Slow and Steady

Measuring and Tuning Multicore Interference

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Motivation



Image taken from Wikipedia

Real-time:

- Needs timing predictability
- Can benefit from multicore processors

Our work:

- Reproducible measurements
- Uncovering aggressive configurations




Motivation



10 second deadline 1 second execution time with no interference



C




*Bechtel and Yun. RTAS 2019


Motivation







Comparing enemies







Comparing enemies



Outline



Reproducible Measurements




Uncovering aggressive configurations

9




Results

Slowdowns




Effect of temperature


- Frequency throttling significantly impacts measurements
- Discard all measurements taken at more than 80 °C



Slowdowns



Slowdowns



Other mitigations

Operating system:

- Disallow thread migration
- Run PUT at max priority
- Ensure parallel execution
- Remove unnecessary software


Compiler:

• Disable compiler optimisation for enemy processes


Hardware:

• Flush caches between runs

Slowdowns




Impact of context switches




- Context switches still affect the execution time
- There is a linear correlation between execution time and the number of context switches

Statistical approach



- The maximum observed value is often unreliable
- We choose the 90th percentile instead

Slowdowns



Outline




Reproducible Measurements



Uncovering aggressive configurations




Results




4-way set associative cache

Enemy tuning



- Template enemies for each shared resource
- Victim programs for each enemy
- We tune the enemy programs to cause maximum interference

Enemy tuning





Slowdown:	1.14


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Slowdown: 10.08

Selecting optimal configuration







... (+ 5 more)

Enemy templates

- 1. #define ACCESS PATTERN(*scratch addr) ...
- 2. volatile int8_t *scratch = (int8_t*) malloc(SCRATCH_SIZE);
- 3. for (HEADER)
- 4. for (int i = 0; i += STRIDE; i < SCRATCH SIZE)
- 5. ACCESS PATTERN(&(scratch[i]));

Parameter	Enemy range	Cache victim	Memory victim
SCRATCH_SIZE	1-5120КВ	LLC	10 x LLC
STRIDE	1-20	cache line size	Cache line size
ACCESS_PATTERN	1-5 read/writes	read, write	read, write

Outline



Reproducible Measurements



Uncovering aggressive configurations



Results

Experimental setup


Name	SoC	Arch	Cores	
Raspberry Pi 3 B	BCM2837	ARM A53	4	
DragonBoard 410c	Adreno306	ARM A53	4	
Intel Joule 570x	570x	Atom x86	4	
Nano-PC T3	S5P6818	Arm A53	8	
BananaPi M3	A837	ARM A7	8	

- We experiment on both ARM and Intel architectures
- We use as benchmarks coremark and autobench

Hostile environments


Board	Most aggressive hostile environment, per resource		
board	Cache	Main	Overall
Raspberry Pi 3 B	♦ VCCC	VMMM	VMMM
DragonBoard 410c		VCMM	VCMM
Intel Joule 570x	VMMC	VMMC	VMMC
Nano-PC T3	VMCM MCMM	VMCC CMCM	CMCM MCMM
BananaPi M3	VCCC CMCC	VCMC MCMC	VCCC CMCC

Results Visualization



Previous approach slowdown

Results



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Graveyard of enemies

Shared resource targeted	Operation performed
Bus	Transfers between the CPU and RAM
Memory thrashing	Random writes to RAM
Pipeline	Arithmetic operations
System	I/O operations

Conclusions

- Reproducible measurements can be obtained using a two-pronged approach: system interference mitigation and a percentile-based metric
- Enemy programs can be precisely compared, and thus tuned using our reproducible metrics
- Tuning can uncover higher slowdowns achieves a statistically larger slowdown compared to prior work in 35 out of 105 benchmark/chip combinations



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