Under the Freedom of Information Act, I recently obtained the text of the contract between the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) and the contractor that conducts on-street decriminalised parking enforcement on its behalf, namely National Car Parks (NCP). Let's examine some of the more interesting paragraphs of this contract, paying particular attention to any insights offered into targets (also known as benchmarks, key performance indicators, expectations, thresholds and forecasts) or other issues that might affect the way on-street enforcement is conducted. Bear in mind as you read this that NCP is currently owned by 3i, a private equity group that is presumably - like most private equity groups - interested in making lots of money.
The contract comes in two parts: a main contract document which is quite short and concise, and a very large set of appendices called Schedules. Most of the detail (and hence the interesting bits) lies in the Schedules.
Our search for references to targets begins in the main document where we find the paragraph: "The Structure of the Contract will be monitored using Key Performance Indictators KPIs and achievement/non-achievement of targets by the Service Provider will determine the level of renumeration received by the Service Provider each month."
Well, this clearly establishes that the amount of money that the contractor (NCP) receives is reviewed monthly and is tied to whether or not the contractor achieves targets set by the Council. How refreshing to have this laid out in such a straightforward manner (a rare quality to find in Council representatives in my experience!)
But what are these targets? We have to dive into the Schedules to find out. Schedule 2 contains the details of the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and how they are measured. KPI 1 relates to patrol coverage (measured by, for example, spying on random roads to see how many times PAs appear), and KPI 2 relates to having good quality, motivated and informed staff (measured by, for example, using "mystery shoppers"). Apparently nothing to raise eyebrows there then.
KPI 3 is entitled "Issue of good quality PCNs"; and one might think "Fair enough! The PCNs that are issued should be of good quality shouldn't they?" However, reading the KPI Measurement Parameters one starts to get a feeling that KPI 3 should perhaps be more aptly entitled "Issue of a good quantity of PCNs". Specifically the primary KPI Measurement Parameter is "The monthly (seasonally adjusted) PCN threshold." We are informed that: "Schedule 3... specifies the Council requirements with regard to the annual initial Contract Threshold number of PCNs to be issued." and that "This element of the KPI will be deemed to have been met if... the Service Provider achieves, as a minimum, the seasonally adjusted Contract Benchmark for PCN issuance applicable during the monthly period in question." Above, in bold, it states "Failure to meet the required service standards in any monthly period will result in a deduction from the amount payable to the contractor for the monthly period in question."
KPI 4 is entitled "Appropriate vehicle clamping and removal operation". Again one might think "Yes, isn't it entirely reasonable that clamping and removal should be conducted sensitively and appropriately?" Unfortunately the primary KPI Measurement Parameter is once again quantity-related, being entitled "Adherance to the Council Contract Thresholds for vehicle clampings and removals /annum." We are informed that: "Schedule 3... refers to the required volume of vehicles to be clamped, and numbers to be removed each year in order to meet the Council's compliance objectives." and that "This element of the KPI will be deemed to have been met if... the agreed Contract Thresholds for both the numbers of vehicle clamps per month and the numbers of vehicle removals per month have been achieved in the period in question" (along with some other criteria such as maintaining the ability to clamp and remove all types of vehicles including motorcycles and commercial vehicles)
KPIs 5 to 8 are relatively uninteresting (although did you know PAs are required to report defective/missing items of street furniture), so let us see if we can find out a little more about how these KPIs are used to motivate the contractor.
Schedule 2 has something more to say about "Performance Indicators and Payment mechanism." We learn that the Council's Representative reserves the right to "enable a recovery to [be] made pound for pound for any quantifiable losses arising from the Service Provider's failure to meet the required quantitative benchmarks". In addition we learn that "Alongside such a regime the Council supports the principle of incentive payments aimed at motivating the Service Provider to add value to the contract for the benefit of the Council..."
So it seems the Council is very keen to have its targets for the quantity of enforcement met, and is prepared to offer a bonus if they are exceeded. And the Council is not shy about explaining why. In a section entitled "Shortfalls in the Quantity of Enforcement Required" we learn that "Having set realistic benchmarks, the Council is entitled to expect that the Service Provider meet them. Any shortfall against the benchmark not only prejudices the attainment of the required level of compliance but also reduces the Council's reasonable income expectations, and creates a budget shortfall."
"Wait just a minute!" I hear you cry. "My MP/local-council-parking-boss/other-council-representative told me that parking enforcement was only about keeping the streets clear and providing residents with parking! What's all this about income expectations and budget shortfalls?" Well you might ask. There follows details of a penalty scheme which is instituted should the required number of PCNs not be issued. To preserve commercial confidentiality I will not go into all the details; suffice it to say this effectively compensates the Council for lost income should the Service Provider not issue enough PCNs and/or clamp/remove enough vehicles.
So it seems the Council has tasked its Contractor with the task of issuing enough PCNs and clamping/removing enough vehicles to (at least in part) safeguard the healthy revenue stream it derives from decriminalised parking enforcement. If the Contractor fails to do this, the Contractor must pay a financial penalty. If the Contractor does this, and even exceeds the targets, the Contractor could be in line for an incentive payment.
So just what are the targets for parking enforcement (PCN issue and clamping/removal) in the case of Kensington and Chelsea? We find these in Schedule 3. Having waded through a lot of detail about, for example, what PAs can and can't say when challenged on the issue of a ticket (mostly along the lines of "I can't cancel it, contact the Council") we are rewarded by a (more) interesting section entitled "Vehicle Immobilisation Requirements". Here we learn that: "The number of valid clamps fitted in a year should not fall below the agreed benchmark. This is currently set at 15,000 per annum... The Service Provider's attention is drawn to the KPIs listed in Schedule 2... which detail the requirement of the Service Provider to meet the Contract clamping threshold and which outline that the Service Provider's renumeration may be affected by their failure to do so."
Intruigingly, it turns out that there are - at least as far as I could find - no corresponding quantitative requirements for the number of removals (only that vehicles should be removed within 20 minutes of a request), and that requests for removal must be made for certain circumstances of contravention.
However, there are certainly quantitative requirements for the number of PCNs to be issued. In a section entitled "On Street Enforcement Procedures" we learn that "PAs are to issue PCNs to all vehicles found in contraventions of the parking regulations, subject to any exemptions, dispensations or waivers operable at the time of observation. The number of valid PCNs issued in a year should not fall below 306,000 until there is a significant increase in compliance, as determined by the Council Representative."
Consider the consequences of a contract of this nature and its effect on how a contractor would seek to conduct on-street enforcement. Being a private company that is presumably profit-motivated (esp. when owned by a private equity group), the Service Provider wants to avoid penalty payments for missing targets, and perhaps wants to put itself in line for an "incentive" payment for exceeding targets. Unfortunately it is unlikely to try and achieve this by sensitive, good quality parking enforcement driven by commonsense. It is more likely to pay close attention to the KPIs, including the targets that relate to the number of PCNs and clampings highlighted above. No prizes for guessing who else benefits from the (assured) income generated by this scheme (hint: the C.....l), no prizes for guessing who pays the financial price for it (hint: Y.u, the M......t) and no prizes for guessing who picks up all the verbal and physical abuse from angry motorists on-street (hint: the poorly-paid P.....g A.......t).
Obtaining and reading this contract was simultaneously assuring and disappointing. Assuring because it not only affirms my long-held theory about the actual source of the misery heaped on motorists (at least in terms of parking enforcement), but also shows that the Freedom of Information Act really works - even if it did take around six months to obtain the full set of documents! Disappointing because the contract is exactly the sort of unimaginative document containing exactly the sort of dark-age quantity-driven measurement indicators that is so consistent with the poor-quality target-driven on street enforcement motorists have to endure every day.
While we can hope future contracts will be a bit more enlightened and imaginative, I don't believe there is actually much chance of this happening. This is because a harsh parking regime generates a healthy income for a Council that is in many cases paid for by persons living outside the borough in question (and what better way to collect revenue than through taxation without representation). In Kensington and Chelsea's case income from parking is one of the reasons they are able to have one of the lowest Council Tax rates in the country. The alternative of having a more reasonable enforcement regime while raising Council Tax would solely affect vote-bearing persons living inside the borough and would thus likely cost the majority political party on the Council many of their seats at the next local election. So I can't see our representatives in the House of Commons doing anything to address the situation any time soon!William Knottenbelt
March 2007