There is a growing movement to retrofit ageing, large scale infrastructures, such as water networks, with wireless sensors and actuators. Next generation Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are a tight integration of sensing, control, communication, computation and physical processes. The failure of any one of these components can cause a failure of the entire CPS. This represents a system design challenge to address these interde- pendencies. Wireless communication is unreliable and prone to cyber-attacks. An attack upon the wireless communication of CPS would prevent the communication of up-to-date information from the physical process to the controller. A controller without up-to- date information is unable to meet system’s stability and perfor- mance guarantees. We focus on design approach to make CPSs secure and we evaluate their resilience to jamming attacks aimed at disrupting the system’s wireless communication. We consider classic time-triggered control scheme and various resource- aware event-triggered control schemes. We evaluate these on a water network test-bed against three jamming strategies: constant, random, and protocol aware. Our test-bed results show that all schemes are very susceptible to constant and random jamming. We find that time-triggered control schemes are just as susceptible to protocol aware jamming, where some event- triggered control schemes are completely resilient to protocol aware jamming. Finally, we further enhance the resilience of an event-triggered control scheme through the addition of a dynamical estimator that estimates lost or corrupted data.