping judge is a far higher and nobler sort
[BOOK III] [4225] of thing. Is not that still more disgraceful?
[BOOK III] [4227] Yes, he said, that is still more disgraceful.
[BOOK III] [4234] catarrh; is not this, too, a disgrace?
[BOOK III] [4245] Patroclus, who is treating his case.
[BOOK III] [4251] as is commonly said, before the time of Herodicus, the guild of Asclepius
[BOOK III] [4279] I mean this: When a carpenter is ill he asks the physician for a rough and
[BOOK III] [4284] no good in a life which is spent in nursing his disease to the neglect of
[BOOK III] [4298] But with the rich man this is otherwise; of him we do not say that he has
[BOOK III] [4301] He is generally supposed to have nothing to do.
[BOOK III] [4309] ourselves: Is the practice of virtue obligatory on the rich man, or can he
[BOOK III] [4311] question, whether this dieting of disorders, which is an impediment to the
[BOOK III] [4316] body, when carried beyond the rules of gymnastic, is most inimical to the
[BOOK III] [4320] house, an army, or an office of state; and, what is most important of all,
[BOOK III] [4322] is a constant suspicion that headache and giddiness are to be ascribed to
[BOOK III] [4324] higher sense is absolutely stopped; for a man is always fancying that he is
[BOOK III] [4325] being made ill, and is in constant anxiety about the state of his body.
[BOOK III] [4343] Clearly; and his character is further illustrated by his sons. Note that
[BOOK III] [4371] All that, Socrates, is excellent; but I should like to put a question to
[BOOK III] [4391] their own persons. For the body, as I conceive, is not the instrument with
[BOOK III] [4394] which has become and is sick can cure nothing.
[BOOK III] [4396] That is very true, he said.
[BOOK III] [4398] But with the judge it is otherwise; since he governs mind by mind; he ought
[BOOK III] [4403] the honourable mind which is to form a healthy judgment should have had no
[BOOK III] [4404] experience or contamination of evil habits when young. And this is the
[BOOK III] [4407] is in their own souls.
[BOOK III] [4416] Yes, he said, that is the ideal of a judge.
[BOOK III] [4418] Yes, I replied, and he will be a good man (which is my answer to your
[BOOK III] [4419] question); for he is good who has a good soul. But the cunning and
[BOOK III] [4421] fancies himself to be a master in wickedness, when he is amongst his
[BOOK III] [4422] fellows, is wonderful in the precautions which he takes, because he judges
[BOOK III] [4428] and is by others thought to be, rather wise than foolish.
[BOOK III] [4432] Then the good and wise judge whom we are seeking is not this man, but the
[BOOK III] [4439] This is the sort of medicine, and this is the sort of law, which you will
[BOOK III] [4445] That is clearly the best thing both for the patients and for the State.
[BOOK III] [4452] And the musician, who, keeping to the same track, is content to practise
[BOOK III] [4465] Neither are the two arts of music and gymnastic really designed, as is
[BOOK III] [4469] What then is the real object of them?
[BOOK III] [4486] savage, and that the mere musician is melted and softened beyond what is
[BOOK III] [4490] educated, would give courage, but, if too much intensified, is liable to
[BOOK III] [4509] And the harmonious soul is both temperate and courageous?
[BOOK III] [4513] And the inharmonious is cowardly and boorish?
[BOOK III] [4519] which we were just now speaking, and his whole life is passed in warbling
[BOOK III] [4521] spirit which is in him is tempered like iron, and made useful, instead of
[BOOK III] [4529] If the element of spirit is naturally weak in him the change is speedily
[BOOK III] [4532] once, and is speedily extinguished; instead of having spirit he grows
[BOOK III] [4533] irritable and passionate and is quite impracticable.
[BOOK III] [4537] And so in gymnastics, if a man takes violent exercise and is a great
[BOOK III] [4553] weapon of persuasion,--he is like a wild beast, all violence and
[BOOK III] [4557] That is quite true, he said.
[BOOK III] [4574] government is to last.
[BOOK III] [4586] Very good, I said; then what is the next question? Must we not ask who are
[BOOK III] [4597] That is also clear.
[BOOK III] [4618] interests with himself, and that of which the good or evil fortune is
[BOOK III] [4624] in their whole life show the greatest eagerness to do what is for the good
[BOOK III] [4625] of their country, and the greatest repugnance to do what is against her
[BOOK III] [4639] a falsehood and learns better, against his will whenever he is deprived of
[BOOK III] [4646] willingly of evil? Is not to have lost the truth an evil, and to possess
[BOOK III] [4648] is to possess the truth?
[BOOK III] [4653] And is not this involuntary deprivation caused either by theft, or force,
[BOOK III] [4678] State is to be the rule of their lives. We must watch them from their
[BOOK III] [4680] to forget or to be deceived, and he who remembers and is not deceived is to
[BOOK III] [4681] be selected, and he who fails in the trial is to be rejected. That will be
[BOOK III] [4691] And then, I said, we must try them with enchantments--that is the third
[BOOK III] [4695] pleasures, and prove them more thoroughly than gold is proved in the
[BOOK III] [4705] reject. I am inclined to think that this is the sort of way in which our
[BOOK III] [4754] True, I replied, but there is more coming; I have only told you half.
[BOOK III] [4763] principle to the rulers, and above all else, that there is nothing which
[BOOK III] [4773] will be destroyed. Such is the tale; is there any possibility of making
[BOOK III] [4776] Not in the present generation, he replied; there is no way of accomplishing
[BOOK III] [4800] What is the difference? he said.
[BOOK III] [4835] property of his own beyond what is absolutely necessary; neither should
[BOOK III] [4842] God; the diviner metal is within them, and they have therefore no need of
[BOOK III] [4843] the dross which is current among men, and ought not to pollute the divine
[BOOK III] [4845] of many unholy deeds, but their own is undefiled. And they alone of all
[BOOK IV] [4871] have gold and silver, and all that is usual among the favourites of
[BOOK IV] [4878] mistress or any other luxurious fancy, which, as the world goes, is thought
[BOOK IV] [4888] If we proceed along the old path, my belief, I said, is that we shall find
[BOOK IV] [4892] greatest happiness of the whole; we thought that in a State which is
[BOOK IV] [4895] them, we might then decide which of the two is the happier. At present, I
[BOOK IV] [4910] round the winecup, while their wheel is conveniently at hand, and working
[BOOK IV] [4916] this is not of much consequence where the corruption of society, and
[BOOK IV] [4917] pretension to be what you are not, is confined to cobblers; but when the
[BOOK IV] [4922] State, whereas our opponent is thinking of peasants at a festival, who are
[BOOK IV] [4924] State. But, if so, we mean different things, and he is speaking of
[BOOK IV] [4925] something which is not a State. And therefore we must consider whether in
[BOOK IV] [4948] The process is as follows: When a potter becomes rich, will he, think you,
[BOOK IV] [4970] That is evident.
[BOOK IV] [4972] Here, then, is a discovery of new evils, I said, against which the
[BOOK IV] [4977] Wealth, I said, and poverty; the one is the parent of luxury and indolence,
[BOOK IV] [4980] That is very true, he replied; but still I should like to know, Socrates,
[BOOK IV] [4981] how our city will be able to go to war, especially against an enemy who is
[BOOK IV] [4985] such enemy; but there is no difficulty where there are two of them.
[BOOK IV] [4992] That is true, he said.
[BOOK IV] [5018] the two cities, telling them what is the truth: Silver and gold we neither
[BOOK IV] [5024] That is not likely; and yet there might be a danger to the poor State if
[BOOK IV] [5031] You ought to speak of other States in the plural number; not one of them is
[BOOK IV] [5033] however small, is in fact divided into two, one the city of the poor, the
[BOOK IV] [5042] thousand defenders. A single State which is her equal you will hardly
[BOOK IV] [5046] That is most true, he said.
[BOOK IV] [5054] I would allow the State to increase so far as is consistent with unity;
[BOOK IV] [5055] that, I think, is the proper limit.
[BOOK IV] [5059] Here then, I said, is another order which will have to be conveyed to our
[BOOK IV] [5063] And surely, said he, this is not a very severe order which we impose upon
[BOOK IV] [5066] And the other, said I, of which we were speaking before is lighter still,--
[BOOK IV] [5075] Yes, he said; that is not so difficult.
[BOOK IV] [5079] be taken, as the saying is, of the one great thing,--a thing, however,
[BOOK IV] [5101] Then to sum up: This is the point to which, above all, the attention of
[BOOK IV] [5110] of the poet; for any musical innovation is full of danger to the whole
[BOOK IV] [5125] Why, yes, he said, and there is no harm; were it not that little by little
[BOOK IV] [5132] Is that true? I said.
[BOOK IV] [5134] That is my belief, he replied.
[BOOK IV] [5158] sit; what honour is due to parents; what garments or shoes are to be worn;
[BOOK IV] [5164] But there is, I think, small wisdom in legislating about such matters,--I
[BOOK IV] [5165] doubt if it is ever done; nor are any precise written enactments about them
[BOOK IV] [5175] Until some one rare and grand result is reached which may be good, and may
[BOOK IV] [5178] That is not to be denied.
[BOOK IV] [5194] I think, he said, that there is no need to impose laws about them on good
[BOOK IV] [5216] Yes, I replied; and the charming thing is that they deem him their worst
[BOOK IV] [5217] enemy who tells them the truth, which is simply that, unless they give up
[BOOK IV] [5222] a man who tells you what is right.
[BOOK IV] [5232] indulges them and fawns upon them and is skilful in anticipating and
[BOOK IV] [5233] gratifying their humours is held to be a great and good statesman--do not
[BOOK IV] [5248] he is four cubits high, can he help believing what they say?
[BOOK IV] [5258] Yes, he said; that is just what they are doing.
[BOOK IV] [5266] What, then, he said, is still remaining to us of the work of legislation?
[BOOK IV] [5278] to any interpreter but our ancestral deity. He is the god who sits in the
[BOOK IV] [5279] centre, on the navel of the earth, and he is the interpreter of religion to
[BOOK IV] [5284] But where, amid all this, is justice? son of Ariston, tell me where. Now
[BOOK IV] [5300] the assumption that our State, if rightly ordered, is perfect.
[BOOK IV] [5302] That is most certain.
[BOOK IV] [5304] And being perfect, is therefore wise and valiant and temperate and just.
[BOOK IV] [5306] That is likewise clear.
[BOOK IV] [5308] And whichever of these qualities we find in the State, the one which is not
[BOOK IV] [5320] And is not a similar method to be pursued about the virtues, which are also
[BOOK IV] [5328] What is that?
[BOOK IV] [5330] The State which we have been describing is said to be wise as being good in
[BOOK IV] [5335] And good counsel is clearly a kind of knowledge, for not by ignorance, but
[BOOK IV] [5344] There is the knowledge of the carpenter; but is that the sort of knowledge
[BOOK IV] [5350] Then a city is not to be called wise because possessing a knowledge which
[BOOK IV] [5365] Well, I said, and is there any knowledge in our recently-founded State
[BOOK IV] [5370] There certainly is.
[BOOK IV] [5372] And what is this knowledge, and among whom is it found? I asked.
[BOOK IV] [5374] It is the knowledge of the guardians, he replied, and is found among those
[BOOK IV] [5377] And what is the name which the city derives from the possession of this
[BOOK IV] [5404] Again, I said, there is no difficulty in seeing the nature of courage, and
[BOOK IV] [5425] and this is what you term courage.
[BOOK IV] [5430] I mean that courage is a kind of salvation.
[BOOK IV] [5446] whatever is dyed in this manner becomes a fast colour, and no washing
[BOOK IV] [5448] ground has not been duly prepared, you will have noticed how poor is the
[BOOK IV] [5466] your opinion, is not the courage which the law ordains, and ought to have
[BOOK IV] [5481] then justice which is the end of our search.
[BOOK IV] [5502] Temperance, I replied, is the ordering or controlling of certain pleasures
[BOOK IV] [5503] and desires; this is curiously enough implied in the saying of 'a man being
[BOOK IV] [5509] There is something ridiculous in the expression 'master of himself;' for
[BOOK IV] [5510] the master is also the servant and the servant the master; and in all these
[BOOK IV] [5511] modes of speaking the same person is denoted.
[BOOK IV] [5515] The meaning is, I believe, that in the human soul there is a better and
[BOOK IV] [5517] then a man is said to be master of himself; and this is a term of praise:
[BOOK IV] [5519] which is also the smaller, is overwhelmed by the greater mass of the worse
[BOOK IV] [5520] --in this case he is blamed and is called the slave of self and
[BOOK IV] [5523] Yes, there is reason in that.
[BOOK IV] [5531] Yes, he said, I see that what you say is true.
[BOOK IV] [5576] Why, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, each of which resides
[BOOK IV] [5591] The inference is obvious.
[BOOK IV] [5595] sight and escape us; for beyond a doubt she is somewhere in this country:
[BOOK IV] [5600] just eyes enough to see what you show him--that is about as much as I am
[BOOK IV] [5607] Here is no path, I said, and the wood is dark and perplexing; still we must
[BOOK IV] [5638] his nature was best adapted;--now justice is this principle or a part of
[BOOK IV] [5654] Because I think that this is the only virtue which remains in the State
[BOOK IV] [5656] and, that this is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all
[BOOK IV] [5657] of them, and while remaining in them is also their preservative; and we
[BOOK IV] [5668] and which is found in children and women, slave and freeman, artisan,
[BOOK IV] [5670] not being a busybody, would claim the palm--the question is not so easily
[BOOK IV] [5680] And the virtue which enters into this competition is justice?
[BOOK IV] [5691] what is another's, nor be deprived of what is his own?
[BOOK IV] [5693] Yes; that is their principle.
[BOOK IV] [5695] Which is a just principle?
[BOOK IV] [5700] what is a man's own, and belongs to him?
[BOOK IV] [5716] he is unfitted, and either to take the implements or the duties of the
[BOOK IV] [5717] other; or when one man is trader, legislator, and warrior all in one, then
[BOOK IV] [5719] meddling of one with another is the ruin of the State.
[BOOK IV] [5724] one with another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm
[BOOK IV] [5734] This then is injustice; and on the other hand when the trader, the
[BOOK IV] [5735] auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice,
[BOOK IV] [5753] light in which justice will shine forth, and the vision which is then
[BOOK IV] [5777] rightly described in the same terms, because he is affected in the same
[BOOK IV] [5785] An easy question! Nay, rather, Socrates, the proverb holds that hard is
[BOOK IV] [5789] employing is at all adequate to the accurate solution of this question; the
[BOOK IV] [5790] true method is another and a longer one. Still we may arrive at a solution
[BOOK IV] [5804] this quality, when found in States, is not derived from the individuals who
[BOOK IV] [5807] which is the special characteristic of our part of the world, or of the
[BOOK IV] [5813] There is no difficulty in understanding this.
[BOOK IV] [5817] But the question is not quite so easy when we proceed to ask whether these
[BOOK IV] [5818] principles are three or one; whether, that is to say, we learn with one
[BOOK IV] [5821] into play in each sort of action--to determine that is the difficulty.
[BOOK IV] [5843] should hereafter fall out by the way. Imagine the case of a man who is
[BOOK IV] [5845] say that one and the same person is in motion and at rest at the same
[BOOK IV] [5847] that one part of him is in motion while another is at rest.
[BOOK IV] [5858] the axis stands still, for there is no deviation from the perpendicular;
[BOOK IV] [5863] That is the correct mode of describing them, he replied.
[BOOK IV] [5888] is seeking after the object of his desire; or that he is drawing to himself
[BOOK IV] [5908] The object of one is food, and of the other drink?
[BOOK IV] [5912] And here comes the point: is not thirst the desire which the soul has of
[BOOK IV] [5916] is of cold drink; or, if accompanied by cold, then of warm drink; or, if
[BOOK IV] [5917] the thirst be excessive, then the drink which is desired will be excessive;
[BOOK IV] [5919] pure and simple will desire drink pure and simple, which is the natural
[BOOK IV] [5920] satisfaction of thirst, as food is of hunger?
[BOOK IV] [5922] Yes, he said; the simple desire is, as you say, in every case of the simple
[BOOK IV] [5927] drink, or food only, but good food; for good is the universal object of
[BOOK IV] [5929] drink; and the same is true of every other desire.
[BOOK IV] [5939] Well, you know of course that the greater is relative to the less?
[BOOK IV] [5947] And the sometime greater to the sometime less, and the greater that is to
[BOOK IV] [5948] be to the less that is to be?
[BOOK IV] [5954] slower; and of hot and cold, and of any other relatives;--is not this true
[BOOK IV] [5960] science is knowledge (assuming that to be the true definition), but the
[BOOK IV] [5961] object of a particular science is a particular kind of knowledge; I mean,
[BOOK IV] [5962] for example, that the science of house-building is a kind of knowledge
[BOOK IV] [5963] which is defined and distinguished from other kinds and is therefore termed
[BOOK IV] [5973] kind; and this is true of the other arts and sciences?
[BOOK IV] [5979] of a relation is taken alone, the other is taken alone; if one term is
[BOOK IV] [5980] qualified, the other is also qualified. I do not mean to say that
[BOOK IV] [5981] relatives may not be disparate, or that the science of health is healthy,
[BOOK IV] [5983] are therefore good and evil; but only that, when the term science is no
[BOOK IV] [5984] longer used absolutely, but has a qualified object which in this case is
[BOOK IV] [5985] the nature of health and disease, it becomes defined, and is hence called
[BOOK IV] [5990] Would you not say that thirst is one of these essentially relative terms,
[BOOK IV] [5993] Yes, thirst is relative to drink.
[BOOK IV] [5995] And a certain kind of thirst is relative to a certain kind of drink; but
[BOOK IV] [5996] thirst taken alone is neither of much nor little, nor of good nor bad, nor
[BOOK IV] [6001] Then the soul of the thirsty one, in so far as he is thirsty, desires only
[BOOK IV] [6004] That is plain.
[BOOK IV] [6014] at the same time, but what you say is that one hand pushes and the other
[BOOK IV] [6023] And in such a case what is one to say? Would you not say that there was
[BOOK IV] [6025] him, which is other and stronger than the principle which bids him?
[BOOK IV] [6029] And the forbidding principle is derived from reason, and that which bids
[BOOK IV] [6043] soul. And what of passion, or spirit? Is it a third, or akin to one of
[BOOK IV] [6048] Well, I said, there is a story which I remember to have heard, and in which
[BOOK IV] [6049] I put faith. The story is, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, coming up
[BOOK IV] [6059] The moral of the tale is, that anger at times goes to war with desire, as
[BOOK IV] [6062] Yes; that is the meaning, he said.
[BOOK IV] [6065] desires violently prevail over his reason, he reviles himself, and is angry
[BOOK IV] [6066] at the violence within him, and that in this struggle, which is like the
[BOOK IV] [6067] struggle of factions in a State, his spirit is on the side of his reason;--
[BOOK IV] [6069] when reason decides that she should not be opposed, is a sort of thing
[BOOK IV] [6075] Suppose that a man thinks he has done a wrong to another, the nobler he is
[BOOK IV] [6076] the less able is he to feel indignant at any suffering, such as hunger, or
[BOOK IV] [6083] But when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong, then he boils and
[BOOK IV] [6084] chafes, and is on the side of what he believes to be justice; and because
[BOOK IV] [6085] he suffers hunger or cold or other pain he is only the more determined to
[BOOK IV] [6087] either slays or is slain; or until he hears the voice of the shepherd, that
[BOOK IV] [6088] is, reason, bidding his dog bark no more.
[BOOK IV] [6090] The illustration is perfect, he replied; and in our State, as we were
[BOOK IV] [6094] I perceive, I said, that you quite understand me; there is, however, a
[BOOK IV] [6101] the soul spirit is arrayed on the side of the rational principle.
[BOOK IV] [6105] But a further question arises: Is passion different from reason also, or
[BOOK IV] [6110] which is passion or spirit, and when not corrupted by bad education is the
[BOOK IV] [6118] But that is easily proved:--We may observe even in young children that they
[BOOK IV] [6123] is a further proof of the truth of what you are saying. And we may once
[BOOK IV] [6129] the better and worse to be different from the unreasoning anger which is
[BOOK IV] [6140] Must we not then infer that the individual is wise in the same way, and in
[BOOK IV] [6152] which the State is just?
[BOOK IV] [6166] And ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and has the care of
[BOOK IV] [6181] is the largest part of the soul and by nature most insatiable of gain; over
[BOOK IV] [6196] And he is to be deemed courageous whose spirit retains in pleasure and in
[BOOK IV] [6203] of what is for the interest of each of the three parts and of the whole?
[BOOK IV] [6207] And would you not say that he is temperate who has these same elements in
[BOOK IV] [6212] Certainly, he said, that is the true account of temperance whether in the
[BOOK IV] [6218] That is very certain.
[BOOK IV] [6220] And is justice dimmer in the individual, and is her form different, or is
[BOOK IV] [6223] There is no difference in my opinion, he said.
[BOOK IV] [6225] Because, if any doubt is still lingering in our minds, a few commonplace
[BOOK IV] [6230] If the case is put to us, must we not admit that the just State, or the man
[BOOK IV] [6231] who is trained in the principles of such a State, will be less likely than
[BOOK IV] [6251] And the reason is that each part of him is doing its own business, whether
[BOOK IV] [6257] states is justice, or do you hope to discover some other?
[BOOK IV] [6274] however, not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is the true
[BOOK IV] [6277] work of others,--he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master
[BOOK IV] [6281] he has bound all these together, and is no longer many, but has become one
[BOOK IV] [6309] against the whole, an assertion of unlawful authority, which is made by a
[BOOK IV] [6310] rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom he is the natural
[BOOK IV] [6311] vassal,--what is all this confusion and delusion but injustice, and
[BOOK IV] [6327] Why, I said, that which is healthy causes health, and that which is
[BOOK IV] [6334] That is certain.
[BOOK IV] [6336] And the creation of health is the institution of a natural order and
[BOOK IV] [6338] disease is the production of a state of things at variance with this
[BOOK IV] [6343] And is not the creation of justice the institution of a natural order and
[BOOK IV] [6350] Then virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, and vice
[BOOK IV] [6360] injustice has not been answered: Which is the more profitable, to be just
[BOOK IV] [6365] that, when the bodily constitution is gone, life is no longer endurable,
[BOOK IV] [6368] principle is undermined and corrupted, life is still worth having to a man,
[BOOK IV] [6370] that he is not to acquire justice and virtue, or to escape from injustice
[BOOK IV] [6373] Yes, I said, the question is, as you say, ridiculous. Still, as we are
[BOOK IV] [6385] some tower of speculation, a man may look down and see that virtue is one,
[BOOK IV] [6400] The first, I said, is that which we have been describing, and which may be
[BOOK IV] [6401] said to have two names, monarchy and aristocracy, accordingly as rule is
[BOOK IV] [6407] government is in the hands of one or many, if the governors have been
[BOOK IV] [6411] That is true, he replied.
[BOOK V] [6416] Such is the good and true City or State, and the good and true man is of
[BOOK V] [6417] the same pattern; and if this is right every other is wrong; and the evil
[BOOK V] [6418] is one which affects not only the ordering of the State, but also the
[BOOK V] [6419] regulation of the individual soul, and is exhibited in four forms.
[BOOK V] [6433] Who is it, I said, whom you are refusing to let off?
[BOOK V] [6440] whole chapter which is a very important part of the story; and you fancy
[BOOK V] [6447] Yes, he said; but what is right in this particular case, like everything
[BOOK V] [6452] when they have arrived, and, in general, what is the nature of this
[BOOK V] [6455] on the State for good or for evil. And now, since the question is still
[BOOK V] [6477] Yes, Socrates, said Glaucon, and the whole of life is the only limit which
[BOOK V] [6480] of community of women and children is this which is to prevail among our
[BOOK V] [6485] Yes, my simple friend, but the answer is the reverse of easy; many more
[BOOK V] [6487] practicability of what is said may be doubted; and looked at in another
[BOOK V] [6489] best, is also doubtful. Hence I feel a reluctance to approach the subject,
[BOOK V] [6505] you are yourself only a hesitating enquirer, which is my condition, is a
[BOOK V] [6506] dangerous and slippery thing; and the danger is not that I shall be laughed
[BOOK V] [6511] homicide is a less crime than to be a deceiver about beauty or goodness or
[BOOK V] [6512] justice in the matter of laws. And that is a risk which I would rather run
[BOOK V] [6521] Well, I said, the law says that when a man is acquitted he is free from
[BOOK V] [6534] children is to follow the path on which we originally started, when we said
[BOOK V] [6550] is labour enough for them?
[BOOK V] [6552] No, he said, they share alike; the only difference between them is that the
[BOOK V] [6572] That is the inference, I suppose.
[BOOK V] [6599] which is still generally received among the barbarians, that the sight of a
[BOOK V] [6615] First, then, whether the question is to be put in jest or in earnest, let
[BOOK V] [6616] us come to an understanding about the nature of woman: Is she capable of
[BOOK V] [6618] And is the art of war one of those arts in which she can or can not share?
[BOOK V] [6642] That is not an easy question to answer when asked suddenly; and I shall and
[BOOK V] [6649] By Zeus, he said, the problem to be solved is anything but easy.
[BOOK V] [6651] Why yes, I said, but the fact is that when a man is out of his depth,
[BOOK V] [6665] --that different natures ought to have the same pursuits,--this is the
[BOOK V] [6666] inconsistency which is charged upon us.
[BOOK V] [6670] Verily, Glaucon, I said, glorious is the power of the art of contradiction!
[BOOK V] [6675] When he thinks that he is reasoning he is really disputing, just because he
[BOOK V] [6676] cannot define and divide, and so know that of which he is speaking; and he
[BOOK V] [6680] Yes, he replied, such is very often the case; but what has that to do with
[BOOK V] [6683] A great deal; for there is certainly a danger of our getting
[BOOK V] [6697] whether there is not an opposition in nature between bald men and hairy
[BOOK V] [6698] men; and if this is admitted by us, then, if bald men are cobblers, we
[BOOK V] [6706] which the individual is engaged; we should have argued, for example, that a
[BOOK V] [6707] physician and one who is in mind a physician may be said to have the same
[BOOK V] [6732] on the instant is not easy; but after a little reflection there is no
[BOOK V] [6738] we may hope to show him that there is nothing peculiar in the constitution
[BOOK V] [6748] again, did you mean, that the one has a body which is a good servant to his
[BOOK V] [6749] mind, while the body of the other is a hindrance to him?--would not these
[BOOK V] [6751] the one who is ungifted?
[BOOK V] [6759] and in which for her to be beaten by a man is of all things the most
[BOOK V] [6764] men, yet on the whole what you say is true.
[BOOK V] [6766] And if so, my friend, I said, there is no special faculty of administration
[BOOK V] [6767] in a state which a woman has because she is a woman, or which a man has by
[BOOK V] [6770] woman is inferior to a man.
[BOOK V] [6778] One woman has a gift of healing, another not; one is a musician, and
[BOOK V] [6784] is unwarlike and hates gymnastics?
[BOOK V] [6788] And one woman is a philosopher, and another is an enemy of philosophy; one
[BOOK V] [6789] has spirit, and another is without spirit?
[BOOK V] [6791] That is also true.
[BOOK V] [6814] Then, as we were saying before, there is nothing unnatural in assigning
[BOOK V] [6822] at present, is in reality a violation of nature.
[BOOK V] [6840] will make a woman a good guardian; for their original nature is the same?
[BOOK V] [6846] What is it?
[BOOK V] [6848] Would you say that all men are equal in excellence, or is one man better
[BOOK V] [6873] And this is what the arts of music and gymnastic, when present in such
[BOOK V] [6888] exercising their bodies from the best of motives, in his laughter he is
[BOOK V] [6893] and he himself is ignorant of what he is laughing at, or what he is about;
[BOOK V] [6894] --for that is, and ever will be, the best of sayings, That the useful is
[BOOK V] [6895] the noble and the hurtful is the base.
[BOOK V] [6899] Here, then, is one difficulty in our law about women, which we may say that
[BOOK V] [6907] Yes, I said, but a greater is coming; you will not think much of this when
[BOOK V] [6912] The law, I said, which is the sequel of this and of all that has preceded,
[BOOK V] [6913] is to the following effect,--'that the wives of our guardians are to be
[BOOK V] [6914] common, and their children are to be common, and no parent is to know his
[BOOK V] [6917] Yes, he said, that is a much greater wave than the other; and the
[BOOK V] [6921] utility of having wives and children in common; the possibility is quite
[BOOK V] [6930] But that little attempt is detected, and therefore you will please to give
[BOOK V] [6936] means of effecting their wishes--that is a matter which never troubles
[BOOK V] [6938] possibilities; but assuming that what they desire is already granted to
[BOOK V] [6940] to do when their wish has come true--that is a way which they have of not
[BOOK V] [6959] That is right, he said.
[BOOK V] [6967] natures to have intercourse with each other--necessity is not too strong a
[BOOK V] [6971] which lovers know, and which is far more convincing and constraining to the
[BOOK V] [6975] orderly fashion; in a city of the blessed, licentiousness is an unholy
[BOOK V] [6981] degree, and what is most beneficial will be deemed sacred?
[BOOK V] [6985] And how can marriages be made most beneficial?--that is a question which I
[BOOK V] [7024] practitioner is deemed to be good enough; but when medicine has to be
[BOOK V] [7027] That is quite true, he said; but to what are you alluding?
[BOOK V] [7044] offspring of the one sort of union, but not of the other, if the flock is
[BOOK V] [7053] hymeneal songs composed by our poets: the number of weddings is a matter
[BOOK V] [7057] similar agencies, in order as far as this is possible to prevent the State
[BOOK V] [7086] Yes, he said, that must be done if the breed of the guardians is to be kept
[BOOK V] [7105] And what is the prime of life? May it not be defined as a period of about
[BOOK V] [7120] child of which he is the father, if it steals into life, will have been
[BOOK V] [7131] sanction of the rulers; for we shall say that he is raising up a bastard to
[BOOK V] [7147] That also, he said, is a reasonable proposition. But how will they know
[BOOK V] [7158] inter-marry. This, however, is not to be understood as an absolute
[BOOK V] [7165] Such is the scheme, Glaucon, according to which the guardians of our State
[BOOK V] [7167] argument show that this community is consistent with the rest of our
[BOOK V] [7174] State,--what is the greatest good, and what is the greatest evil, and then
[BOOK V] [7185] And there is unity where there is community of pleasures and pains--where
[BOOK V] [7191] Yes; and where there is no common but only private feeling a State is
[BOOK V] [7202] And is not that the best-ordered State in which the greatest number of
[BOOK V] [7209] individual--as in the body, when but a finger of one of us is hurt, the
[BOOK V] [7213] and the same expression is used about any other part of the body, which has
[BOOK V] [7218] there is the nearest approach to this common feeling which you describe.
[BOOK V] [7224] Yes, he said, that is what will happen in a well-ordered State.
[BOOK V] [7227] this or some other form is most in accordance with these fundamental
[BOOK V] [7240] But is there not another name which people give to their rulers in other
[BOOK V] [7290] law commands; and is the violator of these duties to be regarded as an
[BOOK V] [7291] impious and unrighteous person who is not likely to receive much good
[BOOK V] [7302] heard than in any other. As I was describing before, when any one is well
[BOOK V] [7303] or ill, the universal word will be 'with me it is well' or 'it is ill.'
[BOOK V] [7330] Then the community of wives and children among our citizens is clearly the
[BOOK V] [7349] they are all of one opinion about what is near and dear to them, and
[BOOK V] [7366] That is good, he said.
[BOOK V] [7368] Yes; and there is a further good in the law; viz. that if a man has a
[BOOK V] [7386] That is true, he replied.
[BOOK V] [7415] The Olympic victor, I said, is deemed happy in receiving a part only of the
[BOOK V] [7416] blessedness which is secured to our citizens, who have won a more glorious
[BOOK V] [7418] victory which they have won is the salvation of the whole State; and the
[BOOK V] [7419] crown with which they and their children are crowned is the fulness of all
[BOOK V] [7435] And what do you say, now that the life of our protectors is made out to be
[BOOK V] [7436] far better and nobler than that of Olympic victors--is the life of
[BOOK V] [7444] cease to be a guardian, and is not content with this safe and harmonious
[BOOK V] [7445] life, which, in our judgment, is of all lives the best, but infatuated by
[BOOK V] [7448] wisely Hesiod spoke, when he said, 'half is more than the whole.'
[BOOK V] [7458] share with the men? And in so doing they will do what is best, and will
[BOOK V] [7469] There is no difficulty, I said, in seeing how war will be carried on by
[BOOK V] [7488] The idea is ridiculous, he said.
[BOOK V] [7490] There is also the effect on the parents, with whom, as with other animals,
[BOOK V] [7493] That is quite true, Socrates; and yet if they are defeated, which may often
[BOOK V] [7494] happen in war, how great the danger is! the children will be lost as well
[BOOK V] [7507] is a very important matter, for the sake of which some risk may fairly be
[BOOK V] [7534] Still, the dangers of war cannot be always foreseen; there is a good deal
[BOOK V] [7548] what is hereafter to be their own business; and if there is danger they
[BOOK V] [7555] soldier who leaves his rank or throws away his arms, or is guilty of any
[BOOK V] [7562] present of to his enemies; he is their lawful prey, and let them do what
[BOOK V] [7580] What is your proposal?
[BOOK V] [7589] Capital, I said. That the brave man is to have more wives than others has
[BOOK V] [7590] been already determined: and he is to have first choices in such matters
[BOOK V] [7595] Again, there is another manner in which, according to Homer, brave youths
[BOOK V] [7612] That, he replied, is excellent.
[BOOK V] [7615] first place, that he is of the golden race?
[BOOK V] [7628] heroic personages, and what is to be their special distinction; and we must
[BOOK V] [7638] That is very right, he said.
[BOOK V] [7647] which there is that the whole race may one day fall under the yoke of the
[BOOK V] [7650] To spare them is infinitely better.
[BOOK V] [7652] Then no Hellene should be owned by them as a slave; that is a rule which
[BOOK V] [7666] And is there not illiberality and avarice in robbing a corpse, and also a
[BOOK V] [7669] him,--is not this rather like a dog who cannot get at his assailant,
[BOOK V] [7686] houses, what is to be the practice?
[BOOK V] [7695] Why, you see, there is a difference in the names 'discord' and 'war,' and I
[BOOK V] [7696] imagine that there is also a difference in their natures; the one is
[BOOK V] [7697] expressive of what is internal and domestic, the other of what is external
[BOOK V] [7698] and foreign; and the first of the two is termed discord, and only the
[BOOK V] [7701] That is a very proper distinction, he replied.
[BOOK V] [7703] And may I not observe with equal propriety that the Hellenic race is all
[BOOK V] [7712] when Hellenes fight with one another we shall say that Hellas is then in a
[BOOK V] [7714] enmity is to be called discord.
[BOOK V] [7719] occurs, and a city is divided, if both parties destroy the lands and burn
[BOOK V] [7726] Yes, he said, that is a better temper than the other.
[BOOK V] [7742] discord only--a quarrel among friends, which is not to be called a war?
[BOOK V] [7758] that the guilt of war is always confined to a few persons and that the many
[BOOK V] [7775] of this discussion you thrust aside:--Is such an order of things possible,
[BOOK V] [7793] seem not to be aware that you are now bringing upon me the third, which is
[BOOK V] [7800] are we that you shall tell us how such a State is possible: speak out and
[BOOK V] [7811] higher degree of justice than is to be found in other men?
[BOOK V] [7834] And is our theory a worse theory because we are unable to prove the
[BOOK V] [7839] That is the truth, I said. But if, at your request, I am to try and show
[BOOK V] [7840] how and under what conditions the possibility is highest, I must ask you,
[BOOK V] [7860] Let me next endeavour to show what is that fault in States which is the
[BOOK V] [7861] cause of their present maladministration, and what is the least change
[BOOK V] [7869] change were made, which is not a slight or easy though still a possible
[BOOK V] [7872] What is it? he said.
[BOOK V] [7888] no other State can there be happiness private or public is indeed a hard
[BOOK V] [7892] you have uttered is one at which numerous persons, and very respectable
[BOOK V] [7903] able to fit answers to your questions better than another--that is all.
[BOOK V] [7908] I think that, if there is to be a chance of our escaping, we must explain
[BOOK V] [7923] lover, if he is worthy of the name, ought to show his love, not to some one
[BOOK V] [7931] thought by him to be worthy of his affectionate regards. Is not this a way
[BOOK V] [7934] he who is neither snub nor hooked has the grace of regularity: the dark
[BOOK V] [7935] visage is manly, the fair are children of the gods; and as to the sweet
[BOOK V] [7936] 'honey pale,' as they are called, what is the very name but the invention
[BOOK V] [7937] of a lover who talks in diminutives, and is not averse to paleness if
[BOOK V] [7938] appearing on the cheek of youth? In a word, there is no excuse which you
[BOOK V] [7950] And the same is true of ambitious men; if they cannot command an army, they
[BOOK V] [7962] And may we not say of the philosopher that he is a lover, not of a part of
[BOOK V] [7968] judging what is good and what is not, such an one we maintain not to be a
[BOOK V] [7969] philosopher or a lover of knowledge, just as he who refuses his food is not
[BOOK V] [7974] Whereas he who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and who is curious
[BOOK V] [7975] to learn and is never satisfied, may be justly termed a philosopher? Am I
[BOOK V] [7985] the performance is in town or country--that makes no difference--they are
[BOOK V] [7995] That is also good, he said; but I should like to know what you mean?
[BOOK V] [8000] What is the proposition?
[BOOK V] [8002] That since beauty is the opposite of ugliness, they are two?
[BOOK V] [8006] And inasmuch as they are two, each of them is one?
[BOOK V] [8011] remark holds: taken singly, each of them is one; but from the various
[BOOK V] [8017] And this is the distinction which I draw between the sight-loving,
[BOOK V] [8025] made out of them, but their mind is incapable of seeing or loving absolute
[BOOK V] [8035] beauty, or who, if another lead him to a knowledge of that beauty is unable
[BOOK V] [8036] to follow--of such an one I ask, Is he awake or in a dream only? Reflect:
[BOOK V] [8037] is not the dreamer, sleeping or waking, one who likens dissimilar things,
[BOOK V] [8043] beauty and is able to distinguish the idea from the objects which
[BOOK V] [8045] idea nor the idea in the place of the objects--is he a dreamer, or is he
[BOOK V] [8048] He is wide awake.
[BOOK V] [8057] revealing to him that there is sad disorder in his wits?
[BOOK V] [8062] assuring him that he is welcome to any knowledge which he may have, and
[BOOK V] [8069] Something that is or is not?
[BOOK V] [8071] Something that is; for how can that which is not ever be known?
[BOOK V] [8074] that absolute being is or may be absolutely known, but that the utterly
[BOOK V] [8075] non-existent is utterly unknown?
[BOOK V] [8079] Good. But if there be anything which is of such a nature as to be and not
[BOOK V] [8105] And knowledge is relative to being and knows being. But before I proceed
[BOOK V] [8128] that knowledge is a faculty, or in what class would you place it?
[BOOK V] [8130] Certainly knowledge is a faculty, and the mightiest of all faculties.
[BOOK V] [8132] And is opinion also a faculty?
[BOOK V] [8134] Certainly, he said; for opinion is that with which we are able to form an
[BOOK V] [8137] And yet you were acknowledging a little while ago that knowledge is not the
[BOOK V] [8141] is infallible with that which errs?
[BOOK V] [8151] That is certain.
[BOOK V] [8153] Being is the sphere or subject-matter of knowledge, and knowledge is to
[BOOK V] [8158] And opinion is to have an opinion?
[BOOK V] [8162] And do we know what we opine? or is the subject-matter of opinion the same
[BOOK V] [8170] Then if being is the subject-matter of knowledge, something else must be
[BOOK V] [8175] Well then, is not-being the subject-matter of opinion? or, rather, how can
[BOOK V] [8178] which is an opinion about nothing?
[BOOK V] [8186] And not-being is not one thing but, properly speaking, nothing?
[BOOK V] [8195] Then opinion is not concerned either with being or with not-being?
[BOOK V] [8203] But is opinion to be sought without and beyond either of them, in a greater
[BOOK V] [8217] Then you would infer that opinion is intermediate?
[BOOK V] [8222] which is and is not at the same time, that sort of thing would appear also
[BOOK V] [8224] the corresponding faculty is neither knowledge nor ignorance, but will be
[BOOK V] [8234] Then what remains to be discovered is the object which partakes equally of
[BOOK V] [8242] This being premised, I would ask the gentleman who is of opinion that there
[BOOK V] [8243] is no absolute or unchangeable idea of beauty--in whose opinion the
[BOOK V] [8244] beautiful is the manifold--he, I say, your lover of beautiful sights, who
[BOOK V] [8245] cannot bear to be told that the beautiful is one, and the just is one, or
[BOOK V] [8246] that anything is one--to him I would appeal, saying, Will you be so very
[BOOK V] [8247] kind, sir, as to tell us whether, of all these beautiful things, there is
[BOOK V] [8252] the same is true of the rest.
[BOOK V] [8254] And may not the many which are doubles be also halves?--doubles, that is,
[BOOK V] [8278] That is quite true, he said.
[BOOK V] [8282] tossing about in some region which is half-way between pure being and pure
[BOOK V] [8289] knowledge; being the intermediate flux which is caught and detained by the
[BOOK V] [8299] That is certain.
[BOOK V] [8317] I shall tell them not to be angry; no man should be angry at what is true.
[BOOK VI] [8338] And what is the next question? he asked.
[BOOK VI] [8352] Neither, I said, can there be any question that the guardian who is to keep
[BOOK VI] [8383] that such an union of qualities is possible, and that those in whom they
[BOOK VI] [8395] there is no part whether greater or less, or more or less honourable, which
[BOOK VI] [8401] And if they are to be what we were describing, is there not another quality
[BOOK VI] [8407] falsehood, which is their detestation, and they will love the truth.
[BOOK VI] [8411] 'May be,' my friend, I replied, is not the word; say rather 'must be
[BOOK VI] [8412] affirmed:' for he whose nature is amorous of anything cannot help loving
[BOOK VI] [8413] all that belongs or is akin to the object of his affections.
[BOOK VI] [8417] And is there anything more akin to wisdom than truth?
[BOOK VI] [8440] That is most certain.
[BOOK VI] [8442] Such an one is sure to be temperate and the reverse of covetous; for the
[BOOK VI] [8450] What is that?
[BOOK VI] [8453] antagonistic than meanness to a soul which is ever longing after the whole
[BOOK VI] [8458] Then how can he who has magnificence of mind and is the spectator of all
[BOOK VI] [8471] Or again: can he who is harmoniously constituted, who is not covetous or
[BOOK VI] [8477] Then you will soon observe whether a man is just and gentle, or rude and
[BOOK VI] [8483] There is another point which should be remarked.
[BOOK VI] [8493] And again, if he is forgetful and retains nothing of what he learns, will
[BOOK VI] [8496] That is certain.
[BOOK VI] [8522] together, and are they not, in a manner, necessary to a soul, which is to
[BOOK VI] [8528] gift of a good memory, and is quick to learn,--noble, gracious, the friend
[BOOK VI] [8547] and yet all the time they are in the right. The observation is suggested
[BOOK VI] [8548] to me by what is now occurring. For any one of us might say, that although
[BOOK VI] [8549] in words he is not able to meet you at each step of the argument, he sees
[BOOK VI] [8558] I cannot tell, he replied; but I should like to know what is your opinion.
[BOOK VI] [8569] Yes, Socrates; and that is a way of speaking to which you are not at all
[BOOK VI] [8575] which the best men are treated in their own States is so grievous that no
[BOOK VI] [8576] single thing on earth is comparable to it; and therefore, if I am to plead
[BOOK VI] [8579] are found in pictures. Imagine then a fleet or a ship in which there is a
[BOOK VI] [8580] captain who is taller and stronger than any of the crew, but he is a little
[BOOK VI] [8582] is not much better. The sailors are quarrelling with one another about the
[BOOK VI] [8583] steering--every one is of opinion that he has a right to steer, though he
[BOOK VI] [8593] of them. Him who is their partisan and cleverly aids them in their plot
[BOOK VI] [8615] Then suppose you now take this parable to the gentleman who is surprised at
[BOOK VI] [8623] to the rest of the world, he is right; but also tell him to attribute their
[BOOK VI] [8626] him--that is not the order of nature; neither are 'the wise to go to the
[BOOK VI] [8628] truth is, that, when a man is ill, whether he be rich or poor, to the
[BOOK VI] [8629] physician he must go, and he who wants to be governed, to him who is able
[BOOK VI] [8630] to govern. The ruler who is good for anything ought not to beg his
[BOOK VI] [8639] pursuit of all, is not likely to be much esteemed by those of the opposite
[BOOK VI] [8640] faction; not that the greatest and most lasting injury is done to her by
[BOOK VI] [8651] Then shall we proceed to show that the corruption of the majority is also
[BOOK VI] [8652] unavoidable, and that this is not to be laid to the charge of philosophy
[BOOK VI] [8664] Well, and is not this one quality, to mention no others, greatly at
[BOOK VI] [8670] knowledge is always striving after being--that is his nature; he will not
[BOOK VI] [8671] rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is an appearance only, but
[BOOK VI] [8686] And when truth is the captain, we cannot suspect any evil of the band which
[BOOK VI] [8696] Neither is there any reason why I should again set in array the
[BOOK VI] [8713] who aspire after a profession which is above them and of which they are
[BOOK VI] [8722] philosopher, is a rare plant which is seldom seen among men.
[BOOK VI] [8732] is a most singular circumstance) destroys and distracts from philosophy the
[BOOK VI] [8733] soul which is the possessor of them.
[BOOK VI] [8735] That is very singular, he replied.
[BOOK VI] [8753] suitable environment, for evil is a greater enemy to what is good than to
[BOOK VI] [8754] what is not.
[BOOK VI] [8758] There is reason in supposing that the finest natures, when under alien
[BOOK VI] [8759] conditions, receive more injury than the inferior, because the contrast is
[BOOK VI] [8772] And our philosopher follows the same analogy--he is like a plant which,
[BOOK VI] [8782] When is this accomplished? he said.
[BOOK VI] [8786] there is a great uproar, and they praise some things which are being said
[BOOK VI] [8798] And yet, I said, there is a still greater necessity, which has not been
[BOOK VI] [8801] What is that?
[BOOK VI] [8814] No, indeed, I said, even to make the attempt is a great piece of folly;
[BOOK VI] [8815] there neither is, nor has been, nor is ever likely to be, any different
[BOOK VI] [8817] is supplied by public opinion--I speak, my friend, of human virtue only;
[BOOK VI] [8818] what is more than human, as the proverb says, is not included: for I would
[BOOK VI] [8820] whatever is saved and comes to good is saved by the power of God, as we may
[BOOK VI] [8831] opinion of the many, that is to say, the opinions of their assemblies; and
[BOOK VI] [8832] this is their wisdom. I might compare them to a man who should study the
[BOOK VI] [8833] tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast who is fed by him--he would
[BOOK VI] [8835] causes he is dangerous or the reverse, and what is the meaning of his
[BOOK VI] [8836] several cries, and by what sounds, when another utters them, he is soothed
[BOOK VI] [8841] passions of which he is speaking, but calls this honourable and that
[BOOK VI] [8847] others the nature of either, or the difference between them, which is
[BOOK VI] [8852] And in what way does he who thinks that wisdom is the discernment of the
[BOOK VI] [8857] judges when he is not obliged, the so-called necessity of Diomede will
[BOOK VI] [8883] That is evident.
[BOOK VI] [8908] And what will a man such as he is be likely to do under such circumstances,
[BOOK VI] [8917] Now, when he is in this state of mind, if some one gently comes to him and
[BOOK VI] [8918] tells him that he is a fool and must get understanding, which can only be
[BOOK VI] [8925] reasonableness has had his eyes opened a little and is humbled and taken
[BOOK VI] [8934] And how can one who is thus circumstanced ever become a philosopher?
[BOOK VI] [8945] Thus, my excellent friend, is brought about all that ruin and failure which
[BOOK VI] [8953] That is most true, he said.
[BOOK VI] [8955] And so philosophy is left desolate, with her marriage rite incomplete: for
[BOOK VI] [8963] That is certainly what people say.
[BOOK VI] [8971] about her which is not to be found in the arts. And many are thus
[BOOK VI] [8974] crafts. Is not this unavoidable?
[BOOK VI] [8980] and is decked out as a bridegroom going to marry his master's daughter, who
[BOOK VI] [8981] is left poor and desolate?
[BOOK VI] [8991] an alliance with her who is in a rank above them what sort of ideas and
[BOOK VI] [9007] is hardly worth mentioning, for rarely, if ever, has such a monitor been
[BOOK VI] [9009] how sweet and blessed a possession philosophy is, and have also seen enough
[BOOK VI] [9010] of the madness of the multitude; and they know that no politician is
[BOOK VI] [9011] honest, nor is there any champion of justice at whose side they may fight
[BOOK VI] [9014] is he able singly to resist all their fierce natures, and therefore seeing
[BOOK VI] [9017] himself or others, he holds his peace, and goes his own way. He is like
[BOOK VI] [9020] full of wickedness, he is content, if only he can live his own life and be
[BOOK VI] [9027] him; for in a State which is suitable to him, he will have a larger growth
[BOOK VI] [9030] The causes why philosophy is in such an evil name have now been
[BOOK VI] [9032] shown--is there anything more which you wish to say?
[BOOK VI] [9035] of the governments now existing is in your opinion the one adapted to her.
[BOOK VI] [9037] Not any of them, I said; and that is precisely the accusation which I bring
[BOOK VI] [9038] against them--not one of them is worthy of the philosophic nature, and
[BOOK VI] [9039] hence that nature is warped and estranged;--as the exotic seed which is
[BOOK VI] [9040] sown in a foreign land becomes denaturalized, and is wont to be overpowered
[BOOK VI] [9043] philosophy ever finds in the State that perfection which she herself is,
[BOOK VI] [9044] then will be seen that she is in truth divine, and that all other things,
[BOOK VI] [9046] that you are going to ask, What that State is:
[BOOK VI] [9049] whether it is the State of which we are the founders and inventors, or some
[BOOK VI] [9061] difficult; and what still remains is the reverse of easy.
[BOOK VI] [9063] What is there remaining?
[BOOK VI] [9066] ruin of the State: All great attempts are attended with risk; 'hard is the
[BOOK VI] [9086] philosophy is not considered by them to be their proper business: at last,
[BOOK VI] [9099] citizens fails and is past civil and military duties, then let them range
[BOOK VI] [9114] You are speaking of a time which is not very near.
[BOOK VI] [9116] Rather, I replied, of a time which is as nothing in comparison with
[BOOK VI] [9121] unity. But a human being who in word and work is perfectly moulded, as far
[BOOK VI] [9131] coldly on the subtleties of controversy, of which the end is opinion and
[BOOK VI] [9150] foreign clime which is far away and beyond our ken, the perfected
[BOOK VI] [9151] philosopher is or has been or hereafter shall be compelled by a superior
[BOOK VI] [9153] that this our constitution has been, and is--yea, and will be whenever the
[BOOK VI] [9154] Muse of Philosophy is queen. There is no impossibility in all this; that
[BOOK VI] [9155] there is a difficulty, we acknowledge ourselves.
[BOOK VI] [9159] But do you mean to say that this is not the opinion of the multitude?
[BOOK VI] [9168] whom you are speaking is not such as they supposed--if they view him in
[BOOK VI] [9170] another strain. Who can be at enmity with one who loves them, who that is
[BOOK VI] [9171] himself gentle and free from envy will be jealous of one in whom there is
[BOOK VI] [9183] It is most unbecoming.
[BOOK VI] [9185] For he, Adeimantus, whose mind is fixed upon true being, has surely no time
[BOOK VI] [9187] envy, contending against men; his eye is ever directed towards things fixed
[BOOK VI] [9208] And if the world perceives that what we are saying about him is the truth,
[BOOK VI] [9210] them that no State can be happy which is not designed by artists who
[BOOK VI] [9218] This is no easy task. But whether easy or not, herein will lie the
[BOOK VI] [9246] rushing at us with might and main, that the painter of constitutions is
[BOOK VI] [9251] Much calmer, if there is any sense in them.
[BOOK VI] [9254] that the philosopher is a lover of truth and being?
[BOOK VI] [9258] Or that his nature, being such as we have delineated, is akin to the
[BOOK VI] [9288] necessity be destroyed; that they can hardly be saved is not denied even by
[BOOK VI] [9294] But, said I, one is enough; let there be one man who has a city obedient to
[BOOK VI] [9296] the world is so incredulous.
[BOOK VI] [9298] Yes, one is enough.
[BOOK VI] [9305] And that others should approve, of what we approve, is no miracle or
[BOOK VI] [9311] only possible, is assuredly for the best.
[BOOK VI] [9316] for the best, but also that the enactment of them, though difficult, is not
[BOOK VI] [9368] immovable when there is anything to be learned; they are always in a torpid
[BOOK VI] [9374] the higher education is to be imparted, and who are to share in any office
[BOOK VI] [9379] And will they be a class which is rarely found?
[BOOK VI] [9384] pleasures which we mentioned before, but there is another kind of probation
[BOOK VI] [9409] were satisfied or not, it is for you to say.
[BOOK VI] [9415] short of the whole truth is not fair measure; for nothing imperfect is the
[BOOK VI] [9428] highest knowledge of all which, as we were just now saying, is his proper
[BOOK VI] [9431] What, he said, is there a knowledge still higher than this--higher than
[BOOK VI] [9434] Yes, I said, there is. And of the virtues too we must behold not the
[BOOK VI] [9442] you what is this highest knowledge?
[BOOK VI] [9447] that the idea of good is the highest knowledge, and that all other things
[BOOK VI] [9452] that the possession of all other things is of any value if we do not
[BOOK VI] [9459] the finer sort of wits say it is knowledge?
[BOOK VI] [9471] term 'good'--this is of course ridiculous.
[BOOK VI] [9485] question is involved.
[BOOK VI] [9490] be what is just and honourable without the reality; but no one is satisfied
[BOOK VI] [9491] with the appearance of good--the reality is what they seek; in the case of
[BOOK VI] [9492] the good, appearance is despised by every one.
[BOOK VI] [9497] actions, having a presentiment that there is such an end, and yet
[BOOK VI] [9499] of this as of other things, and therefore losing whatever good there is in
[BOOK VI] [9501] in our State, to whom everything is entrusted, to be in the darkness of
[BOOK VI] [9508] no one who is ignorant of the good will have a true knowledge of them.
[BOOK VI] [9510] That, he said, is a shrewd suspicion of yours.
[BOOK VI] [9538] And do you wish to behold what is blind and crooked and base, when others
[BOOK VI] [9548] ridicule upon me. No, sweet sirs, let us not at present ask what is the
[BOOK VI] [9549] actual nature of the good, for to reach what is now in my thoughts would be
[BOOK VI] [9550] an effort too great for me. But of the child of the good who is likest
[BOOK VI] [9570] The old story, that there is a many beautiful and a many good, and so of
[BOOK VI] [9572] is applied.
[BOOK VI] [9576] And there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of other things
[BOOK VI] [9577] to which the term 'many' is applied there is an absolute; for they may be
[BOOK VI] [9578] brought under a single idea, which is called the essence of each.
[BOOK VI] [9587] And what is the organ with which we see the visible things?
[BOOK VI] [9596] But have you remarked that sight is by far the most costly and complex
[BOOK VI] [9606] No, indeed, I replied; and the same is true of most, if not all, the other
[BOOK VI] [9611] But you see that without the addition of some other nature there is no
[BOOK VI] [9627] Noble, then, is the bond which links together sight and visibility, and
[BOOK VI] [9628] great beyond other bonds by no small difference of nature; for light is
[BOOK VI] [9629] their bond, and light is no ignoble thing?
[BOOK VI] [9634] element? Whose is that light which makes the eye to see perfectly and the
[BOOK VI] [9643] Neither sight nor the eye in which sight resides is the sun?
[BOOK VI] [9647] Yet of all the organs of sense the eye is the most like the sun?
[BOOK VI] [9651] And the power which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence which is
[BOOK VI] [9656] Then the sun is not sight, but the author of sight who i