In strategic interaction, where multiple agents pursue personal objectives, conflict is bound to arise, as the actions of the individual agents have an effect on the welfare of the others. In such situations the need arises for the explicit regulation of individual and collective behaviour which has traditionally followed two alternative approaches, well-known in the economics literature: the spontaneous order approach, which studies how norms result from endogenous agreements among rational individuals, and the mechanism design approach, which studies how norms are exogenously designed in order to reach desirable properties.
The present symposium is motivated by the conviction that the two paradigms to understand norms in strategic interaction are by no means incompatible and can be effectively used together for regulative purposes. The aim of the symposium is to gather researchers looking at norms in strategic interaction from different perspectives, i.e. philosophy, computer science, game theory, logic, fostering discussion and interdisciplinary collaboration. Researchers will be given the opportunity of presenting their work in a stimulating environment, without novelty constraints on the contributions.
The symposium will encourage submissions in (but will not be limited to) the following areas:
- Normative multi-agent systems
- Norms in experimental game theory
- Theories of agency and responsibility
- Action formalisms
- Theories of collective responsibility and norms
- Theories of contracts
- Bargaining and negotiation
- Coalition formation
- Norms and preferences
- Theories of compliance
- Norm emergence and simulation
- Norm change
- Deontic logic