Norms, Actions, Games

London, April 1-2, 2014


In strategic interaction, where multiple agents pursue personal objectives, conflict is bound to arise, as the actions of the individual agents have an effect on the welfare of the others. In such situations the need arises for the explicit regulation of individual and collective behaviour which has traditionally followed two alternative approaches, well-known in the economics literature: the spontaneous order approach, which studies how norms result from endogenous agreements among rational individuals, and the mechanism design approach, which studies how norms are exogenously designed in order to reach desirable properties.

The present symposium is motivated by the conviction that the two paradigms to understand norms in strategic interaction are by no means incompatible and can be effectively used together for regulative purposes. The aim of the symposium is to gather researchers looking at norms in strategic interaction from different perspectives, i.e. philosophy, computer science, game theory, logic, fostering discussion and interdisciplinary collaboration. Researchers will be given the opportunity of presenting their work in a stimulating environment, without novelty constraints on the contributions.

The workshop is sponsored by SINTELNET, the European Network for Social Intelligence and NIBS, the ESRC Network for Integrated Behavioural Science.


Registration is open to everyone. To register, follow this link . Fees for registration (100 pounds for early registration, 120 for late registration) include lunches, coffee breaks, refreshments. The deadline for early registration is March 21st.

The workshop is held under the auspices of