[1]
[2] PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Theodorus, Theaetetus.
[3]
[4] Euclid and Terpsion meet in front of Euclid's house in Megara; they enter
[5] the house, and the dialogue is read to them by a servant.
[6]
[7]
[8] EUCLID: Have you only just arrived from the country, Terpsion?
[9]
[10] TERPSION: No, I came some time ago: and I have been in the Agora looking
[11] for you, and wondering that I could not find you.
[12]
[13] EUCLID: But I was not in the city.
[14]
[15] TERPSION: Where then?
[16]
[17] EUCLID: As I was going down to the harbour, I met Theaetetus--he was being
[18] carried up to Athens from the army at Corinth.
[19]
[20] TERPSION: Was he alive or dead?
[21]
[22] EUCLID: He was scarcely alive, for he has been badly wounded; but he was
[23] suffering even more from the sickness which has broken out in the army.
[24]
[25] TERPSION: The dysentery, you mean?
[26]
[27] EUCLID: Yes.
[28]
[29] TERPSION: Alas! what a loss he will be!
[30]
[31] EUCLID: Yes, Terpsion, he is a noble fellow; only to-day I heard some
[32] people highly praising his behaviour in this very battle.
[33]
[34] TERPSION: No wonder; I should rather be surprised at hearing anything else
[35] of him. But why did he go on, instead of stopping at Megara?
[36]
[37] EUCLID: He wanted to get home: although I entreated and advised him to
[38] remain, he would not listen to me; so I set him on his way, and turned
[39] back, and then I remembered what Socrates had said of him, and thought how
[40] remarkably this, like all his predictions, had been fulfilled. I believe
[41] that he had seen him a little before his own death, when Theaetetus was a
[42] youth, and he had a memorable conversation with him, which he repeated to
[43] me when I came to Athens; he was full of admiration of his genius, and said
[44] that he would most certainly be a great man, if he lived.
[45]
[46] TERPSION: The prophecy has certainly been fulfilled; but what was the
[47] conversation? can you tell me?
[48]
[49] EUCLID: No, indeed, not offhand; but I took notes of it as soon as I got
[50] home; these I filled up from memory, writing them out at leisure; and
[51] whenever I went to Athens, I asked Socrates about any point which I had
[52] forgotten, and on my return I made corrections; thus I have nearly the
[53] whole conversation written down.
[54]
[55] TERPSION: I remember--you told me; and I have always been intending to ask
[56] you to show me the writing, but have put off doing so; and now, why should
[57] we not read it through?--having just come from the country, I should
[58] greatly like to rest.
[59]
[60] EUCLID: I too shall be very glad of a rest, for I went with Theaetetus as
[61] far as Erineum. Let us go in, then, and, while we are reposing, the
[62] servant shall read to us.
[63]
[64] TERPSION: Very good.
[65]
[66] EUCLID: Here is the roll, Terpsion; I may observe that I have introduced
[67] Socrates, not as narrating to me, but as actually conversing with the
[68] persons whom he mentioned--these were, Theodorus the geometrician (of
[69] Cyrene), and Theaetetus. I have omitted, for the sake of convenience, the
[70] interlocutory words 'I said,' 'I remarked,' which he used when he spoke of
[71] himself, and again, 'he agreed,' or 'disagreed,' in the answer, lest the
[72] repetition of them should be troublesome.
[73]
[74] TERPSION: Quite right, Euclid.
[75]
[76] EUCLID: And now, boy, you may take the roll and read.
[77]
[78] EUCLID'S SERVANT READS.
[79]
[80] SOCRATES: If I cared enough about the Cyrenians, Theodorus, I would ask
[81] you whether there are any rising geometricians or philosophers in that part
[82] of the world. But I am more interested in our own Athenian youth, and I
[83] would rather know who among them are likely to do well. I observe them as
[84] far as I can myself, and I enquire of any one whom they follow, and I see
[85] that a great many of them follow you, in which they are quite right,
[86] considering your eminence in geometry and in other ways. Tell me then, if
[87] you have met with any one who is good for anything.
[88]
[89] THEODORUS: Yes, Socrates, I have become acquainted with one very
[90] remarkable Athenian youth, whom I commend to you as well worthy of your
[91] attention. If he had been a beauty I should have been afraid to praise
[92] him, lest you should suppose that I was in love with him; but he is no
[93] beauty, and you must not be offended if I say that he is very like you; for
[94] he has a snub nose and projecting eyes, although these features are less
[95] marked in him than in you. Seeing, then, that he has no personal
[96] attractions, I may freely say, that in all my acquaintance, which is very
[97] large, I never knew any one who was his equal in natural gifts: for he has
[98] a quickness of apprehension which is almost unrivalled, and he is
[99] exceedingly gentle, and also the most courageous of men; there is a union
[100] of qualities in him such as I have never seen in any other, and should
[101] scarcely have thought possible; for those who, like him, have quick and
[102] ready and retentive wits, have generally also quick tempers; they are ships
[103] without ballast, and go darting about, and are mad rather than courageous;
[104] and the steadier sort, when they have to face study, prove stupid and
[105] cannot remember. Whereas he moves surely and smoothly and successfully in
[106] the path of knowledge and enquiry; and he is full of gentleness, flowing on
[107] silently like a river of oil; at his age, it is wonderful.
[108]
[109] SOCRATES: That is good news; whose son is he?
[110]
[111] THEODORUS: The name of his father I have forgotten, but the youth himself
[112] is the middle one of those who are approaching us; he and his companions
[113] have been anointing themselves in the outer court, and now they seem to
[114] have finished, and are coming towards us. Look and see whether you know
[115] him.
[116]
[117] SOCRATES: I know the youth, but I do not know his name; he is the son of
[118] Euphronius the Sunian, who was himself an eminent man, and such another as
[119] his son is, according to your account of him; I believe that he left a
[120] considerable fortune.
[121]
[122] THEODORUS: Theaetetus, Socrates, is his name; but I rather think that the
[123] property disappeared in the hands of trustees; notwithstanding which he is
[124] wonderfully liberal.
[125]
[126] SOCRATES: He must be a fine fellow; tell him to come and sit by me.
[127]
[128] THEODORUS: I will. Come hither, Theaetetus, and sit by Socrates.
[129]
[130] SOCRATES: By all means, Theaetetus, in order that I may see the reflection
[131] of myself in your face, for Theodorus says that we are alike; and yet if
[132] each of us held in his hands a lyre, and he said that they were tuned
[133] alike, should we at once take his word, or should we ask whether he who
[134] said so was or was not a musician?
[135]
[136] THEAETETUS: We should ask.
[137]
[138] SOCRATES: And if we found that he was, we should take his word; and if
[139] not, not?
[140]
[141] THEAETETUS: True.
[142]
[143] SOCRATES: And if this supposed likeness of our faces is a matter of any
[144] interest to us, we should enquire whether he who says that we are alike is
[145] a painter or not?
[146]
[147] THEAETETUS: Certainly we should.
[148]
[149] SOCRATES: And is Theodorus a painter?
[150]
[151] THEAETETUS: I never heard that he was.
[152]
[153] SOCRATES: Is he a geometrician?
[154]
[155] THEAETETUS: Of course he is, Socrates.
[156]
[157] SOCRATES: And is he an astronomer and calculator and musician, and in
[158] general an educated man?
[159]
[160] THEAETETUS: I think so.
[161]
[162] SOCRATES: If, then, he remarks on a similarity in our persons, either by
[163] way of praise or blame, there is no particular reason why we should attend
[164] to him.
[165]
[166] THEAETETUS: I should say not.
[167]
[168] SOCRATES: But if he praises the virtue or wisdom which are the mental
[169] endowments of either of us, then he who hears the praises will naturally
[170] desire to examine him who is praised: and he again should be willing to
[171] exhibit himself.
[172]
[173] THEAETETUS: Very true, Socrates.
[174]
[175] SOCRATES: Then now is the time, my dear Theaetetus, for me to examine, and
[176] for you to exhibit; since although Theodorus has praised many a citizen and
[177] stranger in my hearing, never did I hear him praise any one as he has been
[178] praising you.
[179]
[180] THEAETETUS: I am glad to hear it, Socrates; but what if he was only in
[181] jest?
[182]
[183] SOCRATES: Nay, Theodorus is not given to jesting; and I cannot allow you
[184] to retract your consent on any such pretence as that. If you do, he will
[185] have to swear to his words; and we are perfectly sure that no one will be
[186] found to impugn him. Do not be shy then, but stand to your word.
[187]
[188] THEAETETUS: I suppose I must, if you wish it.
[189]
[190] SOCRATES: In the first place, I should like to ask what you learn of
[191] Theodorus: something of geometry, perhaps?
[192]
[193] THEAETETUS: Yes.
[194]
[195] SOCRATES: And astronomy and harmony and calculation?
[196]
[197] THEAETETUS: I do my best.
[198]
[199] SOCRATES: Yes, my boy, and so do I; and my desire is to learn of him, or
[200] of anybody who seems to understand these things. And I get on pretty well
[201] in general; but there is a little difficulty which I want you and the
[202] company to aid me in investigating. Will you answer me a question: 'Is
[203] not learning growing wiser about that which you learn?'
[204]
[205] THEAETETUS: Of course.
[206]
[207] SOCRATES: And by wisdom the wise are wise?
[208]
[209] THEAETETUS: Yes.
[210]
[211] SOCRATES: And is that different in any way from knowledge?
[212]
[213] THEAETETUS: What?
[214]
[215] SOCRATES: Wisdom; are not men wise in that which they know?
[216]
[217] THEAETETUS: Certainly they are.
[218]
[219] SOCRATES: Then wisdom and knowledge are the same?
[220]
[221] THEAETETUS: Yes.
[222]
[223] SOCRATES: Herein lies the difficulty which I can never solve to my
[224] satisfaction--What is knowledge? Can we answer that question? What say
[225] you? which of us will speak first? whoever misses shall sit down, as at a
[226] game of ball, and shall be donkey, as the boys say; he who lasts out his
[227] competitors in the game without missing, shall be our king, and shall have
[228] the right of putting to us any questions which he pleases...Why is there no
[229] reply? I hope, Theodorus, that I am not betrayed into rudeness by my love
[230] of conversation? I only want to make us talk and be friendly and sociable.
[231]
[232] THEODORUS: The reverse of rudeness, Socrates: but I would rather that you
[233] would ask one of the young fellows; for the truth is, that I am unused to
[234] your game of question and answer, and I am too old to learn; the young will
[235] be more suitable, and they will improve more than I shall, for youth is
[236] always able to improve. And so having made a beginning with Theaetetus, I
[237] would advise you to go on with him and not let him off.
[238]
[239] SOCRATES: Do you hear, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says? The philosopher,
[240] whom you would not like to disobey, and whose word ought to be a command to
[241] a young man, bids me interrogate you. Take courage, then, and nobly say
[242] what you think that knowledge is.
[243]
[244] THEAETETUS: Well, Socrates, I will answer as you and he bid me; and if I
[245] make a mistake, you will doubtless correct me.
[246]
[247] SOCRATES: We will, if we can.
[248]
[249] THEAETETUS: Then, I think that the sciences which I learn from Theodorus--
[250] geometry, and those which you just now mentioned--are knowledge; and I
[251] would include the art of the cobbler and other craftsmen; these, each and
[252] all of, them, are knowledge.
[253]
[254] SOCRATES: Too much, Theaetetus, too much; the nobility and liberality of
[255] your nature make you give many and diverse things, when I am asking for one
[256] simple thing.
[257]
[258] THEAETETUS: What do you mean, Socrates?
[259]
[260] SOCRATES: Perhaps nothing. I will endeavour, however, to explain what I
[261] believe to be my meaning: When you speak of cobbling, you mean the art or
[262] science of making shoes?
[263]
[264] THEAETETUS: Just so.
[265]
[266] SOCRATES: And when you speak of carpentering, you mean the art of making
[267] wooden implements?
[268]
[269] THEAETETUS: I do.
[270]
[271] SOCRATES: In both cases you define the subject matter of each of the two
[272] arts?
[273]
[274] THEAETETUS: True.
[275]
[276] SOCRATES: But that, Theaetetus, was not the point of my question: we
[277] wanted to know not the subjects, nor yet the number of the arts or
[278] sciences, for we were not going to count them, but we wanted to know the
[279] nature of knowledge in the abstract. Am I not right?
[280]
[281] THEAETETUS: Perfectly right.
[282]
[283] SOCRATES: Let me offer an illustration: Suppose that a person were to ask
[284] about some very trivial and obvious thing--for example, What is clay? and
[285] we were to reply, that there is a clay of potters, there is a clay of oven-
[286] makers, there is a clay of brick-makers; would not the answer be
[287] ridiculous?
[288]
[289] THEAETETUS: Truly.
[290]
[291] SOCRATES: In the first place, there would be an absurdity in assuming that
[292] he who asked the question would understand from our answer the nature of
[293] 'clay,' merely because we added 'of the image-makers,' or of any other
[294] workers. How can a man understand the name of anything, when he does not
[295] know the nature of it?
[296]
[297] THEAETETUS: He cannot.
[298]
[299] SOCRATES: Then he who does not know what science or knowledge is, has no
[300] knowledge of the art or science of making shoes?
[301]
[302] THEAETETUS: None.
[303]
[304] SOCRATES: Nor of any other science?
[305]
[306] THEAETETUS: No.
[307]
[308] SOCRATES: And when a man is asked what science or knowledge is, to give in
[309] answer the name of some art or science is ridiculous; for the question is,
[310] 'What is knowledge?' and he replies, 'A knowledge of this or that.'
[311]
[312] THEAETETUS: True.
[313]
[314] SOCRATES: Moreover, he might answer shortly and simply, but he makes an
[315] enormous circuit. For example, when asked about the clay, he might have
[316] said simply, that clay is moistened earth--what sort of clay is not to the
[317] point.
[318]
[319] THEAETETUS: Yes, Socrates, there is no difficulty as you put the question.
[320] You mean, if I am not mistaken, something like what occurred to me and to
[321] my friend here, your namesake Socrates, in a recent discussion.
[322]
[323] SOCRATES: What was that, Theaetetus?
[324]
[325] THEAETETUS: Theodorus was writing out for us something about roots, such
[326] as the roots of three or five, showing that they are incommensurable by the
[327] unit: he selected other examples up to seventeen --there he stopped. Now
[328] as there are innumerable roots, the notion occurred to us of attempting to
[329] include them all under one name or class.
[330]
[331] SOCRATES: And did you find such a class?
[332]
[333] THEAETETUS: I think that we did; but I should like to have your opinion.
[334]
[335] SOCRATES: Let me hear.
[336]
[337] THEAETETUS: We divided all numbers into two classes: those which are made
[338] up of equal factors multiplying into one another, which we compared to
[339] square figures and called square or equilateral numbers;--that was one
[340] class.
[341]
[342] SOCRATES: Very good.
[343]
[344] THEAETETUS: The intermediate numbers, such as three and five, and every
[345] other number which is made up of unequal factors, either of a greater
[346] multiplied by a less, or of a less multiplied by a greater, and when
[347] regarded as a figure, is contained in unequal sides;--all these we compared
[348] to oblong figures, and called them oblong numbers.
[349]
[350] SOCRATES: Capital; and what followed?
[351]
[352] THEAETETUS: The lines, or sides, which have for their squares the
[353] equilateral plane numbers, were called by us lengths or magnitudes; and the
[354] lines which are the roots of (or whose squares are equal to) the oblong
[355] numbers, were called powers or roots; the reason of this latter name being,
[356] that they are commensurable with the former [i.e., with the so-called
[357] lengths or magnitudes] not in linear measurement, but in the value of the
[358] superficial content of their squares; and the same about solids.
[359]
[360] SOCRATES: Excellent, my boys; I think that you fully justify the praises
[361] of Theodorus, and that he will not be found guilty of false witness.
[362]
[363] THEAETETUS: But I am unable, Socrates, to give you a similar answer about
[364] knowledge, which is what you appear to want; and therefore Theodorus is a
[365] deceiver after all.
[366]
[367] SOCRATES: Well, but if some one were to praise you for running, and to say
[368] that he never met your equal among boys, and afterwards you were beaten in
[369] a race by a grown-up man, who was a great runner--would the praise be any
[370] the less true?
[371]
[372] THEAETETUS: Certainly not.
[373]
[374] SOCRATES: And is the discovery of the nature of knowledge so small a
[375] matter, as just now said? Is it not one which would task the powers of men
[376] perfect in every way?
[377]
[378] THEAETETUS: By heaven, they should be the top of all perfection!
[379]
[380] SOCRATES: Well, then, be of good cheer; do not say that Theodorus was
[381] mistaken about you, but do your best to ascertain the true nature of
[382] knowledge, as well as of other things.
[383]
[384] THEAETETUS: I am eager enough, Socrates, if that would bring to light the
[385] truth.
[386]
[387] SOCRATES: Come, you made a good beginning just now; let your own answer
[388] about roots be your model, and as you comprehended them all in one class,
[389] try and bring the many sorts of knowledge under one definition.
[390]
[391] THEAETETUS: I can assure you, Socrates, that I have tried very often, when
[392] the report of questions asked by you was brought to me; but I can neither
[393] persuade myself that I have a satisfactory answer to give, nor hear of any
[394] one who answers as you would have him; and I cannot shake off a feeling of
[395] anxiety.
[396]
[397] SOCRATES: These are the pangs of labour, my dear Theaetetus; you have
[398] something within you which you are bringing to the birth.
[399]
[400] THEAETETUS: I do not know, Socrates; I only say what I feel.
[401]
[402] SOCRATES: And have you never heard, simpleton, that I am the son of a
[403] midwife, brave and burly, whose name was Phaenarete?
[404]
[405] THEAETETUS: Yes, I have.
[406]
[407] SOCRATES: And that I myself practise midwifery?
[408]
[409] THEAETETUS: No, never.
[410]
[411] SOCRATES: Let me tell you that I do though, my friend: but you must not
[412] reveal the secret, as the world in general have not found me out; and
[413] therefore they only say of me, that I am the strangest of mortals and drive
[414] men to their wits' end. Did you ever hear that too?
[415]
[416] THEAETETUS: Yes.
[417]
[418] SOCRATES: Shall I tell you the reason?
[419]
[420] THEAETETUS: By all means.
[421]
[422] SOCRATES: Bear in mind the whole business of the midwives, and then you
[423] will see my meaning better:--No woman, as you are probably aware, who is
[424] still able to conceive and bear, attends other women, but only those who
[425] are past bearing.
[426]
[427] THEAETETUS: Yes, I know.
[428]
[429] SOCRATES: The reason of this is said to be that Artemis--the goddess of
[430] childbirth--is not a mother, and she honours those who are like herself;
[431] but she could not allow the barren to be midwives, because human nature
[432] cannot know the mystery of an art without experience; and therefore she
[433] assigned this office to those who are too old to bear.
[434]
[435] THEAETETUS: I dare say.
[436]
[437] SOCRATES: And I dare say too, or rather I am absolutely certain, that the
[438] midwives know better than others who is pregnant and who is not?
[439]
[440] THEAETETUS: Very true.
[441]
[442] SOCRATES: And by the use of potions and incantations they are able to
[443] arouse the pangs and to soothe them at will; they can make those bear who
[444] have a difficulty in bearing, and if they think fit they can smother the
[445] embryo in the womb.
[446]
[447] THEAETETUS: They can.
[448]
[449] SOCRATES: Did you ever remark that they are also most cunning matchmakers,
[450] and have a thorough knowledge of what unions are likely to produce a brave
[451] brood?
[452]
[453] THEAETETUS: No, never.
[454]
[455] SOCRATES: Then let me tell you that this is their greatest pride, more
[456] than cutting the umbilical cord. And if you reflect, you will see that the
[457] same art which cultivates and gathers in the fruits of the earth, will be
[458] most likely to know in what soils the several plants or seeds should be
[459] deposited.
[460]
[461] THEAETETUS: Yes, the same art.
[462]
[463] SOCRATES: And do you suppose that with women the case is otherwise?
[464]
[465] THEAETETUS: I should think not.
[466]
[467] SOCRATES: Certainly not; but midwives are respectable women who have a
[468] character to lose, and they avoid this department of their profession,
[469] because they are afraid of being called procuresses, which is a name given
[470] to those who join together man and woman in an unlawful and unscientific
[471] way; and yet the true midwife is also the true and only matchmaker.
[472]
[473] THEAETETUS: Clearly.
[474]
[475] SOCRATES: Such are the midwives, whose task is a very important one, but
[476] not so important as mine; for women do not bring into the world at one time
[477] real children, and at another time counterfeits which are with difficulty
[478] distinguished from them; if they did, then the discernment of the true and
[479] false birth would be the crowning achievement of the art of midwifery--you
[480] would think so?
[481]
[482] THEAETETUS: Indeed I should.
[483]
[484] SOCRATES: Well, my art of midwifery is in most respects like theirs; but
[485] differs, in that I attend men and not women; and look after their souls
[486] when they are in labour, and not after their bodies: and the triumph of my
[487] art is in thoroughly examining whether the thought which the mind of the
[488] young man brings forth is a false idol or a noble and true birth. And like
[489] the midwives, I am barren, and the reproach which is often made against me,
[490] that I ask questions of others and have not the wit to answer them myself,
[491] is very just--the reason is, that the god compels me to be a midwife, but
[492] does not allow me to bring forth. And therefore I am not myself at all
[493] wise, nor have I anything to show which is the invention or birth of my own
[494] soul, but those who converse with me profit. Some of them appear dull
[495] enough at first, but afterwards, as our acquaintance ripens, if the god is
[496] gracious to them, they all make astonishing progress; and this in the
[497] opinion of others as well as in their own. It is quite dear that they
[498] never learned anything from me; the many fine discoveries to which they
[499] cling are of their own making. But to me and the god they owe their
[500] delivery. And the proof of my words is, that many of them in their
[501] ignorance, either in their self-conceit despising me, or falling under the
[502] influence of others, have gone away too soon; and have not only lost the
[503] children of whom I had previously delivered them by an ill bringing up, but
[504] have stifled whatever else they had in them by evil communications, being
[505] fonder of lies and shams than of the truth; and they have at last ended by
[506] seeing themselves, as others see them, to be great fools. Aristeides, the
[507] son of Lysimachus, is one of them, and there are many others. The truants
[508] often return to me, and beg that I would consort with them again--they are
[509] ready to go to me on their knees--and then, if my familiar allows, which is
[510] not always the case, I receive them, and they begin to grow again. Dire
[511] are the pangs which my art is able to arouse and to allay in those who
[512] consort with me, just like the pangs of women in childbirth; night and day
[513] they are full of perplexity and travail which is even worse than that of
[514] the women. So much for them. And there are others, Theaetetus, who come
[515] to me apparently having nothing in them; and as I know that they have no
[516] need of my art, I coax them into marrying some one, and by the grace of God
[517] I can generally tell who is likely to do them good. Many of them I have
[518] given away to Prodicus, and many to other inspired sages. I tell you this
[519] long story, friend Theaetetus, because I suspect, as indeed you seem to
[520] think yourself, that you are in labour--great with some conception. Come
[521] then to me, who am a midwife's son and myself a midwife, and do your best
[522] to answer the questions which I will ask you. And if I abstract and expose
[523] your first-born, because I discover upon inspection that the conception
[524] which you have formed is a vain shadow, do not quarrel with me on that
[525] account, as the manner of women is when their first children are taken from
[526] them. For I have actually known some who were ready to bite me when I
[527] deprived them of a darling folly; they did not perceive that I acted from
[528] goodwill, not knowing that no god is the enemy of man--that was not within
[529] the range of their ideas; neither am I their enemy in all this, but it
[530] would be wrong for me to admit falsehood, or to stifle the truth. Once
[531] more, then, Theaetetus, I repeat my old question, 'What is knowledge?'--and
[532] do not say that you cannot tell; but quit yourself like a man, and by the
[533] help of God you will be able to tell.
[534]
[535] THEAETETUS: At any rate, Socrates, after such an exhortation I should be
[536] ashamed of not trying to do my best. Now he who knows perceives what he
[537] knows, and, as far as I can see at present, knowledge is perception.
[538]
[539] SOCRATES: Bravely said, boy; that is the way in which you should express
[540] your opinion. And now, let us examine together this conception of yours,
[541] and see whether it is a true birth or a mere wind-egg:--You say that
[542] knowledge is perception?
[543]
[544] THEAETETUS: Yes.
[545]
[546] SOCRATES: Well, you have delivered yourself of a very important doctrine
[547] about knowledge; it is indeed the opinion of Protagoras, who has another
[548] way of expressing it. Man, he says, is the measure of all things, of the
[549] existence of things that are, and of the non-existence of things that are
[550] not:--You have read him?
[551]
[552] THEAETETUS: O yes, again and again.
[553]
[554] SOCRATES: Does he not say that things are to you such as they appear to
[555] you, and to me such as they appear to me, and that you and I are men?
[556]
[557] THEAETETUS: Yes, he says so.
[558]
[559] SOCRATES: A wise man is not likely to talk nonsense. Let us try to
[560] understand him: the same wind is blowing, and yet one of us may be cold
[561] and the other not, or one may be slightly and the other very cold?
[562]
[563] THEAETETUS: Quite true.
[564]
[565] SOCRATES: Now is the wind, regarded not in relation to us but absolutely,
[566] cold or not; or are we to say, with Protagoras, that the wind is cold to
[567] him who is cold, and not to him who is not?
[568]
[569] THEAETETUS: I suppose the last.
[570]
[571] SOCRATES: Then it must appear so to each of them?
[572]
[573] THEAETETUS: Yes.
[574]
[575] SOCRATES: And 'appears to him' means the same as 'he perceives.'
[576]
[577] THEAETETUS: True.
[578]
[579] SOCRATES: Then appearing and perceiving coincide in the case of hot and
[580] cold, and in similar instances; |